Let me mention briefly some methodological considerations. DUL follows the pattern of the traditional Semitic lexicons. Such a dictionary has its place and is certainly necessary for the Ugaritic language. However, it may be noteworthy to consider also a more functional approach to lexicography. For example, DUL does not include syntactic analyses (e.g., with which verbs a noun is used as subject or as object, or with which nouns or prepositions a verb is used), which are at least advisable for lexemes occurring more frequently. The relation of a specific lexical item with other lexical items in a clause (syntagmatic analysis) could receive more attention. Also the organization of glosses under frequently used lexical items does not necessarily reflect a semantic analysis. A paradigmatic analysis is partly undertaken in that parallel lexemes in a poetic context are listed. However, DUL lacks a systematic notation of synonyms or antonyms. There is also no differentiation between the use of a word in prose texts and in poetic texts. Since the occurrences of a lexical item are not necessarily listed comprehensively in an entry, an indication of frequency would have been a helpful feature.

The layout of the dictionary leaves a few things to be desired, especially if one is used to the clearly arranged Spanish original. In DUL there is no additional space between the individual entries, and the hanging indent of the lemmata is barely large enough to indicate a new entry. Here, a more liberal use of space and especially the printing of the lemmata in a more distinct boldface (the boldface used is hardly distinguishable from the normal typeface) and/or in a larger font size would have facilitated a much easier and quicker overview. The type of font used is, at least for my taste, not pleasant to read, particularly because the print does not appear to be very sharp. These shortcomings regarding the layout are partly due to the small format of the volume (6" x 9.5"=15 cm x 24 cm; cf. the size of the Spanish DLU: 8" x 10.5"=20 cm x 27 cm). The inconsistency on the title page of part 1—the beginning lemma is given as “'(a/i/u” instead of “'(a/i/u)”—catches one’s eye. Somewhat unorthodox is the transliteration of the gutturals /'/ and /'/ with the signs ? and f (the Spanish DLU uses ' and ‘). The list of abbreviations lacks the frequently used “bkn” (always “bkn atx.”) which apparently stands for “broken” and designates fragmentary readings.

DUL sets a high standard for Ugaritic lexicography. Presently, it is the most important and up-to-date lexical tool for Ugaritic studies. Not only students of Ugaritic, but also those of cognate languages (including particularly Biblical Hebrew) will tremendously benefit from it. Despite the fact that this dictionary is expensive, I highly recommend it for use in Ugaritic classes of all levels, since it is simply the best choice for serious translation. It is not difficult to foresee that DUL will find its firm place on the scholarly desk for years to come, even when finally the long-awaited Ugaritisches Handwörterbuch (UHw) is published.

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MARTIN PROBSTLE


The author, Mark Goodacre, is Senior Lecturer in New Testament Studies in the Department of Theology at the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom. He earned his B.A., M. Phil., and D.Phil. degrees from Oxford University. His previous publications include Goulder and the Gospels: An Examination of a New Paradigm (JSNTSup, 133; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996) and The Synoptic Problem: A Way Through the Maze (The Biblical Seminar, 80; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001). Goodacre’s study joins several recent works analyzing the hypothetical gospels source document Q (e.g., Christopher M. Tuckett’s Q and the History of Early Christianity: Studies on Q [Edinburgh:
T. & T. Clark, 1996], Dale Allison’s The Jesus Tradition in Q [Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997]; and John S. Kloppenborg Verbin’s Excavating Q: The History and Setting of the Sayings Gospel [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000], yet it mounts a full-fledged scholarly assault on Q in order to challenge its very existence. While Goodacre’s book is not the first to attempt to discredit the legitimacy of Q, it does represent one of the most recent, erudite, and engaging works to threaten Q’s viability.

R. E. Brown recently noted that, for most readers, the issue of the tangled literary relationships among the Synoptic Gospels, known as the “Synoptic Problem,” is “complex, irrelevant to their interests and boring” (An Introduction to the New Testament, Anchor Bible Reference Library [New York: Doubleday, 1997], 111). Goodacre is well aware of Brown’s concern (105), yet he dives into the subject unafraid. His overarching goal is to demonstrate that instead of Matthew and Luke both utilizing Mark and Q in their Gospels, Luke utilized Matthew as well as Mark, but with no need of a sayings tradition such as Q. Goodacre thus joins such earlier skeptics of Q as Austin Farrer, John Drury, and Michael Goulder. The stakes are high in this debate, for the scholarly consensus is clearly on the side of those who accept the viability and usefulness of Q in understanding the literary relationships among the Synoptic Gospels.

Goodacre’s work contains nine chapters and an epilogue. Most of the chapters are updated versions of scholarly essays presented and/or published elsewhere. Chapter 1 sets forth Goodacre’s concerns about the emerging acceptance of Q as a “concrete entity with recognizable parameters, a Gospel that has been ‘discovered,’ a once-lost text that has been found” (9)—one that even has the paraphernalia of a de facto text with its own critical edition, synopsis, concordance, and versification system (7). Here he also introduces his concern to de-link rejection of Q with rejection of the Markan Priority hypothesis. He vigorously defends Markan Priority in chapter 2. Chapter 3 entails Goodacre’s critiques of arguments in favor of Q, both those constructed positively and negatively. In chapter 4, he looks carefully at one of the pillars of the Q hypothesis—the argument that Luke’s arrangement and order of material common to Luke and Matthew assumes he did not know Matthew. Here he examines what he understands to be Luke’s reworking of Matthew’s “Sermon on the Mount.” This focus extends into chapters 5 and 6, the former of which utilizes Narrative Criticism in order to “inject some fresh life” (105) into the Synoptic Problem, and the latter of which analyzes how twentieth-century cinematic versions of the life of Jesus deal with the Sermon on the Mount in order to accomplish the same goal. Chapter 7 finds Goodacre focusing his magnifying glass on the first beatitude as it occurs in Matthew, Luke, Thomas, and Q in order to demonstrate that Luke had reason enough to write his version of this saying in light of what Matthew had already written. In chapter 8, Goodacre examines the major and minor agreements between Luke and Matthew, and in chapter 9 he explores the narrative sequence of Q 3-7 and contrasts it with Thomas in order to demonstrate that while Thomas is a Sayings Gospel, Q is not. After an epilogue in which Goodacre reflects on what life would be like without Q, the book ends with a bibliography and three indices (ancient texts, authors, and subjects).

Goodacre is well acquainted with the literature on the subject of Q, and he makes judicious use of his secondary sources in order to illustrate and clarify his arguments. On several occasions, he effectively lays out for his readers the basis for his arguments regarding the primary documents (the Synoptic Gospels, and sometimes Thomas) by placing his evidence in either a two-column or three-column format. By displaying not only the English, but often the Greek and/or Coptic in these comparative formats, he makes his points not only visually compelling but precise and easy to follow.

Goodacre wishes neither to simply attack Q proponents nor to whitewash Q
skeptics. While not afraid to duel with those who disagree with him regarding Q, he is nonetheless willing to highlight their evidence and arguments when he agrees with them (cf. his observations on Christopher Tuckett’s work [94-95]). Even in his “farewell” to Q, Goodacre sounds regretful if not emotional (cf. his reference to “a lump in our throats” [189]) because “it has served us well” (ibid.). At the same time, he exhibits no reticence in criticizing those who misjudge or misread the evidence, even when they oppose the concept of Q (cf. his critique of David L. Dungan’s misreading of Goulder [12, n. 52]). Methodological flaws are critiqued, and persuasive evidence is highlighted—on both sides of the Q spectrum.

But one finds Goodacre typically critiquing methodological flaws used in favor of Q. He shows no patience with flawed premises (52); logical fallacies (54); misstated, inaccurate, or overlooked evidence (55, 61, 134, 146); circular arguments (55, 77, 82, 117); the use of excessive rhetoric instead of argument (78-79); and so on. Goodacre’s analytical scalpel repeatedly slices up the evidence and arguments of Q proponents. But this overt and sustained approach puts the responsibility on him to avoid the same flaws, and he does not always succeed in doing so.

For instance, though I am not an advocate of Markan Posteriority, the evidence Goodacre provides to support his assertion that the dating of Matthew and Luke is “clearly post-70” (23) is unpersuasive: using words like “suggestive,” “hints,” “may,” “perhaps,” and “not conclusive” (23-25) is not the most compelling way to build a clear and conclusive case. Also, his assertion that Luke keeps Mark 13 “intact” in Luke 21 (96, n. 42) is not congruent with the evidence: the concern in Mark 13:15-16 about what those on the housetops and in the fields should do is substantially found in Luke 17:31, rather than Luke 21.

In building parts of his case to dispose of Q, the hypothetical nature of which underscores his concerns in chapter 1, Goodacre’s own alternative theories, suggestive scenarios, and imaginative possibilities (cf. 89-91) seemed at times to quickly morph into conclusions. For example, Goodacre states that “we might theorize” (89) that Luke had a copy of Mark for a much longer time than he had a copy of Matthew. Yet a page later—in the conclusion to this particular section—Goodacre’s “theory” takes on the dimensions of a settled conclusion: “Perhaps Luke is even more sure of Markan Priority than we are; he has known Mark for longer and it has had time to enter his bloodstream before there is any question of contamination from its interpretation by and absorption into Matthew” (90). Maybe it’s easier to see, on the basis of this movement from theory to conclusion, how Q proponents can write with such certainty about the nature of Q.

I found the weakest chapter of the book to be the one in which Goodacre compares contemporary cinematic depictions of the life of Christ as support for his reading of the Synoptic Problem. Goodacre realizes that such an endeavor is questionable (121) and knows that such comparisons are not perfect (130), so he carefully sketches the goals he is aiming at in making such an analysis: opposing the trend to view the Gospels in isolation from each other, illustrating ways in which the Gospels can be reworked, and stimulating the imagination as one studies the Synoptics (122-23). I believe he is successful in realizing his goals. Nevertheless, this chapter, while stimulating to read, would work better as an appendix since it does not carry the same weight as the other chapters. It is difficult, for instance, to compare the artistic inspiration of the writers and directors of such films as The Greatest Story Ever Told and The Last Temptation of Christ (and, to a lesser degree, Monty Python’s Life of Brian), with the literary goals of the Gospel writers. And again, arguments stemming from conjecture (e.g., “Luke, like the filmmakers, may have felt that so much direct speech all at once would be too much to keep the audience interested” [126]), do not ultimately convince.
At times it is clear that The Case Against Q has been written in pieces. For example, while Goodacre refers to “Q skeptics” in chapter 1 (10), he later defines what he means by the term—as if he were using it for the first time—in chapter 2 (19, n. 1). While one would not necessarily be surprised to discover such illogical sequences cropping up in a book of essays written over a period of a few years, Goodacre’s work deserves further editing to make it more seamless and integrated, and, thus, more forceful.

Such editing would also correct some syntactical and/or typographical problems I encountered in reading the book. The reference, for example, to “Griesbach’s Mark’s alleged omissions” (28, n. 23), is not easy to understand at first glance. Also, the end of a complicated sentence (“is adjusted in Q 4:1-13, 16, 463, in which no doubt is recorded in the Critical Text” [174, n. 16]) at best encroaches upon incomprehensibility. As for glaring typographic errors, I found three examples: “The question that these rather limited examples of special Mark raise [sic] see above, is [sic] whether they are best regarded, . . .” (32); “The desire to look each [sic] of the Gospels . . .” (107); and the reference to “Luke 9:51-18” (181). Fortunately, such problems do not appear regularly.

I was surprised with another feature of the book, one that Goodacre apparently had little to do with: its price. The book, while brimming with incisive, scholarly argumentation, is not a thick work; yet $30.00 seems to be too steep a price to pay for all of its 228 pages, especially since it is a paperback.

While consensus is hard to overturn, it often becomes a target for further investigation. In this case, however, it is unlikely that Q skeptics will win over Q proponents—or vice versa—any time soon. In the context of unpacking his argument that Luke reworked Matthew’s Sermon on the Mount, Goodacre states: “Yet the theory of Luke’s use of Matthew makes equally as good an account of the data as does the Q theory” (97). This is part of the basic problem: the evidence can be explained in more than one way. Only time will reveal whether Goodacre’s work—and the work of others who are skeptical of Q’s existence—will break the consensus that currently exists.

Goodacre has provided an accessible, scholarly, and largely lucid case against the consensus on Q. It is arguably the best current work from the Q-skeptical perspective. Both scholars and nonspecialists outside the field of synoptic studies will profit from examining his evidence and arguments. I believe Brown was correct in his assessment of most readers’ dismal views of the thorny Synoptic Problem. Yet Goodacre has clearly injected not only new life, but imagination, creativity, and forceful argumentation into the seemingly arcane subject of the Synoptic Problem, and his book will certainly cause a further reevaluation of the evidence and arguments used in favor of Q.

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The author of this colossal work received his doctorate in the history of architecture. As a professor at the University of Karlsruhe, Germany, he is member of the German Archeological Institute in Cairo. He has published numerous articles, reports on the excavations at Abû Minâ (1967-2000), and books dealing predominantly with the history of ancient architecture.

The main body of Christliche Architektur in Ägypten consists of two major parts. In six chapters and 378 pages, the author deals with the history of Christian architecture in Egypt, including architectural elements, building techniques, and other related issues.