

as in Dt 27-28. The treatment of the theme of death as opposed to life sums up what Barth has said in his earlier important discussion on this topic in *Die Errettung vom Tode in den individuellen Klage- und Dankliedern des Alten Testaments* (Zürich, 1947).

The discussion of the place of David in the Psalter purports that the superscriptions of the Psalms which present David as the author with biographical details "cannot have been written before the third century B.C." (p. 63). This particular point may need some drastic revisions in view of the manuscript finds of the Psalms from Caves 4 and 11 of Qumran, one of which is a fragmentary copy (4QPs^a) from the second century B.C. of a considerably earlier canonical Psalter containing superscriptions referring to David (cf. F. M. Cross, Jr., *The Ancient Library of Qumran* [Garden City, N.Y., 1961], p. 165, and J. A. Sanders, *The Psalms Scroll of Qumran Cave 11* [Oxford, 1965], and his *The Dead Sea Psalms Scroll* [Ithaca, N.Y., 1967], pp. 13, 157, 158).

As a whole this book is a splendid short introduction for nonspecialists, but also the advanced student can learn from it. From a liberal point of view, which needs to be constantly kept in mind, it covers the more difficult problems of Psalm research.

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Harvey, Van A., *The Historian and the Believer*. New York: Macmillan, 1966. xv + 301 pp. \$6.95.

The problem to which this book addresses itself is one which may be posed very sharply. It concerns the contrast between the probabilities of historical judgment and the certainty claimed for faith by one who is a believer. How may the certainty of faith rest upon the probabilities, that is, the relative certainties of the historian? "Can one and the same man hold the same judgment tentatively as an historian but believe it passionately as a Christian?" (p. 18). The historian who claims to know, not simply believe, must give reasons for his claim. The development of modern historiography is that of the emergence of the historian's autonomy. He does not simply record, edit and harmonize past reports. Rather he assesses the deposits of the past, and so, in a sense, creates fact by this process of assessment, which is, of course, performed in the light of articulate principles. These must not be stereotyped, for since history is a "field-encompassing field," that is, since it takes within it all spheres of human experience, the nature of and procedures for the assessment must be appropriate to the particular area of discussion. Sound historical judgment will be based on appropriate assessment. Here the author connects with Toulmin and his examination of the variety of kinds of arguments occurring in practical discourse.

Harvey proceeds by adopting the standpoint of F. H. Bradley that "the warrants and backings for historical judgments lie grounded in

present knowledge" (p. 71). However, he refuses Bradley's identification of present knowledge with scientific knowledge, for since history is a field-encompassing field, its methodology may not be dictated by that of any one field. Thus the differing status of different conclusions is to be recognized. Some will be probable, with various degrees of probability. Others will be practically certain. "In history, we need only the level of certainty the context requires" (p. 93). A stance which Harvey adopts on the basis of "present knowledge" is that of skepticism toward miracles, miracles of any shape. For indeed Harvey lumps together many different kinds of miracle (*e.g.*, the raining of blood from the sky, the singing of the *Te Deum* by a beheaded martyr, the stories of Jonah and of Joshua's sun, the resurrection of Jesus Christ [cf. also p. 223]) and adopts the attitude that for certain reasons (cf. p. 88) skepticism toward any alleged miracle is justified. When one asks how a particular historical judgment is validated, one receives the following answer: the historian decides that his hypothesis is correct "in seeing how far other facts . . . corroborate such an interpretation" (p. 92). It is difficult to see how the historian can see without some intuition (the addition of the adjective "mystical" [p. 96] is confusing). It is also appropriate to ask what constitutes the "seeing how far," that is, how is it that the historian measures the relation between his "how far" and the fact he has established as the basis of this insight? This would seem to compromise his emphatically stated distinction between how one comes to know, and how one comes to justify what is known.

The conclusion of the first part of the book is that the historian ought to presuppose present knowledge. It is this that Harvey means by his cumbersome phrase "the morality of historical knowledge."

The second section of the book is an examination of historical movements in theology in the light of this criterion. As each is examined, its weaknesses are high-lighted; and in this way the ground is prepared for the statement of the author's own position in the final chapter. The weakness of "traditional belief" (chapter IV) is that it makes sound historical judgment impossible (p. 119). The weakness of the dialectical theology (Tillich is included along with Bultmann and Barth) is that in leading to the conclusion that faith has no essential relationship to a past historical fact (p. 131), the representative writers do not even address themselves to the fact of the historian's autonomy. If the truth of history is opposed to the truth of faith and the results of historical inquiry are of no concern to faith, "it is impossible for faith to clarify its own object" (p. 158). The weakness of the "New Quest for the historical Jesus" is not that it violates the morality of historical knowledge, but that it universalizes a particular understanding of historical scholarship (p. 186), and does not allow a diversity which should be as varied as are the questions which men ask. (It may be noted that Harvey commends Ebeling for not postulating supernatural causes or absolutely unique events and for affirming that the historian employs the same method for dealing with all past

phenomena.) Moreover, the warrant for the claims of the New Quest is unsatisfactory. Since it appeals to the faith, namely the self-understanding, of Jesus it is laying the case on very tenuous grounds, and indeed is driven to require some of the data which (against the Old Quest) it is asserted that it is impossible to get. For since thought and self-understanding occur in a context, to reconstruct such self-understanding requires a consideration of "chronology" (p. 189). Moreover (and this is the real fault), the New Quest assumes the uniqueness of Jesus' selfhood, and this idea of "uniqueness" (miracle being one example of it) Harvey does not allow. He writes "as an a priori assumption it can hardly serve the purposes of critical history."

The error of the New Quest is that it solicits heavy assent to a tenuous historical judgment, namely, that concerning the selfhood of Jesus.

The further position now taken on by Harvey is what is called (awkwardly) Hard Perspectivism. The issue is whether a different perspective on the "facts" from one which rules out miracles is an appropriate one. Against the fact-interpretation identification of the Hard Perspectivist (Alan Richardson is the chief representative), Harvey insists on a distinction of fact from interpretation. Richardson's argument that the perspective which enables us to "see" most of the facts is the most adequate offends Harvey and leads him to a discussion of "presuppositions" (see below). But what then does "fact" mean? Is it to be taken in the idealist sense? Are we to assume that having made the distinction, a fact can have ideally not more than one, *i.e.*, the correct, interpretation? Does the objectivity ideal here reappear in a different form?

The question, Does Christian faith require specific historical assertions which "in the nature of the case, are dubious or not fully justified"? (p. 249) sets the issue squarely. Harvey has already refused certain answers: (1) whatever the historian does about the supernatural or miracles, faith needs them and will assert them; (2) faith is independent of the results of historical research; (3) the self-understanding of Jesus is the source of both historical knowledge, and the kerygma and faith; (4) the fact of faith and the interpretation derived from faith and expressing faith are identical. He suggests a modified "blik" theory of faith. The believer and the unbeliever differ not in the "fact" which they interpret but in the significance they see in it. Both interpretations presuppose "that there is some 'given' to be interpreted" (p. 252), some "paradigmatic event," some archetypes cast up by history. Different religions are struck differently by different models of interpretation. The "blik" is about the given: so one may not, on the basis of characterizing faith as a perspective, say that it has no referent, that is that it is noncognitive. However, the "event," the "given," the "fact" is of little significance. What is important is the perspective taken of it. This becomes obvious from the description of the crucifixion (which is somewhere near the heart of Christianity) and of the resurrection, where, dependent upon Ebeling, Harvey asserts: "the so-called

appearances can be interpreted only as the concomitant phenomena of the faith-awakening encounter with Jesus" (p. 274). Belief in miracle is not required. Confidence in Jesus' message is. This is a historically (*i.e.*, rationally) defensible position. Indeed Harvey suggests that the perspectival image derived from the Biblical narratives may be compared with the Biblical Christ, which latter is the memory image of Jesus distorted by theological interpretation by the NT writers (pp. 267, 268). But faith does not depend upon such a reconstruction (hence, the performance would be an academic exercise), indeed faith is independent of historical beliefs. "No remote historical event can . . . as such, be the basis for a religious confidence about the present" (p. 282). So what of Jesus and his life and death? These are important as parabolic clues to an image, which image helps in understanding reality known on other grounds ("in all events"). The autonomy of the historian's judgment is won at the price of abandoning the exclusiveness of Christianity.

The book is unfortunately vague in some important places, and in arguing towards his conclusion, the author leaves the impression that the destination is (at times) more important than the route. For example, in the fourth chapter, in his polemic against "traditional belief," he admits that this term (which he nowhere defines or expounds) is far too sweeping but lets it stand nevertheless. The issue is purportedly over the soundness of historical judgment and conclusions. It turns out to be one of presuppositions. Harvey's premise is that the genuinely critical historian works in the case of the Gospels with skeptical presuppositions concerning miracles, since these are called for by scientific history and are also appropriate to the subject matter. This skepticism is given an explicit formulation. Resurrection is "initially improbable." To assert the opposite is to lack "a certain quality of mind" which makes for sound historical judgment. Harvey's method, however, parallels that which he criticizes. He writes, "Logical possibilities . . . are converted into practical possibilities" (p. 122). In the case of "traditional belief" the logical possibility is "miracles are not impossible." In his own case the logical possibility is "miracles are impossible." Since the dynamic of argument is parallel in both cases, we ask for that which leads to the better judgment of the skeptical historian, and receive the answer that it is a certain "intangible quality" (pp. 119, 120) present to the one and absent to the other! We remain in the realm of counter-assertion! "Traditional belief" is not sufficiently illustrated by specific examples to enable the reader to see whether the author's assessment of its method is in fact fair and cogent. He shows no concern to set the presuppositions over against one another and examine them on their merits. The initial improbability that underlies the whole argument here in the chapter (and the entire book) is assumed. It is never examined, indeed it is never explained.

Harvey's proclivity to over-generalization may be shown at other points to vitiate his argument. In arguing against Alan Richardson's

position, which he (unhappily) calls "hard perspectivism," he criticizes those who would drop the fact-interpretation distinction, since "there is no *one true* significance of an event" (p. 221). What, never? Surely some events must be exempted from this generalization. To say that evaluation of significance cannot be final, is not the same as to say that there cannot be one true significance of an event. At least the language that speaks of *the* significance of an event is not vacuous. We sense an oversimplification of the problems involved in the argument against the fact-interpretation identification. We suggest that there are three rather than two alternatives to be considered: (1) fact and interpretation are quite distinct, (2) fact and interpretation are identifiable, (3) no general rule is to be made *a priori*. If one examines the data without loading the case, it may be found that an interpretation is the primary fact in certain cases, and, in others, interpretation has to do with a more primary fact than itself. What the status of the interpretation is will itself be a matter of interpretation. Thus an interpretation may assess a fact as problematical. It is an assertion of rather far-reaching consequences to say that an event cannot be interpreted meaningfully (p. 215). The fact that in many if not most cases of historical judgment there are plausible alternatives, does not mean that in some cases there may not be one correct one, nor that even among the plurality (in a given instance) one is not much more probable than others.

Harvey takes issue concerning the use made of the notion of presupposition by the Christian apologist. His allegation is that the specific usage conflicts with the general presuppositions of the critical historian. To put the matter in this way beclouds the issue. For in pressing behind the "very concrete beliefs" (p. 224) to the assumptions they illustrate, one may obviously come up with propositions of wider generality; that is, one may generalize from the concrete beliefs about a particular set of events. The issue is fogged by this confusing contrast between general and particular. The real point concerns the nature of the assumptions. The basic issue is whether the presupposition is to take the form, unique events happen, or, unique events do not happen. It is difficult to understand how a fair-minded historian would *on principle* exclude the unique. If history is a "field-encompassing field," as Harvey claims it is, should not the open-minded historian consider the possibility that there might be one case that was unique? He would, if such were found, have to modify his view of historical warrants. How would one know unless one had experienced it, except by taking the witnesses to the unique as trustworthy? A conflict of presuppositions is not settled by appeal to "facts" (in Harvey's sense).

Our point is that in arguing for a skeptical presupposition Harvey has engaged in much loose talk. We give one final example. The resurrection of Jesus is identified with faith-interpretation (it would be a fair question to ask whether different interpretations of the resurrection could appeal to an agreed upon "fact"), with a right understanding of Jesus. The "so-called appearances can be inter-

preted only as 'concomitant phenomena . . . ' of faith. It is not the case that this is the only interpretation possible. Harvey means that this is the only adequate interpretation. The use of the term "concomitant" is thus not helpful, for it tells us nothing. The resurrection is indeed dispensable for Harvey since he cannot allow miracle, and since he does not have to refer to Jesus' person for the faith perspective (p. 274).

One wonders how it is possible to give so much away in acknowledging the "scientific" spirit of critical history.

The following misprints were noted: sigilography for sigillography (p. 56), expecially for especially (p. 113), bibilical for biblical (p. 151), regin for reign (p. 272).

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Ladd, George Eldon, *The New Testament and Criticism*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1967. 222 pp. \$3.95.

The purpose of the author is to demonstrate by means of clear-cut illustrations the fact that the various critical methodologies, *i.e.*, textual, linguistic, literary, form, historical and comparative-religion, are not inherently destructive of conservative faith. In fact, they are necessary for a sound conservative understanding of Scripture. Some conservatives will question this thesis, for they will feel that their rigid authoritative regard for the Bible will be affected by accepting any of the critical methodologies mentioned above. Nevertheless, Ladd would insist that if faith is affected by these methods *per se*, such faith needs to be purged since "an adequate study of the Bible demands a historical-theological methodology" (p. 14).

Each chapter is profusely illustrated to show how the method can be applied in a conservative context. The most conservative reader, it seems to me, would have to concede the author's point. These methods are absolutely necessary in order to study the Bible intelligently. Too often any type of criticism concerning the Bible is considered from a pejorative point of view. But criticism in itself is a neutral term and an inescapable activity in studying the Bible. Ladd defines it thus: "Criticism means making intelligent judgments about historical, literary, textual, and philological questions which one must face in dealing with the Bible, in the light of all the available evidence, when one recognizes that the Word of God has come to men through the words of men in given historical situations" (p. 37).

While the reviewer agrees with Ladd's basic conclusions and conservative tendencies, he feels a certain uneasiness resulting from the author's approach and attitude. Why does Ladd, especially in chapters 6-8, set in opposition to *his* conservative use of these methods the usage of the radical critics without making allowance for other conservative views which may deviate from his? By attacking the results of these