Kubo's ability as a textual critic is well demonstrated in the body of this monograph where he patiently scrutinizes variant after variant to determine which reading has the strongest claim to originality. He is guided by the canon that the harder reading which best suits the context and which best explains the reasons for the origin of the other variants is to be preferred. There are ample examples of the author's resourcefulness in the positing of possibilities for the way in which variants may have arisen, as well as of reasons for a particular reading's claim to originality. One may have questions on some of these, but on the whole one can only show respect for a job well done. When textual criticism is carried on according to the modern canons, a true sense of the correct Greek idiom becomes an indispensable piece of equipment for the textual critic. Kubo demonstrates that he is not in want of it. This study will undoubtedly become a basic reference work for any future commentary on 1 and 2 Peter and Jude.

Since variants are discussed in two chapters and are organized within these chapters according to type, variants that stand in organic relation are often discussed in separate sections. This seems inevitable, but cross references would have helped for clarity. On page 141, e.g., the variant readings for Jude 5 are discussed rather briefly. The pronouncement which follows, "this section should then read απαξιονται οτι θεος," does not appear to stem from the short discussion. Five variants are listed, but only three are considered. It would seem that some reference should have been made to page 86 where the reasons for adopting the reading θεος are given.

Unfortunately, due to the pressures imposed by publication deadlines, the book did not receive careful proofreading and the benefit of editorial assistance. Often sentences are less clear than one would wish. It is to be hoped that a basic study of this nature will be revised for a second printing in which English grammar and syntax will be more carefully heeded. An index of Scriptural references would also greatly enhance the value of the book.

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The book is suggestive. This is both its strength and its weakness. The methodological analyses undertaken and their application to selected historical materials are the basis for an invitation to Christological construction. Its strength is in its unrelenting adherence to its methodological aim. Its weakness is that of all methodological treatises: we want to be told how to move from analysis to construction. The "shape" is not of things to come, but of what was and is. Such analysis of the situation, if it is comprehensive enough, is useful as a preliminary
to further Christological construction. What the book suggests is a quite ingenious way of organizing the historical materials, a host of non-methodological questions which spring from the particular categories used, the need for further writing to take us from methodology to exposition. What we learn, did we not already know it, is that Christological problems are exceedingly complex.

One of these questions is that of the relation between method and norm. Since in modern times Christology is no longer only a “medium of theological expression” but “a norm of theological validity” (p. 10), the range of Christological discussion has been considerably widened, and questions now have to be raised of a different nature from those appropriate to the classical discussion.

The “shape” of Christology, as of any discipline, is determined by the “method” employed in operating the “models” which interpret what is “given.” An exposition of these technical terms is made the ground for a consideration of the three models which have had wide currency in Christological construction: the two-nature model, the psychological model, the revelation model. The discipline takes its shape from the models employed within it. It is in this way that the model comes to have a normative function.

McIntyre wishes to question this status of the model in Christological discourse. He takes the extreme permissiveness of the two-nature model as his line of attack. The principle (the model that models this model) of “no physis anhypostatos” permits such a wide range of conflicting interpretations, from Nestorianism to Eutychianism, Chalcedon being a compromise which needed further elucidation, that the model of the two-natures may not stand as normative. In the discussion of the relation between norms and method certain problems remain. The author affirms that what “conditions the form of Christological method” is norm (p. 45), in the particular instance that of doing justice to the worship of the church. Do methods spring from norms or do norms depend upon the prior application of method? It would seem that the distinction is not as clear-cut as the suggestion here made would imply. The matter is more complicated than is here suggested, norm and method being interactive. What lies behind this distinction is the uneasiness about the permissiveness of the two-natures model. To say that models do not merit the normativeness which they have been given is one thing. To say that models should not be normative is quite another, one which would go against the author’s own purpose.

A plea is made for a “situational deployment” of the concept of human nature (p. 112). It springs from contemporary insistence on the non-fixity of human “nature” (we never seem to be able to dispense with the word), and is linked with the influence of Sartre. Here we move across a category barrier, to the psychological model. In its exposition, McIntyre is concerned with the threat of docetism. The rehabilitation of the psychological model (the model of the liberal Christologies) involves a moderation of historical skepticism evident during much of our present theological century. He argues that the
historical skeptics (Barth, Bultmann, Käsemann and Bornkamm are mentioned) inconsistently discuss "attitudes, motives, reactions and even feelings of Jesus" (p. 127). Thus their skepticism is not to be taken at its face value.

The psychological model is to be free to develop as is found necessary. We only get landed into insuperable difficulties when, as with the Kenotic Christologies where "consciousness" is identified with "nature," Chalcedon stands sentry over the psychological model. Heresy is just around the corner.

The discussion ends with a treatment of what is called the "revelation model." To do justice to the New Testament data, two statements are necessary. An event, interpreted as a divine action (Jesus), reveals God, but in human form, to the one in whom the Spirit dwells, schematized as A(x) reveals B(A) to C (Holy Spirit). This must be supplemented by the further statement: "God as he is in and for himself" (p. 152) is revealed in Jesus Christ to one in whom the Spirit dwells, schematized as B(A) reveals B(E) to C (Holy Spirit). His basic criticism of the revelation model is that it is abstract. While it depends upon "other models for its content and indeed for its form" (p. 168), specifically the soteriological, it is presented in such a manner as to make it appear that it can stand independently of these. What he calls for is a rewriting of Christological theory in the light of an application of the two-natures model (nature being viewed not in static terms but by means of the psychological model) to this revelation model. This would mean pushing beyond the Christology of Barth with its historical skepticism and would make available to us an apologetic suited to the rough and tumble of the common room! He thus reiterates his invitation made earlier: "I should like to enter a plea for the extension of the psychological model, in some respects at least to the divine nature, for how else can we properly speak about the 'mind of Christ' or indeed 'the will of God'?" (p. 143). (We note again the suggestive nature of the book. To enter a plea is not to suggest a program.)

His criticism of revelation as being non-biblical is based upon a particular conception of what appeal to Scripture is. For "biblical" is not to be confined to mean "amenable to direct reference to the text of Scripture." It may mean conformity to the approach and intention of Scripture, a much more difficult and complex criterion. On such a reading, who shall say that the revelation concept is not biblical? "Word of God" is certainly a biblical model in both senses of the term "biblical." A similar naïveté is to be found in the reference to Chalcedon where he defends it against dualism (p. 93). Surely it is not what is said but the way in which it is said that is crucial. The intention may be to preserve unity: the form which the expression takes may make that intention incapable of fulfilment. The criticisms of Chalcedon made by Schleiermacher are cogent at this point. McIntyre does not consider these, nor certain contemporary attempts at Christological construction which notice them (Tillich's, for example). We cannot save Chalcedon merely by appealing to its words, nor even to its in-
tention. How it says what it says may confuse the intention of what is to be said.

There are here many things to stimulate, and some to frustrate. But one must not expect more than the author intends. What we are here given is a method, by which a model (i.e., the idea of a model) may be applied to the given materials of Christological history. But hints for construction might follow clarification.

The following errata were noted: "scriptures" for scriptures (p. 42, l. 37), "which is the model is" for "which the model is" (p. 57, l. 12), "protects" for "projects" (p. 106, l. 21).

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Once more the writer refers to the remarkable treatise by Gerard Zerbolt of Zutphen entitled, De Libris Teutonicalibus, in which the reader is advised that it is permissible to make proper use of the Bible in his own vernacular. Zerbolt's production was not considered as a safe guide for laymen, for which reason only one copy has survived. That being the case, we must not be surprised to find even today all sorts of persons in high positions who either strongly condemn or highly favor the reading of sacred writings by ordinary laymen. At the same time we must look forward to reading reviews of the latest book by Strand that will go to an extreme in accusing him of having misrepresented certain facts and opinions. The old controversy has not yet yielded to a demand for enlightened interpretation of the historical developments.

Particularly valuable is Chapter IV, which is devoted to the use of the Bible in the Middle Ages. The author asks an important question here, and he indicates that he has long been aware of two widespread attitudes on the part of both Roman Catholic and Protestant scholars. On the one hand we wonder if the publishers of the translated Bibles were good Catholics, and on the other hand we must reckon with those Protestants who imagine that Luther was unique in his work as a