

that it would certainly come within a definite short number of years. (This glorious Parousia was in fact held back only in the grace of God to allow the church to complete its mission and call all men everywhere to repentance and faith.) That the church is thus the eschatological community, already living in "the last days" and partaking of the blessings of the Eschaton through its commitment to Christ and its reception of the Spirit, and especially called to hasten that glorious appearing by its believing witness "till He come." All this leads to the declared conviction of the author that any weakening or abandonment of the Parousia hope can only result in "a real and extensive impoverishment" of the church's life.

It seems unfortunate that such a thorough study, supported by a bibliography of over 1000 titles, should end with a superficial criticism of the British Advent Awakening of the last century and of the Seventh-day Adventist Church of today, a criticism based upon the negative evaluation of a single secondary source in each case. This is the more to be regretted because Moore's criticism of these two movements does not lie in the area of his main thesis. Moore's criticism is based upon his present view of the nature and interpretation of apocalyptic, and its patent misapplication in the course of church history. Even in this area he is to be commended for his recognition that "apocalyptic properly begins with Daniel," and that apocalyptic shares its basic presuppositions with OT prophecy (p. 18). But he appears not to have sufficiently recognized that there is a properly biblical apocalyptic and also an extra-biblical apocalyptic, and that though the second is based upon the first, the first deserves to be examined and evaluated separately, both in its relationships to OT prophecy and in its bearing on the teachings of Christ and the early church concerning the Parousia.

Newbold College, Bracknell, Berkshire, England      E. W. MARTER

Ogden, Schubert M., *The Reality of God and Other Essays*. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. xii + 237 pp. \$ 6.00.

In this book there is presented to us a theology which claims to be secular, metaphysical and empirical. The problem with which this theology is occupied and which assumes a normative role is that of the relationship between the transcendence and the immanence of God, or that of his passivity and his relatedness to the world. The relatedness of God to the world is taken as a point of departure. So certain canons of theological importance emerge: in speaking of God one must begin with human experience; within human experience man's relatedness to his fellow is a given fact, hence God must be spoken of in terms of relationship. Indeed God is the eminently related one.

Theology begins with the subject and generalizes the experience of subjects. This Ogden calls the "reformed subjectivist principle" (p. 57). By defining the self as relational we are led to a consideration of the

nature of relationship and so to process philosophy. By starting with the self we have available the existentialist analyses of selfhood, and so there opens up the possibility of a synthesis between existentialist and process philosophy.

One may in this manner reappraise the starting point and the employment of analogy in theology. By starting with the experience of being a self in relationship with other selves (since selfhood is experienced only in relationship), we may, by the *analogia entis*, speak of the concept of God's absoluteness as having ingredient within it the notion of relatedness. This is a "way of conceiving God's reality which is able to do justice to modern secularity" (p. 63).

A further theological concern is that of showing the cognitive status of theological statements. This requires nothing less than the adoption of a total metaphysic, within the terms of which particular assertions are shown to have significant meaning. What is required is a metaphysic that represents the common structure of existence. In this way the theologian can claim objectivity for his statements.

Such a theological program, it is claimed, can more adequately justify the meaning of faith than that which retains mythological elements while ostensibly seeking to demythologize. For human existence may be represented both in philosophical as well as mythological terms. The truth which myth represents can be known only as a process of translation into philosophical terms. It is Ogden's claim that process philosophy serves as the vehicle for such a translation which permits a cognitive evaluation of original content. The task of the appropriate translation of myth is to provide the "right" philosophy for the process of translation.

The implications of this methodology for the doctrine of God are worked out in further essays in the book, where the author makes quite clear that it is not for the traditional understanding of God that he is an apologist. Ogden embraces the argument of Sartre that existentialism is a humanism, and not antihumanistic (with its implication that there is no human nature since there is no God to have a conception of it), as an expression of his own brand of theism, that of the eminently related God, that of pan-en-theism. While Sartre's argument is to be judged atheistic from the point of view of supernaturalism, it is to be seen as theistic from the viewpoint of God as eminently relative, to whom each of man's choices makes an enduring difference.

That God acts in history means that he participates fully and completely, directly and immediately, in the world of creatures. God's history is eminent history. Each creature is God's act. So the statement "God acts in history" is taken by Ogden as analogy rather than myth. Analogy represents God in non-objectifying existentials. So he can write that in his self-understanding man "represents not only his understanding of God's action, but, through it, the reality of God's action itself . . . man's action actually *is* God's action" (p. 181). To say that God acts in history is to say that the transcendent action of God is represented in human deeds and words. In Jesus we are given a

transparent means of representing "a certain possibility for understanding human existence" (p. 186).

The closing essay of the book attempts to demythologize some of the traditional imagery employed in the service of eschatology. The mythological expressions concerning the end refer both to God and to man. Their meaning is to be found in terms both of "human possibility" and also of "divine actuality" (p. 216). Man's end is in God, the eminently related one. Man's end is to be loved by the pure unbounded love of God, and his prerogative is to accept God's love. The promise of faith is that God is man's end. "Our final destiny . . . is . . . to be loved by the pure unbounded love of God, for whom each of us makes a difference exactly commensurate to what he is and of everlasting significance" (p. 226). God is the all-encompassing one. Even hell is God's hell.

Here we are presented with a radical existentializing of theology. All theological concepts have reference to man's present existence, in relationship with his fellows within the world. Man as an individual is set within the nexus of complex relationships, the totality of which is due for consideration by the theologian in the employment of the conception of "God." In Ogden's theology we have a juxtaposition of individual self-understanding, and the fortunes of the whole, the divine. This leads to a restriction of the concern with the individual to the present moment. Thus eschatological doctrine is concerned with the future of God, not that of the individual. Subjective survival is not an appropriate theme of such eschatology. The present is all-important. We reject this claim, and with it the suggestion for a theological direction which is based upon it. History is important, the resurrection is important as history, as having happenedness, as that which stands over against us from the past. A theory of knowledge or a theology which makes no room for the uniqueness of historical reality in the past, and allows of hope for the future is *ipso facto* disqualified by its failure to account for man's individuality, and for the uniqueness of historic occasions. Jesus' history is more than "simply" a means of representing a way of understanding human existence (p. 186). If not, we have gone the length of identifying theology with philosophy: the purported differentia of theological data become "simply" means for illustrating philosophical convictions.

On such a reading one can cast one's theological net extremely wide. Having rejected traditional atheism as atheism by redefining theism, one can find theists among philosophers who in fact think themselves atheists. So Sartre becomes an apologist for a theistic understanding of existence, by having pointed out what he has in fact overlooked—a stage in the argument which renders him, on Ogden's definition, theistic. If God is actualized in the choices of men (cf. p. 176: *that* God is necessary, but *what* God is is dependent in part upon the decision of the creatures in his world), and if the fact that there is moral truth implies the unconditioned meaningfulness of life, such confidence is made fully intelligible only in the idea of an eminently relative God,

intrinsically affected by those choices of man's freedom. Thus Sartre is brought under the wing of Christian theism. It must indeed be a permissive kind of theism that can make this move.

While agreeing that too often attempts have been made to penetrate beyond the limitations of human finitude in dealing with the future, and that the task of theology is to speak of faith, and read theological symbols in the light of faith, we dissent from the exclusive confining of theological symbol to the present existence. Indeed all eschatological symbol does represent an understanding of human existence. That existence is not in principle to be confined to the present. To do so would mean the removal of hope from Christian existence. Not enough attention has been given to this aspect of the question. It is only when exclusive attention is given to the present existence that it can be said that the question of survival is left "completely open" (p. 229). But the specificity with which one asks quite concrete questions about the meaning and expression of present existence, coupled with the fact that hope is endemic to man *qua* man, as is indicated by phenomenological studies, drives one to seek for quite specific answers to the problem of the future. The alternative would be to see in the resurrection of Jesus (to be taken seriously as a historical datum) a clue to theological reason that embraces within it the concern for answering questions regarding the future of the individual man. For such the statement that the question of the future individual is completely open is only one side of what needs to be said.

Ogden appeals to the cognitive status of statements made within the context of a process philosophy which attempts to offer an explanation of the world on the grand scale. Naturally the Christian theologian is concerned that the statements he makes be both meaningful and true. All such statements are made within contexts, the exploration of which is necessary for the understanding of the statements. But there is no *single* context which is determinative of meaningfulness for theological statements. Statements about faith, necessarily symbolic, are to be understood within the context which faith itself creates, either directly or more distantly, as in the process of translation of "mythical" statements into metaphysical statements. If we differentiate between primary and secondary contexts, we would indicate a philosophical expression of faith, in the grand scale of a metaphysic such as that of Whitehead as a secondary context. The exhibition of the cognitive status of theological statements can take place from within primary contexts, as well as from within secondary contexts. Ogden plumps for *one* such secondary context as the locus from which arguments for the cognitive status of theological statements can be made. We should not be led to think that this is the only possibility.