especially the case in the light of the quite fundamental assertion that revelation occurs at the end of history. Theology has always found terminological ambiguity convenient. It appears to be playing with words to talk of an "end" having occurred proleptically, since "end" in normal parlance means finis in a temporal sense. How can history go on if its end has occurred? We have great sympathy with the idea being expressed and would want to endorse it, but consider the terminology unfortunate, even if the meaning of "end" as "goal" or "fulfilment" or "purpose" makes it plausibly ambiguous. The adjective "final" (p. 95) is a more obvious pun than the noun "end." We also welcome the insistence that an epistemology which will be at all adequate to the NT kerygma will have to start with the resurrection, from "the substantive, historical nucleus of the apostles' resurrection affirmations" (p. 84), although we are not told what that is. The argument from phenomenology, that man is constituted by hope, is a most effective way of indicating the meaningfulness of eschatological assertions. Here we have one of the more useful employments of the notion of the universal. But, it must be pointed out, the status of the phenomenological account of man as hopeful does not prove anything about the truth of that which he anticipates, namely the resurrection, but only that the hope is meaningful. Nevertheless, it provides a useful argument against those who will confine discussion (at least at the outset) to the problem of meaning.

The following errata were noted: "betwen" for "between" (p. 68); "clean" for "clear" (p. 70); "hinderances" for "hindrances" (p. 101); "difference" for "different" (p. 133); "pre-supposes" for "pre-supposes" (p. 135); "escatology" for "eschatology" (p. 164).

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Edward W. H. Vick


In his editor's note, Nelson Peter Ross indicates the purpose and occasion which have brought forth this volume: "When Quirinus Breen retired from his professorship of history in the University of Oregon in 1964 some of his colleagues, students, and friends sought to mark the occasion with a permanent tribute. The result is this collection of some of his essays, now published in his honor" (p. ix).

In the Preface, Heiko A. Oberman characterizes an aspect of Breen's work which manifests itself well in the present publication: "comprehensiveness and comprehension" which "may entail a risky trek into a 'no man's land' between fields." He also points out that Breen, with "his humanistic respect for rhetoric as a method cum fundamento in re . . . would not wince when this trek is compared with the ongoing search to expose and combat that veritas duplex which Breen has described as an eminent problem in the symbiosis of Christianity and 'humanism'" (p. vii).
In the Foreword, Paul Oskar Kristeller calls to attention the fact that the present volume omits Breen's "books and some of his more detailed scholarly papers, but . . . illustrates very well the unity and range that characterize Breen's work as a whole, and also the twofold orientation that has evidently inspired him throughout his life as a person and as a scholar"—his "persistent concern to combine and to reconcile his faith as a liberal modern Protestant and his work as a free and objective secular scholar" (p. v).

The foregoing quotations have been presented because they state so well what is the intent, nature, and scope of the volume here under review. In brief, the selections from Breen's published articles appearing in this volume are collected in chapters bearing the following titles: "Three Renaissance Humanists on the Relation of Philosophy and Rhetoric" (the three humanists are Pico, Ermolao Barbaro, and Melanchthon), "The Twofold Truth Theory in Melanchthon," "The Terms 'Loci Communes' and 'Loci' in Melanchthon," "John Calvin and the Rhetorical Tradition," "The Twelfth-Century Revival of the Roman Law," "Renaissance Humanism and the Roman Law," and "The Church as Mother of Learning."

The briefest glance at the above array of titles indicates the breadth of Breen's scholarship, and a look into any chapter in the book will at once reveal the depth of that learning. The fact that the articles here represented have appeared in a wide array of journals such as CH, the Journal of the History of Ideas, Review of Religion, Encounter, and the Oregon Law Review, bespeaks the degree to which he has achieved success in the "comprehensiveness and comprehension" spoken of by Oberman.

The volume is enhanced by the inclusion of a "Curriculum Vitae" (pp. xi-xvi) and a "Bibliography of the Writings of Quirinus Breen" (pp. 269-274). The latter contains well over 100 titles of books, articles and book reviews, beginning with Breen's first major work, John Calvin: A Study in French Humanism (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1931). This bibliography expresses even better than the book itself can do, the true breadth of Breen's scholarly interests and competence, as we find listed therein studies reaching out to touch even such areas as law-school curriculum, Italian libraries, the history of education, and international relations.

The selection made for the present volume could hardly encompass all the areas represented in the Bibliography, but has rather been directed toward one major thrust of Breen's scholarly work as indicated in the title Christianity and Humanism. It seems to the present reviewer that the choice of essays has been good. The fact that they center about one theme lends unity to the presentation, and the fact that they treat a variety of topics—such as philosophy, rhetoric, law, and learning—gives the book a special richness of detail and perspective. Moreover, they are timely, for although they speak about the past, they also speak from that past to concerns which are relevant and alive today. In addition, the book is eminently interesting and read-
able. Indeed, this volume furnishes an excellent representation of the work of one of the truly great scholars of our time, and provides a fitting tribute to him.

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KENNETH A. STRAND


Cullmann has for several years persistently engaged in a running debate with Rudolph Bultmann. His earlier book *Christ and Time* has met with heavy criticisms not only for the obscurity in which certain cardinal points have been left, but also from its general orientation, from which conclusions have been drawn that are distasteful to its author. This new book is an attempt to answer explicit criticisms and to clarify Cullmann’s positions against implications which have been drawn from former obscurities.

If the tension between the “already” and the “not yet” in the NT and in the Christian message is maintained, we are not led to an antagonism between “salvation-history” and Christian existentialism. Indeed the two positions are complementary. To raise the essential question of continuity between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith is to press beyond the position of Bultmann. The question is whether a sequence of events can be an object of faith as well as of assent. Cullmann answers with an emphatic affirmative. In faith the believer is overwhelmed by that in which he did not participate (p. 115). The events of salvation are *pro nobis*, but first they are *extra nos*.

In contending for the priority of salvation-history over revelation, the polemic is directed against Pannenberg, who according to Cullmann, subordinates salvation to revelation. We must press back behind the process of interpretation to get at the events. The historical must be separated from the interpretative and the mythological if we want to see how revelation occurs in history. The interpretation must come from the events themselves, “out of the naked events” (p. 96). This is repeatedly emphasized by Cullmann.

There is, however, a relationship to the facts that is independent of faith, a preliminary hearing (p. 71). There is a sequence of events which can be unfolded as history quite independent of whether the faith-encounter ensues or not. But when faith is present there is to the believer a coincidence of the historical and the theological (p. 71). Before this coincidence there must be the *Vorverständnis* of the acceptance of the objective reality of “a series of divine events.” The discernment of this crucial sequence of events, selected out of history as such, is what constitutes faith. To the historian the sequence upon which faith depends is quite meaningless. Proper interpretation of the events is disclosed in and with the events themselves. The