and to use it for the proclamation of God’s word is most certainly timely and valid. He recognizes that in doing this “the risk of confusion or ambiguity is great. But this risk cannot be avoided, lest one shut himself up in the past in regard to the biblical message, the individual believer becomes a split personality and the church a ghetto” (p. 162). To save the Christian Gospel from this fate is undoubtedly the task of Christians today.

This is not a large book, but it could have been smaller and still have said what it says. At times it becomes repetitious. Wilbur Benware is credited with having revised the English version. On the whole the book is readable, though at times it does not read quite smoothly.

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In reviewing this most suggestive book, one can only point to some of the major emphases and leave it to the reader to study the book for himself. For this is without doubt one of the more important publications during a decade in which books on theology have appeared in both volume and variety.

“The decisively important question is obviously that of the context in which the talk of revelation arises” (p. 43). What is at stake is an adequate conception of the kind of knowing process in which the word “God” is meaningfully employed. Knowledge of God is not mastery of a certain subject matter nor indeed a deduction from an ethical awareness, but rather it is an openness in the midst of life, openness to the future, a future that is shaped by and towards the very knowledge which revelation makes possible. Revelation is not a kind of mastery of the object by the subject. Rather it is an openness to the precariousness which the future enables and demands. The book assumes the viewpoint created by the context of revelation in order to examine that context. This context is not that of the isolated individual hoping for a lonely salvation. Moltmann wishes to avoid a subjectivistic individualism where the transcendental ego or the essential self is the subject of analysis. Thus, rather than identifying him *tout court* with the existentialist theologians, one must ask further concerning his realism of hope.

Man’s possibilities are seen as patent of fulfillment only within a social context. The *eschaton*, which is not yet, will be realized only with the hopeful engagement of the Christian in the affairs of the world in a constructive, imaginative, indeed daring, fashion. The hopeful believer moves out into the unknown, confident that the promise of God embraces that unknown. It is in that *futurum absconditum* that God is hidden. For God is Yahweh, who is known by those who move ahead with Him not knowing where they go, but having heard His promise. Here is to be found the context of revelation. Over against the
secularism of much contemporary theology, Moltmann insists that
God is to be known in the midst of life. The context of revelation is
not secular society, any more than the norm for theology can be the
secularism of such society, that is to say, purely in some kind of present.
Nor must we look for revelation purely at the end of history, in some
kind of utopianism or other, whether that of the fundamentalist or
of the Marxist.

The future orientation of this theology is to be seen against the
background of the past. That we may say anything about God at all
(for example, that he is the God of promise and fulfillment) is a result
of how he has come to be known as a result of this dealing in past
history. If God were entirely an “eschatological” concept, we would
have a blank. If eschatology were an eschatological concept, we would
have nothing to say about the end time, about fulfillment. Eschatolog-
ical truth is filled out with a content made available within the realm
of human history, man’s historical experience, the past of human
history. So the nature of historical reality will have to be considered.
An adequate eschatology can be produced only when the crucial
questions of historical reality are appropriately addressed and answered.

This leads to a discussion of the resurrection. Indeed one’s view of
reality is in question as the problem of the resurrection is in question.
“It is not only the nature of the reality of the resurrection that stands
in question, but also the reality on the basis of which the question
of the reality of the resurrection is shaped, motivated and formulated”
(p. 167). Moltmann urges the shaping of a perspective which begins
with the reality of resurrection and thereafter moves to a consideration
of the nature of reality as such. The question of the reality of the resur-
rection should be asked on the basis of a view of reality which makes it
possible, and not be tied down to the question of the “historical prob-
ability of the fact of Jesus’ resurrection.” Rather than to bring
analogies to the resurrection and have our judgment determined by
common human experience, a new concept of historical method must
be developed that does not have such a “one-sided interest in the
similar,” but which seeks the unique in the similar. Analogies are to
begin with the resurrection. If this is done, we shall speak of a new
possibility for the world, indeed, of the “eschatologically new”
(p. 179).

Moltmann’s theology is developed in contrast to Bultmann’s exis-
tentialism, which has its own way of interpreting the resurrection—as
the rise of Easter faith on the part of the disciples. For Moltmann,
what actually happened between the cross and burial and the Easter
appearance is hidden in the hiddenness of God, the NT writers not
professing to know the secret. For the resurrection is an eschatological
reality. It is known as its promise finds continual fulfillment in each
future. It is the beginning and foreshadowing (the perspectives ever
kept in tension) of God’s eternal Lordship, of God’s eternal future. Here
is both promise and beginning of the universality of the new creation.
The resurrection is promise in fulfillment and fulfillment in promise,
and thus recapitulation and consummation of the OT’s vision of Yahweh, as the God who when he fulfilled his promise left an “overspill” which could be the basis of future anticipation. Resurrection becomes a heuristic analogy of a new future.

Thus an attitude of expectation is seconded by that of mission. The openness of God’s future is shared by the church, as it helps to shape that future, living in the midst of history and anticipating the unknown which has been revealed in the resurrection. To give a theological account of such revelation, dynamic categories must be employed: thus all theories of reason which depend upon an Aristotelian concept of the universal cannot be made adequate to the reality of Christian faith, for they cannot allow for the unexpected, the new, the ever-moving and ever-widening horizon which faith makes possible.

Certain questions come to mind in the examination of the theses of this book: we may put them under two classifications. The first concerns the eschatologizing of theological conceptions. Is it to be assumed that all theological conceptions are amenable to being given an eschatological reference? If the theologian’s principle of economy often leads him to conservation even when transformation is necessary, do not certain theological concepts resist such an approval? Moltmann’s treatment of the idea of natural theology is a case in point. If natural theology is an eschatological conception, this is rather a rejection of its traditional role than an adjustment of it. It is becoming clear that a theology that insists upon a view of history shaped by the resurrection has to rethink quite fundamentally the whole basis of theological reason, and the “root metaphors” and the analogies which shall guide it. An assumption which guided the “natural” theologians was that there was some form of universal knowledge available as a point of departure for a deductive process of apologetic. But the universal also becomes an eschatological concept and not a logical one; that is, one derived from universal logos.

The second kind of question concerns the meaning of the resultant concepts. What degree of specificity can be given to the “future” which is made the clue to all the concepts of theology? This is another way of posing the question concerning revelation. Where does revelation take place? In history? In my history? In the history of ideas? In the history of the church? of the world? or in all of these? Futuristic categories can be existentialist, or idealist or radically empirical. The talk of future may be nothing more than a manner of speaking about the present, and a stance that is taken in that present. What is involved is a philosophy of time. There hangs over the discussion a certain ambiguity in the conceiving of the future. One’s expectation of the future may be based upon a priori considerations which turn to history for their confirmation, or for their illustration. In certain cases talk of the future may be a device for speaking about the present, a modified form of existentialism, whose interest is still in the present manner of existence, even if that existence is shaped by God’s future. The futurization of the present is a matter of emphasis. But is it the
present which is then spoken of? Speech about God cannot be wholly future, for in that case there would be no speech at all. Indeed, it becomes a contradiction of terms to speak of revelation as future, if the futurity of revelation is made exclusive. The alternative left is to claim that the future is revealed in the present, but that it is not exhausted in the present. This is what Moltmann does, but the future is left open-ended. The essential clue to that future is given in the present, so the claim may be made that the future is presented there. We may learn from Moltmann, if we have the courage, that what is more important than the shape of the future is that God is Lord of it, whatever it will be. That, after all, is really what it means to be an "adventist."

Just how much Moltmann is indebted to Wolfhart Pannenberg will become clearer to the English reader as more of the latter's works are translated into English. It will no doubt be found that the implications of questions treated by Moltmann will find their fuller treatment in the system of Pannenberg.

The following errata were noted: "miad" for "mind" (p. 91, n.); "reult" for "result" (p. 203); "totaleterian" for "totalitarian" (p. 233, n. 1); "of of" for "of" (p. 272).

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In this doctoral thesis by the Anglican rector of Clevedon, Somerset, the question "What was the expectation of the early church concerning the time of the Second Advent?" is discussed. In seeking the answer to this debated question modern scholarship is first subjected to a critical analysis and then each relevant NT passage is laid under full tribute and tersely discussed.

Against the background of Hebrew prophecy and apocalyptic, Moore discusses the "consistent" eschatology of Schweitzer and Werner, and shows that their thesis, that Jesus erred in expecting a Parousia and so brought about a total and fatal crisis in the life of the early church, breaks down, in part, on the patent fact that the church instead of dying out from disillusionment continued to live and suffer, work and witness. On the other hand, the "realized" eschatology of Dodd, Glasson, and J. A. T. Robinson, which teaches that it was the early church rather than Jesus that erred in expecting an apocalyptic end, is also unsatisfactory, for although Jesus indeed taught that the kingdom had already come in his own person and work, there is no justification for excising from the gospels the clear teaching of Jesus concerning a literal resurrection, a final judgment, an actual Parousia, and a future establishment of the kingdom in a glorious manner. Further, the "demythologized" eschatology of Bultmann and Conzelmann, which builds on both Schweitzer's concept of a mistaken Jesus and