is superb. This, evidently, is the author’s chief purpose, and he has accomplished it well.

Nevertheless, now that the author’s essays have been cast into book form, would it not have been useful to add at least a small amount of further treatment along the line indicated above? In their original form, these essays hardly needed such treatment, for the scholars reading them would undoubtedly have kept the necessary background in mind. But the present book will likely reach many laymen in the field (at least, it is sincerely hoped by this reviewer that such may be the case!), and for them further detail on the historical situations presupposed in the various pieces of literature would certainly have been helpful and appropriate. This I suggest even though at the same time I would share the author’s caution regarding “the evidence intended to show that the history of early Christianity consists of nothing but one crisis after another” (see p. xv).

The contributions made by Grant in these essays, both in their original form and now again here, are well known to scholars in the field and do not need elaboration. Suffice it to say that in many points Grant’s work has offered valuable correctives. As just one example, we cannot but be impressed by the rather extensive list of illustrations from Irenaeus (pp. 165-168), giving evidence of this church father’s rhetorical training. Grant’s conclusion is most apropos: “Too often we are content with a picture of Irenaeus as orthodox but rather stupid. The camera needs to be refocused and the picture taken over again” (p. 169). This is, of course, by no means the only place where Grant has helped us realize the need for a new picture.

It is not always that essays produced over a number of years and published in a wide array of scholarly publications can be drawn successfully together into a useful and cohesive compilation. Particularly would this be the case when fully two decades and as many as fifteen essays are involved. And yet, this is precisely what has been accomplished here. *After the New Testament* is a well-balanced and well-integrated compilation of excellent studies, and provides a much-deserved monument to Grant’s outstanding scholarship in the field. But perhaps most important is its very real value as a tool for all who are interested in early Christian literature (including the New Testament) and in the history of the ancient Christian church.

Andrews University

Kenneth A. Strand


The author starts with the “self-evident, universal and inescapable fact” of his hearers’ concern for persons (these are the Bampton Lectures preached at Oxford in 1966). In view of this he has no hesitation (when the long preliminaries are over) in plunging into a discussion concerning Jesus, which can be assumed to make immediate
connection since it will prove to have "defining and validating relevance" (p. 12) apropos to what it means to be a person. We are invited to an exercise in experimental thinking, akin to that of other theoretical enterprises (as well as theology). So with due effort to cover his flanks in two chapters of methodological pussy-footing, we move into tactical maneuvers. The aim is to juxtapose two claims to universality—that of our concern for persons and the historical claim for the universal significance of Jesus (p. 21, repeated on p. 24).

The latter claim was made within the context of the Messianic expectations of the Jews, based as these were on the belief that history supplied the key to the cosmos. History ultimately determines reality, so there must be an attempt at uniting the realm of persons and the realm of things, and at showing that the explanation of the world lies here. This was indeed intended by the application of the logos concept to Jesus Christ. Likewise the *homoousios* of Athanasius points to the involvement of God in history, by bringing transcendence and immanence together and showing that "change and process are no necessary bar to absoluteness and fulfilment" (p. 48). In view of Chalcedon, we are invited to consider anthropology as theology.

In the fifth chapter we move sharply from the fifth century to the problems of modernity. Man, who can be considered non-personally in continuity with other beings, is defined by being personal. Since God manifest in Jesus Christ has desacralized the cosmos, "all other divine elements in the universe have lost their rank and power" (p. 60). The possibility for the desacralization of the universe has occurred. As secularized the universe was freed for scientific investigation. Since the Christian attempted to confine God to the sacred, and philosophy maintained a dichotomy between mind and matter, theologians accepted the Kantian ban on speaking of the existence of God. So the way was opened for the discovery that God was dead, and that Jesus was the glory of man. With the exclusion of God from purposeful participation in materiality and history he was in fact dying. Since man participates in the dichotomy also, he became an insoluble problem to himself, and without purpose in the universe had to face the problem of fragmentation. In the happening of Jesus Christ we are offered an alternative to the optimism of the scientist on too narrow a front, and the "nausea" or the "courage" of the existentialist, namely a means of giving an account for both the personal and the impersonal in the world and relationship between them.

The final chapters are a contemporary appraisal of the Chalcedonian symbol in the light of these concerns. It is on the grounds of the resurrection in spite of the presence of evil in the world that the Christian maintains hope in the future of persons within the universe. This symbol means that since Jesus Christ "endured evil and emerged from evil" (p. 89) we may hope for the fulfillment of human personalness in materiality and history. In Jesus is provided the historical example of achievement which constitutes the distinctive human existence of every man. Here is also provided the lesson that transcendence and
immanence are not contradictory. Jenkins is concerned to indicate that he is not breaking with the traditional emphasis here. Man may find fulfilment insofar as God’s existence in love is independent of man’s, insofar as God has “no necessary relations with anything or person other than himself” (p. 109). Such impassibility also means that nothing can make any difference to his being God, not even the suffering of God.

In order to get his enterprise started, Jenkins appeals to what he claims to be a universal datum. We are not told the range of the appeal he intends for his lectures. Without doubt it is a universal one. There is hardly any other way of reading his appeal to the universal. But is the appeal to knowledge of persons universal? It may be universal to the congregations gathered in St Mary’s to hear the lectures, but that may well be because of the direct or indirect influence of a Christian tradition. We are referred to the self-authenticating value judgment of the intrinsic value of being a person. The essential issue is that of the correctness of the observation that such an awareness is universal, or that “reflection [whose reflection?] will intuitively show the strength of this claim” (p. 5). We have shifted here from the universally acknowledged to the universally acknowledgeable. If the proposed datum is not universal, then the argument becomes provincial right from the outset. For the significance of Jesus Christ for persons is dependent upon the universality of the concern with persons. Is it really possible, as is claimed, to avoid anything theoretical and do without any presupposed theory? Why should we start with this fact? A whole set of presuppositions obviously lies behind this selection. Indeed, concern for persons is a Christian concern. Thus we might say that the method amounts to the making clear of their presuppositions for those who have them, but a university audience can hardly be taken as representative of the mass of mankind. We seriously question the validity of the notions of universal and of the starting point which are so important in this work.

The book raises the problem of the function of natural theology in an acute way, and by the unclear method employed leaves it unresolved. Has the author escaped the Aristotelian conception of reason which he wanted to avoid? The arche or archai from which one starts, then by a process of reason establishing that which is less certain from the outset, are given and unquestioned. It is a sign of weakness to question the given than which nothing could be more certain. However, whether one takes the book as a reappraisal of ancient creeds, and so a piece of Christology proper, or as an argument against the death of God, or an unduly restricted scientism, or a piece of apologetic, or as a confession of faith, there will be found here much to stimulate.

The following erratum was noted: “depair” for “despair” (p. 88).