stems such as הנש (“deliver”), צנג (“flee”), ושי (“save”) (557-560). See also D. Kellermann’s article on הַנָּשֶׁת (“crown, wreath”) (18-28), where he studies semantically related words such as רַג (“royal diadem”), הַנָּשָׁה (“garland”), and הַרֵיה (“decorations joined together to form a wreath”). However, the majority of the word studies uses a more traditional linguistic approach and focuses mostly on etymological relationships.

The articles are generally written from within the tradition of European form-critical and tradition-historical scholarship. The majority of contributions stem from European, Scandinavian, and Israeli scholars, with only a small number of articles being written by authors from North America (six out of 53 in total). One has to take into consideration the interval of about thirteen years between the original German, which was published in 1988, and the translated present volume, which creates a certain gap between the dictionary and current scholarly opinion.

There are a number of minor orthographical errors, mainly occurring in the German titles in the footnotes, which basically appear to be errors of translation and copying (e.g., 39, n. 76; 394, n. 38; 402, n. 53).

One can only hope that the translation of the series will continue at a good pace and that the complete set will be available soon to the scholar of the OT who does not include German on the menu of his or her interests. Hopefully, the final price for the whole series will be accessible not only to institutions but also to individuals.

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*Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide* is a handsome collection of essays by some of the leading scholars in Pauline research, dealing with sociology, anthropology, and Greco-Roman rhetoric. In some respects harking back to W. D. Davies (*Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology*, 4th ed. [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980]), the present volume argues that Judaism never existed in isolation from or as a religiocultural entity opposed to Hellenism. A volume teeming with rich ideas, this work should be a required reading for anyone with an interest in Paul’s Jewish and Hellenistic backgrounds.

Due to its specific focus on Paul, as well as its sociohistorical orientation, the general direction of the present volume differs from *Hellenism in the Land of Israel* (J. J. Collins and G. E. Sterling, eds., Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity 13 [Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2001]). But inasmuch as both works are among the latest responses to Martin Hengel’s *Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in Their Encounter in Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period* (trans. John Bowden, 2 vols. [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974])—a work whose impact has been felt in nearly all the subsequent works on Judaism and Hellenism—reading the two works side by side (or one after another, as I did)
will provide the reader with a broader, deeper, and more balanced historical perspective on the question. Moreover, as a sequel to the earlier *Paul in His Hellenistic Context* (Troels Engberg-Pedersen, ed. [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995]), the present volume has been produced with the same premise as that work, namely, that Paul needs to be understood “within a shared ‘context,’” as one among many Greco-Roman personalities of antiquity (1). The chief difference is that the present volume extends that premise beyond Paul to Judaism, so that Judaism can also be understood as one among many ancient Mediterranean cultural groups struggling for survival and self-expression within “the comprehensive cultural melting pot” of Hellenism (2).

In his opening essay (“Judaism, Hellenism, and the Birth of Christianity”), Wayne A. Meeks offers a succinct sketch of past and present Pauline scholarship. Meeks persuasively argues that the evolutionary assumptions that lie behind the Hegelian dialectic of Tübingen and the *Religionsgeschichtliche* school of Göttingen have in recent years been set aside in favor of less ambitious and more concrete studies, concentrating on subjects such as “Paul’s Greco-Roman rhetoric” or his “sociopolitical strategies.” Then Dale B. Martin (“Paul and the Judaism/Hellenism Dichotomy: Toward a Social History of the Question”), largely in agreement with Meek’s basic thesis, closes in with lethal arguments on the badly wounded behemoth that is the methodological legacy of nineteenth-century Germany. He avers that the all-too-neat, symmetrical dualism that sought to characterize Hellenism and Judaism as mutually exclusive, antithetical cultural opposites is a sheer tour de force of nineteenth-century Germany, an academic monstrosity that German intellectuals conjured up to bolster the value of German *Kultur* against the advancing political hegemonies of France and Britain. Martin declares: “German scholars throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were powerless to escape its grasp” (35).

Martin’s essay itself, however, seems to be built on the dualistic assumption that Hellenism represents universalism and Judaism represents particularism. At the beginning of the essay, Martin offers a persuasive argument that nineteenth-century German scholarship had arbitrarily ascribed to Hellenism universalistic (therefore desirable) religiocultural values, using Judaism at every turn as a foil for the superiority of the German culture. Then, Martin goes on to argue that the contrary was true in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England and in post-World War II America, where scholars, by ascribing to universalism negative values such as colonialism, preferred the particularism of Hebraism (or Judaism in the case of America). Martin’s primary aim in these discussions seems to be to show that Hellenism, i.e., universalism, was not uniformly favored by scholars outside of Germany. In the midst of his brilliant argument, Martin, however, may be overlooking an important point, that universalism and particularism are generic conceptual categories that have persisted in history to our day. I am in complete agreement with Martin that it is a mistake to see Paul’s world in crude dualistic terms and equate, in a knee-jerk fashion, Hellenism with universalism and Judaism with
particularism. But as Stanley K. Stowers’s essay in this book ably points out, universalism and particularism coexisted in Hellenism as parallel phenomena: whereas the Greek philosophers, especially those in the Platonic school, were universalistic in their thinking, most of the common people seem to have understood the Hellenistic culture in particularistic terms, such as land, generational continuity, and unique adaptation of different varieties of ethnic cult (87-88). Similarly, universalism also existed within Second Temple Judaism alongside particularism. The writings of Philo, The Wisdom of Solomon, and The Letter of Aristeas—in contrast to Jubilees, for example—were considerably more universalistic in orientation. Martin’s essay unfortunately gives the impression that the dualism of universalism and particularism was itself an invention of nineteenth-century Germany. Rather, it appears that the fallacy of nineteenth-century Germany lay in the equation of Hellenism with universalism (therefore as something positive) and Judaism as a whole with particularism (therefore as the embodiment of everything sinful and evil). This falsity notwithstanding, the dualism of universalism and particularism must be recognized as an enduring conceptual category that transcends ethnic, cultural, and temporal boundaries.

Responding to Martin, Philip S. Alexander (“Hellenism and Hellenization as Problematic Historiographical Categories”) asserts that any similarity between the Greek culture and Rabbinic Judaism—which ranged from individual concepts to major cultural conventions—was not so much the result of direct borrowing as of cross-pollination caused by geographical proximity and common historical circumstances going back many centuries. In support of his thesis, Alexander produces impressive and extensive documentation of the borrowed Greek words of the educated kind found in the Rabbinic literature to note that the writings of the rabbis offer no evidence of their formal training in Greek. This painstaking effort serves well as corroboration for Alexander’s thesis, but it does little to clarify just what those Hellenized values were which are to be found in the Jewish material of Paul’s time (other than the writings of Philo).

Stanley K. Stowers (“Does Pauline Christianity Resemble a Hellenistic Philosophy”) advances an interesting hypothesis that Paul’s communities differed from both Hellenistic volunteer associations and Jewish synagogues alike because, unlike these, there were no organic and symbolic relations developed or promoted between his communities and the “practices related to sacrifice, intergenerational continuity, and productivity” (86). Instead, Paul’s communities resembled Hellenistic philosophical schools such as Pyrrhonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Cynicism (93), which focused on questions concerning self-mastery, textual interpretation, and the workings of the soul (“technology of the self”) with each centering on the school’s central “unitary value,” such as virtue, freedom, and friendship. Stowers’s provocative hypothesis raises several questions that impinge on the overall thesis of the present volume. First, if the Greek philosophical schools intentionally fashioned their communities in opposition to the local consuetudinary practices both religiously and culturally (88-89), would it not be fair to say that the teachings of the philosophical schools were universalistic (cf.
100-102)? Also, if Stowers's thesis is correct, would it not be accurate to say that it was Pauline Christianity, rather than nineteenth-century Germany, which was ultimately responsible—for the ideational tendency that gave rise to the dualism of Hellenism (universalism)/Judaism (particularism) in Pauline scholarship? In other words, if we go with Stowers's Judean hypothesis (83), the relationship of Paul and Judaism must be viewed as being on a par with, say, the universalistic Zeno's disdain for the local worshipers of Zeus. Finally, Stowers's hypothesis calls into question the key aspects of Krister Stendahl's thesis set forth years ago (“The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West,” *HTR* 56 [1963]: 199-215) that the Western notions of introspective conscience were a later intellectual development that was not so elegantly worked into Christianity by Augustine. If Paul was creating communities styled after Hellenistic philosophical schools whose teachings focused on the questions of character and the inner workings of the soul, are not Paul's teachings ultimately introspective in character? If Stowers is correct, the problem of introspective conscience in the West may be a direct legacy of Paul's penchant for the mastery of the self, a legacy that was embellished, neatened, and passed on to posterity by Augustine.

Loveday Alexander ("IPSE DIXIT: Citation of Authority in Paul and in the Jewish and Hellenistic Schools") advances an intriguing hypothesis that explicit verbatim quotations were the literary means by which the tradents of antiquity made known their allegiance to their respective founding sages, whose doctrines they each espoused. If confirmed, this thesis will have a significant impact on our understanding not only of Paul's writings, but of the biblical writings as a whole. If explicit citations were indeed the time-honored method in the ancient Hellenistic world by which the founding teacher’s ideas were passed on to the succeeding generations of pupils, one wonders why we do not find explicit quotations of Scriptures in any of the pre-Pauline Jewish writings of the Second Temple period except in the Dead Sea Scrolls, especially if the Hellenistic thought patterns and scribal practices had made inroads into Judaism, as the present volume maintains. If Alexander is correct, to what degree can the authors of the Pseudepigraphical writings, for example, be thought of as tradents, since none of them contains what could be characterized as explicit citations of Scripture? Is it possible that Second Temple Judaism had developed, in conformity with the practices of the biblical prophets and writers, its own system of transmission, unaffected by (or even in opposition to) the Hellenistic pedagogical influence? Moreover, if Alexander is correct, are we to assume that of all the Jewish sects in the Second Temple period the Essene pedagogy was most deeply influenced by the Hellenistic philosophical schools?

Wayne A. Meek's essay ("Corinthian Christians as Artificial Aliens") argues that Pauline communities, particularly those in Corinth, most closely resembled, by virtue of requiring conversion from their would-be members, the Jewish Diaspora communities, which in turn resembled other transplanted ethnic immigrant communities of the contemporary Mediterranean world. Meeks
characterizes Paul's Christian groups as "artificial aliens," partaking in the Jewish quest for identity, itself a quintessentially Hellenistic quest found in other ethnic associations trying to deal with the vexing question of where to draw the line between identity and assimilation. There is no question that Meeks is correct in his assessment that the people living in the ancient Mediterranean world would have viewed Paul's communities as just another odd sort of self-styled alien group.

John M. G. Barclay ("Matching Theory and Practice: Josephus's Constitutional Ideal and Paul's Strategy in Corinth") posits that Paul's community was a πολιτεία founded upon a "constitutional" ideal akin to that outlined in Josephus's Against Apion (144). According to Josephus, an ideal πολιτεία rested on five basic principles: matching of theory and practice, thorough education, comprehensive application of ethical principles in daily life, unquestioning adherence to the law, and harmony in belief and practice. Comparing Paul point by point with Josephus's five principles of constitutional structure (144-149), Barclay concludes that whereas Paul's civic program is deficient on practical specificity that Josephus ascribes to Judaism, it is very much comparable to the constitutional utopianism of Josephus. As one reads Barclay's scintillating comparisons of Paul's community and the Josephan Jewish polity, however, especially for anyone who cut his or her teeth on the old German school, it is difficult not to notice the hint of superiority (of course, unintended) in the expressions such as "flexibility and adaptability" (162) and "creative environments" (163), which Barclay uses to describe the Pauline community vis-à-vis Judaism, even if this Judaism is only a figment of Josephus's imagination. Paul's community—whose "structural desideratum" (162) was "an apparently conscious disinclination to spell out" (161) the observant life in rigid detail—would have been, I am sure for many, a superior environment in which to live and work compared to the straight-jacket polity of Judaism that Josephus describes. Barclay's essay offers a lot to ponder and many research ideas that need to be pursued, but his comparison ironically leads to a fateful fork in the road: the old and far path of the German schools or the new path that the present volume is trying to pioneer; either Paul was trumping the Josephan type of Judean ideals with his version of universalism in the style of the Hellenistic philosophical schools such as Stoicism (cf. Stowers), or Paul and Judaism were two similar but equally valid and fundamentally unrelated social phenomena growing randomly on the rich soil of Hellenism.

In any case, the three essays by Stowers, Meeks, and Barclay, espousing three very different characterizations of Paul's community, make plain that, to use the words of Barclay, Paul's churches were "new and culturally indeterminate" communities (141). It appears, however, that these essays unintentionally offer two somewhat opposing perspectives on Paul's community. Barclay's model comes closest to the insider view of how Paul and his converts would have thought about themselves, namely, as a community founded on the "constitution" of the gospel, a polity different from and superior to anything found in either
Judaism or Hellenism. By contrast, Stowers and Meeks offer the perspectives of outsiders who would have characterized the Pauline community as either an artificial alien association or a philosophical school.

Henrik Tronier ("The Corinthian Correspondence between Philosophical Idealism and Apocalypticism") posits a surprising view that Jewish apocalypticism ultimately derives from the Middle Platonic epistemology of diariesis (division) as formulated by Philo. Philo argued that cognitive transformation was needed before one could perceive the transcendent conceptual world whose dualistic rationality underpins the empirical world according to the logic of the logos, the agent responsible for both the ordering of the conceptual world and the impartation of the revelation effecting cognitive transformation. Thus in 1 Enoch, the present empirical world, although spatially of a piece with its heavenly counterpart, becomes rationally comprehensible to Enoch only through the interpretive activities of heavenly messengers, who, due to their revelatory function, correspond to the Philonic logos. Then moving to Paul, Tronier locates, with impressive creativity and consistency, traces of Philo’s diariesic epistemology in Paul’s body metaphor (1 Cor 12), his description of a heavenly ascent (2 Cor 12), and his concept of the spiritual body (1 Cor 15). These, according to Tronier, are apocalyptic constructs whose aim is to effect cognitive transformation by reinterpreting the present situation against the backdrop of the pristine social order of the heavenly world, where the social hierarchy of this world is turned upside down and God’s people of low status, such as Paul, are at the top of the pecking order. Although Tronier opens up new and promising ways of looking at Paul with these insights, his argument needs a broader evidentiary basis. For example, the interpretive activities of the heavenly messengers (the Holy Spirit in Paul’s case), which unveil the rational meaning of the present empirical world, do not necessarily constitute evidence that the Jewish apocalypticists believed in a coherent and transcendent conceptual world comparable to that found in Platonism and Philo. Tronier’s essay is creative and deserving of further study, but as it stands, its argument rests on tenuous grounds and its ideas (particularly those pertaining to 1 Cor 15) are a bit elusive.

In her essay ("Pauline Accommodation and ‘Condescension’ [συγκατάβασις]: 1 Cor 9:19-23 and the History of Influence"), Margaret M. Mitchell seeks to resolve the exegetical stalemate over 1 Cor 9:19-23 which, in her estimation, has been caused by the moribund hermeneutic kept afloat by the mistaken notion of the Judaism-and-Hellenism divide. The provenance of 1 Cor 9:19-23 cannot be traced, she argues, to a specific Hellenistic or Jewish source, as David Daube and Clarence E. Glad have tried to do in their works, but to Hellenistic-Jewish-Roman “commonplaces” that any reasonably well-informed denizens of the ancient Mediterranean world would have known. To prove her point, Mitchell examines with impressive erudition and care the works of Tertullian, Clement of Rome, Origen, and John Chrysostom, who, by virtue of living “closer to [Paul’s] cultural milieu than we are” (213), were
to explain the Pauline text based on the *topos* of condescension (ἀνεγκατάσβασίς) without explicitly referring to Homer, who first coined the word as a technical term to express the idea of divine variability. Mitchell contrasts and compares this plebeian exegetical practice of the fathers with that of Philo, who, in his explanation of the OT texts containing anthropomorphism as forms of divine condescension and variability, had no qualms about openly attributing the idea to Homer, a pagan author. Her point is that by the time Paul wrote 1 Cor 9:19-23, the *topos* of condescension or variability that was already a rhetorical commonplace in the Hellenistic world both in Judaism and Hellenism, was not attributable to any particular personality or source—in Mitchell’s words, “a complex mix of Hellenistic Jewish assumptions and reappropriations” (214). One can only be grateful for Mitchell’s beautifully conceived and ably argued thesis.

David E. Aune’s essay (“Anthropological Duality in the Eschatology of 2 Cor 4:16–5:10”) begins with a succinct summary of the scholarly debate on this passage, followed by a crisp, to-the-point delineation of the contrasting characterizations that have been mistakenly used in the past to describe Jewish apocalyptic eschatology and Hellenistic eschatology. Aune then leads his readers through a detailed exegesis of the passage, punctuating it with a massive body of evidence expertly culled from Hellenistic and Jewish literary sources, concluding that Paul is referring in 2 Cor 4:16–5:10 “to a temporary form of heavenly existence (an intermediate state)” occurring between one’s death and resurrection (232). While cautiously recognizing that there is little direct evidence for this idea in the text (237 chart), Aune postulates, mostly on the basis of literary parallels, that Paul’s notion of the intermediate state is “a conception that has both Hellenistic and Jewish features, but which is ultimately at home in neither” (239). Judging from the evidence appearing in the essay, the presence of Hellenistic conceptual categories in this passage seems to be a certainty, even if Paul obtained them either as transmitted through the Jewish writings or straight from popular philosophies traceable to Plato. Aune’s main argument—that Paul came to believe in an interim heavenly postmortem existence that is fully “clothed” with a substance of some kind (if this is what Aune means) rather than in a disembodied state, as has been traditionally held—is interesting and deserves a further look. At the same time, Aune needs to answer more fully why this notion is at such variance with the rest of Paul’s theology—a problem of which Aune is fully aware (236, 238)—because his postulation that Paul was creating a hybrid of Jewish and Hellenistic conceptual categories does not constitute a solution to this problem. Also, since according to Paul, the believer’s inner transformation necessarily involves the body (cf. Rom 12:1-2), how would it have been possible for him, one wonders, to conceive of an existence that is without a body (cf. Tronier, 192), unless the interim existence involves no transformative experience at all?

Espousing Cilliers Breytenbach’s thesis that Paul’s reconciliation motif derives from the Hellenistic *topos* of friendship and politics, John T. Fitzgerald (“Paul and Paradigm Shifts: Reconciliation and Its Linkage Group”) argues that Paul did not
simply borrow the commonplaces, but fashioned new constructs out of them to bring about paradigm shifts in the thinking of the audience. For example, Paul took the original emancipation motif of the Sinai tradition and dramatically transformed it into a theme of enslavement. Also, he transformed the concept of atonement from a process initiated by humans through sacrifices and repentance into a process initiated by God through the sacrifice of his Son. The Hellenistic *topes* of reconciliation underwent similar changes at the hands of Paul, from being an appeal made by the offending party for a settlement and rapprochement to a grace settlement proffered by the offended party, which in this case was God. According to Fitzgerald, Paul was the first Jewish (Christian) person to bring together the ideas of atonement and reconciliation in a manner similar to Dionysus and Plato.

In his introductory essay ("Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide"), Engberg-Pedersen reveals and discusses the overall aim of the book, which is to put "a new program" of research (4) on the table for Pauline scholarship with the intention of replacing, for good, the misguided dualism of Hellenism and Judaism. As one makes one’s way through the book, it becomes clear that, indeed, looking at Paul and Second Temple Judaism as subsets of Hellenism is not only a refreshing and fruitful interpretive approach, but an approach that is here to stay for quite a while. Nevertheless, the description given to the approach of the present work as a "new program" needs to be reconsidered, as it could give the false impression that the editor intends with these essays to put together a new *Schule* capable of bringing the entire Pauline scholarship on board, a feat that is no longer possible in our day.

Finally, one wonders whether looking at the NT through an outsider’s perspective is necessarily a more accurate way of looking at history, unless, of course, one insists that history is an outsider’s perspective, period. An urgent question is whether the insider’s view of Paul, which, in my opinion, may be ultimately responsible for the dualism of Jewish particularism and Christian universalism (the nascent form of which has been pointed out in Barclay’s essay), has any place in the current interpretive climate. If Paul, for example, formulated his gospel as a new interpretive possibility in the setting of the Jewish and Christian self-understanding that presupposed, rightly or wrongly, the dualism of Hellenism and Judaism, one wonders whether it is possible to understand Paul without referring to that dualism. In other words, one wonders whether the view of Paul offered in this volume, one which sees him primarily from an outsider’s perspective, is not just as one-sided in the opposite direction as was the older view it seeks to replace.

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In this work Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis mounts a full-fledged investigation into and reinterpretation of the anthropology of several significant Qumran