magazines and newspapers, speeches, e-mail messages and web sites, in addition to solid historical monographs and journal articles (especially in chap. 4, “The Year 1000”). Scholars will benefit from perusing his explanatory notes at the end of each chapter, as they further define issues, compare opposing viewpoints, and give additional examples of points made in the text.

Despite its brevity, *Millennium Bug* accomplishes even more than its author promised in the Foreword. The book provides not only a biblical perspective on the Y2K panic, but along the way it offers a good bit of medieval and modern history, lots of pastoral counseling, and some sage advice on how to know Jesus Christ as one’s personal Savior so as not to panic when the real end-time arrives. Its stunning cover art, engaging prose style, and practical suggestions should appeal to a broad spectrum of readers young and old. Unfortunately, the Seventh-day Adventist slant of chaps. 3 through 7 (jargon, Ellen White citations, church-history references) will no doubt limit its popular appeal among other Christians and non-Christians whose concerns about Y2K might otherwise lead them to read this book. Perhaps Paulien, an authority on how to reach the secular mind (see his *Present Truth in the Real World*), could revise these latter chapters and write a book with wider appeal that religious publishers like Eerdmans or Zondervan would be happy to market in Christian bookstores nationwide. *The Millennium Bug* deserves no less.

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Josef Pieper presented the content of this book in two separate lectures as part of the Bonn, Germany, “Week for Higher Education” during the summer of 1947. Following the German publication by Kösel-Verlag in 1948, Pantheon Books published its first English translation in 1952. Josef Pieper was (1904-1997) a post-World War II West German Catholic philosopher located at the time of the original publication at the University of Westphalia. This edition, translated anew by Gerald Malsbary, includes an appendix with eight review articles of the original translation published in 1952.

The original parochial purpose for presenting the two lectures that became this book must be kept in mind when reading it. The author’s main purpose in addressing the postwar West German Republic was to convey the need for a liberal education in the context of leisure. The author’s vision was focused on the need to balance out a university’s curricular offerings of scientific, work-related disciplines like medicine, engineering, and architecture, with leisure-oriented disciplines like philosophy and theology.

This need for leisure was framed following the Cold War’s ideology of the need of Germany to resist the communist threat. As a philosopher Pieper also added cautions against the maladies of the capitalist evils. He saw both communism and capitalism as equal threats against the culture of Germany. Both threats are perceived by Pieper as having the same basic philosophical malady (i.e., giving preeminence to work over and above the need for celebrating festivals in the context of leisure).
Pieper presents the concept of festivals as facilitating the “cultus” or the religious sacrifice, as catalyst and sole raison d’être for human existence. The logic used by the author is given in the context of western philosophy following Greek classical roots going through Socrates, Plato, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Pascal, Hegel, Kant, Weiss, Uexküll and others. The “cultus” is an exercise free of practical consequences, worship for the sake of leisure, beauty, and communion with God and the inner self.

The author extensively quotes in Latin from Thomas Aquinas and others, and in Greek, mostly using first-hand source materials. The philosophical paradigm presented was grounded on Pieper’s definition of the German government’s higher-education problem. “Here is where the metaphysical roots of the problem lie: the ‘politicization’ is only a symptom and consequence. And indeed, it must be admitted here that this is nothing other than the fruit . . . of philosophy itself, of modern philosophy!” (75).

Freedom was to be understood as the academic exercise that by definition was not subject to any particular useful purpose. This academic freedom fosters what Pieper calls plain festivals. Festivals are grounded on religious celebrations for the sake of leisure and beauty.

Work, as defined by Kant in his Law of the Human Reason, provides the capacity to acquire property. Work in turn holds a claim on humans. This claim means that there “is nothing in his knowing that is not the fruit of his own efforts; there is nothing ‘received’ in it” (14). If this logic of labor is to be followed to its ultimate consequences then, as Hermann Rauschning said and Pieper quoted: “Every action makes sense, even criminal acts . . . all passivity is senseless” (14). What follows this logic is the question of life’s meaning and satisfaction: can humans live by work alone? The answer given by Pieper is the raison d’être for promoting the “artes liberales” or liberal arts as an integral part of the university’s curriculum.

Pieper’s solution to transcending human making-meaning is to ground society on a moral basis that transcends human byproducts of work and capital. He presents the need to ponder, beyond the need to work itself. This, he says, can best be done in the context of philosophy. “Only that wisdom is sought for its own sake (says Thomas) which does not come to man as a possession; much more so, would this lovingly sought-for wisdom be such as to be granted to man as a ‘loan’” (Commentary on the Metaphysics, I, 3, quoted by Peiper, 113). Humans need to ground their work on leisure; that which we produce and control ought to depend from that which is free and a mystery. Human products need to be subordinated to the philosophical process.

At this point of the argument Pieper makes the leap into a statement of faith—“Only God understands the word ‘from a single point of view’; that is, by itself and in terms of its one, final cause. “He alone is wise, who knows the highest cause”—in such a sense, God alone is meant” (115). This statement of faith guides all meaningful philosophy, something beyond humans that is stable and eternal. How can we reach out to this understanding? Pieper argues that philosophy alone, grounded on a theology that talks about human universal unity in God, can produce leisure that fosters festivals that praise the God that facilitates all knowledge (the Christian God). In this process humans find their true and only meaning in life, as opposed to finding meaning in the byproduct of their own work.
At the end on the millennium, and at the beginning of a “New World Order,” as proclaimed by the so-called only superpower remaining, we need to define order. Since the existing order seems to be solely grounded on production of capital, where not even two philosophies to produce this capital exist (in the absence of communism that existed as a perceived threat to Pieper and the post-World-War-II cold war era), it is critical for us to examine Pieper’s arguments.

In Pieper’s days the key to producing capital was work. As a product of an industrial society, work was translated as labor-intensive and hand-focused. Today capital is mainly conceived in the world of technology, where technology has taken the place of work, and brainpower has taken the place of manpower and hand-labor-intensive work. Our world presents a greater threat to human transcendence than the world of Pieper’s post-World-War-II era. In Pieper’s time at least humans were a commodity to produce capital. Today, humans are not the main commodity. Technology requires fewer hands, fewer people. This pushes the human capital from producing labor and finding the *raison d’etre* in it, to consuming technology and finding the *raison d’etre* in this consumerism.

I argue that our predicament is worse than Pieper’s predicament. In his time the solution was closer to the social mores. A society that saw humans as producers, the source of capital, was closer to leisure than a society that sees humans as consumers of their own product—technology. If there has ever been a time when we needed to foster philosophical and theological freedom it is today. If philosophy and theology also become the tools of society to promote the perceived well-being of institutions, in order to preserve the social milieu, then there is simply no way to balance and critique the social ills.

“Rather wonder is the beginning in the sense of the ‘principle’ (principium), the abiding, ever-intrinsic origin of philosophizing” (106). The definition of wonder has a negative and a positive side. It is negative to feel incomplete; thus the one who wonders must question. He “who feels wonder, does not know, or does not know completely, does not comprehend. He who knows does not feel wonder” (106). For a technological society it is pertinent to know and the commodity is knowledge, knowledge that can be compartmentalized, domesticated. For the church of this era to also domesticate knowledge could mean to negate the very process of wondering. The technological era, for the sake of fostering unity and preserving the institution, may feel threatened by the fostering of a sense of mystery. Today our churches and our society both need to foster the leisure that produces wonder, the wonder that produces critique and new possibilities.

The Christian problem with philosophy is not only to figure out whether, and in what manner “natural knowledge of the world can be joined in theory to supernatural faith” (132). It is much greater and encompassing; it includes the concept of wonder, the concept of mystery. Within Christianity wondering is an end in itself, “it concerns whether, and in what manner, the philosophizing of someone who roots his thinking in Christian reality can become a truly Christian philosophizing” (132).

For a Christian community it is imperative to foster philosophy for philosophy’s sake. If the church were to domesticate its theological and philosophical production it could threaten its own integrity of faith, and its capacity to wonder about the mysteries of salvation and apocalyptic realities. As Pieper warned us before, Christian philosophy must not ignore selected areas of
reality just because they are controversial or full of mystery. On the contrary, Christian philosophy must be different. “Christian philosophy is different because of its splashing and foaming of the soul’s breakers against the cliff of the divine Truth” (130). Such splashing promotes wonder and must serve as a deterrent against the New World Order of technocratic unity and dehumanizing capitalism.

It seems to me that Pieper’s message for today is a dual one. On the one hand he sounds the alarm against the technological advances that seem to kill the sense of wonder by domesticating philosophy with the dual leash of productivity and capitalism—a process that dehumanizes people and as such plays the role of the antichrist. The second call of alarm is directed towards the Christian church, a call not to kill the sense of wonder and mystery within its own theologians and philosophers. If the church is to be ready to sound the apocalyptic alarm against the world, it must keep the sense of wonder and the tensions that are brought by mystery within its own rank of philosophers and theologians. These two warnings, if listened to, can perhaps help the church be ready for the great leisure time that the real New World Order of the New Jerusalem will bring to this world. The church ought to foster a sense of wonder and mystery that will be the norm in this truly New World Order, the New Jerusalem Order, a place of true leisure.

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The Silent Church is a pioneering study into Seventh-day Adventist social ethics and how the Adventist ethic affects and should affect Adventism’s thought and action in the human-rights arena. Plantak, an Adventist pastor in England, undertook the topic as his doctoral research. He correctly points out that Adventism has generally been silent on social issues in the twentieth century, even though its earliest pioneers were far from silent. A case in point is “the church’s silence on the issue of human rights in the 1960s” (15). Again, he points out, when the church does speak, it all too often does so defensively in an area where it has special vested interests, such as in defeating Sunday laws.

The purpose of the study was to examine Adventist history, theology, and ethics in order to discover reasons for inconsistencies in the denomination’s approach to human rights. In order to accomplish that goal, the author needed to sample several issues in Adventist history. Although not formally stated as a goal in the “purpose of the research” section, the study also had a constructive aspect. It was obviously part of Plantak’s objective to move beyond what he considers traditional Adventism’s “pragmatic” approach to social issues and human rights to the development of a theoretical ethical/theological foundation for those concerns.

The author found himself in largely virgin territory in terms of extensive Adventist research on the topic. The closest previous study was probably Michael Pearson’s Millennial Dreams and Moral Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Pearson dealt mainly with Adventist personal ethics, especially how the Adventist Church deals with moral decisions in the area of human sexuality. Plantak’s study sought to widen the beachhead created by