SUFFERING AND CESSATION FROM SIN ACCORDING TO 1 PETER 4:1

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1 Peter 4:1

a. Χριστοῦ οὖν παθόντος σαρκὶ
   Since therefore Christ suffered in the flesh

b. καὶ ὑμεῖς τὴν αὐτὴν ἐννοιαν ὅπλίσασθε,
   arm yourselves with the same thought,

c. ὅτι ὁ παθὼν σαρκὶ πέπαιναι ἀμαρτίας,
   for whoever has suffered in the flesh has ceased from sin.

1 Pet 4:1c declares that “whoever has suffered in the flesh has ceased from sin.” This statement, which is a significant element in Peter’s argument, is found in a unit of material extending from 3:13-4:6. In this section Peter exhorts his readers to confidence in time of persecution. They are to know that even if they suffer for righteousness’ sake, they will be blessed (vs. 14). The basis of this confidence is given in 3:18-4:6. In 3:18-22 Christ is pictured as having gained, through his death and resurrection, the victory over the sins of men and the powers of the cosmos. Baptism is the vehicle by which believers receive the salvation made possible through Christ. In 4:1-6 this baptismal connection with Christ’s death/resurrection victory is amplified in terms of the believer’s concrete turning from former passions of Gentile life to live henceforth for the will of God, in spite of the fact that this new situation will lead to abuse. The point plainly is that because Christ has deprived the hostile forces of their essential power, Christians can be what they now have become and can take what they now must endure. They are to perceive and to align themselves with a fundamental result of the Christ-event, viz., that “whoever has suffered in the flesh has ceased from sin.”

The precise meaning of this important declaration in 1 Pet 4:1c has been much debated. In attempting to come to an adequate
understanding of this problematic text, the exegetical particulars will be dealt with first, then various views of the statement will be set forth and evaluated and, finally, conclusions will be drawn. The present article is devoted to exegetical particulars, and the other matters will be treated in subsequent articles in this series.

1. The Meaning of “Suffering” (4:1a)

In respect to 4:1a it is clear from the οὖν ("therefore") that Peter is drawing a conclusion from what has preceded. The conclusion is based upon the whole of 3:18-22, but finds its basic starting and focal point in the specific mention in vs. 18 of Christ’s death in the flesh. The aoristic statement about Christ’s suffering (παθόντος) in the flesh in 4:1a unquestionably is resumptive of the aoristic statements about Christ’s suffering (ἐπαθέν) or death (θανατωθείς) in the flesh in 3:18. The fact that suffering is mentioned in 4:1a and death in 3:18b is not indicative of any real difference in meaning. Both are said to occur in the flesh, and there is a basic equivalency between the terms “suffering” and “death” in 3:18.

Furthermore, over against the use of πάσχειν (“to suffer”) in reference to Christians in 1 Peter (2:19-20; 3:14, 17; 4:1b, 15, 19; 5:10), in which case the term never means to die, “suffering” as applied to Ἰησοῦς, while including the general sufferings of his Passion, has a primary reference to his suffering of death (2:21, 23; 4:1a). This is in line with the exclusive use of πάσχειν in Hebrews

1On the question of whether 3:18-22 is a digression, see Excursus A at the close of the present article.


3The view of some commentators that the mention of suffering in 4:1c, in a phrase which is parallel to that found in 4:1a, is an exception and refers to baptismal death will be discussed in a subsequent article in the context of my evaluation of various views on the meaning of 1 Pet 4:1c.

4In respect to 2:21 it is interesting to note that a number of witnesses have ἀπέθανεν for ἐπαθέν, though this may be due to the variant reading ἀπέθανεν in 3:18, as pointed out by Metzger, p. 690.

The same significance of πάσχειν is attested in Ignatius and Barnabas. Examples very likely occur in Smyrn. 2 (in the second and third usages of the term; its first occurrence has the meaning "to experience" "go through," or "undergo") and 7:1; Barn. 5:5, 13; 6:7; 7:2, 5, 10; 12:2, 5. The noun πάθος ("suffering") bears the same sense in Barn. 6:7; Smyrn. 1:2; 7:2; 12:2; Eph. 20:1; Phild. intro.; 9:2; Magn. 11.⁶ (The meaning of πάθος is very clear in these Ignatian texts, because the πάθος of Christ is coupled with his ἀνάστασις ["resurrection"]). Cf. Trall. 11:2 and Rom. 6:3.

However, not only was it possible for Peter to use πάσχειν ("to suffer") for death, it was also valuable that he should do so. It enabled him to speak on two important fronts and yet connect the two together. By the use of this one term he could speak about the death of Christ and also of the sufferings of Christians, which,

⁵While the verb ἀποθνῄσκειν ("to die") occurs in Hebrews for death (7:8; 9:27; 10:28; 11:4, 13, 21, 37)—even violent death, as in 11:37—, it is never used for the death of Jesus (Wilhelm Michaelis, "πάσχω," TDNT, 5:917).

according to Peter, were a participation in the event of Christ's self-giving for righteousness' sake. Thus, what Christ did and what Christians are called upon to be a part of and to do are brought into fundamental relationship through the one motif of πάσχειν.8

2. "Arm Yourselves with the Same Thought" (4:1b)

The participial clause referring to Christ's suffering of death in 1 Pet 4:1a is clearly causal and, as such, introduces the motivation and basis for the independent clause which follows. Inasmuch as Christ suffered in the flesh—an event which found (1) its necessary and victorious fulfillment in his resurrection to lordship over the cosmic forces which control this world, and (2) its anthropological realization in the salvific event of baptism, which was typified by the Flood (3:18-22)—Peter's readers are exhorted to arm themselves (ὤννοεία) against their aggressors with the same ἐννοεῖα.

The Basic Meaning of ἐννοεῖα

The term ἐννοεῖα has been variously translated or interpreted as "thought," "knowledge," or "insight";9 "controlling idea";10 "governing principle" or "principle of conduct";11 "fundamental or guiding conviction";12 "principle of thought and feeling,"

7Note 1 Pet 4:13-14, which exhorts believers to rejoice since they share Christ's sufferings.
8Cf. Dalton, p. 121.
9Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich, p. 266, col. 2; Ernst Kühl, Die Briefe Petri und Judae, Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament, 6th ed. (Göttingen, 1897), p. 246; J. Behm, "ἐννοεῖα," TDNT, 4:971. Behm also speaks of ἐννοεῖα as having to do with an ethically binding recognition. Giving further precision to ἐννοεῖα as insight, Windisch, p. 73, speaks of "the determinative insight" (die bestimmende Einsicht); and Dalton, p. 247, talks of a "practical insight."
11Dalton, pp. 244, 247.
"motive"; in "idea," "design," "resolve"; "purpose," "decision," "intention." In the LXX the word occurs almost exclusively in the Wisdom Literature (Sus 2:8 is the only exception), and most of its uses are to be found in Proverbs (twelve times in the singular; once in the plural in 23:19), where it is coupled with such terms as βουλή ("plan" or "decision"), σοφία ("wisdom"), γνῶσις ("knowledge"), παιδεία ("instruction" or "training") and φρόνημος ("sensible" or "prudent"). It is concerned with the intellectual side of man, but as enlisted in and directed to practical and moral ends. Johannes Behm suggests that the word in Proverbs is always used in the sense of consideration, insight, perception, or cleverness. In Wis 2:14 the plural occurs on the lips of those who find the righteous man a reproof of their thoughts (ἐννοοῦν). This text offers some background to Heb 4:12, the only other text in the NT besides 1 Pet 4:1 where ἐννοοῦμα occurs. According to Hebrews, the word of God is able to discern "the thoughts (ἐνθυμήσεων) and intentions (ἐννοοῦν) of the heart." Here ἐννοοῦμα denotes what a person with his reason and will intends to do in the moral sphere.

13Selwyn, pp. 208, 98.
16In 1 Clem. 21:3 it is coupled with διαλογισμοί ("thoughts," "reasonings").
17Spicq, p. 143, well says that in Proverbs ἐννοοῦμα refers to a disposition of the spirit or a reflection which orients all moral conduct.
18"ἐννοοῦμα," TDNT, 4:969.
19Wis 2:12-20, in its emphasis on the attitude and intent of the ungodly toward the righteous man, reminds one of the thrust of 1 Pet 4:1-4.
20According to Herman Cremer, the two words employed here are synonymous in their verbal forms. ἐνθυμεῖσθαι means "to weigh" and ἐννοεῖν "to consider" (Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek, 4th ed. [Edinburgh, 1895], p. 439). It may be noted that 1 Clem. 21:9 presents a good parallel to Heb 4:12: Whereas in Hebrews the word of God is κριτικὸς ἐνθυμήσεων καὶ ἐννοεῖν καρδίας ("the discerner of the thoughts and intentions of the heart"), Clement says of God that ἔρευνητης . . . ἐστὶν ἐννοεῖν καὶ ἐνθυμήσεων ("he is the searcher of the intentions and thoughts").
21Perhaps "moral devisings" would be a good paraphrase of ἐννοοῦν in Heb 4:12. This would not of itself necessarily imply an evil devising but, given the
With the above background in mind, as well as Peter’s view of Christ’s sufferings (2:21, 23-24; 3:18), one can conclude that the word ἐννοια in 1 Pet 4:1 contains two basic ingredients: insight and intention. Reason and will are involved. Christians are to have the same thought about, or understanding of, suffering as Christ did, and they are to have the same purpose. In effect, Peter tells his readers what Paul told his in Phil 2:5: “Have this mind among yourselves, which you have in Christ Jesus.” These words are a challenge to reflection and understanding, but also to determination and action, for the text goes on to speak of what Christ in fact did.

ἐννοια in Relationship to 1 Pet 3:18-22

To be more specific and taking into account the immediately preceding complex of thoughts in 1 Pet 3:18-22, from which Peter draws his conclusions in 4:1ff., the particular insight or knowledge which Christians are to use as armor is twofold: (1) the knowledge of the redemptive necessity of suffering, derived from the example of Christ, and (2) the perception that such suffering is the prelude to victory over hostile forces. Thus, the statement “since therefore Christ suffered in the flesh” is resumptive not only of Christ’s death mentioned in 3:18, but also of that which belonged in fundamental unity with that death and which is also mentioned in 3:18 and amplified in 3:19-22, viz., the resurrection and victorious lordship of Jesus Christ. What Peter is saying is that Christians

immediate context in vs. 11 (which exhorts against disobedience and to which vs. 12 is connected by an explanatory γὰρ [“for”], as well as the emphasis in vs. 13 on God as the omniscient Judge), it is apparent that ἐννοια has a negative meaning here. Behm is therefore justified when, with reference to the ἐννοια of Heb 4:12, he speaks of “the morally questionable thoughts” (“ἐννοια,” TDNT, 4:971). In Sus. 28, the only other occurrence of ἐννοια in the LXX apart from Proverbs and Wisdom, ἐννοια is qualified by ἀνώματος (“lawless”) and refers to the “wicked plot” of those who would put Susanna to death. It might also be pointed out that ἐνθομήσεις, which can function as a synonym of ἐννοια, carries this negative meaning in Matt 9:4 and 12:35. Cf. Friedrich Büchsel, “ἐνθομήσεις,” TDNT, 3:172.

22Suffering for the good is divinely willed according to 1 Peter. See Floyd V. Filson, “Partakers with Christ: Suffering in First Peter,” Int 9 (1955): 405, par. 1.

participate in the total fate of Jesus Christ. Their insight into this reality and their acceptance of it is to be their armor.

This participation is not merely by way of human imitation, however, but by way of Christ’s causation.24 As it is “through the resurrection of Jesus Christ” that baptism can be an efficacious vehicle of God’s redemptive intention for human beings (3:21),25 so the causative power of Jesus Christ is implied in the statement “since therefore Jesus Christ suffered in the flesh.” When Christians are challenged to arm themselves with the same thought, this is not to be understood as meaning that Christians are to imitate Christ by the power of their own will, but rather that the indicative of God’s saving grace has made it possible for them to be effectively challenged to place their will and existence on the side of God’s intention and into the locus of God’s action and to live in the strength of Christ’s victory. It is another way of saying that the imperative is made possible by, and grounded in, the indicative.

24Cf. Dalton, p. 85, par. 1; Spicq, p. 143; Stibbs, p. 148; and E. A. Sieffert, “Die Heilsbedeutung des Leidens und Sterbens Christi nach dem ersten Brief des Petrus,” Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie 20 (1875): 424. According to Sieffert, the sufferings of Christ are not only an example “but, through their sanctifying effects (vss. 18ff.), also that which makes imitation possible, as evidenced by the causal significance of the genitive absolute” (translation mine). So, for Sieffert, Christ’s sufferings in Peter are not only a “model” (Vorbild) but also a “salvific cause” (Heilsgrund) (p. 426). In this he is entirely correct. However, note the critique of this view by Kühl, p. 246, n. **. Kühl rejects the view that Christ’s suffering supplies the salvific basis for imitation. He insists that Peter’s admonition that Christians be like Christ in his willingness to suffer points to the bare fact of Christ’s suffering. Contra this position, see my own remarks above.

The call for Christians to arm themselves is really a call to faith in the Christ-event. It is like the λογίζομεν ("reckon") of Rom 6:11, which calls on the Christians to take stock of and ground themselves in what Christ has done and to see themselves as sharing in it through baptism. When Peter challenges believers to arm themselves with "the same thought," this does not imply that they do not have the thought at all, but that they are to settle into it and conform themselves to it all the more.\(^{26}\)

3. "For Whoever Has Suffered in the Flesh Has Ceased from Sin" (4:1c)

If the interpretation being offered here is sound, then the ὅτι ("that" or "for") clause of 1 Pet 4:1c need not be taken (though it may be taken) as explicative of "the same thought" of 4:1b, for what the thought is, is already contained in the cross/victory complex implied in 4:1a. Thus, W. J. Dalton's contention that it is somewhat harsh to refer back to 4:1a as "the same mind," inasmuch as Christ's suffering in the flesh is presented as an event rather than a direct representation of his mind or thought,\(^{27}\) does not carry weight. This is especially so, since Dalton also sees the whole of 3:18-22 as the foundation for 4:1-6. If this is the proper understanding of the flow of Peter's thought (and I think it is), it is not difficult to see Christ's own determinative insight, governing conviction, and controlling idea and purpose in what Christ did. Surely, Christ's suffering in the flesh was not a bare event, but expressed the very mind and purpose of Christ.

What that mind was is stated in 3:18a, the very statement which all commentators agree is being resumed in 4:1a, despite whether they see 3:18b-22 or 19-21 as forming a unity with it or as a digression. According to 3:18, "Christ also [1] died for sins once for all, the righteous for the unrighteous, [2] that he might bring us to

\(^{26}\)Along this line Spicq, p. 143, says that "the same thought" "signifies that the Christian life is a progressive assimilation to the crucified and risen savior, and that repeated suffering in the flesh, envisaged by faith as a blessed conformation to Jesus Christ, should be accepted and supported in the same spirit as His" (translation mine).

God.” The thought here is the same as in 2:24: “He himself [1] bore our sins in his body on the tree, [2] that he might die to sin and live to righteousness.” The governing principle of Christ’s action is here clearly revealed.28

The movement of thought in these texts could not be closer to that of 4:1-4, for here the meaning and purpose of Christ’s death, in which believers have a share, is so that they might cease from sin in the sense and for the purpose that they might “live for the rest of the time in the flesh no longer by human passions [the licentiousness, drunkenness, revels, carousing, and lawless idolatry of their previous Gentile life mentioned in 4:3] but by the will of God” (4:2). When Christians arm themselves with the very thought which supplies the redemptive rationale and the victorious result of Christ’s sufferings, then, in a way which corresponds to the twofold movement of the Christ-event as brought out in 3:18a (3:18b-22 as well) and in 2:24, it can be said to them (3:14-16):

But even if you do suffer for righteousness’ sake, you will be blessed. Have no fear of them, nor be troubled, but in your hearts reverence Christ as Lord [cf. 3:22] . . . and keep your conscience clear [cf. 3:21], so that when you are abused, those who revile your good behavior in Christ may be put to shame. For it is better to suffer for doing right . . . than for doing wrong.

Is the ὅτι Clause (4:1c) Epexegetic or Causal?

If the ὅτι clause is not epexegetic of “the same thought,” then it must be taken in a causal sense as supporting Peter’s challenge to be armed with the thought of Christ’s righteous suffering and, by way of implication from the preceding verses, his consequent victory. Why should Christians so arm themselves? Because (as vs. 1c teaches in its context) the one who suffers in the flesh as Christ did will find victory over sin as and because Christ did over the malevolent spiritual powers. Thus, in the maxim-like statement of

28I therefore disagree with Bo Reicke, The Epistles of James, Peter and Jude, AB 37 (Garden City, N.Y., 1964), p. 139, n. 43. Reicke, while more than likely correct in understanding the ὅτι of 1 Pet 4:1c as “for” instead of “that,” says wrongly that “for” is the better translation “since it is hardly possible to attribute to Christ any special consideration as a reason for his suffering.”
4:1c is found the same twofold movement as is seen in 2:24, 3:18, and 4:1-4 as a whole.

If, however, the δτι is causal, a slight problem arises as to its precise connection with the preceding part of the verse. Is it to be taken (1) directly or (2) loosely (somewhat parenthetically) with what has preceded? If loosely (taking up option 2 first), is the idea of Christians arming themselves with "the same thought" most logically tied, in terms of syntax, with vs. 2—so that vs. 1c becomes an explanatory parenthesis and that, as the second person plural was used in 4:1b, it is also to be understood as the implied person in vs. 2? Or if the connection is direct (as in option 1), is 4:1c, with its use of the third person singular (implied in δ παθόν, "he who has suffered"), the direct nonparenthetical follow-up of 4:1b—so that the third person singular must also be thought of as continuing in vs. 2? If option 1 is correct, the δτι is best translated by "since" or "because"; but if option 2 is preferable, "for" recommends itself as the better translation.

Indeed, option 2, according to which vs. 1c is supportive of vs. 1b, but parenthetical to the direct flow of thought, seems best. The presence of the second person plural ὑμῶν ("you") in vs. 4 strongly suggests that the second person plural of vs. 1c is meant to continue in vss. 2 and 3. And it is entirely clear that vs. 4 flows on directly from vs. 3, for "the same wild profligacy" in which the ὑμῶν of vs. 4 no longer participates is a direct reference to the various forms of Gentile sin enumerated in vs. 3 and introductarily and summarily referred to in vs. 2 by ἄνθρωπων ἐπιθυμίας ("human passions").

If the δτι clause of 4:1c be taken thus, as an explanatory parenthesis, and if the second person plural be understood in vs. 2, then 4:1-2 could be properly translated: "Since, therefore, Christ

29That the causal δτι can sit loosely with respect to the rest of the sentence is pointed out by Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich, pp. 593-594.

30The NIV of the NT translates in this way. See n. 33, below.


32Cf. the observations of August Strobel, "Macht Leiden von Sünde frei? Zur Problematik von 1 Petr. 4,1f.,” ThZ 19 (1963):415. Strobel correctly declares that the second person plural must be understood in vss. 2-4 but, apart from his brief mention of vs. 4, where the plural is clear, his argumentation is weak.
suffered in the flesh, arm yourselves with the same thought—for whoever has suffered in the flesh has ceased from sin—so that you live the remaining time in the flesh no longer by human passions but by the will of God.”

The δτι Clause as Explanatory Restatement. As has been pointed out above, the δτι clause need not be taken explicatively, since the content of “the same thought” is most adequately revealed in all that is implied in 4:1a as resumptive of 3:18-22 (which describes [1] Christ’s death and its purpose and [2] the subsequent fulfillment of that death in Christ’s resurrection to his victorious and exalted position over all opposing cosmic powers). However, it is possible, syntactically, to see in the δτι clause a pithy delineation of the content of “the same thought.” In such a case, the δτι clause should not be understood as supplying information on “the same thought”—which was not at all contained in what preceded—but rather as a restatement or application, on the anthropological level, of the meaning and consequence of the christological event. The same two elements are present: suffering and victory.

Ceasing from Sin. However, the problem with construing 4:1c as explicative is how it can be understood that Christians and Christ have the same thought if that thought is ceasing from sin. How can it be said that Christ ceased from sin, especially when it is said in 1 Pet 2:22: “He committed no sin”? Two considerations

33Based on the points presented above, I find the following translation of 1 Pet 4:1-3a offered in the NIV of the NT wanting: “Therefore, since Christ suffered in his body, arm yourselves with the same attitude, because he who has suffered in his body is done with sin. As a result, he does not live the rest of his earthly life for evil human desires, but rather for the will of God. For you have spent enough time in the past doing what pagans choose to do . . .” (emphasis mine).


35Contra Kühl, p. 247. But see Usteri, p. 169. Usteri moves in the right direction when he suggests that the δτι clause adds a new moment which strengthens the admonition implicit in τὴν αὐτὴν ὅπλασασθε (“arm yourselves with the same”): “Suffer for the good rather than for deviating from it.”

immediately arise in this regard, viz., (1) the voice of πέπανται (“has ceased”), and (2) the meaning of ἀμαρτία (“sin”).

The Voice of πέπανται. The answer to the problem might be simplified somewhat if one could regard πέπανται as passive rather than middle. While the middle normally would mean to “cease” or “stop from,” “have done with,” “put an end to,” the passive would mean to be “removed,” “freed,” “delivered,” or “rested from” sin. The passive sense would make possible a thought similar to that contained in the δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμαρτίας of Rom 6:7, understood as meaning “is freed from sin.”

If the passive, in this sense, indeed be correct, then 1 Pet 4:1c, as applied to Christ, could mean that through his death, Christ not only was finished with sin (or sins) as something he had to bear for man, but he was removed from sin as a force with which he had to reckon or a power which impinged upon him—a sphere in which, and yet over against which, he acted righteously, according to God’s will. Such a construction of thought would immediately relate Peter to Paul. For Paul, Christ, while not knowing sin in the sense of concrete deed (2 Cor 5:21), was born into and lived in the reality of a lost world (Gal 4:4-5). Or, otherwise stated, Christ came in the likeness of sinful flesh (Rom 8:3) and was subject to the working of evil powers (1 Cor 2:3). Consequently, when he died, it was not only for sin (Rom 8:3) in order to redeem us (Gal 4:5), but since sin is power as well as guilt, his death was also to sin. That is to say, by death Christ himself was removed from sin’s

57Being finished with sin in this sense would be an implication one could draw from those texts such as 1:18-20, 2:24, and 3:18, where Christ is said to suffer for our sins. According to 3:18ff. and 1:11, these sufferings were followed by Christ’s exaltation and glory.

58Compare Paul at this point with 1 Pet 2:22. On the thought that in 2 Cor 5:21 not knowing sin means a concrete knowing, see Bultmann, 1: 264, 277.

59Gal 4:5 makes clear, with its emphasis on redeeming those “under the law,” that “under the law” in 4:4 means under a system and situation where the lot of mankind is hopeless. The expression “under the law” is a Pauline way of talking about the unredeemed state of human beings. The necessary implication of Rom 6:14 is that to be under the law is to live in the domain and under the dominion of sin. The expression has a religio-sociological significance.

40Gal 4:4-5 and Rom 8:3 contain parallel ideas: “Born under the law” (Gal 4:4) = “in the likeness of sinful flesh” (Rom 8:3). “To redeem those under the law” (Gal 4:5) = “and for sin” (Rom 8:3).
realm of influence, and through the resurrection, from its reign in death (Rom 6:9-10).41

The Significance of ἄμαρτία. It is at this juncture that the second consideration, viz., the significance of ἄμαρτία in 1 Peter must be dealt with. If taking the voice of πέπαυται as passive makes it possible to relate 1 Pet 4:1c with Rom 6:7, does the meaning of ἄμαρτία in 1 Peter do so as well? In addition to 4:1, ἄμαρτία occurs five more times in four other texts of 1 Peter. In 2:22a it is singular, but its use with ποιεῖν ("to do") makes it certain that it is thought of in terms of a concrete deed of wrongdoing. This is confirmed by the verses which immediately follow and interpret "he did no sin" in 2:22a. According to 2:22b-23, he did not manifest guile, he did not revile, and he did not threaten. Instead of manifesting such traits and thus committing sin, 2:24 says that he rather "bore our sins [pl., ἄμαρτίας]... that we might die to sin [pl., ἄμαρτίαις]." Then, in parallel fashion to 2:24a, 3:18a says that "Christ also died for sins [pl., ἄμαρτιῶν]."

As has been pointed out earlier, it is this statement of 3:18 that is recapitulated in 4:1. Noting this, plus the fact that "sin" in the Petrine verses here presented, as well as in its final occurrence in the proverb quoted in 4:8 (ἄμαρτιῶν), is usually plural, and in any case concrete, one is pointed to the conclusion that the same significance should be attributed to the singular form in 4:1c. Whether the verb is middle or passive, 4:1c asserts that there takes place, or is brought about, a cessation from sin in the sense of πάνω.

This sense also presents the most fitting contrast to what follows in 4:2-4, where we have the picture of concrete wrongdoing in the variety of its manifestations.42

41 Cf. Dalton, p. 247. Dalton, in arguing for the connection of Peter with Paul, says that "Christ, though personally sinless, entered into solidarity with the human race and suffered from the effects of this solidarity. By his death he passed definitively from these conditions of existence, conditions of human weakness and misery due to sin, and entered into the new order of the Spirit... the new sphere of his glory. In this sense only can He be said to 'finish with sin.'" With what Dalton says here, cf. Sieffert, p. 424.

42 For further discussion, including rebuttal of Dalton's position, see Excursus B at the close of the present article.

43 To point to the variant reading ἄμαρτιας ("sins") instead of ἄμαρτίας ("sin") as lending further support, by virtue of the plural form, to the sense of concrete
It could, of course, make logical sense in and of itself to say that having been removed from sin as power, Christians need no longer keep on sinning. The real point which must be considered, however, is the meaning which Peter himself gives to the word ἁμαρτία ("sin"). Admittedly, Peter may be using a maxim in 4:1c, and this maxim may have a variant form in Rom 6:7, where contextual considerations make the conclusion inevitable that sin is being conceived of as a power. In such a case, however, the question still would have to be raised as to how Peter was using the maxim, just as the same must be asked of Paul.⁴⁴ In Peter's own context the sin of which 4:1c speaks, no matter what its significance was in Paul's use of the theologoumenon mirrored in Rom 6:7, signifies the practice of immoral acts. If this be the correct sense of ἁμαρτία ("sin"), it then appears that taking πέπαυται ("has ceased") as middle⁴⁵ supplies a better and more logical coherence of thought.⁴⁶ Thus, the sufferer of 4:1c is one who has desisted from his sinful ways.

A specific illustration of this, and one which uses the word παῦω, is to be found in 1 Pet 3:10, which is a slightly modified quotation from the LXX of Ps 34:13. In this text, Peter says of one

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⁴⁴W. C. van Unnik gives support to the general principle involved here when he says that "even where we see a writer using traditional schemes, he always gives them a special turn" ("The Teaching of Good Works in 1 Peter," NTS 1 [1954-1955]:93).

⁴⁵Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich, p. 643, does not even list any passive meanings in the discussion of παῦω. Only active and middle definitions are discussed, with the greater weight being placed on the middle. However, πέπαυται does occur a number of times in the LXX, and sometimes the passive meaning seems intended. In the following list of occurrences the texts italicized probably represent passives: Exod 9:34; Isa 16:10; 24:8, 11; 26:10; 32:10; 33:8. Possibly, we should think the passive in Isa 32:10, where πέπαυται stands in a phrase which is in synonymous parallelism with the preceding phrase which contains a passive (though it is followed by a phrase—not necessarily in synonymous parallelism—which contains an active), and perhaps also in Exod 9:34. Cf. Hart, p. 70.

⁴⁶Bigg, p. 167, supports the middle sense, and this goes along with his general observation (agreed to by Selwyn, p. 209, and evidenced by our consideration above of the specific texts in which ἁμαρτία occurs) that ἁμαρτία in 1 Peter always means a sinful act.
who wishes to see life that he should παυσάτω τὴν γλώσσαν ἀπὸ κακοῦ . . . ("cease" or "keep his tongue from evil . . ."). Then in vs. 11, in dependence on Ps 34:14, he continues: ἐκκλινάτω δὲ ἀπὸ κακοῦ, καὶ ποιησάτω ἀγαθόν ("let him turn away from evil and do right"). While this is an OT quotation, and while the material in the Psalm quoted may have been part of an early Christian catechism dealing with catechumen virtues, of which Peter made use, it is nevertheless true that the material quoted is utilized by Peter to summarize and express his very own simple and practical ethical teaching. However, it is 4:2-4, with which 4:1 is fundamentally related, and 2:21-23 (cf. 2:1) which illustrate best what Peter means by ceasing from sin. At rock-bottom, ceasing from sin has to do with the putting away of the old vices of pagan society and the imitation of the humble virtues of Christ. In other words, Christians, who are modeled after Christ, are a totally new kind of people in comparison with what they were before in their pagan ways. This concept is similar to the idea found in the Pauline literature of putting off the old man and putting on the new (with which cf. 1 Pet 1:14; 2:11; 4:2). The new being and walk of the believer in 1 Peter is presented in the overarching framework of allegiance to God during times of suspicion and slander, threats and trials, pressures and persecutions.

This interpretation obviously has negative results for the question of whether the διὲ clause is explicative. For Peter, Christ is the righteous one (3:18) who did no sin (2:22), the Lamb without spot (1:19). Consequently, "the same thought" which Christ and Christians share cannot include, on the part of Christ, desisting from personal misdeeds. E. A. Sieffert is right, in my judgment, when he points out that the major objection which can be raised against the interpretation of the διὲ clause as explicative is "that the πέπαυται ἀμαρτίας ('has ceased from sin') cannot be applied to Christ, because this expression presupposes not merely an earlier connection with sin but an earlier sinning itself." He himself sees the clause as explicative, and answers the objection by saying that πέπαυται can refer to a previous state as well as to a previous deed.

47Selwyn, pp. 408-410, 413, 414.
48Ibid., p. 190.
49Sieffert, p. 422.
He cites illustrations of this from Diodor, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, and Aristotle. These writers use παύω ("to cease") for the cessation of aspects of suffering such as hunger, danger, and illness. In like manner, says Sieffert, πέπανται ἁμαρτίας refers to the sins of mankind as that under which Christ had to suffer and as that from which he was freed since his πάθειν σαρκί ("suffering in the flesh") was at an end. By his death Christ was freed from all passive connection with sin.50

Over against Sieffert it must be said that one cannot pass so easily and immediately from the various non-biblical sources he quotes to the meaning of 1 Pet 4:1c. This text has a context, and the word ἁμαρτία ("sin") is used in a certain way by Peter, as we have indicated. It was incumbent upon Sieffert to show how the interpretation he presents corresponds with Peter's usage, and this he does not do. That Sieffert comes to this improper conclusion is basically the result of the fact that he finds it necessary to make the ὅτι clause explicative.51 He presents two arguments in favor of this.

50 Ibid., pp. 423-424. In dependence upon Sieffert, Strobel, p. 424, says that πέπανται stands in contrast not only to an earlier deed, but equally to an earlier, encompassing sphere of non-subjective reality. To those who, like Sieffert, hold that 4:1c gives the content of "the same thought," the question can be put: If the ὅτι clause is explicative, so that it be necessary to say that Christ himself ceased from sin, and if this means with respect to Christ that all passive, non-subjective connection with sin is ended (a thought which in the context of 1 Peter could only mean that for him who had done no sin [2:22] his sufferings, due to the world and its sins, were over), how then could it be said to Christians that they should arm themselves with "the same thought" when what ends for them, according to 4:1c-4, is not a passive state of suffering, but the activity of sinning? (After all, 1 Peter presupposes that Christians do continue to suffer.)

The explicative view cannot do justice to the identity between Christ and the believer called for by τὴν ἀυτὴν εἰνοῦν ("the same thought") (cf. Usteri, p. 169, and Kühl, p. 247, n. *). A better equivalence is seen by finding the content of "the same thought" in 4:1a rather than in 4:1c. According to this construction, arming oneself with "the same thought" has no application at all to the end of suffering, but is a call precisely to suffering—a willing suffering for righteousness' sake. Such suffering is the vehicle by which the persecuting powers—behind which stand the cosmic forces of 3:22 (cf. Reicke, Disobedient Spirits, pp. 200-201)—are vanquished, in that the sinful way of life in contrariety to God which they represent is fully rejected. In such a victory built upon this kind of suffering there is a basic identity with Jesus Christ.

51 The interpreter can move in one of two directions. He can start with the idea that the ὅτι clause cannot be explicative since this would entail too great a problem
First, Sieffert states that if one relates "the same thought" to 4:1a, where the event of Christ's suffering in the flesh is spoken of, this would result in seeing in ἐννοεῖα ("thought") the idea contained in βουλή ("plan" or "decision"), so that ἐννοεῖα would then mean "decision" (Entschluß) or "intention" (Vorsatz). However, maintains Sieffert, ἐννοεῖα is usually "the consideration of a question or a fact, and this therefore requires that the δὴ which follow must have the meaning "that."\(^5\) This argument is not sound, for as we have seen, the word ἐννοεῖα can carry the idea of intention, and one evidence of this is the fact that ἐννοεῖα can be connected with βουλή, as in Prov 2:11, 3:21, and 8:12. Furthermore, if ἐννοεῖα means the consideration of a question or fact, why cannot this fact be the suffering of Christ in the flesh (4:1a), with the implied consequence of this, viz., his victory?

Second, there is, according to Sieffert, an obvious connection between μηκέτι ("no longer") in vs. 2 and πέπαινατ ("has ceased") in vs. 1c, a connection which disallows taking the δὴ as parenthetical. Sieffert believes that the only way to maintain this connection and yet have vs. 2 be a reference to the readers (which it must be, since vs. 3, which confirms vs. 2, refers to the readers) is to take 4:1c as explicative of 4:1b and to consider the εἰς τὸ ("so as" or "so that") statement of vs. 2 as dependent on the total clause originating with διάλεγμα ("arm yourselves") and ending with ἀμαρτίας in vs. 4:1b-c).

*The δὴ Clause (4:1c) in Relationship to μηκέτι in 4:2*

To be sure, as our own argumentation has shown, vs. 2 must be thought of as containing a second person plural, but since we

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\(^5\)Sieffert, p. 421.
have taken 4:1c as parenthetical, there is on this basis no problem for, nor discrepancy between, the second person plural of vs. 2 and the third person singular of 4:1c. This means that the only real point of discussion with Sieffert is over his contention that μηκέτι ("no longer") depends on πέπαυται ("has ceased") and that this excludes the parenthesis. I disagree with Sieffert. While πέπαυται ἁμαρτίας ("has ceased from sin") and the μηκέτι clause are in conceptual agreement, the latter (together with vss. 3-4, supplying details germane to the significance of πέπαυται ἁμαρτίας), the primary factor which calls for and makes possible the μηκέτι of vs. 2, is the believers' acceptance of the exhortation in 4:1b (which, in turn, is based upon the christological datum of 4:1a). When believers arm themselves with the thought of Christ's suffering for righteousness' sake and his consequent victorious lordship (3:18-4:1), they will no longer live by human passions (vss. 2-4).

When vss. 1-2 are understood according to the exegesis I am suggesting, then justice is done to (1) the μηκέτι, (2) the plural reference in vs. 2, and (3) the meaning of sin in 1 Peter and the implication which follows from this meaning and the middle voice which coheres with it, viz., that Christ could never have been said to have desisted from concrete sinning. Thus, "the same thought" can only be what we have suggested is contained in 4:1a when seen as resuming the previous context, viz., suffering for the cause of righteousness brings victory.

For Christ, the originator of the victory, that victory, following his expiatory suffering for sins, consists in his supremacy over the malevolent forces which threaten existence; and for suffering Christians, the receptors of the results of the Christ-event, victory expresses itself in terms of a clear conscience (3:21) and cessation.

53Though disagreeing with the explicative understanding of 4:1c, represented by Sieffert and others, Kühl, p. 248, asserts that μηκέτι stands in the closest relation to πέπαυται. He does this in agreement with his interest in demolishing the idea that πέπαυται ἁμαρτίας also refers to Christ. It cannot do so, says Kühl, because the result of the πέπαυται is the μηκέτι clause, which refers to evil deeds done.

54Desisting from sinful actions (4:1c) and no longer living according to human lusts (4:2) do not really stand in the relation of cause and effect, but of synonymity. Both are the result of arming oneself with the thought of Christ's suffering, an idea which finds the practical equivalent in the "he who has suffered in the flesh" of 4:1c.
from the sinful way of life in paganism (4:1c, 2-4). Therefore, while 4:1c contains the two basal elements of the Christ-event and hence of "the same mind," viz., suffering and victory, these elements are applied in such a way that, as a pair, they can refer here only to humans but not to Christ.

4. Conclusion

We conclude, then, that arming oneself with "the same thought" in 4:1c refers back to 4:1a "since therefore Christ suffered in the flesh"—, with all that this statement implies as resumptive of the preceding context. 1 Pet 4:1c adds support to this call for Christian armament by declaring that suffering for the right (implied: as Christ did and because Christ did) and victory over the wrong are indissolubly related realities.

A further word may be said about suffering for the right. That this idea is inherent in 4:1c is clear from the fact that ὁ ἡμικαταθητη ("he who has suffered") in 4:1c stands parallel with Χριστὸς ἡμικαταθητη ("Christ having suffered") in 4:1a, and this latter phrase is derived from 3:18, where it is explicitly connected with the thought of suffering for others. Furthermore, the ὅτι ("for," "because") standing at the beginning of 3:18 indicates that vs. 18 gives support to, and is the supreme illustration of, the idea of suffering for the right in 3:17 (cf. vs. 14). Thus, the fundamental ingredient in Christ's suffering for the right was his suffering for others.

The thought then arises: Since there is a fundamental parallel and relationship between Christ's suffering and ours, could it be that 4:1c, by way of implication, carries the thought that as Christ suffered for us to bring us to God (3:18), we are armed with the same thought when we suffer for him, as those grasped by his

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55Compare with our twofold structure for interpreting "arm yourselves with the same thought" the presentation of Leonhard Goppelt, Der erste Petrusbrief, Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament, vol. 12:1, ed. by Ferdinand Hahn, 8th ed. (Göttingen, 1978), pp. 268-271. Goppelt's scheme moves as follows: The way of suffering and death leads to life in the Spirit, as seen in the case of Christ (3:18-22). When the believer arms himself with this insight of faith, he suffers in the flesh, with its inherent consequence that he ceases from sinning (4:1a). Henceforth, he lives in this world according to the will of God (4:2), which is the historical counterpart of the eschatological living in the Spirit (spoken of in 4:6).
salvific work? If it is the Christian vocation to follow the example of the Christ who suffered for others (2:21), may it not be that this example encompasses not merely how Christians treat their persecutors, but how they do all that they do, for Christ? Is not this reciprocity the very point of 1 Pet 2:24? In this text it is stated that the purpose of Christ’s dying was so that man might die to sin and live to righteousness. This is another way of talking about living for Christ or for God.

According to Peter, the aim of Christ’s death was to bring us to God (3:18) whose servants we are to be (2:16) and whose will we are to follow (4:2). The basic idea involved here has a counterpart in 2 Cor 5:15: “And he died for all, that those who live might live no longer for themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised.” Consequently, “the same thought” may contain, as a contextual implication, the idea of “for the other.” In terms of the relationship between Christ and Christians the idea is that of “One for all” and, therefore, “all for One.” It is only in the context of this relationship that suffering and victory over sin can be brought together. Otherwise the thought would be unbiblical and unchristian. Suffering has no saving value in and of itself.

Another exegetical question of significance for the interpretation of 1 Pet 4:1 is the nature of the aorist tense in διὰ παθῶν (“he who has suffered”) and of the perfect in πέφαυσα (“has ceased”). This will be considered in connection with the various views of the text which will be set forth in the continuation of this series in a future issue of AUSS.

56 Cf. Reicke, James, Peter, and Jude, p. 116. Reicke says: “Thus the newly converted, vs. 1a, must be ready to suffer for Christ in the flesh as Christ suffered for them in the flesh.”

57 Bigg, p. 167, points in this direction when he says of 4:1c: “St. Peter does not say our guilt is taken away by our sufferings, or that Christ did not suffer for us all, or that our sufferings can do us any good except so far as they are bourne for the love of Christ.”
EXCURSUS A

1 PETER 3:18-22: DIGRESSION OR PROGRESSION?


This passage, in whole or in part (i.e., 3:18b-22 or only 3:19-21), is not extraneous to Peter's argument. In 3:18-22, Peter is preparing the way for his practical admonitions in 4:1ff. on the new life which, amidst antagonism, believers must and can lead. The necessity and the ability to lead this life are grounded in the victory of Christ spoken of in 3:18-22. This victory includes his death, his resurrection and subsequent preaching to the evil spiritual powers who disobeyed at the time of the Flood (cf. 2 Pet 2:4-5 and Jude 6), and his exaltation to God's right hand and over all spiritual forces. This victorious power of Christ invests itself in baptism, and thus baptism saves.

Consequently, it can rightly be said that the discussion from 3:14 onward concerning the bearing of Christians during times of suffering for righteousness at the hands of earthly antagonists is being continued in 4:1ff. But this argument has now become all the stronger because of Peter's emphasis on Christ's victory over sin and all cosmic antagonists—a victory which makes itself known savingly through baptism.

In relation to 3:22 and 4:1, cf. Ceslas Spicq, Les épîtres de Saint Pierre (Paris, 1966), p. 143; also D. G. Wohlenberg, Der erste und zweite Petrusbrief und der Judasbrief (Leipzig, 1915), p. 120 (he suggests that the οὖν ["therefore"] in 4:1 indicates that the following admonition is to be understood in the light of the fact that Christ was exalted to God's right hand from the deepest suffering); see also Dalton, pp. 85, 100, 240. Bo Reicke thinks there is a further tie-in between 4:1 and the previous context by virtue of the relationship he sees between ἐννοια ("thought") and συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα ("appeal for" or "pledge of a good conscience") in 3:21 (see his Disobedient Spirits, pp. 202, 189-190, 193; also pp. 2, 127-130, and especially 135-136 on the non-digressionary character of 3:18-22).
EXCURSUS B

"SIN" ACCORDING TO 1 PETER: DEED OR STATE?

William J. Dalton, in the interest of his view that πέπαινεται ("has ceased") is passive and that therefore "sin" must refer, as in Rom 6:7, to something more than sin committed, argues for a distinction in the use of "sin" in 1 Peter. He maintains that the term "sin" in 2:22 means sin committed, but that in 2:24, 3:18, and 4:8 it refers rather to the resultant ‘state of sinfulness’ due to past sin’ because in these verses stress is placed in one way or another on remission of sin (Christ's Proclamation to the Spirits: A Study in 1 Peter 3:18-4:6 [Rome, 1965], p. 242 and nn. 24 and 25). Three points may be made in rebuttal.

1. It is artificial to disconnect concrete sin and the resultant state of sinfulness. This latter concept, as framed by Dalton, can only be another way of speaking about the guilt of sin, for it is only the guilt of sin that can be due to past sinning; the propensity to sin or being under the power of sin is that which precedes concrete sinning. Now, there can be no fundamental separation between sin as guilt and sin as misdeed. (Note Rom 1:32: "Those who do such things deserve to die.") While one may reflect on guilt abstractly or as an abstract concept, in reality it always involves the concrete act itself. Sin by definition is a guilty act. When 1 Pet 2:22 says that Christ committed no sin, it is saying that Christ in no way was guilty of an evil deed. When, on the other hand, 3:18 says that Christ died for sins, it is saying that he took away our guilty misdeeds as something to be remembered and held up against us in the judgment. The ledger book is clean. What is forgiven is not sin as power or fate, but sin as concrete deed. Only sin as deed can be forgiven; sin as power has to be broken.

2. That which follows 1 Pet 4:1c (vss. 2-4) is a description of sinful deeds which are overcome in Christian life in contrast with the old pagan life. It is not an abstract state of sinfulness that is emphasized here (i.e., it is not the concept of sinfulness = guilt), but deeds contrary to the will of God. One no longer does what one used to do.

3. The idea of ceasing from the guilt of sin does not meet the terms of Dalton's own argumentation according to which 1 Pet
4:1c represents the same teaching as Rom 6:7, for Dalton maintains that Rom 6:7 is talking about being freed from the slavery of sin (p. 244). Now, if in respect to all this Dalton means something more than the guilt of sin by “‘a state of sinfulness’ due to past sin,” he should have made this clear. If by his phrase “‘a state of sinfulness’” he means the defective, sin-inclined nature of man, he should have said so. But how would this definition fit in with the idea of *remission of sins* in 2:24, 3:18, and 4:8, of which Dalton speaks on p. 242, n. 25?