BOOK REVIEWS

"2 Corinthiens 3, 6-14 et le début de la formation du Nouveau Testament,” NTS 24 [1978]: 384-386). He also questions the value of the Papias' material on the Logia of Matthew, and disputes the value of Irenaeus Hist. Eccl. 3.1.1 as a witness to the Semitic origin of the Gospels. But his main criticism of Carmignac is that of "narrow fundamentalism," namely, of "working on the faith assurance of assuming a priori that the Gospel is true, and of applying himself to prove it historically" (pp. 178-179).

Carmignac replies to these charges with thought-provoking arguments, and with two relevant questions: first, if there are scientific arguments in favor of an early date for the writing of the Gospels, why not take them seriously? and second, if these arguments help an unbeliever to ponder about the historicity of Jesus, or if they strengthen the faith of a believer, will this result not be worthwhile?

Grelot concluded his series of ironical remarks by prophesying that in the year 2000 the theories of Carmignac "will lay in the graveyard of dead hypothesis" (p. 187). Carmignac, in turn, challenges Grelot to meet at that date (if both are still alive!) and verify then which of the two will have been the best prophet. We would hope that the stimulating discussion brought about by this little book will contribute to the clarification of some important areas of the Synoptic question long before that time.

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This book presents a simple but important argument: namely, that since all science is based on assumptions, a Christian should approach science from explicitly Christian assumptions. This is not the first of such arguments, but it is good to see it applied specifically to sociology, a field that in America definitely has Christian roots. The book is a welcome contribution to the age-old dialogue between religion and science, faith and reason. It is very readable with short chapters, easy language, and lively style. The author demonstrates broad knowledge of philosophy and of the history of both Christian and scientific thought, although he draws from such sources mainly to support his Christian apologetics.

The book is divided into two parts. Part A, "Thinking Christianly about the Social Sciences: A Question of Assumptions," examines the assumptions of science, their sources and implications (chaps. 1-4), and assesses the state of objective science in general and social science in particular (chaps. 5 and 6). Part B, "Toward a Christian Understanding of Human Relationships," is a case study of this mainstream sociological topic, outlining a framework that a Christian might use in examining the
subject. The original human condition is a “relational given”; sin brought about separation and thus a “relational problem” which presents a “relational dilemma” (chap. 7). One “illegitimate” solution to this dilemma is substitution by idolatry, humanism, or utilitarianism (chaps. 8 and 9). The other false solution is denial: humanism denies the transcendent, fatalism denies humanity, individualism denies our need for others, communalism denies our need for personal identity, naturism denies humanity’s dominion over creation, and technologism denies the problem by trying to exercise absolute control over nature (chaps. 10-12). The conclusion (chap. 13 and epilogue) recapitulates what a Christian social science should be: namely, explicit, integrative, and based on biblical values.

This kind of social science is to be guided by the basic tenets of the Judeo-Christian faith, which Gaede boils down to three assumptions: (1) “God, as the Creator of the world, is greater than His creation”; (2) “the human being, as one aspect of God’s creation, is inferior to the Creator”; and (3) humanity is fallen through “the existence and powerful influence of sin” (pp. 50-51). Gaede shows how modern science developed within these “Christian constraints,” but how these constraints, seen as impediments to progress, were gradually eliminated through the influence of Enlightenment thought. “Objective science” thus became “arrogant” and “dogmatic,” allowing only “naturalistic” interpretation and effectively pushing away any alternative framework.

The author’s understanding of “objective science” is perhaps the greatest problem that this book poses. To him, objectivism is really naturalism (pp. 66-67); i.e., it sees the material universe as the sum total of reality and excludes belief in the supernatural. According to him, a Christian cannot follow the model of objective science and simply keep God in the background; to follow the value-neutral model is to be “seduced” into naturalism (p. 74). Gaede confesses having fallen into this trap himself in his earlier experience of social-science research. This equation of objectivism with naturalism, however, seems to be another assumption that the author does not discuss. An attempt to be objective does not ipso facto make the scientist a non-Christian, as Gaede seems to assume (e.g., p. 71); in fact, such an assumption belongs to the dualistic framework that he explicitly condemns (pp. 163-165).

Finite beings as we are, our understandings of God and this world are incomplete or even erroneous; if we are seriously searching for the truth, we must allow other interpretations besides our own. By comparison we come closer to the truth, but this implies a certain framework within which the different perceptions are interpreted. Christians hold the Bible as such a framework for matters of faith. Scientific theories have served that purpose for the findings of science. Gaede is right in claiming that science is still far from objective truth; theories and paradigms can change almost overnight. The fact that the scientific community eventually accepts a new
paradigm, however, shows objectivity in the search for truth. In Christianity, the Reformation could be seen as an introduction of another paradigm to the sphere of faith. In both spheres, science and faith, change has apparently come through objective investigation; without it, we would still believe in a flat earth or burn "witches"!

Both in matters of faith and in matters of knowledge, then, we see only "through the glass, darkly," and know only "in part" (1 Cor. 13:12). We are products of our history, and that historicity colors all our interpretations. At the same time, it is this positive prejudice that enables us to understand or interpret in the first place; we cannot interpret on a sterile ground, we interpret within our own frameworks with all their limitations and biases. This insight makes it all the more important to check our interpretations with those of other interpretive frameworks, a process that takes place not only in science but in all interpersonal association. Objectivity may not be possible, but we come closer to it by intersubjectivity, by trying to see with the eyes of another, perhaps a person with a different world view. Gaede himself could not have written such a penetrating analysis without the aid of objective science (how would he know what pantheism is?)!

There are some logical contradictions in this book. As one example, Gaede claims that because science is based on assumptions, its findings are relative (pp. 62-64), yet there is an implication that the findings of Christian science are absolute (at least, not relative) in spite of their assumptions. Looking from a larger perspective, this creates a problem: to someone with different assumptions, Christian science is relative, and within Christianity there are different assumptions and thus different findings. A Christian, however, need not be ashamed to admit that his or her findings are relative, because this need not mean that truth is relative, only our understanding of it is. As a second instance, Gaede portrays natural scientists as narrow-minded (no doubt true in many cases) and considers himself to be taking a broad-minded stand. This, however, leads him to another contradiction, as can be seen in the following statement: "A Christian social science does not require nonparticipating social scientists to operate on the basis of its assumptions. Nor does it deny the legitimacy of social science efforts constructed within other frameworks, though it certainly may deny their claims to truth" (pp. 160-161). How can there be legitimacy without claims to truth? In another place (p. 92) Gaede portrays the Christian scientist as one who is sifting through the findings of naturalistic science and taking what is applicable. If these findings are based on wrong assumptions, what use does the Christian have for any of them? This is simply an admission that scientific findings are not quite so bad as Gaede is portraying them to be.

One last point: the title of the book does not accurately reflect its content, for one would guess from the title that this is an existential treatise. The connection between the title and the content is indeed a bit
farfetched; only in one spot (p. 158) is there a suggestion that the "house where gods may dwell" is science. The subtitle at least could have been used to describe the content, which is the proposal of a Christian philosophy for social science.

In writing this book, Gaede undertook a challenge that has been a controversy of the ages. It is unrealistic to expect that he, or anyone else, could satisfactorily solve it. Where Gods May Dwell, however, is valuable as another Christian voice in the dialogue. It gives some creative insights and provokes thought, and can thus profit any Christian who wants seriously to examine the relationship between faith and science and the foundations upon which these rest.

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The problem which Jerry Gladson deals with in this book goes beyond the mere academic world of reflections and information. The issue is not simply theological or philosophical, nor even exegetical, but rather one that concerns every one of us in daily life. It was to be expected, therefore, that the prologue which opens Gladson's study would draw its material from life—in this case, the unexpected and tragic death of a woman named Janet. Thus, we immediately immersed into a feeling of pain mixed with the consciousness of the overwhelming reality—"the abiding question"—of the meaning of suffering.

The author first considers briefly various attempts that have been made to deal with the question of theodicy. The Eastern view denies the reality of suffering. Augustine and Irenaeus assume it as a necessary condition—the former to guarantee freedom, the latter as a means to spiritual development. Process Philosophy sees the solution within a common struggle involving God, who runs the risk to love and thereby has no control at all over evil. Lastly, the "tragic view" interprets suffering as an inherent part of the human condition, meaningless and definitely pessimistic. Since none of these solutions "adequately explain" the problem of evil in God's world, Gladson turns to the book of Job, wherein the presumed solution will be reached.

Job, the victim of a "heavenly council" involving God and man, is crushed by successive trials which bereave him of all his wealth and children, and finally leave him sick and devastated. After some time of stoic submission, Job revolts and claims his innocence against God. His friends who had come to comfort him reject his view and contend that God cannot