SOME REFLECTIONS ON CULLMANN'S NEW EDITION
OF CHRIST AND TIME

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The third German edition of Oscar Cullmann's Christus und die Zeit appeared in 1962. The fact that after fourteen years a new edition was desirable testifies to the continuing influence of Cullmann's thought, which has aroused wide interest in the English-speaking world. Doubtless the new English edition will be warmly welcomed. Cullmann's acceptance in German theology, toward which the book was originally directed, has been less enthusiastic. Constituting as it does a debate—an Auseinandersetzung—with both Barth and Bultmann, it has met with comparatively little agreement in Germany at a time when the weight of prestige has been passing from the one to the other of these theologians. In some sense in Germany these years Cullmann has seemed like a voice crying out from the sidelines.

This situation lends significance to the fact that in this new edition the author has chosen in place of a foreword to write a 19-page statement entitled: "Rückblick auf die Wirkung

1 First ed., Zürich, 1946; second ed., 1948; Eng. trans., Christ and Time, Philadelphia, 1950. All references here are to the 3rd German edition, cited as ChZ.

2 Thus, for instance, H. W. Bartsch, "Anmerkungen zu O. Cullmann: Christus und die Zeit," Kerygma und Mythos, II (Hamburg, 1952), pp. 36-38, while declaring that Christ and Time "as a whole is consciously formulated in opposition to Bultmann's program" ("als ganzes bewusst im Gegensatz zu dem Programm Bultmanns gestaltet ist"), at the same time devotes only two and a half pages to its consideration and concludes with the statement that it is a book "the discussion of which for our problem must be limited to these remarks" ("dessen Diskussion sich jedoch für unser Problem auf diese Anmerkungen beschränken muss").
des Buches in der Theologie der Nachkriegszeit”—"A Look Back at the Impact of the Book on the Theology of the Post-War Period." In this "Look Back" Cullmann is concerned with much more than the influence of his book on others. Rather, he gives much of his attention to ways in which his work has been misunderstood by theologians of varying positions. Indeed, this introductory statement could almost have been entitled: "How My Book Has Been Understood—and Misunderstood.'

How relevant Christ and Time is to contemporary issues central to New Testament theology is indicated by the stature of those who have reacted to his book. Cullmann cites among others the reactions of Karl Barth and his followers, Rudolf Bultmann and his pupils, Fritz Buri as a disciple of Albert Schweitzer, and some Roman Catholics. That in each case the criticism has involved a prime theological concern testifies to the book's centrality; that Cullmann feels that he has been misunderstood in many cases demonstrates the need for a clarifying statement such as he now has given.

II

It is understandable that Cullmann devotes much attention to the reaction of the Bultmannians. Although Christ and Time was originally written with the positive purpose of determining the "essence of the New Testament message," it has been popularly looked upon as an attack on Bultmann's demythologizing and existential hermeneutic. In this connection it is relevant also that the most important review of Christ and Time to have appeared was Bultmann's discussion in the Theologische Literaturzeitung. In distinction to almost

8 ChZ, p. 11.
4 See n. 2 above.
every other critic mentioned, Cullmann agrees that Bultmann has understood him correctly⁶ and thus has been able to discuss the point really at issue: the essence of the New Testament kerygma. For Cullmann this includes as an integral part the temporal tension in the economy of salvation between "already fulfilled" (at the Cross) and "not yet completed" (at the Parousia) and the consequent orientation of all events to the Cross, which constitutes the "midpoint" of time;⁷ for Bultmann it is rather a call to existential commitment leading to authentic self-understanding.⁸ Cullmann is careful to point out—and this needed to be done—that for him it is the tension, not temporality as such, not the concept of linear time, that is essential to the kerygma. At the same time he continues to use these other concepts because they are the most useful frame of reference he has found for expressing the essential tension between the Cross and the Parousia.

The basic exegetical issue between Cullmann and the Bultmannians becomes clear in Cullmann's estimate of Hans Conzelmann's Die Mitte der Zeit.⁹ He recognizes that the latter has taken his title from Cullmann's own emphasis on the cross as the midpoint of redemptive history, and he agrees largely with Conzelmann's analysis of Luke-Acts as setting forth the notion of redemptive history. The point at which Cullmann and Conzelmann are in basic disagreement—and at which their two books become antithetical—is in the evaluation of the Lucan view as primary or secondary to the kerygma.¹⁰ For Cullmann it is primary, because he finds its roots already in the teaching of Jesus; for Conzelmann, as for the Bultmannians in general, it is a secondary and erroneous

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⁷ ChZ, p. 19.
⁸ Bultmann's own position is set forth especially well in History and Eschatology: The Presence of Eternity (New York, 1957).
¹⁰ ChZ, pp. 16 f.; Cullmann, "Parousieverzögerung und Urchristentum," ThLZ, LXXXIII (1958), col. 3.
construction introduced by Luke in answer to the problem that arose in the early church when the Parousia did not occur as expected. Bultmann and his students in general, understand the correct solution of this Parousieverzögerungsproblem to have been found by Paul and John, whom they see as having begun to demythologize in the direction of existential understanding of certain elements in Christianity inherited from Jewish apocalyptic and Gnostic-Hellenistic mystery religions. This involved a reinterpretation of the nature of eschatology.\textsuperscript{11} Cullmann, on the other hand, maintains in opposition to the Bultmannians that 1) Luke’s heilsgeschichtlich view of eschatology is not a break (in the wrong direction) with the previous thought of the church, but that it is an elaboration and prolongation of the essential temporal tension already present in the teaching of Jesus; and 2) Paul and John do not demythologize, but rather share in this essential tension between “already fulfilled” and “not yet completed.”\textsuperscript{12} Thus for him there is no basic antithesis in the eschatological views of Luke on the one side and of Paul and John on the other, as there is for Bultmann.

These lines of debate show on what a broad front Cullmann fights his battle. Although for years he has been expounding his position in his lectures to his students, his published defense, particularly of the crucial issues raised under 2) above, is not yet complete. This makes his promised book on redemptive history and eschatology in the New Testament the more to be desired.

\textbf{III}

In discussing the reactions of Barth and his pupils to \textit{Christ and Time}, Cullmann emphasizes that most criticisms have arisen from one basic misunderstanding of his book: that he was writing a treatise on the concept of time and insisting that the Biblical conception of time as linear was

\textsuperscript{11} Bultmann, \textit{History and Eschatology}, pp. 38 ff.
\textsuperscript{12} ChZ, p. 16.
essential. Cullmann confesses himself ready to share in the blame for such a misunderstanding, however, in that he does open his book with a comparison between the Biblical conception of time as linear and the Hellenistic notion of it as cyclical and then goes on to discuss "Time and Eternity." He now emphasizes that the notion of linear time is for him only a foil, an unessential but useful frame of reference for the presentation of the essential element of the kerygma—the tension between "already" and "not yet." Although he had already warned briefly against this misunderstanding in the Foreword to his second edition, that it was so widely overlooked makes clear the importance of the present fuller statement.

Cullmann's relationship to Barth, his colleague at Basel for more than a quarter of a century, raises still a broader question: what are the respective realms of the Biblical exegete and of the systematic theologian? Is it allowed the latter to raise questions and seek answers not open to the former? Cullmann answers emphatically in the affirmative. The exegete must limit himself to those problems clearly dealt with as problems in Scripture, and he must deal with these problems within the frames of reference set out by the Biblical writers. Thus for the exegete Scripture is normative both for subject matter and for conceptual context. Cullmann declares that as an exegete, he must be content "before any evaluations, any judgments, yes, perhaps even before any 'encounter' in my understanding of existence, before any faith, simply to listen obediently to what the men of the New Covenant desire

13 This seems also to have been the understanding of P. S. Minear, op. cit., pp. 23 f.: "To him [Cullmann], all theology that is truly Christian is a continuation of Biblical history; any loss, therefore, of the distinctively Biblical conception of time is a sign of dangerous deviation from the gospel"; cf. the present writer's similar misunderstanding, "Eschatology and Time," The Ministry, XXIX : 6 (June, 1956), 29-31.
14 ChZ, pp. 20-23.
15 Ibid., p. 32.
to convey to me as revelation, even when it is completely foreign to me." To the systematic theologian, on the other hand, he allows a broader and more adventurous scope: he must indeed confront Scripture with contemporary philosophical questions and employ philosophical methodology in seeking his answers. But even here there remains a Scriptural norm: while consideration is not restricted to those problems raised as such by Scripture, it is justified only if the possibility of the problem is at least implied by the Bible. Furthermore, the systematic theologian's conclusions must not alter or ignore the substance of Scriptural assertions. This latter position is rooted in Cullmann's concept of the apostolic period, the time of the central event, the midpoint in redemptive history, as normative for the subsequent history of the church.

In view of this objective distinction between the limits imposed on the exegete and those open to the systematic theologian, Cullmann confesses that his criticisms of Barth's attempt to relate God's time to the time of salvation may not have been entirely justified, and foregoes further comment until Barth has discussed eschatology in the Church Dogmatics.

The point at which this distinction becomes especially relevant to contemporary discussion is, of course, with Bultmann, in whose work there is no clear line between the exegetical and the dogmatic—or perhaps to say it better, who is both an exegete and a dogmatician. From the side of Bultmann this

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16 Ibid., pp. 25 f.
17 Ibid., pp. 22 f.; cf. Cullmann, "The Necessity and Function of Higher Criticism," The Early Church (London, 1956), pp. 14-16. As an example of an area open to the systematic theologian but closed to the exegete, Cullmann offers the question of the relation between time as connected with the redemptive-historical action of God, and His eternity. He sees this justified by implications of God's eternity in such passages as Jn 1:1; 1 Cor 15:28.
18 ChZ, pp. 31 f.; "The Tradition," The Early Church, pp. 75-87.
19 See K. Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik (München, 1932), I:1, 486 ff.; II:1, 709 ff.; cf. Cullmann's criticisms, ChZ, pp. 23, 29, 72.
problem has been discussed in an article by Walter Klaas.\textsuperscript{20} He quotes Barth's evaluation that

Bultmann is an exegete. But it is impossible to engage him in exegetical discussion. For he is also a systematic theologian of the type which handles texts in such a way that their exegesis is always controlled by a set of dogmatic presuppositions and is thus wholly dependent upon their validity.\textsuperscript{21}

Klaas then declares that the question of how far Bultmann allows his exegesis to be ruled by systematics must be answered in terms of the starting point and the object of his historical-critical methodology.\textsuperscript{22} After reviewing the rules of this methodology as worked out in \textit{The History of the Synoptic Tradition},\textsuperscript{23} he points to the program of demythologizing as their only possible outcome: if one takes as his point of departure the origin of Christian tradition in the piety and theology of the earliest church, one must inevitably demythologize in order to proceed beyond it.\textsuperscript{24} To Bultmann this is clear on two counts. 1) Every kerygmatic statement in the New Testament contains an admixture of theological concept; even the simplest kerygmatic declaration, Κύριος Ἰησοῦς (2 Cor 4:5), presupposes a particular understanding of the Kyrios-concept. For Bultmann this precludes a clear distinction between kerygmatic and theological pronouncements and necessitates demythologization. He sees Paul and John as already having begun to do this.\textsuperscript{25} 2) This procedure is necessary for proclamation. At this point Bultmann's understanding of the work of

\textsuperscript{20}“Der systematische Sinn der Exegese Rudolf Bultmanns” in G. Bornkamm and W. Klaas, \textit{Mythos und Evangelium (ThEH, N. F., Nr. 26}, München, 1953), pp. 29-56.
\textsuperscript{21}Barth, \textit{Church Dogmatics} (Edinburgh, 1960), III : 2, 445; Klaas \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 29 ff.
\textsuperscript{22}Klaas, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{24}Klaas, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 37.
the Spirit—which he shares with Barth—is important. Revelation, He who reveals and He who is revealed are understood as one in the event of proclamation. Thus the Spirit is the power of proclamation in the community. The word that encounters the Church is the Word she herself proclaims. This is the word—Jesus’ word—that the promised Spirit brings “to your remembrance.”

Klaas concludes:

The question of the correctness or incorrectness of Rudolf Bultmann’s systematization of exegesis can be reduced then to the question of the right understanding of the act of preaching. Systematically and exegetically considered, the decision on this question must coincide with the determination of whether with Bultmann’s understanding of the work of the Spirit in the community’s proclamation of the Word, the Reformers’ “sola fide,” “sola gratia,” “sola scriptura,” “solus Christus,”... that is to say, the freedom and the continuing freedom of grace, is understood and appropriated.

When we compare this rationale for Bultmann’s fusion of exegesis and systematics with Cullmann’s point of view, it is important to recognize that they both are committed to the viewpoint and procedures of form-criticism. Although Cullmann has used form-criticism fruitfully throughout a lifetime of research, his point of departure from Bultmann in this regard is to deny that it inevitably leads to demythologi-
zing and existential exegesis. In fact, he sees form-criticism as a tool of the objective critical-historical method, and hence at base in contradiction to existential exegesis. In their common concern to determine the kernel of the New Testament message, both have employed form-criticism. Bultmann has found that kernel in a kerygma which demands demythologization. Cullmann has found it in a view of redemptive history characterized by a tension that is foreign and uncongenial to the modern mind, but one which he nevertheless insists is constitutive of the kernel.

It is just at this point that a most serious problem for Cullmann's position arises. Can the kerygma as he conceives it, alien as it is to modern man's understanding, be effectively proclaimed today? Indeed, is the preaching of this kerygma really proclamation at all? Cullmann faces this challenge squarely in his "Look Back," and promises a full answer in his forthcoming book on eschatology. Until it appears, it would be premature to carry this problem further. On its effective answer will rest much of the justification of the radical distinction that he makes between exegesis and systematic theology.

It is probably wrong, however, to see this question of "proclaimability" as the basic issue between Cullmann and Bultmann. John B. Cobb, Jr. has pointed out that although at times Bultmann has justified his program of demythologizing as necessary for the kerygma to be credible to modern man, this is probably not his basic principle. Rather, as


So, for instance, in Bultmann's basic essay, "New Testament and Mythology," in H. W. Bartsch, ed., Kerygma and Myth (New York, 1961), pp. 3 ff.; cf. Bartsch, "Anmerkungen zu O. Cullmann," op. cit., p. 38: "Finally it must be the task of every interpretation, and with it also that of present-day proclamation, to align the New Testament witness with the concepts of the present. This is indeed the driving motive which we see at the beginning of Bultmann's undertaking." ("Am Ende muss es doch Aufgabe einer jeden Interpretation und damit auch der gegenwärtigen Verkündigung sein, das neutestamen-
Cobb says, "even if he were not so sure that in the modern world we must think in terms of a closed universe, he would still object to any account of the acts of God that pictured them as tangible and visible from natural and historical perspectives," and this on the basis of two principles: 1) that of paradox ("that the act of God occurs in history but never appears from the standpoint of history") mediated to him by the early Barth from Kierkegaard, and 2) the existentialist hermeneutic, derived from Heidegger. It is on these two points, and particularly on that of existentialism, that the debate between Cullmann and Bultmann appears ultimately to rest. And here we are involved with two basically different concepts of reality.

IV

It is on this fundamental question of existential interpretation that Cullmann has also set himself apart from the "New Quest of the Historical Jesus" undertaken by a number of Bultmann's former students. This "New Quest" as contrasted tliche Zeugnis mit den Begriffen der Gegenwart auszurichten. Das ist aber das treibende Motiv, das wir am Anfang des Unternehmens Bultmanns sehen.")

33 Ibid., p. 3.
with the "Old Quest" summarized by Albert Schweitzer\(^35\) in the early years of the twentieth century, rejects any possibility of reconstructing from the Gospel materials a biography of Jesus through the use of the historical-critical method. Its concern is rather to establish a continuity between the kerygma of the primitive church, proclaiming an exalted Lord, and the preaching of Jesus of Nazareth.\(^36\) It seeks an affirmative answer to the question, Did Jesus' preaching call men to decision and existential self-understanding even as did the proclamation of the early church?

Cullmann has stated his position on this New Quest in his essay contributed to the collection, \textit{Der historische Jesus und der kerygmatische Christus} (see n. 28 above), entitled "Unzeitgemässe Bemerkungen zum 'historischen Jesus' der Bultmannschule" ("Unfashionable Remarks on the 'historical Jesus' of the Bultmannian School"). His position is essentially that while in principle he greets any attempt to know more of the historical Jesus, and while he heartily endorses and uses form-criticism and therefore denies with the Bultmannians the possibility of reconstructing a biography of Jesus, yet he sees form-criticism itself as demanding an attempt at historical objectivity which precludes recourse to an existential hermeneutic. Thus Cullmann attacks the New Quest at the very point—its existentialist orientation—which, as we have seen, is at the base of his debate with Bultmann.

But Cullmann too is engaged in a quest of the historical Jesus. With the "post-Bultmannians" he recognizes the necessity of a historical continuity between the kerygma and Jesus. Is his quest essentially the new or the old?

James Robinson has rejected the Old Quest on two grounds: its methodological impossibility and its theological illegitimacy.\(^37\) With the first Cullmann agrees to the extent that form-criticism correctly and "indeed consciously put aside the

\(^{35}\) Especially in his \textit{The Quest of the Historical Jesus} (London, 1922).

\(^{36}\) Robinson, \textit{A New Quest}, pp. 12 ff.

\(^{37}\) \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 26-47.
question of the historical Jesus." 38 He goes on to emphasize however that form-criticism nevertheless remains a positive though difficult tool for "the determination of essential historical elements concerning his life and teaching." 39 On the question of illegitimacy, Cullmann disagrees, as this theological illegitimacy for the post-Bultmannians is rooted in their existential orientation. Cullmann would rather see certain elements in Jesus' life and teachings as both methodologically determinable and theologically essential. 40

This makes understandable Cullmann's concern to find already in Jesus' teaching the central kernel of the New Testament message. At this point again he evinces an element common to the New Quest. But whereas the latter seeks to find "in Jesus the existentialist dialectic of believing existence which he (Bultmann) finds first emerging explicitly in Paul and John," 41 Cullmann's concern is not only with Jesus' teaching, but also with Jesus' Messianic self-consciousness (a characteristic concern of the Old Quest) as it bears on the central, temporal eschatological tension between "already" and "not yet."

38 Cullmann, "Unzeitgemässe Bemerkungen," op. cit., p. 266. He seems to be thinking of form-criticism not simply in a narrow sense as the identification and classification of literary types, but rather in the broad sense of relating Gospel materials to the life situation of the church and seeking to evaluate primary and secondary materials in them. On this distinction between form-criticism per se and the broader reorientation of Gospel scholarship of which it was a part, see Robinson, A New Quest, pp. 36-38. It is this latter, broader trend that dealt a death blow to the Old Quest.


40 Cullmann, "The Necessity and Function of Higher Criticism," op. cit., p. 7: "The Biblical revelation in both the Old and New Testaments is a revelation of God in history, in the history of the people of Israel which found its achievement in the incarnation of Jesus of Nazareth and worked itself out through the primitive community... But as soon as we speak of Jesus of Nazareth, we speak of history, and the history of Jesus presupposes a relationship both with the history of Israel and with the history of the primitive church."

41 Robinson, "The Recent Debate on the 'New Quest,'" op. cit., 205.

42 Cullmann, Die Christologie des Neuen Testaments (Tübingen, 1958), pp. 117-134.
From the foregoing it appears clear that it is unfair to classify Cullmann's quest either as a revival of the old or a form of the new. His attitude toward the Gospels as testimonies of faith produced in the context of the living church precludes a return to the Old Quest as such. But his rejection of existentialism and his insistence on the theological necessity of historical information regarding Jesus sets him apart from the New Quest. 43

One concludes a survey such as the foregoing with a distinct impression that much is to be expected from Cullmann's forthcoming book on eschatology. It can be anticipated that here the pattern of his thought on a number of outstanding issues, already so well advanced, will be largely completed.

43 Robinson's complaint ("The Recent Debate on the 'New Quest,'" op. cit., 204 f.) that a demonstration based on the historical-critical method, of the continuity between Jesus the proclaimer and Jesus Christ the proclaimed "does not answer the question of a material unity of Jesus' words and deeds with the kerygma" would perhaps be answerable from Cullmann's viewpoint by the fact that he finds that which for him is central in the New Testament message to be a part of Jesus' own messianic self-consciousness (which, of course, the Bultmannians reject: cf. G. Bornkamm, Jesus von Nazareth [Stuttgart, 1959], pp. 155-163). Robinson's further statement, "nor can this explanation of historical phenomena of the past 'mediate' an eschatological self-understanding to us today, in the way that the kerygma does," seems to be a valid criticism only on existentialist presuppositions.