tool if it tends to dependence rather than to the learning of the basic forms. Another danger one should avoid is to give the impression that the learning of the forms itself is the goal without learning how to translate these forms.

If the student does not rely on this tool for the basic forms, it can be helpful and time-saving. Otherwise it can, ironically, become an obstacle for the learning of Greek.

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Sakae Kubo


Sam Keen cannot seem to make up his mind. Will he describe grace as our maintaining balance and harmony, being wise, or will grace be the sense of wonder we feel when fascinated and awed by the holy? Keen writes a book that is beautiful in structure, style, and content, a book that appeals simultaneously to the mind and to the sensibilities. But he never resolves the issue of whether his book is an apology for wonder or a defense of balance.

One of the most appealing things about Keen's book is the way he moves carefully from an analysis of general human experience, step by step to theological affirmation. The first three chapters use the methods of phenomenology and history of religions to describe the essence of wonder and its past. Chapters Four and Five rely primarily on a philosophical approach to describe the contemporary loss of wonder. Not until Chapter Six does Keen present his constructive position, and it is only in the last chapter, subtitled "A Quasi-Theological Postscript," that Keen relies heavily on theological terminology. Keen has organized his book carefully for the general reader, educated in psychology and philosophy, who has a difficult time affirming or confessing faith. Keen hopes he can entice this reader to believe, to trust, to be grateful to a power outside of himself. He would be grateful if such a reader could find it in himself to call that power God. He does not argue that that power should be described in Christian terms.

Keen prepares the way for stating his own constructive position by carefully showing how the sense of wonder shared by "traditional" man (primitive, Greek, Jewish, and Christian) has been lost by modern man since Kant and Hume. Primitive and Greek men were awe-struck by the cosmos (ontological wonder); Jewish and Christian men more by the *kairos* (historical wonder). But all these traditional men trusted the reality they encountered outside of themselves. With Hume's insistence that there was no necessary connection between any two matters of fact, modern man was "confronted with dialogue that lacks logical connection, events which bear no relationship to each other, action without consequence, and consequences which happen but are not caused" (p. 102). Before such a world man can not respond in wonder. "He is weightless, with nothing to push against;
he must form his identity in a void. The universe is neither caring nor alien—only neutral. Nothingness is the final word about the nonhuman world” (p. 114).

With this diagnosis of man’s condition we expect Keen to respond with an unabashed plea for fascination and awe at the world around us; especially after he spends a whole chapter dismantling man’s contemporary attempt through work to escape his sense of insignificance in a meaningless cosmos. But instead of proposing wonder, Keen makes a case for balance. “I will suggest that healthy personality involves a balance between receptivity and manipulation, between wonder and action” (p. 151). To put it another way, Keen has been diverted from the logic of his book by the fascination of two Greek gods, Apollo and Dionysius.

He uses the two symbols of Apollo and Dionysius to describe not only distinct, but conflicting “modes of being in the world” (p. 152). Apollonian man works, creates, knows, promises. Dionysian man plays, responds, feels, celebrates. Grace is to be found by becoming homo tempestivus, the timely man who relies on wisdom to know how to alternate between Apollo and Dionysius. “Health lies in the both/and (not in the either/or): in granting proper reverence to both Dionysius and Apollo. In the mature personality the pendulum is constantly swinging between wonder and action” (p. 195). The “healthy personality is structured upon a principle of oscillation” (p. 195).

The reader’s surprise at finding a wise balance instead of wonder as the recommended mode of living is heightened by the fact that Apollo is identified with the principle of action and Dionysus with the principle of wonder. Keen has shown sensitively how much man has lost by no longer having fascination and awe for reality outside of himself, by not having a capacity for wonder. But instead of showing how wonder can be recaptured and what contemporary forms it takes, Keen suggests we be timely, “opportune, wise men of balance.” Has not Keen’s structure distorted his content? By deciding on a bipolar structure to describe reality he has pre-ordained that he will have to find an overreaching, third, category to unify the two, and balance is an obvious choice. But is not balance precisely an Apollonian term? Keen himself describes balance as a key to the Apollonian way. “He is the god of ego, light, youth, purity, reasonableness, order, discipline, and balance” (p. 152). Keen has driven throughout his book towards the need for wonder, which he identifies with the Dionysian way, only to end by prescribing balance, an Apollonian trait.

Just as we are adjusting ourselves to this amusing turn of events, Keen in his concluding theological postscript again reverses his field. Keen has equated wonder, in the first chapter, with the holy. “Both have as their object a mystery that is at once awful and desirable (mysterium tremendum et fascinans). I will suggest further that there is no substantial difference between wonder and the experience of the holy” (p. 35). Now, at the end of his book, just after he has invoked not wonder but balance as modern man’s way out of his
meaninglessness, Keen invokes wonder again. "Our judgment must be that the basic attitudes a person adopts toward the world are a more significant indication of psychological spiritual health than the specific symbols he uses to express these attitudes. Whether we continue to talk about God is not so important as whether we retain the sense of wonder which keeps us aware that ours is a holy place" (p. 211). In the end Keen returns to his original purpose, to show how modern man can find meaning by standing in awe before creation. Keen's dalliance in the groves of Grecian gods has simply confused the issue.

It remains only to mention what must be regarded as Keen's greatest contribution, apart from structure and style. Keen has tried nothing less than to relate the experience of grace, not to the doctrine of redemption, but to the doctrine of creation. If we were to describe the theologian as dancer (one of Keen's favorite symbols for homo tempestivus) we would have to say that Keen stumbles in executing a central pas de deux, but impresses us mightily with his overall performance.

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Roy Branson


The author has placed in our hands the first major commentary in English on the book of Proverbs since 1899, when Toy's commentary appeared in the "International Critical Commentary" series. The "new approach," as the subtitle indicates, pertains to a thoroughgoing form-critical analysis of Pr 1-9; 22:17-24:22; and 31:1-9 in the light of Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian wisdom literature. The author's threefold aim is (1) to show that these passages belong to a different literary genre than the wisdom "sentences" in Pr 10:1-22:16 and 24:23-29:27; (2) to reinvestigate the argument which maintains that the history of Israelite wisdom tradition and the tendency of its development is reflected in Pr; and (3) to analyze basic characteristics of Biblical "proverbs."

A highly significant introduction (pp. 1-47) contains four essays which set forth McKane's conclusions on Pr 1-9, on the "sentence literature" in Pr, on the meaning of māšāl, and on a detailed comparison of the text of the Septuagint with the Masoretic text.

Part I (pp. 51-208) deals with a study of international wisdom, namely the Egyptian instruction as found in Ptahhotep, Kagemni, Merikare, Amenemhet, Duauf, Ani, Amenemope, and Onchsheshongy. This is followed by the Babylonian-Assyrian instruction as represented by the "Counsels of Wisdom" from the Kassite period (1500-1200) and by Ahikar from the 5th or 4th century. The final section in Part I deals with Babylonian and Assyrian proverbs.