oligarchies seeking to control our lives, and against the traditions that warp the plain meaning of foundation documents. The literalist ideal is direct access to the text. The Bible is not to be interpreted only by church prelates and theologians, but by every layman. Remember the ploughboy who, Tyndale claimed, would know the Bible better than the bishop. Such Bible populism runs deep and broad throughout American evangelical churches.

The same kind of populism insists that the U.S. Constitution can be interpreted by anyone who bothers to read it and can find plain sense in its text. Here the enemy oligarchy includes judges, law professors, and especially the nine Supreme Court justices, who are seen as perverters of the plain sense, legislating from the bench and forcing the text to say things it does not intend. The appeal of literalism to the American electorate is populist, and the methods of literalism are taught in evangelical congregations. Populism is political, for in America the electorate is where much of the power lies. Conservatives have repeatedly mobilized significant sectors of this electorate on issues regarding the way in which the Constitution is applied in the courts. Once again, Crapanzano has provided the details, but does not comprehend the larger picture.

Other points indicate Crapanzano's failure to integrate the two halves of his book. In discussing Constitutional literalism, he states that fundamentalist interpretation of Scripture is removed from "corrupting influences of any particular context of application," a luxury which lawyers and judges do not have (243). But the first half of his book is filled with examples where fundamentalists and other evangelicals struggle precisely with application of the Bible to specific contexts. Their struggles have many interesting similarities to Constitutional law.

Crapanzano's book is an excellent compendium of examples of literalism in the churches and the courts. As such it serves as a helpful resource. But ultimately his book fails to integrate the subject matter. If we wish to understand today's conservative movement in the U.S. courts and the evangelical churches, Serving the Word provides an important introduction. However, the reader is left to write most of the conclusion.

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This collection is an all-English-language edition of papers presented at the third Durham-Tübingen Research Symposium on Earliest Christianity and Judaism in September 1994 and was originally published untranslated by Mohr-Siebeck in 1996. In the Introduction, Dunn states that the purpose of the symposium was to further discuss Paul's attitude to the Jewish law in light of the continuity-discontinuity discussion initiated by Sanders (Paul and Palestinian Judaism), Limbeck (Die Ordnung des Heils), and his own "new perspective." The logic of the volume's organization is not immediately apparent. One would expect that since only Galatians, Romans, and 1 & 2 Corinthians are being discussed, papers relevant to these books would be grouped together. Even a thematic organization would have been helpful. Nonetheless, the unnumbered chapters are replete with rich material that quickly acquaints the reader with the status of the current debate.
The first two chapters provide general information. In chapter 1 (“The Understanding of the Torah in the Judaism of Paul’s Day: A Sketch” [7-23]), Hermann Lichtenberger provides a concise survey of the references to “torah” in the Qumran literature, the LXX, the Pseudepigrapha, Philo, and Josephus. He maintains that the literature refutes any notion that Torah is the vehicle to salvation. The second chapter (“The Attitude of Paul to the Law in the Unknown Years between Damascus and Antioch” [25-51]) contains Martin Hengel’s summary of his monograph, Die Unbekannte Jahre des Apostels Paulus, in which he hypothetically traces the development of Paul’s legal theology in the sixteen years between his conversion and the second missionary journey. Paul, he argues, was “no real antinomian” (29), but approached the law differently than mainstream Jews as a result of his encounter with Christ.

Three chapters are dedicated to the law in Galatians. In chapter 3 (“Paul’s Reasoning in Galatians 2:11-21” [53-74]), Jan Lambrecht opposes any notion that Paul endorsed “two gospels” for Jew and Gentile and contends that Paul preached a liberating gospel that transcended both Jewish and pagan systems of worship. Chapter 4 contains the essay of Bruce Longenecker (“Defining the Faithful Character of the Covenant Community” [75-97]), who provides an excellent contribution to the niarq Xπαροφί debate, from which he concludes that the covenant community is comprised of those who “fulfill the intentions of the law” even if they do not “observe the prescriptions of the law” (94). Graham Stanton presents the final chapter on Galatians (“The Law of Moses and the Law of Christ” [99-116]), in which he examines all the references to law—both positive and negative—and concludes that the “law of Christ” is actually a redefined version of the “law of Moses.” However, he refrains from divulging the contents of the “law of Christ.”

Three chapters are devoted to discussing the law in the Corinthian correspondence. In the sixth chapter (“Letter and Spirit in 2 Corinthians 3” [117-130]), Karl Kertlege argues similarly to Stanton, with his thesis that the “Spirit in the gospel erases the death-dealing power of the law, but not the (Mosaic) law as such” (128). Chapter 14 contains Peter Tomson’s essay on “Paul’s Jewish Background in View of His Law Teaching in 1 Corinthians 7” (251-270), in which he contends that Paul was a law-observant Jew who called for Jewish Christians to keep the “whole law” and gentiles “their minimum set of ‘commandments of God’” (269). In the fifteenth chapter (“All Things to All People: Paul and the Law in the Light of 1 Corinthians 9.19-23” [271-285]), Stephen Barton posits that Paul’s attitude to the Jewish law was governed by sociopolitical concerns as they related to the salvation of souls. In other words, Paul’s submission to the Jewish sociopolitical culture was not driven by a sense of conviction, but was strictly missiological.

Eight of the seventeen chapters are dedicated to Romans. In chapter 7 (“The Law in Romans 2” [131-150]), N. T. Wright examines the nature of the law and its association with gentiles and concludes that Paul sees the law strictly as a Jewish identity marker that has no significant relevance for gentiles. In chapter eight (“Three Dramatic Roles: The Law in Romans 3-4” [151-164]), Richard Hays agrees that the law identified the Jewish people, but further suggests that it pronounces
judgment on all human beings and points to the coming of Christ and the establishing of the covenant community. In chapter 9 ("The Adam-Christ Antithesis and the Law: Reflections on Romans 5:12-21" [165-205]), Otfried Hofius contends that the law—being a negative instrument belonging to the painful Adamic era—became obsolete at the Christ event. In the following chapter ("Hermeneutics of Romans 7" [207-214]), Hans Hubner calls for a hermeneutic of “willing” to supplement the hermeneutic of “knowing” in the interpretation of Rom 7. Chapters 11-13 contain a dialogue between Stephen Westerholm ("Paul and the Law in Romans 9-11" [215-237]; "Response to Heikki Räisänen" [247-249]) and Heikki Räisänen ("A Response to Stephen Westerholm" [239-246]). Westerholm charges that Paul’s intention in chapters 9-11 was to detail God’s triumph in Christ over the corrupt, created order, apart from any human effort. The citizen of the new order has no obligation to law. Räisänen counters that he has overstepped his exegetical liberties, and defends the continuity of the law. The final essay in the section on Romans appears in chapter 16 ("'Do we undermine the Law?' A Study of Romans 14.1-15.6" [287-308]), in which John M. G. Barclay proposes that Paul saw law observance as an “optional” requirement for the people of God, but remained faithful to choice parts of the Jewish law.

James Dunn brings the discussion to a conclusion with the final essay ("In Search of Common Ground" [309-334]). After offering cogent critiques to each contribution, Dunn "shows his hand" as he stresses the continuity of the law “into the new age inaugurated by Christ” (334). As Dunn forms his conclusions, it is obvious that he is trying to make sense of continuity in light of certain passages that hint at discontinuity. Hence, he muses: “How could Paul both claim that the law is holy and that nothing is unclean?” (326 [emphasis mine]). He suggests that even Paul was unable to achieve such a synthesis (ibid.).

Dunn’s dilemma is obviously shared by the other contributors who support the law’s continued relevance. Stanton laments: “We might reasonably wish that he had explained a little more fully what he meant by ‘the law of Christ’” (116); Kertledge refers to the ‘law of Christ’ as the new expression of the Mosaic law, but does not go into detail (128); Tomson never defines the “minimum set of commandments” (269) that gentiles were obligated to keep; Longenecker speaks of those who “fulfill the intentions of the law” (94); Wright observes that “Paul has not worked out in detail . . . exactly what this ‘keeping the law’ involves” (138); and in his response to Westerholm’s rejection of the law’s continuing relevance, Räisänen reasons: “Where the issue is that of men responding in faith to God’s grace in Christ, some kind of responsive co-operation by humans . . . must be presupposed” (246).

These comments highlight what I believe to be the major flaw in the book: the failure to define what is meant by “law.” Given the semantic options for the term νόμος, is it possible that the impasse would be weakened if those in the debate were emancipated from interpretive traditions and dared to view options other than the so-called “Mosaic” law? If Paul’s references to “law” are merely viewed through Mosaic eyes, it is only natural that confusion will arise from those trying to see how circumcision, sacrifices, and ceremonial uncleanliness relate to the integrated Christian community. Given the cultic exclusivity of the ceremonial
aspects of the Mosaic law, I can see why Hofius and Westerholm have no problem “throwing out the baby with the bathwater.” They tend to operate under the assumption that Christianity started with a moral tabula rasa, and the behavioral rules evolved situationally along with the growth of the community. The desire to rid Christianity of the Mosaic law is meticulously demonstrated in Hofius’s tunnel-visioned reading of Rom 5, where he totally rejects the overarching context. Yes, “law” does reveal sin, but Paul himself declares that “sin must not reign in the body” (6:11), and only “law” can identify sin (7:7).

The inability to define “law” also helps me to understand why Wright, Kertledge, and Tomson are hesitant when it comes to revealing the content of the “law” that Christians are obligated to keep. As I reflect on their confusion, I can’t help but wish that Hengel had placed more stock in his observation that “the first commandment, the law of love, and the ten commandments all had a central role in Paul’s preaching” (29). It would also have been beneficial if Tomson had specified the “basic commandments” that comprise “God’s commandments” in 1 Corinthians 7:19 (267-68). And how does Kertledge match his comment: “This law finds its new expression as the ‘law of Christ’ which is binding on Christians” (128), with his earlier statement that views the decalogue as representative of the Mosaic law? (122).

I am somewhat surprised that a project of such scope, prestige, and magnitude contains so many typographical, stylistic, and translation errors. Almost every chapter has items that need correction. Perhaps the lack of editorial finesse can serve as an object lesson for the fact that some things need to be carefully examined more than once. I would suggest starting with the references to τῶν καθότις in Paul.

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The second volume of the English-language version of the Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon: Internationale theologische Enzyklopädie is just as encyclopedic and helpful as the first. More than a mere translation, the English version has tailored many of its articles to meet the needs of English readers. In addition, several articles have been added specifically with that readership in mind. Beyond those modifications are updated and expanded reference sections especially aimed at enriching the English bibliographic information. Under the experienced editorship of Geoffrey W. Bromiley, the expanded translation is well adapted for its new market (for a full review of the series, see AUSS 38 (2000): 150-152).

The 384 articles of the second volume run from treatments of theologians and theological topics, to discussions of regional churches (e.g., Ethiopia), to introductions of biblical books, to such esoteric subjects as EST and the electronic church. Topics are treated with a multidisciplinary richness that makes The Encyclopedia of Christianity a rich resource on most of the topics treated.

Perhaps the subject given the most space in volume 2 is ecumenism and related subtopics. That is not particularly surprising, given the nature of the Encyclopedia. Included in this large cluster of topics are “Ecumenical Association