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MADABA PLAINS PROJECT: TALL JALUL 2009

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Introduction

After ten seasons in the field, the archaeological excavations at Tall Jalul, led by the Institute of Archaeology at Andrews University under the directorship of Randall W. Younker, have resulted in significant clarification of the site’s occupation. Located on the rolling Madaba Plains in the central Jordanian plateau, Jalul rises above the plain, creating the highest elevation in the immediate Madaba region. As the largest ancient site in central Jordan, the early occupation of ancient Jalul covers more than 7 hectares (the equivalent of 18 acres), while later Islamic Jalul, referred to as the Jalul Islamic Village (JIV), covers about 28 hectares or 69 acres.

History of Exploration

Several early explorers mention the ancient site of Jalul in their travel accounts. Swiss explorer Johann Burckhardt visited Jalul in 1812, and in 1822 wrote one of the earliest descriptions of the site: “In order to see Medaba, I left the great road at Hesban, and proceeded in a more eastern direction. At six hours and three quarters, about one hour distant from the road, I saw the ruins of Djeloul, at a short distance to the east of which, are the ruined places called El Samek, El Mesouh, and Om el Aamed.”


Several terms are used when referring to the Jalul region. The entire orbit, including both ancient and modern settlements, is referred to simply as “Jalul.” Ancient Jalul, known as “Tall Jalul,” is the tell proper, which rises above the surrounding countryside. The “Jalul Islamic Village” (JIV), is the area south of the ancient tell. Some modern usage of these ancient ruins continues in the western side of JIV to this day. The local residents call JIV “Old Jalul.” Finally, modern Jalul is the current village of Jalul, inhabited primarily by the Beni Sakhr tribe.

Sixty years later, in 1872, Henry Baker Tristram visited Jalul, which he referred to as “Jeljul.” He writes that shortly after leaving “Azizah,” he came to Jeljul: “Five minutes west of this [Azizah] was a small ruin, apparently of a fort and a village, which we visited, called Jeljul (Djellgood of Irby and Mangles, or Djeldjoun of Burckhardt).”

Not long after Tristram’s visit, English traveler Charles Montagu Doughty records in 1886 of passing by a number of ruins, including those of Jalul: “The plots of khurbets [ruins] are mostly small as hamlets; their rude dry building is fallen down in few heaps of the common stones. I was so idle as to write the names of some of them, Khurbet Enjahsah, Mehaineh, Meddaine, Negase, Libbun, Jeljul, Nelnochkh, Mehrud, Howihih, Gamereyn (of the two moons) Harfa (where a Mohammedan shrine and mosque; anciently it was a church).”

In 1933, William Foxwell Albright writes that the site yielded numerous Middle Bronze, Late Bronze, Early Iron I-II, Byzantine, and early medieval Arabic sherds. He notes that the ancient name is unknown and remarks that the “Middle Bronze occupation in the extreme east of Palestine was surprisingly dense.” In the same year, Nelson Glueck also visited the site, noting the late Bronze and Iron age remains on the ancient tell and, in addition, mentioned the remains of the Byzantine and Islamic village to the south of the ancient site.

As part of the 1976 Hesban Survey, the ruins of Jalul were first surveyed by Robert Ibach. However, excavation of Tall Jalul did not begin until 1992. After scientific research was begun on the site, General Akkash Al Zaben, the late landowner of the ancient site of Jalul, ceded the land rights of Tall Jalul to the Jordanian Department of Antiquities, thereby enabling continued research on the site. Zaben’s daughter, Sabal Al Zaben, who serves as our field archaeologist, continues to support exploration on her ancestral land.

History of Excavations
Excavations at the site of Jalul on the Madaba Plains in Jordan began in 1992 with the opening of two fields. Since then some eight fields (Fields A-H) have

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been explored, exposing material remains on the ancient site from the Middle Bronze Age through the Hellenistic period. Though the acropolis, located on the southwestern corner of the site, remains unexcavated due to its continued use as the local cemetery, the other eight fields have yielded informative administrative and domestic architectural remains as well as an impressive roadway leading into and through one of the ancient city’s gate complexes. East of the acropolis, a deep central depression and a smaller depression to the north hold promise of a significant water system—a gem for future seasons. To the south of the ancient tell, the JIV has undergone two seasons of exploration and has yielded significant information relative to the later use of Jalul, whose occupation shifted sometime during the Hellenistic period from the upper ancient occupation site to the lower area south of the tell.

Results of the 2009 Season

The 2009 season focused on three fields (Fields C, D, and G) and the JIV. The primary chronological periods explored were the


We are especially indebted to Fawwaz Al Kraysheh, Former Director General of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan, for his support of the project this season; we appreciate the services of Bassam Al Mohamid and Hussam Hjazeen, who served as representatives for the Department of Antiquities; and we are grateful to other members of the Department of Antiquities, including Khalil Hamdan, Hanadi Taher, Rula Quossus, and Aktham Oweidi, without whom we could not have had such a successful season. We wish to express our gratitude to the American Center of Oriental Research, Barbara Porter, Director, and Christopher Tuttle, Associate Director, for providing invaluable support and assistance. Our team was housed at the Mariam Hotel in Madaba, where we enjoyed attention to our personal comfort from the hotel’s owner, Charles Twal, whose flexibility and willingness to accommodate our off-site needs was heroic.

The Director of the Tall Jalul excavations is Randall W. Younker. The Codirector of the ancient site of Tall Jalul is Constance E. Gane, and Reem Al Shqour codirected the excavation of the JIV. Staff members for the 2009 season included Paul Zeljko Gregor and Paul Ray, who served as associate directors. Sabal Al Zaben served as Field Archaeologist and facilitated the excavations of the JIV. The Field Supervisors were Paul Ray (Field C), Jennifer Groves (Field D), and Paul Zeljko Gregor (Field G). Paul
Late Iron II C/Persian period (539-332 B.C.E.) in Fields C and D, the Iron Age II (specifically ninth to seventh centuries B.C.E.) in Field G, and the Early and Middle Islamic periods (especially the Mamluk period, 1250-1516 A.D.) in the JIV. A total of 68 faculty, staff, students, and volunteers (Pl. 3) worked on the site, along with more than twenty Jordanian workers. Younker directed the excavations with the assistance of codirectors Constance Gane and Reem Al Shqour.

Excavations in Field C, directed by Paul Ray, focused on the Late Iron II/Persian architecture exposed in earlier seasons (1994-2007). By the end of the six-week season, two buildings were articulated in the southern part of Field C. A large southern building with at least three building phases was identified. A narrow street separates this large building from the northern Late Iron II/Persian-period pillared house, uncovered in 1994 and 1996. A second building in the southern part of Field C, also dating to the Late Iron II/Persian period, was found in the southeastern quadrant of the field.

Further clarification of the Persian domestic building complex in Field D was the focus of field supervisor Jennifer Groves. The significant and abundant finds from the Persian-period remains found in both Fields C and D at Jalul help to clarify the emerging picture of occupation during the Persian period in Transjordan. Archaeological sites that have yielded, or may have yielded previously, Persian-period remains in the Amman region include Tall Safut, Khirbet el-Hajar, Tall el-Dreijat, Umm Uthainah, Abu Nuseir, and tombs at Meqabelein, Khilda, Tall Hisban, Tall al-‘Umayri, and Tall Jalul.11

Paul Zeljko Gregor directed the vigorous excavation in Field G, further exposing the ninth-century B.C.E. fortified city wall, initially uncovered in 2007, further confirming a substantial presence in the Iron Age. With this Ray served as the objects registrar and architect, and Jody Washburn was the pottery registrar. Karen Borstad and Theodore Burgh conducted the GPS survey of the JIV, while Paul Ray, Zech Ray, and Owen Chestnut oversaw the GPS readings on Tall Jalul and the JIV. The following individuals were responsible for creating architectural drawings: Bassam Al Mohamid (Field G), Paul Ray (Fields C and D), and Magalie Anna Dartus (the JIV). Zech Ray served as the objects artist. Square supervisors for Field C were Christie Chadwick, Chris Chadwick, Sarah Gane, Roy Gane, Jennifer Shrestha, and Audrey Shaffer; Field Supervisors for Field D were L. S. Baker, Jr., Sean Porras, Owen Chesnut, and Jasmine Saunders. Square supervisors for Field G were Micah Johnson, Jeff Hudson, Chad Washburn, Michelle Benglin, and Justin Singleton. Square supervisors for the JIV were Magalie Dartus, Thomas Pieters, Ehren Lichtenwalter, and Christine Chitwood.


articulation, the southern portion of an eighth-to-seventh-century B.C.E. building north of the city wall was exposed. Cutting across both the city wall and the building and exiting beyond the city wall was a magnificently preserved water channel, dating to the seventh century B.C.E. of the late Iron Age II/Persian period. The significance of this unusual and intriguing find will be the focus of further investigation into what appears to be an abundant water supply, tapped by a sophisticated water reservoir system.

Below the southern slope of the ancient tell and southwest of the modern road excavation of the JIV, Field A, also called “old Jalul” (see below), was directed by Reem Al Shqour. The primary focus was further exploration and articulation of a possible khan, also known as a caravanserai or roadside inn. The rooms associated with this complex date to the Early Islamic period (Umayyad) and were subsequently reconstructed during the Mamluk period, with portions continuing in use as late as the Ottoman period. During excavation of the upper level of Field A, a second subterranean level was discovered, including an impressive vaulted room. The significance of a substantial caravanserai, which would demand an abundant water source for large animal caravans of camels and donkeys, underscores the probability that Jalul was a significant site on the caravan route across the desert.

Karen Borstad and Theodore Burgh conducted the Tall Jalul Mapping Project, focusing on mapping the JIV (Fig. 1 and Pl. 4). Using a rover unit of the ProMark 3 GPS system, twenty-two structures were located and their locations recorded. The mapped structures can now be displayed on a georeferenced aerial photo of the JIV site (pls. 1 and 2).

In the following sections, each field director and specialist presents preliminary scientific results of their contributions to the archaeological excavation conducted during the 2009 season at Tall Jalul and the JIV.

Field C: Late Bronze Age II through Hellenistic Period

Paul Ray
Andrews University

This season of excavations brought clarification to the nature of the Late Iron II C/Persian period walls that have been exposed in the southern portion of this field in recent seasons (see below). Earlier seasons of excavation exposed the remnants of a tripartite building in the northern part of the field. It is of interest that most of the material culture from the earlier periods discovered in this field were found in the northern section, which is where we will begin our summary of the excavations.

Field Phase 11 (Late Bronze Age II/ Iron Age I Transition)

Although no architecture has been found to date, two Late Bronze Age II lamps (Objects 95 and 96) and a chalice (Object 97), along with numerous

12 The objects will be published in a forthcoming report.
frit, faience, carnelian, and quartz beads (Objects 93a-e), were found in a mud-brick detritus (C.3:23)\textsuperscript{13} layer, which were apparently fall from a wall immediately to the south.

**Field Phase 10 (Iron Age I)**

In the 1994 season, the remnant of an Iron Age I building was found just above bedrock, downslope of the acropolis, in Square 4. It consisted of a wall (C.4:29). Since an Iron Age II wall was built on top of it and slightly offset to the west, not much more can be said about the nature of this building, which is the earliest feature found in the field so far. Iron Age I sherds were found in the soil layer (C.4:30), just on top of bedrock to the east of the wall. More sherds from this period were also found in soil layers (C.3:40, 41) immediately above bedrock, elsewhere in the field.

**Field Phase 9 (Iron Age II)**

The eastern wall of an Iron Age II pillared house (Fig. 2), offset on a slight angle, was built on top of the earlier Iron Age I wall in Square 4. This wall (C.4:10 = 20) ran in a southwest-northeast direction throughout Squares 4 and 2, with its extension in the latter designated Wall 11. Near the southeastern corner of Square 4, the southern wall (C.4:34) of the structure turned to the west, continuing into Square 3 as Wall 29. The parallel north-south long wall on the west side of the building appears to have been scavenged for later building activities, as a robber trench was found that ran the length of Squares 1 and 3, and which can still be seen in the south balk of Square 3 (C.3:12) and the north balk of Square 1 (C.1:11). The northern perimeter wall, where the entrance was probably located, remains unexcavated. The building was subdivided on the south into a large broad room, with walls C.4:31 and C.3:21 to the east and west respectively, and flanking a doorway in the center. The northern part of the building was further divided by pillars, of which only five remain; three along the eastern side of the building (C.2:20, 22 and 25) and two (C.1:31 and C.2:27) paralleling pillar C.2:25 along the northern edge of Squares 1 and 2.

Later in the period, apparently during the seventh century B.C.E., the building was destroyed. There were at least twenty disarticulated skeletons, along with two ballistics (Objects 269 and 298), an iron axe head (Object 386), late Iron Age II ceramics and part of a horse figure (Object 290) typical of the period in the bedrock pit (C.1:28) located in the center of the building. Above this, roof debris, a broken roof roller, two ballistics (Objects 136 and 184), two iron arrowheads (Objects 156 and 206), and part of an iron [dagger?] blade (Object 208) were found in the destruction debris in Squares 2 and 4. The pit may have originally served as a place for subterranean storage; because it was not plastered, a cistern would seem to be ruled out. An ephemeral wall (C.3:36), which ran along the western balk of Square 3, also appears to have been built sometime during Iron Age II, as suggested by the

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{That is: Field C, Square 3, Locus 23.}
ceramics found in its foundation trench (C.3:43). It is perhaps connected with another structure to the west of the pillared house.

After the destruction of the pillared house, activities seem, for the most part, to have centered to the south. Already in the 1996 season, a half square (C.5) was opened, with exposure widened to a full square in 1999. In 2005, three additional squares (C.6-8) were opened, broadening the field considerably.

Field Phase 8 (Iron Age II C/Persian Period)
During this phase, an Iron Age II C/Persian period building was built to the southeast of the Phase 9 pillared house. What has been excavated consists of walls (C.7:35 and 36), which appear to be the northwest corner of the building, and a cobbled pavement (C.7:38) to the north of the building (Fig. 3). Associated artifacts include a spindle whorl, a shell pendant, and a figurine fragment (Objects 768, 774, and 785). With the remainder of the structure lying unexcavated in the area between Fields C and D, nothing further can be said about this building at present. In addition, there seems to have been renewed activity in the northern part of the field, as ceramic remains from this period were found mixed with earlier (Iron Age II) material in the destruction debris of the following phase. If the pillared house was rebuilt or movements made in that direction during this phase, it was soon destroyed again, most likely by an earthquake, as large amounts of the mud-brick superstructure of Wall C.4:34 fell to the south into Square 5.

Field Phase 7 (Iron II C/Persian Period)
Field C appears to have undergone a period of abandonment at this juncture for an unknown, but probably relatively short, period of time. A considerable amount of decayed mud brick (C.5:9, 15, 26 = 27, 31 = 32 = 33; C.6:29, 32, 33, 36, and 37) and destruction debris from the earthquake, along with Iron Age II and Iron Age II C/Early Persian period material culture, accumulated at this time. This material eroded to the east, in Squares 5 and 6, most likely due to the seasonal rains washing downhill from the acropolis to the west. Artifacts found among the destruction debris include three ballistics (Objects 567, 568 and 731), two spindle whorls (Objects 569 and 584), a buzz toy (Object 581), a basalt lamp (Object 583), a stone weight (Object 734), and a pendant (Object 763).

Field Phase 6 (Iron II C/Persian Period)
The pillared house in the northern part of the field was no longer in use during this phase. It was probably at this time that its western perimeter wall was removed, as the latest pottery in the robber trench (C.1:11 = C.3:12) dates to this period. Instead, it appears that a new building was built immediately to the east that partially reused the eastern wall of the earlier building. A new wall (C.2:10) was built parallel to and slightly west of the eastern perimeter wall of the earlier building, with its southern extension (Wall C.4:10 = 20)
presumably being reused, and with new coursing added to its top as another new wall (C.6:19 = C.5:44) was built from its corner, which turns in a slight southeastern direction. Its foundation trench (C.6:28) was cut deeply through destruction and abandonment debris of the previous two phases. Not much can be said about this “eastern building,” as most of it remains outside the area of excavation.

To the south, a large building was erected with a paved street or alleyway (C.5:42) located between it and the building to the east. This building (Fig. 4) consists of Wall C.8:17 on the south; the remnant of an eastern wall (C.7:14), which was later scavenged; and Wall C.6:21 = C.5:8 on the north. Wall C.8:16 = C.7:12 forms an inner partition wall. There are also the remains of a stone pavement (C.5:25) on the northwest corner of the building. The foundation trench (C.6:30) of the north wall (C.6:21 = C.5:8), like that of Wall C.6:19 = C.5:44 of the “eastern building” across the street, was cut through the destruction and abandonment debris of the previous phases.

Field Phase 5 (Iron II C/Persian Period)

During this phase, there was a western expansion to the building on the southern end of the field. The western wall of the earlier phase seems to have been removed; thus far there is little trace remaining unless feature C.8:25 is a remnant. The southern wall (C.8:17) of the building was extended to the west as Wall C.8:17b and consists of much larger stones than its eastern counterpart. A new square (C.11) to the west of Square 8 was opened in the 2009 season. It is possible that the stonework (C.11:11) in its east balk is the westernmost extension of the southern wall of the building. On the north, Wall C.6:21 = C.5:8 was also lengthened to the west, with the extension of Wall C.5:13, which is slightly offset to the south. Part of the new western wall was found in Square 5 during the 1999 season and designated Wall C.5:21. In 2009, the north balk of Square 8 was removed, making it possible to trace this wall farther to the southwest as Wall C.8:26, until it also disappeared into the west balk of the square. At the same time, there was a thickening or widening of the center wall or pylon (C.8:16 = C.7:12) in the center of the building. Sections of a pavement (C.8:20 = 28 = 31 = C.5:29) were found throughout the building, consisting of alternating sections of small flagstones and plaster. The street between the two buildings—the “eastern building” apparently continuing in use at this time—was also repaved with a new set of flagstones (C.5:39 = C.6:11) on top of a dirt-fill layer (C.5:40-41 = C.6:24) during this phase.

Field Phase 4 (Iron II C/Persian Period)

The previous phase came to an end with the occurrence of another earthquake. As is typical of tectonic activity on the Transjordanian side of the Great Rift Valley, the Arabian Plate shifts to the north, causing architectural elements to fall to the south. This earthquake caused considerable damage to the building in the southern part of the field, destroying both the mud-brick superstructure and much of the stone coursing of Walls C.6:21 = C.5:8 = 13 and C.8:16 =
C.7:14. It took all of the 2007 season and part of 2009 to clear the massive amount of stones from southernmost squares (Square 7 and especially Square 8) before reaching undisturbed wall courses and the pavement below the destruction debris. The mud-brick superstructure (C.5:7, 10; C.6:26, 27, 38) and some stone work from the southern wall (C.6:19 = C.5:44) of the “eastern building” were also destroyed at this time, falling south into Squares 5 and 6. A number of artifacts were found in the earthquake debris; a stamp seal (Object 678) was perhaps the most significant find (Fig. 5).

During the postearthquake Phase 4, a buttress wall (C.7:13 = C.6:35) was added along the southeastern face of Wall C.6:21 = C.5:8, 13 to strengthen this end of the building, which apparently sustained the brunt of the damage caused by the earthquake. Curvilinear installation (C.5:23) in the northwest corner of the building may have come into existence at this time. The “eastern building” probably went out of use at this time, as a rubble layer (C.6:17) was found on top of the uppermost extant course of Wall C.6:19 = C.5:44. However, the street to the north of Wall C.6:21 = C.5:8, 13 was repaved (C.5:37b = C.6:8) a final time.

**Field Phase 3 (Hellenistic Period and Later Remains)**

This phase appears to reflect the accumulation of post-Iron Age II C/Persian period debris as represented by the tumble or stone fall (C.7:42) in the post-use phase of the building on the southern end of the field.

Field Phases 1 and 2 represent subsurface debris and topsoil respectively within Field C.

**Summary and Future Work**

Parts of two buildings were articulated during the 2009 season in the southern part of Field C. Although this brought clarification to the late Iron Age II/Persian-period structures on this section of the tell, there is still much work to be done in future seasons both in terms of lateral exposure (to clarify some of the partially excavated structures on the current peripheral edges of the field) and depth (the potential discovery of earlier structures beneath some of the currently excavated buildings).
Figure 1. Karen Borstad using GPS Rover to map the JIV.

Figure 2. Pillared house in Field C, looking north.
Figure 3. Southeast building in Field C, looking west.

Figure 4. Southern building in Field C, looking west.
Figure 5. Stamp seal (Object 678) from Field C.
Plate 1. Topographical Map of Tall Jalul.
Plate 2. Aerial photo of Tall Jalul and the JIV.
Plate 3. Participants of the 2009 Tall Jalul Excavation Team. A number of team members were missing from the photograph.
Plate 4. JIV workers Ehren Lichtenwalter and Thomas Pieters help Theodore Burgh map features in the JIV.

Plate 5. Ceramic horse figure (Object 660).
Plate 6. Ceramic plaque figure (Object 784).

Plate 7. Erika Fortin excavating cache of pottery in Field G.
Plate 8. Water channel in Field G.

Plate 9. Randall Younker, director of the excavation at Jalul, in subterranean vaulted room in the JIV.
Plate 10. A selection of Jalul 2009 Season small finds.
Plate 11. Leg fragment in the shape of a lion's paw from a large basalt bowl (Object 716).

Plate 12. Mamluk potsherd from the JIV being analyzed on the 3-D scanner.
Excavations in Field D, the Persian-period domestic complex, were carried out again in 2009. The field was opened in 1996 with four squares (Squares 1-4) and expanded by the addition of two squares (Squares 7-8) to the west in 2005. The latter were opened to reveal more of Room 1 (primarily in Square 1) and Room 2 (primarily in Square 3).

The original objectives for the 2009 season were to conclude excavation of the domestic complex in the original four squares and continue excavating Squares 7 and 8 (on the western edge of the field) to reveal new areas of the house (Fig. 6). Upon initial in-field assessment, however, it became clear that the original 5-m-long east balk lines of Squares 2 and 4 and the north balk lines of Squares 1 and 2 were so eroded as to make excavation below them unsafe for the excavators. The east balk lines of Squares 7 and 8 had largely eroded into Rooms 1 and 2 more than 3 m below. In addition to safety concerns, the strategy of removing these balks would effectively halt erosion into Rooms 1 and 2 of the house because the western walls of these rooms would prevent further soil from being washed in. Balk and interseasonal debris removal throughout the Field occupied the first half of the season.

Another objective was to complete the process of totally removing all floor surfaces in Room 1 (Square 1). Four dirt floors had been identified in Room 1 in previous seasons, indicating a lengthy occupation of Room 1 during the sixth century B.C.E. Portions of the two earliest floors (D.1:75, 76; Fig. 7) remained in the south end of the room. This objective was delayed and ultimately not completed in 2009 due to extensive balk and interseasonal debris removal, but the floor surfaces themselves remained well preserved.

The western wall (D.1:5 = D.7:13) of Room 1 was not fully excavated in previous seasons because it was partially obscured by the east balk of Square 7, leaving the southwestern corner of Room 1 hidden in the balk. After four years of exposure to the elements, rain had washed most of the soil away, nearly exposing the corner. Consequently, the remaining soil was removed to fully reveal the western wall. This exposed a blocked doorway (D.1:103; Fig. 8) in Wall D.1:35. It represents a later use of Room 1 and the latest occupation phase of the domestic complex discovered thus far. The later builders used earlier walls as foundations.

The threshold of the blocked door rests 1 m above the earliest floor. Earlier inhabitants would have used the lower, now-blocked entryway in the north wall (D.1:30) of Room 1 (see Fig. 7). The room was abandoned for some time before being reoccupied, but given the consistency of ceramic forms, the original construction, abandonment, and reuse, this period of disuse would not have exceeded a century. Collapse of the first roof and partial collapse of the earliest walls must have occurred fairly rapidly and
filled in much of the room, preserving the single-row walls to a maximum height of 3 m.

The clearing of the southwest corner of Room 1 also revealed the corner of another earlier, unexcavated building to the south. The builders of Room 1 chose to incorporate this corner into their new room (D.1:108; see Fig. 8). Continued excavation in Square 8 will presumably elucidate its relationship to the domestic complex. In spite of interseasonal conservation efforts, exposure to the elements has reduced the stability of the walls in Room 1. The continued removal of earth on the west side of the western wall in future seasons will require efforts to stabilize it.

The north balk of Square 1 suffered severe undercutting due to erosion. In Field D, the earth is primarily windblown silt, starting 20 cm below topsoil. Seasonal rains quickly compromised the integrity of exposed balks. Soil had washed into Room 1 via the door and window in the north wall (D.1:30) of the room. The erosion created a funnel between Wall D.1:30 and the north balk that descended 3 m down to the base of Wall D.1:30. Consequently, this area has only been excavated to a depth of 75 cm below the top of the wall and will likely not continue until the square north of Square 1 is excavated to that same depth. Wall D.1:88 also suggests the presence of an unexcavated building between Fields C and D.

Unexcavated areas of the domestic complex extend to the west of Room 1. Wall D.7:4 (=D.1:70) in Square 7 (Fig. 9), discovered in 2005 a few centimeters below the topsoil, has now been definitively connected to the Persian house, but it remains uncertain if the portion of the wall in Square 7 is concurrent with the occupation of Room 1.

Room 2

Room 2, adjacent to and slightly southeast of Room 1, was transected by the north balk of Square 3 (Fig. 10). This balk served as a cross section of Room 2 in 2005, when the southern half of the room was initially excavated. In 2009, the balk was removed to provide a clearer picture of Room 2. As with Room 1, Room 2 appears to have had two major occupational phases during the early sixth to early fifth centuries B.C.E. Existing walls are 2.5 m high. The fill in Room 2, comprised of roof collapse followed by later wall collapse, was dense and somewhat protected from the elements by the standing walls. Consequently, the balk was in a better state of preservation and the integrity of the loci was easier to maintain than in the silt piles that had washed into Squares 1 and 2. Artifacts—particularly basalt implements—were frequent in the fill loci in Room 2. The balk contained several partial and a few complete loaf-shaped hand grinders, in addition to two fibula (Objects 693 and 694).

Room 2 was entered via a doorway in the northeastern corner (Fig. 11). The entrance is poorly preserved on the north wall (D.1:44), which was partially dismantled sometime after Room 2 had been abandoned (Fig. 10), as indicated by a robber trench (D.1:104) (Fig. 12). The northern end of the eastern wall (D.1:81 = D.3:28) of Room 2, however, is well preserved and created a nicely finished entryway (see Fig. 11).
To the east of Rooms 1 and 2 lies the courtyard area (Squares 2 and 4; Fig. 13). No living surfaces or activity areas have yet been identified in the northern half of the courtyard; the northern limit is marked by Wall D.2:27 in the northeastern corner of Square 2.

Severe erosion in the north and east balks of Square 2 and the east balk of Square 4 made it advisable to cut the balks back to the 6-m line. In some areas, the erosion had already progressed beyond that line. Balk removal revealed a few new features.

In the process of the Square 2 north-balk removal, a concentration of small rock fall (D.2:36) was discovered west of Wall D.2:27 that may continue into the northeastern corner of Square 1. These rocks were primarily in the north balk and did not extend further south into the courtyard area. They are probably related to unexcavated architecture to the north, as is the tiny portion of exposed Wall D.2:46 (Fig. 14), 1 m in height and length, in the northeastern corner of Square 2.

A hollow ceramic camel’s head (Object 749; Fig. 15), originally part of a kernos vessel, was found in this area between Walls D.2:27 and D.2:46.

Wall D.2:27 has two openings, as yet barely visible, that are probably doors or windows, with a supporting stone between them. Soil in this area had been disturbed by dogs, digging under the openings. Excavations here also revealed a trench (D.2:47) along the northern face of Wall D.2:27 (Fig. 16). The soil in the trench is loose and windblown, filling in around small rocks, which possibly fell from the wall after the trench diggers abandoned it. The trench may not be foundational because there is no sign of a trench or pit along the south face of Wall D.2:27 and the openings suggest there is some distance remaining to be excavated before the bottom of the wall is reached. It is possible that the stones currently exposed represent a later phase of the wall and the trench signifies a rebuilding episode, but that will have to be confirmed by future excavation. A more likely scenario is that builders, centuries after the Persian period, seeing only the top preserved course of Wall D.2:27, dug along the north face of the wall to check its foundation, intending to use it in their own construction, but discovered that there were openings and abandoned Wall D.2:27 as unstable.

The double openings in Wall D.2:27 and its height relative to Wall D.1:30 may indicate that the two walls are contemporary. Both walls seem to be constructed in a similar style (two doorways/windows separated by an upright stone). If so, this could mean that the unexcavated building northeast of the courtyard area was inhabited concurrently with the earlier occupational phase of the domestic complex. Limited ceramic evidence from earth layers between Walls D.2:27 and D.2:46 supports this possibility.
East balk removal in Square 2 revealed an enigmatic stone feature (D.2:43) that may turn out to be a wall and further evidence for architecture to the east.

The southern half of the courtyard, principally in Square 4, has shown more evidence of activity areas in past seasons. A smashed sixth-century-B.C.E. pithos used to store olive oil was found in the northeastern corner, complete with a dipper juglet underneath. A haphazard wall (D.4:45, Fig. 17), composed of small boulders and discarded basalt implements, was unearthed in 2005. It had literally been thrown together. Its purpose remains unclear, but represents, along with the blocked doorway of Room 1, one of the last phases of occupation in the house. Wall 45 contained a nearly complete saddle quern, several loaf-shaped grinders, and numerous hand grinders, all probably grabbed from nearby areas when the wall was loosely constructed.

Removal of the east balk of Square 4 revealed several features. The corner of an unexcavated building (D.4:70, Fig. 18) to the east of the domestic complex was discovered. Based on limited ceramic evidence, it may have been contemporary with the Persian house or the slightly earlier building in Field C.

The southeastern corner of the courtyard in Square 4 included a large mound of packed roof material that is the consistency of concrete and was sterile in terms of artifacts, ceramics, and bones. The mound of collapsed material probably belonged to a building to the east of the courtyard associated with Wall D.4:70.

In the process of removing the last few centimeters of the east balk in Square 4, five courses of mud-brick wall (D.4:75) were uncovered. The individual bricks, mortar, and a mud-plaster facing on both sides of the wall were clearly delineated. Based on the wall’s location and localized mud-brick debris in D4 from earlier seasons (found principally in the southeastern corner), this feature should be connected with a building to the east, which is as yet unexcavated. What appeared to be a pit (D.4:76) was in actuality windblown soil that filled in the area between the roof collapse and the wall.

**Small Finds in Field D**

This season added to the growing corpus of seals and ostraca from Tall Jalul. One bulla (seal impression), half of a seal, and one ostracon with four letters were found in Field D (for photos and analysis, see article by Gane and Chadwick). Unfortunately, these objects were found during balk removal in levels above the architecture of the domestic complex, but the preservation of the letters is excellent.

The bulla (Object 745) was found in the southeastern corner of the courtyard during balk removal. The seal (Object 647) was found during the removal of the top 50 cm of the north balk of Square 1. The four-lettered ostracon (Object 659) came from the top meter of east balk removal, in Square 2, and was discovered during pottery washing.

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<sup>14</sup> For more information on small finds in this and other fields, see below.

<sup>15</sup> Forthcoming publication.
The domestic complex has continued to produce numerous figurines. In 2009, five fragments of horse figurines were recovered in Squares 1, 2, and 4 (Pl. 5). One example of the rear torso included a well-preserved painted saddle without a rider (Object 662; Fig. 19). Four fragments of female figurines from Squares 1, 2, and 3 were also found, including one nearly complete female plaque figurine (Object 784; Pl. 6).

Summary

Although little additional architecture or phasing was discovered in 2009, balk removal did afford another opportunity to capture photos and drawings of phases that are better understood now that more of the domestic complex has been excavated. While the exposure of new architecture in the northern balk of Square 1 and the eastern balk of Squares 2 and 4 and evidence of building collapse in Square 4 are limited, their presence suggests additional buildings to the north and east exist that may be roughly contemporary with the Persian house. The continuation of the walls of Room 1 into Square 7 and the newly discovered blocked door indicate that the domestic complex continues to the west. All lines of evidence reveal a greater density of occupation on the southern half of the tell during the seventh-fifth centuries B.C.E. than had previously been supposed.
**Figure 6.** View of domestic complex looking west. The grassy area in the background (west of Field D) is the acropolis of the tell.

**Figure 7.** The north end of Room 1 of Field D is subfloor level, while the south end includes interseasonal debris covering Floor D.1:75.
Figure 8. Door (Locus 103) in the southwest wall of Room 1 of Field D.

Figure 9. Wall 4 in Square 7 of Field D, Wall 35 of Room 1 in foreground.
Figure 10. Room 2 of Field D transected by the north balk of Square 3. Note damage to Wall D.1:44 above (north of) the sign board.

Figure 11. Field D, Room 2. Note blocked entry way to the left (south of) the meter stick below the arrow.
**Figure 12.** A robber trench cuts Wall D.1:44 of Field D.

**Figure 13.** The Field D courtyard area. The boulders in the lower right are fallen pillar stones.
Figure 14. Field D, Walls 27 and 46.

Figure 15. Ceramic camel-head kernos fragment (Object 749), found between Walls D.2:27 and D.2:46 of Field D.
Figure 16. Trench on the north face of Wall D.2.27 in Field D. The arrow rests in the trench.

Figure 17. Field D, Wall D.2.45, excavated in the 2005 season.
Figure 18. Field D, Wall 70 is the corner of an unexcavated building to the east.

Figure 19. Ceramic riderless horse figurine with saddle (Object 662) from Field D.
Field G: Iron Age City Wall and Water Channel

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Due to the fact that after five seasons of excavations Field A failed to produce any evidence of the city’s fortifications, the decision was made in 2007 to open Field G located on the southeastern ridge of the tell, where signs of a possible fortification wall were visible. During this season, several walls of a building complex were discovered. One of the outer walls appeared to be a city wall, but since the excavated area was limited, its nature remained uncertain. Full-scale excavation resumed at Field G during the 2009 season, where the work continued in some of the existing squares (Squares 1, 2, and 4), and in new squares that were opened (Squares 5-9) to clarify the nature of previously excavated structures.

Ninth-century B.C.E. Occupation

At the end of the season, it was concluded that Field G revealed three occupational phases, each followed by an abandonment phase. The earliest occupational phase came into existence in the earlier part of the ninth century B.C.E. This occurred soon after the kingdom of Israel divided into two kingdoms: the Northern Kingdom, also known as Israel, ruled from Samaria; and the Southern Kingdom, known as the Kingdom of Judah, ruled from Jerusalem. This earliest phase consists of city walls that were revealed in all of the squares except Square 5. Since foundation trenches were not found at the base of the walls, it is obvious that they were erected on a preexisting surface. The southern wall runs through several squares. It is excavated to a length of more than 20 m (see Fig. 20), is approximately 1 m wide, and is made of large- and medium-size boulders supported and stabilized with chink stones. The wall is preserved up to 2 m or more in some places, and follows the southern ridge of the tell. At its southeastern corner, the wall turns sharply at a right angle toward the north (see Fig. 21). It seems that the southern flank of the wall was protected by a tower, found in G.8 and located approximately 15-20 m away from its southeastern corner (see Fig. 22). This wall is probably part of the city’s defense system, which encompasses the entire settlement and was effectively used throughout the Assyrian domination (eighth century B.C.E.). The wall suffered its final destruction during the Babylonian invasion, sometime during the end of the seventh or beginning of the sixth century B.C.E. It is still unknown whether the structures inside of the city wall came into existence at the same time as the city wall. A small probe was excavated under the floor of one building; the pottery found in the probe is very similar to that found under the first course of the city wall, indicating that the wall and structures inside of the wall might have been contemporaneous. However, due to limited excavation that has produced insufficient material for dating,

16During the 2007 season, Field G was excavated by a team from Cincinnati Christian University, supervised by Mark Ziese.
it is better to date the structure inside of the city walls to the eighth century B.C.E.

_Eighth-century B.C.E. Occupation_

A structure emerged during the 2007 season and parts of it were completely excavated during the 2009 season. The building is located in the southeastern corner of the tell, and the city walls were used to support the structure. It was only partially excavated and probably was a single-level building whose roof was supported by pillars that were located in its courtyard. Whether the building was a “four-room house” is not certain, but it does have a small back room measuring 2.6 m long by 1.3 m wide. This room yielded a significant quantity of broken pottery (Pl. 7). The room seems to have been used for depositing damaged or broken pots that ranged from small tripod-based store-jars, small jars, oil lamps, plates, flasks, jugs and juglets to cooking pots, all dating to the eighth century B.C.E. (see Fig 21). The walls of the building and its associated pillars are well preserved. One of the pillars is preserved almost in its entirety, reaching to the ceiling of the building (up to 2.5 m in height; see Fig. 23). A preliminary reading of the pottery found on the floor of the building’s courtyard suggests a date similar to the ceramics found in the small room, indicating that the structure was extensively used in the eighth century B.C.E. when the prophets Isaiah, Micah, Hosea, and Amos were operating in the lands of Israel and Judah. At least part of the building (a small back room) was abandoned after the eighth century B.C.E., while the courtyard and other rooms might have been used during the seventh century B.C.E.

_Seventh-century B.C.E. Occupation_

Sometime after the destruction of Samaria and the Northern Kingdom, a water channel was constructed as the newest addition to the building complex. The direction of the channel seems to indicate that it was connected to what appears to be the city’s water reservoir. The reservoir is located in close proximity to the southeastern corner of the city. The channel runs from the reservoir toward the southern part of the city wall and curves around structures almost parallel to that wall before it cuts through the eastern section of the wall at the place where the eastern and southern walls meet (Figs. 21, 24, and Pl. 8). The builders carefully navigated the path of the channel to avoid demolition of the existing building. In this way, most of the building was left intact apart from several small rooms located closest to the southern city wall (see Fig. 21). Based on a preliminary reading of the pottery found under the foundation of the channel, it is evident that it was constructed during the seventh century B.C.E., while the pottery found inside the channel on its floor suggests that it went out of use during the end of the seventh or beginning of the sixth century B.C.E., probably during the Babylonian invasion.

The channel is well preserved. It is .8 m wide, while the height of both its walls is up to 1 m in certain places. The floor of the channel was well constructed of neatly placed flagstones covered with a thick layer of lime plaster. The channel walls were also plastered on the inside for better water
flow. The channel slopes from the inside out, leading the water outside the city walls toward possible open pools or reservoirs below the tell.

**Water System**

Water was always a rare, yet essential, commodity for ancient peoples and as such played an important role in settlements that were established from earliest human history. Cities were always established around a water source. Sometimes a well-supplied stream outside the city perimeters was used as the main source of water. From here, the water was carried in jars and jugs into the town for food processing and cooking. Additionally, the same water source was used for irrigation, washing, and watering animals. A typical example of such a settlement was Khirbet Iskander, which was established and occupied during the time of Abraham, located near biblical Dibon in central Jordan.

However, when a water source was located outside the city walls, it created a problem for its occupants during a time of siege. As a result, people who tried to find protection inside the city walls could not last long because they had no access to the water source outside the city walls. To prevent this hazardous problem, sometimes the inhabitants dug two channels, one horizontal and one vertical, to bring the water inside, so as to have access to it without exposing themselves to invaders. Such an elaborate system was established in Jerusalem during the reign of King Hezekiah in the eighth century B.C.E. At this site, the excavators dug a vertical shaft and then two teams dug a horizontal channel from opposite ends, eventually meeting in the middle. This way they had access to fresh water at all times.

In the absence of natural springs, streams, or rivers, city inhabitants dug massive cisterns inside the city walls, where rainwater could be channeled and collected. The cisterns were dug into bedrock and plastered on the inside to protect water from leaking (Tall Hisban is a good example for such a cistern or reservoir). This method of collecting and preserving water was the most widely used from the time of the Judges onward. In addition to the main city cistern, which was accessible to all citizens, rich individuals might have excavated cisterns in their own backyards for private use (Jer 38:6).

In addition to the above methods, inhabitants sometimes dug deep wells to reach the water table from inside their cities. Usually wells were wide with stairs around the walls, making deep spring water accessible. One such well was found at Gibeon, in Israel. Cisterns used to collect rainwater contributed to health problems, while digging deep wells provided access to clean and healthy fresh water. Since it was not easy to reach the water table through bedrock, digging wells inside city walls was rare.

There seems to be a city reservoir at Tall Jalul. It has not yet been excavated, but it appears that the reservoir was dug in ancient times either to provide a place to collect rainwater during the rainy season or to reach fresh water below the water table. Future excavations will be needed to provide evidence in support of these two theories. One thing is clear, however. The water channel, which was discovered during the last two seasons, did not serve to supply rainwater to the reservoir, but rather to lead the water out.
If the water reservoir served only as a collecting place for rainwater, then it is possible that rain was so extensive that it overcame the capacity of the reservoir and a channel was constructed to direct surplus water outside the city limits. However, if this reservoir was a deep well, then it is also possible that when the water table rose during heavy rains, the level of water in the well would also rise, threatening to flood the streets and homes of inhabitants who lived in the lower city. Either way, it seems that surplus water was not wasted, but rather collected in large pools outside the city walls for further use in irrigation systems and/or providing water for the animals. The site may have been so well known for its excess of water that it might have been used in poetry by biblical authors as early as the tenth century B.C.E. (Song 7:4, Eng.; 7:5, Heb.). As already suggested, this water system might help in the identification of this site.17

**Figure 20.** The southern part of the city wall in Field G.

**Figure 21.** Structures in the southeastern corner of Field G.
Figure 22. A possible tower in Field G, Square 8.

Figure 23. Pillars in Field G.
Figure 24. A cut through the eastern wall of Field G.
Jalul Islamic Village: JIV Field A
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As noted in the 2008 report, the goal of the excavations in the Jalul Islamic Village (JIV)\(^\text{18}\) was to determine whether the large building complex immediately east of the oldest freestanding square building in the center of the east quadrant of the site was a *khan*. In the 2008 season, parts of two rooms (Rooms A.1 and A.2)—possible cells of a *khan*—were excavated on the southeast side of the building complex. Bedrock was reached in both of these rooms and the ceramic evidence indicates that there was activity in the area of these rooms during the Early Islamic period (Umayyad, ca. seventh century), but the rooms as they now appear were constructed during the Mamluk period, ca. fourteenth century.

**Rooms 1 and 2**

This season, excavation was continued in the same two rooms (Rooms A.1 and A.2; primarily in Squares A.1 and A.2 respectively). The remaining unexcavated areas in both rooms were completely cleared to bedrock this season. Again, the ceramics from the earliest phase of construction confirmed that the rooms were originally constructed in the Early Islamic period (Umayyad) and reconstructed during the Mamluk period.

**Field A. Squares 1 and 2**

**Room A.1: Northern Room**

A basalt stone mill for grinding flour was found on the floor in the northern room. The Mamluk floor (the only clean Mamluk occupation layer found in the excavations) was made of nari with pieces of broken flint—ash was added, giving a grey color to the nari.\(^\text{19}\) Part of this room was a food preparation area. Later, the south part of the room was remodeled during the Ottoman period. Finds such as a grain silo and stone bins for grain suggest that the south part of the room was used for grain storage and animal-keeping in the Ottoman period (Fig. 25).

**Room A.2 East: Exterior**

To the east of the southernmost room (Room A.2) excavation continued. At the bottom of the excavation area a nari floor (A.2:88, 89) was found that was apparently constructed in the Late Byzantine/Early Umayyad period (late sixth century or early seventh century). Above this, a small stretch of wall constructed of ashlars was found that also appears to date from the Byzantine/Umayyad period. After a period of abandonment following the Byzantine/Early Islamic period, the Mamluks constructed an exterior wall in the north

\(^{18}\)See n. 2 for the names of Jalul.

\(^{19}\)Nari is a soil that is mineralogically an impure limestone. It is often used to create a hard-packed floor surface.
cell of Room A.1 in the fourteenth century. The Mamluk phase probably lasted from the fourteenth to the early sixteenth centuries. This was followed by another period of abandonment (late sixteenth to nineteenth centuries). During the nineteenth century, the Ottomans initiated new construction (the exterior portion of the southern room) by creating a fill (A.2:12) and adding walls and a silo. The Ottoman phase of this room went out of use sometime during the nineteenth century and the site was abandoned during the latter part of the nineteenth and throughout the twentieth centuries.

**Room A.1: Western Section, Exterior of Northern Room**

Excavations were also conducted outside of Room A.1 in a courtyard to the west. The earliest phase in this area was an early Mamluk (fourteenth century) surface consisting of a nari floor (A.1:112) with flint fragments. During the Mamluk period, a wall (A.1:103) was constructed in the northern part of this area that contained a niche. This wall was the south wall of a two-story room in Squares A.1 and 3 (see below). The wall dated to the fourteenth century and likely continued in use until the sixteenth century. The area was abandoned from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. Then in the early nineteenth century an Ottoman wall (A.1:1010) was constructed, along with a terrace and a pavement (A.1:107). The Ottoman terrace and a wall abutting up against the exterior side of the west wall of the northern room (of Square 1) were also found. The exact purpose of this wall will require further investigation. In the early twentieth century, a grave was dug into this Ottoman room. Surprisingly, in the grave, a well-preserved ceramic figurine (Object 717; Fig. 40) from the Iron Age II (ca. seventh century B.C.E.) era was found. The figurine was of a bearded male wearing an Egyptian-style atef crown (a high crown with an ostrich feather on each side). Such crowns are common on Ammonite statues and figurines of this period. They depict either Ammonite kings or deities. A similar figurine was found at nearby Tall Jawa a few years ago.

**Field A. Square 3**

**Two-story Building**

To the north of the Ottoman addition, another two-story building with cells or rooms was partly uncovered this season in Square A.3. The upper floor exhibited at least two use phases, one including a *tabun* (earthen oven). A large stone, carved with a Christian cross indicating secondary use, was also found in the upper story of the Mamluk building. A stone-lined opening (Arabic—*khwerah*) could be discerned in the floor of the upper room (Figs. 26 and 27). It led down to a lower story. The opening permitted grain to be dumped into the lower room, which was used for grain storage. By dropping a camera down the stone-lined opening, it could be seen that an opening into the lower grain storage room was located on the north side of the lower story.
Subsequently, this section was excavated 4.7 m, down to the level of the opening into the lower story. As the team excavated down to the entrance 3 m below, they discovered a huge cavity (cave or cistern?) to the east and another cave to the north. These were at different levels. The cave was entered and a gate was seen to the west, but we did not excavate the cave this season. The eastern opening was not entered this season, but it was examined superficially through stone openings.

An arched opening was discovered that led into a small entrance room that, in turn, led into the larger, lower-story room. Even though there were considerable Mamluk ceramics, the date of this arched doorway is still uncertain. This is the earliest opening into the lower story from the north side.

Later, during the Mamluk period, the entrance room was reduced in size into a small stone-lined cubical entrance room (approximately 1.5 m). Access to the lower story was now through a rectangular doorway, framed by stone doorjams, a large stone lintel, and a stone threshold with a water-drainage channel (Fig. 28). This rectangular door was constructed in the Mamluk period and served as an access to the granary. Still later, the rectangular doorway was reduced to a small square doorway, also dating to the Mamluk period. Grain could be shoveled out of the room from this small square access door. (It should not be forgotten than an earlier door from the original construction of the lower story [Late Byzantine/Early Umayyad period] was constructed to the west, although we have not excavated this area yet. This is evident from the presence of a blocked archway on the west side of the lower story.)

The large (4 x 4 m) lower-story room (Pl. 9) was built with stone walls and contained more than 1 m of fill that had accumulated by water running into the room over the centuries after the room went out of use. The ceiling consisted of five stone arches (north to south), with corbelling between the arches. The western-most arch is clearly of a different construction. It could belong to another phase of construction in the southwest corner of the room. It appears to be connected to four ashlars in the corner of the room. However, more excavation is needed for a more complete analysis. At least two architectural phases can be seen in the room, which was probably initially constructed in the late Byzantine/early Umayyad period. It was expanded on the west in the early Mamluk period, with the main entrance at that time also to the west. In the late Mamluk period, that entrance was blocked and the western side of the room was divided into two pens (A.3:13/17) for grain. Tethering holes could be seen in the stones to the south, suggesting that animals were kept in the room at one point. During the last use phase, the only access to the room was through the small northern entrance room, of which at least three phases can be detected. Additionally, at least two Mamluk floors were found in the west side of the large room: the later, upper one was made of hard-packed earth (A.3:13/10 and 13/11), and the lower, earlier floor made of small flagstone (A.3:13/18).

**Square A.3: North Room**

To the north of the two-story building (in the western part of Square A.3) was another room, which was at the same level as the upper story of the two-
story building. Its floor consisted of large flagstones (A.3:7). In a later period, probably during the twentieth century, a robber’s trench was dug to the level of the arched entrance to the lower story and most of the flagstones of the upper northern room were removed.

Square A.3: East Room

Excavations were begun in the east part of Square A.3. This excavation exposed a room located immediately north of the room in Square A.1. Excavations were discontinued after a few days so that personnel could be committed to excavating the two-story building in Square A.3. Nevertheless, ceramics indicate that this room may have been constructed initially in the Umayyad period (as seen elsewhere) and reconstructed during the Mamluk period.

Summary

The structures excavated thus far in JIV appear to support the hypothesis that they are a part of a much larger khan or caravanserai, which would have served caravans en route across the region. The two-story building and associated complex of rooms date primarily to the Mamluk period (fourteenth century), with signs of much earlier Late Byzantine/Early Islamic (sixth-seventh centuries), as well as later Ottoman (nineteenth century), occupational activity.
Figure 25. Southern part of the Northern Room A.1 in the JIV.

Figure 26. A stone-lined opening in the upper level of a two-story building in the JIV Square.
Figure 27. A close-up of the stone-lined opening in upper level of two-story building in JIV Square.

Figure 28. Door to the granary in lower-level of the two-story building in JIV Square.
Mapping of Cisterns and Water Catchments

The water-systems study was prompted by the discovery of five ground-level cistern openings along the ancient built road, found in 2007, that passes from northwest to southeast along the western side of Tall Jalul. In addition, two cisterns on the north foot of the tell were known, as was a large unexcavated cistern on top of the tell. Pottery sherds, collected from the ancient road site in 2007, indicated use of the road from Iron Age to Byzantine times, and possibly into the Islamic period.

The current Mapping Project, under the direction of Borstad and Burgh, led to a discovery of twenty-five cisterns within 500 m of the tell, located predominantly on the north and south sides. Due to time constraints only half of the north side, which is devoid of houses or agricultural plots, was surveyed thoroughly. An olive grove and a private home occupies the area east of the tell, and new homes of the modern Jalul village occupy the immediate west side of the tell. The team conducted a cursory look in both areas. Following are brief descriptions of the types of cisterns found during the survey:

- Thirteen are a constructed hole in the ground, often difficult to see from more than 5-10 m away (Fig. 29).
- Five are capped. The cap is a cement square structure, less than 1 m high, often with a metal cover over the opening. Three of these had one or more external basins (Fig. 30).
- Seven are collapsed (Fig. 31).

During the mapping of the cisterns, it became apparent that the topography southeast and north of the tell formed natural basins and terraces. The appearances of these areas are striking in terms of their distinct shapes, the depth of the basins, and the vegetation variety and color, especially on the south side of the tell. Sheep herds have been observed in the spring season drinking the standing water on the south terraces. At the north of the tell, a striking feature is the high concentration of evenly spaced and uniform-sized rock concentrated at the lowest point of the basins. Borstad and Burgh estimated at least four of these natural basins on the north side of the tell and two prominent terraces and three basins on the south side. Due to time and equipment constraints, these areas were noted, but further detailed terrain mapping will be conducted next season.

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Cisterns with Water Management Features

Four cisterns on the north side of the tell and one on the south side displayed what appeared to be human-made raised earth structures, reinforced with rock, which form a steep drain-like area with the cistern opening at the lowest point. They appear to be for the purpose of funneling flowing surface or rain water into the cistern. Borstad and Burgh mapped these raised structures for future hydrographical analysis and three-dimensional visualization.

The 2009 Mapping Project revealed what appears to be a significant concentration of cisterns and other water management systems around the tell and JIV. The high proportion of cisterns constructed at ground level is a unique feature that suggests the long-term collection of rainwater or possibly more plentiful surface water flow. These cisterns are difficult to date. However, the capped cisterns suggest current use; at least one ground-level cistern contained deep water in June. Preliminary comparative research suggests that the sites with similar concentrations of cisterns are in remote areas and caravanserais close to the desert fringe. Cisterns ring the JIV ruins and residents today buy water from three wells in the immediate area. In spite of the fact that Jalul has no visible surface spring, the extensive water collection/storage system documented in this preliminary survey shows intensive use of Jalul’s natural landscape and geology from ancient occupation of the tell and the JIV to the present day.

Mapping of the Jalul Islamic Village

The primary goal of the 2009 season of the Tall Jalul Mapping Project was to devise and test a method for measuring, recording, and presenting the architectural features within the JIV at the southern foot of the tell. The JIV is defined as all structures south of the tell of ancient Jalul and is thought to have been occupied from Early Islamic through Ottoman times (Plate 2). This area is called “old Jalul” by inhabitants of the modern Jalul village, which lies mainly to the west of the tell. The Mapping Project is in conjunction with ongoing excavations of ruins at the northeastern corner of the JIV. The mapping team used an aerial photo to locate the outlines of subterranean structures and took GPS points at the outer corners of all structures with an identifiable “footprint.” Special architectural features within the structures such as arches and lintels were mapped separately (Fig. 32). An analysis of occupation and use patterning through time in the JIV, plus three-dimensional visualization, is the eventual goal of the Mapping Project. This report will briefly discuss the structures measured in 2009 as a preliminary test of the mapping methodology.

Using a rover unit of the ProMark 3 GPS system (cf. Pl. 4), twenty-two structures were located and their locations recorded. Four of the measured buildings are complete to their roof lines and appear to be the most recently built, as exemplified by Building 1 (Fig. 33). Building 1 is intact, but the amount of debris deposited inside the building’s only room and the lack of window coverings and doors indicates that the structure has not been occupied for some time. In addition to the window and door openings on the east and
west sides, the south wall connects via a door to a small, enclosed courtyard. Embedded stones around the perimeter of the rectangular-shaped space delineate the area. Building 3 (Fig. 34), another of the four recent structures, is located west of Building 1. It appears that this structure is currently used in some capacity (e.g., storage), as the metal door in the front of the building is padlocked. A keystone arch frames the metal door. An outer staircase runs to a second set of stairs that was built into the east wall. The seven stairs in the wall lead to the flat roof. The east and west walls have window openings that have been filled in with stones and mortar. Another structure, Building 5 (Fig. 35), located west of Buildings 1 and 3, is also rectangular, but is not as tall as Building 3. It has more of a broad-room shape. Currently, the building does not have a roof, but the walls are for the most part intact. The east and west walls have three doors and three windows. Inside the structure, walls divide the activity space into individual rooms, but because of deterioration, precise measurements are uncertain at this time. There had been recent human activity around the outside of Building 3, but no evidence of occupation within. The construction of these buildings appears to be contemporary with several complete structures within the JIV that were occupied in 2009. Interviews with Jalul inhabitants are likely to help date their historical phase within the JIV.

One unusual feature of the JIV was a wall running from a ruined structure to a cave entrance located at the northwestern corner. It appears that this cave is partly natural and partly enhanced for habitation; it continues under the modern road in the direction of the tell. A second cave entrance was found just east of the excavation squares (Fig. 36). The remaining structure measured in 2009 had arches and courtyards that appear to be typical of the partially buried structures visible at the west end of the JIV (Fig. 37). The locations of their outer wall corners were occasionally made from estimated assessments of the logical continuation line of visible walls. Accurate measurements will be possible only through excavation.

It is apparent that mapping the complete JIV, following the methods used in 2009, will provide at least a rough outline of its occupational history. In addition to maps that highlight characteristic architectural features such as arches, interviews with local inhabitants should help to identify buildings that have been removed. Such maps could certainly be used to guide the choice of further excavation areas. Presentation of the JIV's occupational history through three-dimensional visualization would require excavation in order to locate and measure accurately the foundations of the structures, plus their estimated height when in use.
Figure 29. Constructed cistern along south end of ancient road.

Figure 30. Capped cistern with external basin south of the tell.
Figure 31. A collapsed cistern south of the tell.

Figure 32. An arch in a building in the JIV.
Figure 33. Building 1 in the JIV.

Figure 34. Building 3 in the JIV.
Figure 35. Building 5 in the JIV.

Figure 36. A cave entrance in the JIV.
Figure 37. An arch of Building 9 in the JIV.
During the 2009 excavation season at Tall Jalul, Jordan, three small inscribed objects were discovered: a fragment of an ostracon, half of a stamp seal, and a complete ceramic bulla. Preliminary descriptions of these objects are included here, pending presentation and analysis of their texts in a forthcoming article.

_Ceramic Bulla_

**Registration number:** JO745 (=Object 745)
**Discovery location:** Field D, Square 10; balk removal
**Discovery date:** 10 June 2009
**Material:** clay
**Size of inscribed area:** approximate width 1.9 cm, height 1.6 cm
**Location and nature of inscription:** raised letters on one side of a roughly round piece of clay, produced by a stamped seal impression
**State of preservation:** complete
**Language of inscription:** probably Ammonite

_Half of a Stamp Seal_

**Registration number:** JO647 (Object 647)
**Discovery location:** Field D, Square 1; balk removal
**Discovery date:** 27 May 2009
**Material:** quartz
**Size of inscribed area:** approximate width 1.9 cm, height 1.8 cm
**Location and nature of inscription:** etched into flat surface of a stamp seal, with letters backward to produce correct impression when stamped onto clay
**State of preservation:** incomplete, with the top half of the seal broken away at the string hole through the object
**Language of inscription:** probably Ammonite

_Fragment of Ostracon_

**Registration number:** JO659 (=Object 659)
**Discovery location:** Field D, Square 2; balk removal
**Discovery date:** 29 May, 2009
**Size of inscribed area:** approximate width 1.8 cm, height 1.6 cm
**Location and nature of inscription:** inside of a sherd, lightly scratched into its surface, with letters lighter in color, perhaps because ink that is now gone has preserved under it the original color of the ceramic

**State of preservation:** incomplete

**Language of inscription:** probably Ammonite

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**Small Finds**

**Paul Ray**

Andrews University

The 2009 excavation season at Jalul yielded 150 museum-quality objects that were registered with the Department of Antiquities of Jordan (Pl. 10). Numerous variously sized fragments of other artifacts that are very common such as ballistics (sling stones) and domestic stone tools were recorded in terms of such identifiers as their find spots and a photo was taken of each so that a careful record of every object that was actually found is taken into account and can be used in reconstructing the history of ancient activity of the tell and the village at its base.

Since, for the most part, objects found on the tell were used during the Iron Age II and Persian periods, while those found at the village were from later periods (Byzantine through Ottoman), we will present them separately.

**Tall Jalul**

On the tell, 128 objects were found. These objects fall within nine categories of artifacts. These categories may be subdivided into two major groupings: those connected with the local, extended families living at the site, and those connected with wider, more community-related activities.

The largest category of family-related objects consisted of items connected with domestic activities. These include eight grinders, seven pestles, six flint blades, three stone and one ceramic bowl, a mortar, a pounder, two stone weights, and a bone tool. Twenty-eight objects are connected with cottage-industry craft specialization, specifically textile production. They include twelve spindle whorls, three loom weights, five weaving-pattern spatula fragments, five bone awls, three fibula, and a needle fragment. Eleven beads and five pendants make a total of sixteen jewelry-related items. Only one cosmetic-related artifact was found this season, consisting of a fragment of a limestone palette. Recreational artifacts consisted of a gaming piece and two buzz toys.

In terms of artifacts related to the community, the largest category was cultic or religiously oriented artifacts. They include twenty-one figurines and fragments of figurines including Objects 680, 681, 724, and 884 (Figs. 38 and 39), three kernoi fragments, part of an incense stand, a vessel fragment with a snake in relief, and a basalt vessel with a foot in the shape of a lion’s paw (Object 716; Pl. 11). Administrative-related artifacts consisted of five seals, one ostracon, and a bulla. Mercantile activities are perhaps represented by two
weights, but these have yet to be connected with known values. Finally, there were thirteen objects connected with warfare, including seven ballistics (sling stones), three arrowheads (two made of bronze and one of iron), two iron spear-point fragments, and a piece of bronze scale armor. In addition, there is a bone handle and another toy that, at the present time, are unidentified in terms of their specific use.

**Jalul Islamic Village**

Twenty-two artifacts were found at JIV. As on the tell, the largest number of artifacts were connected with domestic activity. These included an upper and lower millstone, a roof roller, a glass-bowl fragment, a small pestle and grinding platform, two whetstones, an iron spike, a roof tile, and an ornate furniture leg, possibly made of marble. The next largest category is jewelry artifacts including four bangle (bracelet and anklet) fragments, two rings, a bead, and half of a glass medallion. Objects related to textile production include an awl, a spindle whorl, and a spindle rest. Finally, there was one cultic or religiously related artifact that consisted of the head of an Iron Age II male Ammonite figurine with an *atef* crown on its head (Fig. 40), that had, no doubt, found its way down from the tell.
Figure 38. Ceramic female figurine fragment (Object 681).

Figure 39. Ceramic figurine fragment (Object 724).
Figure 40. Ceramic male figurine head with atef crown (Object 717).
Conclusion

Upon returning to Andrews University, research continues on the finds of this year’s excavation of Tall Jalul. Each object brought from Tall Jalul to the Institute of Archaeology on a one-year loan from the Department of Antiquities, Jordan, has been drawn by an artist (Fig. 41) and photographed. These small finds are on display in the Horn Archaeological Museum for the enjoyment of the public and will soon be returned to Jordan. Pottery is in the process of being drawn and recorded. We are using a new system, a three-dimensional scanner (Pl. 12), for recording the diagnostic pot sherds found in the field. So far nearly all of the sherds from the JIV have been recorded and those from Fields C, D, and G are next on the agenda.

The rewarding results of the 2009 archaeological season have made this one of our best seasons in the field. Both Fields C and D further confirmed the growing evidence supporting a vigorous Late Iron II/Persian-period settlement, complete with residential and administrative complexes. This further confirms the emerging picture of a substantial occupation during the Persian period in Transjordan. The articulation of the eighth-century B.C.E. southern city wall and the magnificently preserved water channel of the seventh century B.C.E. are among the most important finds to date. These findings, along with the large unexcavated depression, probably a water system, on the tell, as well as numerous smaller cisterns and pools, delineated by the GPS Mapping Project, are indicative of a sophisticated water reservoir complex unique to the region. Excavations conducted in the JIV continue to support the possibility of a khan or roadside inn during the later phases of occupation at the site.

Figure 41. Art student, Zech Ray, drawing small finds from 2009 season.
THE PARIAN MARBLE AND OTHER SURPRISES
FROM CHRONOLOGIST V. COUCKE

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I. Coucke’s Work as a Surprise to Thiele

For those who study the history and chronology of the Hebrew kingdom period, the name of V. Coucke is usually only known from a footnote in Edwin Thiele’s *Mysterious Numbers of the Hebrew Kings*. In the footnote, Thiele acknowledged Coucke’s work as follows:

“...The author is happy to call attention to the existence of a number of striking parallels between the details of his chronological scheme and that of Prof. V. Coucke of the Grand Seminaire de Bruges... Not until the author had worked out the details of his chronological scheme and the resultant dates for the kings of Israel and Judah, did he become aware of the earlier work of Professor Coucke. It is a matter of gratification to know that these two independent studies have produced essentially the same results on a number of important points, such as Tishri-to-Tishri regnal years in Judah and Nisan-to-Nisan years in Israel (though Professor Coucke suggests that in the latter instance this might have been 1 Thoth instead of Nisan), and accession-year reckoning in Judah except for a period when a shift was made to the nonaccession-year system, and nonaccession-year reckoning in Israel with a later shift to the accession-year system.”

Coucke and Thiele both recognized Judah’s change to nonaccession reckoning in the ninth century B.C., although Coucke thought that the change started in the reign of Athaliah, while Thiele placed it a few years earlier in the reign of Jehoram. Both scholars concluded that Judah, after a few years, went back to accession reckoning, and eventually Israel also adopted this method. Although they differed in some of the details, their general agreement on the principles that governed the chronological methods of the authors of Kings and Chronicles, arrived at independently, is evidence in favor of the overall soundness of their respective approaches. One other principle discovered by these scholars in addition to those already mentioned was the counting of some

regnal years according to coregencies, whether these coregencies are explicitly stated or implied. No subsequent study that ignores these basic principles has had the success in matching new inscriptive evidence when it appears as have the studies built on the foundation laid down by Coucke and Thiele.  

Thiele apparently was first informed of the work of Coucke by Siegfried Horn. Horn had begun his own study of the chronology of the kingdom period during his student days before World War II. In his investigations of the literature, Horn related that “[t]he most striking contribution in this field of study seemed to me the work of Professor V. Coucke of the Grand Séminaire de Bruges which appeared in 1925 in the form of an article in the Revue Bénédictine, and in an expanded form was republished in 1928 in Volume I of the Supplément au Dictionnaire de la Bible.” Because of his German nationality, Horn was detained in Indonesia and later in India by the British during the war, during which time he had the leisure to develop his own ideas, influenced as they were by Coucke. He was not aware of the work of Thiele until he came to America in 1946, which was two years after Thiele had published an abridgment of the results of his doctoral dissertation. Horn then relates that “to my utter amazement I found my chronological scheme to be in almost complete agreement with that of Thiele.” If Horn was amazed, then surely Thiele was also, and not just because of the many agreements between his work and that of Horn, but also because of the “striking parallels” that Horn introduced him to in the work of Coucke.  

I had made some attempt, without success, to obtain Coucke’s article in the Supplément, so that a comparison could be made between Thiele’s chronology and that of Coucke. Then in the fall of 2009, Andrew Steinmann found a copy of the Supplément in the Wheaton College library, from which he duplicated Coucke’s entry and shared it with me. We found that Coucke’s chronology required more emendations of the text as compared to Thiele’s system, and so Thiele’s work should still be considered as the starting place for subsequent work in this field. At the same time we found several unanticipated and interesting ideas in Coucke’s writing. These ideas form the subject of the present paper.  

II. A Welcome Surprise: Coucke’s Notation  

In his article in the Supplément, and also in his earlier article in the Revue Bénédictine, Coucke presented his chronology for the kings of Judah and Israel in tabular form. Two tables, one for each kingdom, start on the third page of the Supplément article. In both publications the tables contain a welcome innovation,
namely, a notation that shows at a glance whether the years assigned to the king are determined according to Israel's Nisan-based year or Judah's Tishri-based year. To designate the year that began in Nisan of 931 B.C., Coucke wrote “n. 931.” For a year that began in Tishri of the same year he wrote “t. 931.” The six-month offset between the calendars used by the two kingdoms frequently allows narrowing the synchronisms between them to a six-month period, which could start in either Nisan or Tishri. Coucke wrote the first of these periods as “n. 931-t. 931,” the second as “t. 931-n. 930.” The first expression designates a period of time starting on Nisan 1 of 931 B.C. and ending the day before Tishri 1 of the same B.C. year. The second expression designates the time from Tishri 1 of 931 B.C. to the day before Nisan 1 of 930 B.C.

It is regrettable that Thiele did not see the need for a similar type of notation, and equally regrettable that, after he was introduced to Coucke's writings, he did not adopt Coucke's convention for his future work. As it was, Thiele continued to use the inexact “931/30 B.C.” expressions in his writing. Does this term mean a year by the northern kingdom's calendar that started in Nisan of 931, or a Judean-type year starting in Tishri? Or does it mean that the author is uncertain of the date, and whatever is being referred to could have happened at any time from January 1, 931 B.C. to December 31, 930 B.C.? Thiele's notational system became even more inexact in the third edition of *Mysterious Numbers*, where he wrote: “In the interests of simplicity the date 930 is being used for the division of the kingdom instead of the dual symbol 931/30.”

It can be argued whether or not this “simplification” made things easier for the reader. It did nothing to clarify the ambiguity of the original system. That ambiguity has led to confusion, especially to anyone who wanted to look more carefully at the chronology of a given event. This was true for Thiele himself. In the first and second editions of *Mysterious Numbers*, Thiele had Jehoshaphat starting a coregency with his father Asa in 873/72 B.C., with his sole reign extending from 870/69 to 848 B.C. Thiele stated that the reason for the coregency was that Asa, in the thirty-ninth year of his reign, was stricken with a severe disease from which he eventually died (2 Chron 16:12-13), and so in that year he appointed his son as coregent. Thiele had also derived the starting year of the coregency by synchronizing the long reigns of Asa and Jehoshaphat with the reigns of their contemporaries on the throne of Israel.

In the first and second editions of *Mysterious Numbers*, Thiele expressed Asa's accession year as 911/10, his forty-first and last year as 870/69, and the start of the Asa/Jehoshaphat coregency in Asa's thirty-ninth year as 873/72. With an inexact notation like this, the casual reader may have surmised that it really was just two years from the latter part of the thirty-ninth year

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5 *Mysterious Numbers*, 79. The new system, however, coexisted along with the older convention in the third edition.

(873/72) to the first part of the forty-first year (870/69). An exact notation, however, shows it does not work. The years intended started in Tishri of 873 and Tishri of 870 B.C., respectively, and the first of these was Asa’s thirty-eighth year, not his thirty-ninth as Thiele had it. Thiele eventually became aware of the problem (perhaps a colleague pointed it out), and so in his third edition he moved the beginning of the Asa/Jehoshaphat coregency one year later, to 872/71. At least this change would make the coregency start in the thirty-ninth year of Asa. But the move had a ripple effect: Jehoshaphat’s twenty-five years, or twenty-four full years when taking into consideration the nonaccession reckoning usually used for coregencies, now ended in 848/47 instead of in 849/48 as in the previous editions. The ripple effect had to continue, so that Thiele’s third edition moved the reigns of Jehoshaphat’s successors, Jehoram, Ahaziah, and Athaliah, all down one year as compared to the previous editions. This change between editions is not mentioned in the text. It is almost completely obscured by Thiele’s ambiguous notation. Thus the tables of the second and third editions both display Jehoram’s sole reign as beginning in 848, but in the second edition (chart, 67) the more exact date is seen as starting in Tishri of 849, whereas in the third edition (chart, 97), the starting date is Tishri of 848. In the third edition, Ahaziah’s one year of reign moves down from the year beginning in Tishri of 842 to the year beginning in Tishri of 841. Athaliah’s seven years, which Thiele properly takes in a nonaccession sense (compare 2 Kgs 11:3 and 4) should then start in Ahaziah’s ending (and starting) year, the year beginning in Tishri of 841, and end six years later in the year starting in Tishri of 835 B.C. However, this date is not compatible with Thiele’s accession year for Joash, which the third edition starts in Tishri of 836. 8

The length of reign of a coregency is more often than not according to nonaccession reckoning, perhaps because the reigning king would have taken the start of a new year of his reign as the appropriate occasion for installing his son as the heir-apparent. This convention is to be used for the lengths of reign of Jotham and Jehoshaphat. The years of Ahaz, however, as measured from his coregency with Jotham, are measured in an accession sense. For a discussion of this anomaly for Ahaz, see Rodger C. Young, “When Was Samaria Captured? The Need for Precision in Biblical Chronologies,” JETS 47 (2004): 588.

The Mysterious Numbers, 3d ed., chart on p. 101. The chart here shows Athaliah’s reign as taking parts of only six calendar years, instead of the seven calendar years (six full years plus part of one year) that are required if she is to have six accession or seven nonaccession years. If the chart had shown Athaliah’s years in both an accession sense and a nonaccession sense, as is done for the years of Joram of Israel immediately below in the same chart, the problem may have been noticed. As it is, this is an example of how these kinds of charts, no matter how elaborate, can be quite useless for the fine points of chronology, because most readers apparently did not recognize the basic flaw just described. If Thiele had used an exact notation in expressing his years of reign, the flaw should have become evident before his finished chronology was published.
that is, one year before the death of Athaliah, whom Joash succeeded on the throne. Thiele could not move Joash and the subsequent kings of Judah down one year because this would have caused conflict in the synchronisms with Jehu and his successors on the throne of Israel, whose dates are tied to Assyrian dates, and so we are left with a fundamental inconsistency in Thiele’s dates for these early kings of Judah.

Even though I have discussed Thiele’s discrepancies for the reigns of Jehoshaphat through Athaliah in previous publications, I have repeated the discussion here for two reasons. The first reason is to illustrate that Thiele’s predicament could have been avoided if he had, like Coucke, adopted an exact notation that would clear up all confusion about the kind of year being discussed and then applied the appropriate arithmetic that should be used with that year. In the first two editions of *Mysterious Numbers*, if Asa’s final year was written in Coucke’s notation as “t. 870” instead of as 870/69, and the year in which Jehoshaphat became his coregent as “t. 873” instead of as 873/72, it would have been obvious that Thiele’s year for the start of the coregency was three years before the death of Asa, not the two years that he said were compatible with the coregency starting in Asa’s thirty-ninth year. From personal experience, I can also say that it was easier to find Thiele’s errors in his “corrections” of the third edition when I used an exact notation for the reigns of the monarchs, as compared to trying to reconcile Thiele’s charts. Had Thiele written out things in an exact notation, his small arithmetic errors would not have remained obscured as long as they did. If Thiele, then, whom we readily acknowledge as the groundbreaking authority for the chronology of the kingdom period, was confused because he did not adopt a precise notation for his work, is it not clear that persevering in ambiguous notation schemes will continue to produce confusion?

Coucke saw that a well-defined, exact notation was a requirement for serious chronological study. Thiele learned of Coucke’s work fairly early in his career, and if he had adopted Coucke’s notation at that time, then by means of Thiele’s subsequent writings, and the increasing recognition they received, he could have established an effective notation like this long ago. As it is, more than eighty years have passed since Coucke wrote his two treatises, and we still do not have any general agreement on the notational system to be used when writing in this field except for the old imprecise 931/30 B.C. convention. As compared with the methods and conventions for the strict definition of terms adopted by any of the exact sciences, this situation for chronological research is deplorable.

If a writer did not agree that Judah’s years began in Tishri, and Israel’s in Nisan, but that all calendars are to be dated from Heshvan, he or she could write years as 931h and the meaning of the author would be clear, no matter how unreasonable the reader might think it is to start anything in Heshvan.
The second reason for going into detail on this small matter of a one-year discrepancy in Thiele's chronology is to mention that once the problem is understood, another solution can be explored: keep the start of the Asa/Jehoshaphat coregency where it was in the first and second editions (873/72), but move the years for Asa and his predecessors on the throne of Judah back one year. This produces harmony in all the reign lengths and synchronisms of the two kingdoms for the time from Solomon through Athaliah. It does away with Thiele's awkward supposition that the scribes of the two kingdoms superimposed their own method of accession years or nonaccession years on dates from the other kingdom, even though in all other respects they properly observed the system of the other kingdom.10 A further consequence, one with significant theological implications, is that it puts the calendar of Sabbatical and Jubilee cycles in agreement with the regnal dates of Solomon, in particular with the date when the foundation of the Temple was laid.11

Anyone with a technical background who sets out to study the profuse and complex chronological data of the Hebrew kingdom period should soon recognize the need for the use of an exact notation in expressing the basic building blocks of the trade, namely Israel's Nisan-based year and Judah's Tishri-based year. When I began to write in this field in 2003, I made the rather obvious choice of attaching an “n” to the B.C. date to represent Nisan years or a “t” to represent Tishri years. Should these letters be capitalized or lower case? I decided on the latter as less likely to detract from the more important of the two expressions, the B.C. year. My choice for six-month intervals was 931n/931t and 931t/930n. The reader will notice the similarity of these expressions to those introduced by Coucke.

Daiqing Yuan saw this need when writing his Th.M. thesis at Dallas Theological Seminary.12 Daiqing already had a Ph.D. in physics, and so he knew that terms must be defined exactly, and all ambiguities cleared up, before presenting the results of any technical research. The convention he derived is shown in Table 1, along with those of Coucke and myself, in order


to display their essential similarity. Coucke’s notation for a year takes two extra characters, a space and a period, or two spaces and two periods extra for the six-month representation, so it is the least compact of the three. The method of expressing the year in all three conventions is simple enough that any reader who understands that ancient calendars did not all start on January 1 should quickly adapt to this usage.13, 14, 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year beginning Nisan 1</th>
<th>Coucke</th>
<th>Young</th>
<th>Yuan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n. 931</td>
<td>931n</td>
<td>931N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year beginning Tishri 1</td>
<td>t. 931</td>
<td>931t</td>
<td>931T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 months beginning Nisan 1</td>
<td>n. 931-n. 930</td>
<td>931n/931t</td>
<td>N-T931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 months beginning Tishri 1</td>
<td>t. 931-n. 930</td>
<td>931t/930n</td>
<td>T931-N930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the six-month periods, however, the expression is less intuitive. 931n/931t means the period starting on Nisan 1 of 931 B.C., which is clear enough, but the second expression means that this period ends the day before Tishri 1 of the same B.C. year, and so its meaning is not so self-evident. In discussing this with Yuan, we agreed that the six-month period (ignoring intercalary months) might be written as 931n with a subscript 6, i.e., 931n₆, but for the present there are no plans to adopt this modification.

The three Nisan/Tishri conventions were instituted independently by writers who saw the need for an unambiguous way of expressing time periods. Although Coucke published his articles in 1925 and 1928, I had not read any of his writings until late 2009, by which time I had published several articles using the Nisan/Tishri notation, the first article appearing in 2003. When Yuan finished his Th.M. thesis in 2006, he had not seen my articles, so that this represents three writers who independently saw this need, and who independently came up with similar conventions to meet the need. There is no question, then, that there is a requirement for a better way of expressing dates than is currently found in most of the literature. How many times does the wheel need to be reinvented before it starts to roll?

13Coucke’s notation is explained at the bottom of the tables in his “Chronologie” and Supplément articles.
14Young, “When Did Solomon Die?” 590-591, but the notation is explained more fully in idem, “When Was Samaria Captured?” 580.
15Yuan, v.
There is some hope on the horizon. In 2010 or 2011, Steinmann plans to publish his book on the biblical chronology from Abraham to Paul. For the kingdom period, he will use the Nisan/Tishri notation in the form that I have advocated. This is also the form that will be used in discussing some fine points of chronology in the rest of this article.

III. Third Surprise: Coucke’s Use of the Parian Marble to Date Solomon

Coucke was aware of the Assyrian inscription that mentioned Ahab as one of the foes of Shalmaneser III at the Battle of Qarqar, but he used it only as a general checkpoint, not as the starting point for assigning absolute dates to his chronology. His date for the battle, 854 B.C., was in keeping with the majority consensus of scholarship in his time. It was Thiele who was largely instrumental in modifying this to the date that is now almost universally accepted, 853 B.C., although, as Thiele acknowledges, Emil Forrer and other scholars had previously advocated this date. Coucke had Ahab’s death in 853 n, the year after his date for the Battle of Qarqar, but he was unable to use it as a fixed point for his chronology because he failed to appreciate, as did Thiele, that the twelve years between the battle in Shalmaneser’s sixth year, at which Ahab was present, and the tribute from Jehu that the Assyrian king received in his eighteenth year required that the first of these events was in Ahab’s last year and the second in Jehu’s first year. The reigns of Ahab’s two successors, Ahaziah and Joram, then fit into the twelve intervening years. Not understanding this, Coucke instead chose to believe that the scriptural texts were in error, and so assigned seven years to Israel’s Joram instead of the twelve years given him in 2 Kgs 3:1. The uncertainties in these speculations meant that the Battle of Qarqar could not be used as a definitive anchor point to tie the reign lengths of the Hebrew kings to absolute (B.C.) dates, and he looked for some other date from antiquity to be used for this purpose. He was able to determine such a point in the reign of Solomon by combining three ancient sources: the state records of Tyre as recorded in Josephus, the writings of the Roman historian Pompeius Trogus as condensed in Justin’s Epitome of Trogus’s writings, and the chronological data found in the Parian Marble.

Coucke’s use of the Parian Marble and these other sources to date Solomon is the most surprising element in all of his writings. It is apparently unique in studies of the chronology of the Hebrew kingdom period, and yet Coucke introduces it in a matter-of-fact way, as follows: “The first year of the construction of this edifice [Solomon’s Temple] is determined in this way:

16 Andrew E. Steinmann, From Abraham to Paul: A Biblical Chronology (St. Louis: Concordia, forthcoming).
17 Mysterious Numbers, 67-78.
18 Ibid., 73.
According to the Parian Marble, the capture of Troy was in the month of May 1207 B.C.; Tyre was founded a year earlier . . . . 19

Marble from the Greek island of Paros was prized in antiquity for its quality. It was used in making some of the most famous sculptures from the classical era. The term “Parian marble” can refer either to this marble, as excavated from Paros, or, with a capital “M,” to a marble tablet that was originally located on the island, two fragments of which were brought to England in A.D. 1627. This tablet is also called the Parian Chronicle, or (Latin) the Marmor Parium. The smaller of the two fragments was lost in the English Civil War, but not before a transcription and translation had been made. The major fragment was presented to Oxford University in 1667, and it is now one of the foremost treasures of Oxford’s Ashmolean Museum. A shorter third fragment was found in 1897 on Paros itself and now resides in a museum on the island. The full text of the three portions, along with an interlinear translation into English, is found on the Ashmolean’s website. 20 The tablet is a chronological list that dates various events in the histories of Greece and other nations, starting with 1582/81 B.C. and ending with the year that began, according to the Macedonian calendar, in the fall of 264 B.C., i.e., 264/63 B.C. Since the Macedonian calendar used the same lunar month for the start of the year as did the Judean calendar, where the month name was Tishri, the basis for calculations using the Parian Marble may conveniently be written as 264t. Every event listed in the chronology is related to this date, which is therefore assumed to be the date of composition.

Coucke cited the Parian Marble in order to date the fall of Troy to 1207 B.C. as his first step in establishing the dates of Solomon’s reign. A one-year correction should be made to this. The Parian Marble, entry 24, states that Troy was captured in the month of Thargelion (roughly May), and from the capture to the Marble’s base date was 945 years. This would put the fall of Troy in (264t + 945) = 1209t, and more specifically in the late spring of 1208 B.C. Coucke either used inclusive numbering for the 945 years or took the base year of the Marble as 263t instead of 264t, and so derived 1207 B.C., instead of 1208. In what follows, the fall of Troy will be dated to the spring of 1208 B.C., the interpretation of the text that is taken on the Ashmolean website.

Coucke then cited Pompeius Trogus/Justin 18:3.5 as saying that Tyre was founded the year before the fall of Troy, that is, in the year 1210t when making the one-year correction that was just mentioned. However, there is a complication here. Trogus may have been using the Roman calendar as the basis for his statement. Before 153 B.C., the Roman calendar year started

19Supplément, col. 1251.
20Ashmolean Museum (<www.ashmolean.org/ash/qaq/q004/q004006.html>, accessed 13 October 2010).
on March 1,\textsuperscript{21} so that the year before the fall of Troy in May of 1208 B.C. in the Roman system would be the year extending from March 1, 1209 B.C., to the last day of February 1208. Assuming, with Coucke, that the Phoenician calendar year was from Tishri to Tishri,\textsuperscript{22} the founding of Tyre could have been in either the latter part of 1210\textsubscript{t} or the first part of 1209\textsubscript{t}, and it still would have been in the year prior to the fall of Troy, according to the Roman March-based calendar. We therefore have two possible years to consider for the founding of Tyre, 1210\textsubscript{t} or 1209\textsubscript{t}, whereas Coucke only allowed for one year.

This would not be the original founding of Tyre, since there exists correspondence between Abu-Milki, king of Tyre, and the pharaoh of Egypt in the Amarna period, about 130 years prior to 1210\textsubscript{t}. The passage in Pompeius Trogus (18:3:5) cited by Coucke relates that the Phoenicians had been defeated by the king of Ascalon, “after which they took to their ships and founded the city of Tyre the year before the fall of Troy.” Ascalon, more commonly written as Ashkelon, was a Philistine city, and Jacob Katzenstein\textsuperscript{23} and W. F. Albright\textsuperscript{24} relate this refounding of Tyre to the displacements caused by the invasion of the Sea Peoples about the time of Pharaoh Merneptah. Current scholarship identifies the Philistines as part of this Sea Peoples invasion.\textsuperscript{25} The modern dating of the first Sea Peoples invasion to the short reign of Merneptah (ca. 1213–ca. 1203 B.C.) is in agreement with the statement of Pompeius Trogus that Tyre was founded the year before the capture of Troy, while at the same time it gives credibility to the Parian Marble’s date of 1208 B.C. for the latter event.

Having calculated a year for the founding of Tyre, Coucke cited Ant. VIII.3.1/62, where Josephus refers to the court records of Tyre that mention


\textsuperscript{22}Coucke explains why he assumes Tishri-based years for Judah in the *Chronologie* article, 327. Later, Thiele used 1 Kgs 6:37-38 and 2 Kgs 22:3–23:23 to show that Judah had a Tishri-based calendar (*Mysterious Numbers*, 51-52). Coucke remarks that three month-names used in the times of Solomon—Ziv (1 Kgs 6:1, 37), Bul (1 Kgs 6:38), and Ethanim (1 Kgs 8:2)—are found in Phoenician inscriptions, and so these are Phoenician month-names. He then infers that since the two kingdoms had the same month-names, Tyre’s calendar would have the same starting month as was used in Judah.

\textsuperscript{23}H. Jacob Katzenstein, *The History of Tyre from the Second Millennium B.C.E. until the Fall of the Neo-Babylonian Empire in 538 B.C.E.* (Jerusalem: Goldberg’s Press, 1973), 59-61.


\textsuperscript{25}The Philistines in the time of Abraham and Isaac (Gen 21:34, 26:1) may have been of this same ethnic stock, but representatives of an earlier migration.
The assistance given to Solomon by Hiram, king of Tyre, at the beginning of the construction of the Temple in Jerusalem. These records date Hiram's assistance as taking place in the eleventh year of his reign, which was also 240 years after the founding of Tyre. Josephus elsewhere (\textit{Ant. Ap.} I.18/126) says that Hiram's assistance began in his twelfth year of reign, so Coucke allowed that this gave an alternate figure of 241 years after the founding of Tyre to the start of construction of Solomon's Temple. Using the two possible years for the founding of Tyre calculated above and the two periods of elapsed time postulated by Coucke, the construction of the Temple could have started in $(1210t - 240) = 970t$, $(1210t - 241) = 969t$, $(1209t - 240) = 969t$, or $(1209t - 241) = 968t$. Coucke's original calculation, which did not consider a Roman calendar, gave only 969t and 968t. By his use of the Tyrian King List (see next section), Coucke ruled out the first of these possibilities, and this would also rule out the 970t option. He thus settled on 968t as his fixed date from which to start his construction of the chronology of the Hebrew kings.

There are some remarkable concepts in all this. The first is that nothing in Coucke's reasoning is based on a biblical text. Everything is derived from classical authors. Only after he derived the date of the start of construction of Solomon's Temple from these sources did he refer to 1 Kgs 6:1 and 11:42 to say that since Temple construction began in Solomon's fourth year and he reigned forty years, therefore Solomon died in 932t. This is the year for the death of Solomon that I derived in my "Solomon" paper\textsuperscript{26} without any knowledge of Coucke’s reasoning. Coucke then placed the division of the kingdom in 931n, which is the same year for the division of the kingdom that Thiele derived by working with the biblical data, as tied to the 853 B.C. date for the Battle of Qarqar. There has been no need to change this date since Thiele first published it in 1944.\textsuperscript{27} It is therefore noteworthy that the dates of Solomon, which can be established with precision from the biblical and Assyrian data, agree so exactly with the date derived from Coucke's classical sources. The importance of this is not that the classical sources give credibility to the biblical data, but the other way around: the biblical data give credibility to the classical sources. In particular, they are evidence in favor of the factuality of (1) the dating of the fall of Troy to 1208 B.C. by the Parian Marble, (2) the statement of Pompeius Trogus that Tyre was founded the year before Troy fell, and (3) the 240 years from the founding of Tyre to the building of Solomon's Temple that Josephus derived from Tyrian court records.

These conclusions are controversial in their implications for the world of classical scholarship. In particular, the date for the fall of Troy that is usually derived from Greek authors is 1183 B.C., not the 1208 B.C. of the

\textsuperscript{26}Young, “When Did Solomon Die?” 589-603.

Parian Marble. Any study therefore that seeks to establish the Parian Marble’s date over the commonly accepted date needs to consider the question of the Parian Marble’s overall trustworthiness. Sources such as the Canons of Eusebius that are used to justify the 1183 date should also be examined for their credibility. The issues involved are somewhat complex, and the fuller discussion that they require has been relegated to a separate article. For the present study, what is important to emphasize is that Coucke’s derivation of the date when construction began on Solomon’s Temple is entirely innovative. It relies on sources and basic data that no other scholar has put together when seeking to determine fixed dates in the chronology of the books of Kings and Chronicles. And its exactness in matching the dates for Solomon that can be independently derived from the biblical and Assyrian data argues strongly for the soundness of his reasoning.

IV. Coucke’s Use of the Tyrian King List: A Surprise to Later Scholars

In 1953, J. Liver argued that an Assyrian inscription that was published in 1951 showed that Pompeius Trogus’s date for the founding of Carthage, 825 B.C., was to be preferred to the date of 814 B.C. given in other classical sources. Connecting this with the Tyrian King List in Josephus (Ag. Ap. I.17/108; I.18/117–126) that placed the start of work on Solomon’s Temple 143 years before the founding of Carthage, he derived 968/67 B.C. as the date for the founding of the Temple. In 1972, F. M. Cross did a textual analysis of the names and lengths of reigns in the Tyrian King List from Hiram, contemporary of Solomon, to Pygmalion, whose sister Dido fled from Tyre in Pygmalion’s seventh year of reign, after which she founded Carthage in North Africa. Cross’s textual analysis reinforced Liver’s previous research, and he concluded that these extrabiblical sources showed that construction began on the Jerusalem Temple in 968 B.C., in agreement with Liver’s date.

In 1991, William H. Barnes published the results of his Th.D. thesis on the chronology of the Hebrew kingdom period, for which Cross was his thesis advisor. Barnes devoted twenty-seven pages of his book to a textual study and critical analysis of the Tyrian King List, and found that the evidence supporting the historical trustworthiness of the 143 years between the founding

28Andrew E. Steinmann and Rodger C. Young, “The Parian Marble, the Tyrian King List, and the Date of Construction of Solomon’s Temple,” forthcoming.


of the Temple and the founding of Carthage was strong, reinforcing 968 B.C. as the date for the beginning of Temple construction. Barnes stated that for this date, “a variation of a year or two is possible, of course, especially in the light of our ignorance of Phoenician dating practices, but I seriously doubt that an error of more than two years either way is likely.”

I surveyed the work of these scholars in a 2007 article in *Seminary Studies.* Neither I nor the three authors just mentioned were aware of Coucke's study of the Tyrian King List. Coucke's conclusions were therefore independent of those of the later writers, yet everyone involved derived the same date for the beginning of Temple construction. In my article, the agreement of the studies of Liver, Cross, and Barnes on the date when construction began on Solomon's Temple was presented as the last of three major evidences for the factuality of Thiele's date for the division of the kingdom after the death of Solomon. The first line of evidence given for the correctness of Thiele’s date was the internal and external consistency of the reasoning that was used to derive it. The second line of evidence was the exact agreement of this date with the related date for the beginning of construction on Solomon’s Temple, as calculated from the chronology of the Jubilee and Sabbatical cycles. The paper demonstrated that these three lines of evidence are fundamentally independent. The chronology for the division as derived by Thiele did not use, and does not rely on, either the Tyrian King List or the calendar of Jubilee/Sabbatical cycles. The Jubilee/Sabbatical calendar is shown as accurate by its agreement with the chronological data in I Kgs 6:1, but it does not rely on Thiele's derivation of the date of the division of the kingdom or on the Tyrian King List. The date for the foundation of the Temple as derived from the Tyrian King List relies on no biblical texts, nor does it rely on the Jubilee/Sabbatical cycles. The agreement of these three fundamentally independent methods of chronological determination is sufficient to establish Thiele’s date for the division of the kingdom, and the related date for the foundation of Solomon's Temple, as two of the most secure dates in the history of the early first millennium B.C.

Coucke used the Tyrian King List as follows. He allowed two possible dates for the founding of Rome: 752 B.C., following Dionysius of Halicarnassus, or 753 B.C., following Varro. He then used the statement of Pompeius Trogus/Justin (18.6.9) as saying that Carthage was founded seventy-two years before the founding of Rome. His dates for the founding of Carthage were therefore 825 or 824 B.C. Coucke assumed that Tyre used Tishri-based years, so that he used 825t and 824t for these dates. He did not explain why he preferred Trogus's date for the founding of Carthage over the 814 B.C. date given by

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32 Ibid., 54.
When combined with the span of 143 years of the Tyrian King List from the foundation of Solomon's Temple until the founding of Carthage (or flight of Dido), this gave Coucke two possible dates, 968t or 967t for the foundation of Solomon's Temple. Only the first of these agreed with the dates of 969t and 968t he had derived when measuring downward 240 or 241 years from the founding of Tyre, so 968t was the year that Coucke settled on for the foundation of Solomon's Temple. Coucke's treatment of the Tyrian King List therefore arrived at the same conclusion, and exactly the same date, as reached later by Liver, Cross, and Barnes, none of whom was aware of Coucke's earlier research. This agreement between Coucke and the later scholars should be understood as strengthening this one leg of the three supports of the chronology of Solomon's reign, and hence, by extension, the credibility of the other two methods.

Three independent methods of calculating the dates of Solomon are more than sufficient. But Coucke gave us a fourth; this was the subject of the preceding section, dealing with the calculation of the date for the founding of the Temple based on the Parian Marble and citations from Pompeius Trogus and Josephus. There was nothing in the calculation that started with the Parian Marble that depended on the Jubilee and Sabbatical cycles, the Tyrian King List, or Thiele's calculation of the date for the division of the kingdom as derived from biblical and Assyrian texts. Coucke's fourth method is independent of all of these, yet its results are consistent with each of the other methods.

V. Fifth Surprise: Coucke's Correct Date for the Fall of Jerusalem to the Babylonians

In the Supplément, Coucke started his chronological reckonings for the Hebrew monarchies by determining from classical authors the date when construction began on the Temple at Jerusalem. At the lower end of the monarchic period, he determined a date for the fall of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Temple by recourse once again to an ancient literary work, in this case the Canon of Ptolemy. His interest was to derive a date from the Canon for the accession year of Amel-Marduk (biblical Evil-Merodach), the Babylonian king who released from prison Jehoiachin, the next-to-the-last king of Judah. According to 2 Kgs 25:27 and Jer 52:31, Jehoiachin's release was in his thirty-seventh year of captivity and in the accession year (ךְִּשָׁנָה כְּבָשָׁהּ מַלֶּךָ יְכֹלֶם) of Amel-Marduk. Coucke's plan was to

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34 For a discussion of why there are two figures, 825 B.C. and 814 B.C., for the founding of Carthage, see Young, “Three Verifications,” 180, particularly n. 42 that refers to J. M. Peñuela's argument that several years elapsed between the time that Dido fled Tyre until she and her companions founded Carthage. Peñuela maintains that Dido left Tyre in 825 B.C., but she and her companions did not receive permission from the indigenous residents of North Africa to found the city until 814 B.C. (“La Inscripción Asiria IM 55644 y la Cronología de los Reyes de Tiro,” Sefarad 14 [1954]: 28-29 and nn. 164-167).
work backward from Jehoiachin's release in order to date other events relative
to the years of captivity. There is a sufficient number of scriptural texts related
to Jehoiachin's exile, and their meaning is clear enough, that Coucke's procedure
provides a simple and legitimate means of determining the correct date for
the fall of Jerusalem, as long as Ptolemy's date for the accession year of Amel-
Marduk can be firmly established, and as long as no unusual interpretations are
forced onto the biblical texts. From the Canon, Coucke determined that Amel-
Marduk's accession year began on Nisan 1, 562 B.C.35

This date has been verified by inscriptional evidence that shows that
Amel-Marduk's reign began at some time in October of 562 B.C.36 Jehoiachin
was released near the end of the twelfth month (Adar) of the Babylonian
king's accession year (2 Kgs 25:27; Jer 52:31), that is, in the first week of
April, 561 B.C. Jehoiachin's thirty-seventh year of captivity is therefore well
established as 562n by Babylon's Nisan-based years. If the biblical texts were
based on Tishri-based years, Jehoiachin's release would be in 562t. Coucke
then looked to Ezek 33:21 to determine the year in which Jerusalem fell.
In this verse, Ezekiel states that he learned of the fall of Jerusalem on the
fifth day of the tenth month of the twelfth year of "our exile," meaning the
exile he shared with Jehoiachin (Ezek 1:2). Comparing this twelfth year with
the thirty-seventh year of Jehoiachin's exile gives either (562n + 37 - 12) =
587n or (562t + 37 - 12) = 587t for the year in which Ezekiel learned of the
catastrophe. Whether Ezekiel was reckoning by Nisan years or by Tishri years,
the fifth day of the tenth month was the same either way, i.e., January 19, 586
B.C.37 This contradicts a fall of Jerusalem in the summer of 586 B.C. Coucke's
only concern was whether the city fell in Tammuz (the fourth month, Jer
52:6) of 588 B.C. or Tammuz of 587. The former choice would have meant
that nineteen months had elapsed before the news of the fall reached the
exiles in Babylon,38 an unreasonably long time compared to six months if

36Richard A. Parker and Waldo H. Dubberstein, *Babylonian Chronology 626 B.C.–
discussion are taken from this resource.
37Ibid., 28. Month numbering is always with Nisan as the first month, even if the
years are reckoned from a starting point in Tishri, as explained by Thiele (Mysterious
Numbers, 52), and as accepted without explanation by Coucke (*Supplément*, col. 1251).
This well-known phenomenon means that months 7 through 12 of 587t would be the
same as months 7 through 12 of 587n, while months 1 through 6 of 587t would be
one year later than months 1 through 6 of 587n.
38Coucke (*Supplément*, col. 1265) writes that sixteen or seventeen months would
have elapsed. However, according to Parker and Dubberstein, 28, the Babylonians
inserted an intercalary month on March 25 of 587 B.C., so that nineteen months passed
from the fourth month of 588 B.C. to the tenth month of the next calendar year. The
nineteen-month figure assumes that Judah, and specifically Ezekiel, also recognized an
Jerusalem fell in the summer of 587 B.C. Coucke therefore established 587 B.C. as the year of Jerusalem’s fall.

Coucke’s method in this determination used a straightforward exegesis of the scriptural texts involved. Furthermore, the method is in harmony with Babylonian history, since Ptolemy’s date for the accession year of Amel-Marduk has been verified by inscriptional evidence. A further verification of the correctness of Coucke’s procedure came with D. J. Wiseman’s publication, in 1956, of a Babylonian text from the time of Nebuchadnezzar that stated that Nebuchadnezzar captured Jerusalem and its king on the second of Adar in Nebuchadnezzar’s seventh year. This was March 16, 597 B.C. The captured king was Jehoiachin, whom Nebuchadnezzar replaced by appointing as regent Jehoiachin’s uncle, Zedekiah (2 Kgs 24:17). The date of the second of Adar in Nebuchadnezzar’s seventh year was therefore a verification of the accuracy of 2 Kgs 25:27 and Jer 52:31, from which the first year of Jehoiachin’s captivity, and therefore the accession year of Zedekiah, is calculated as either (562n + 36) = 598n or (562t + 36) = 598t. Both of these year-spans include Adar 2, 597 B.C.

Those who support a 586 date for the fall of Jerusalem, and who recognize the problem that Ezek 33:21, coupled with 2 Kgs 25:27 and Jer 52:31, poses for the 586 date, attempt to utilize other means of measuring the years of captivity in order to give agreement with their chronology. Thus Thiele postulated that Jehoiachin’s captivity or exile was not to be measured from the date he was captured by Nebuchadnezzar’s forces, but from a supposed start of the trip to Babylon in the next month, Nisan of 597 B.C. Thiele then further supposed that Ezekiel’s years of exile are measured according to a Nisan-based calendar. In itself, it is not unreasonable that Ezekiel could have used Nisan reckoning, because this was according to the calendar system of Babylonia, where he lived, even though it would have been contrary to the usual Tishri-based calendar used in Judah. With Thiele’s two presuppositions, the twelfth year of exile mentioned in Ezek 33:21 would be (597n – 11) = 586n, and Ezekiel would have received news of the fall of the city on January 8, 585 B.C. This would place Jehoiachin’s release in the thirty-sixth year of his captivity by Ezekiel’s (supposed) Nisan-based reckoning, but in the thirty-seventh year by the Tishri-based reckoning of 2 Kgs 25:27 and Jer 52:31.

Another approach to this problem for those who hold to the 586 B.C. date was offered by Gershon Galil. In order to get Jehoiachin’s captivity intercalary month during this time period. If not, the elapsed time would have been eighteen months.

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40Mysterious Numbers, 187.
to start in Nisan, so that the arithmetic would come out for the 586 date, Galil proposed that although the Babylonian record dated the capture of Jerusalem and Jehoiachin to the month Adar, it was really Nisan in the Judean calendar because Galil presumed that Judah had not intercalated a month in the previous year as the Babylonians did. Adar for the Babylonians was therefore Nisan for the Judeans. The result is the same: Jehoiachin’s captivity was assumed to start in Nisan, not in Adar as in the Babylonian record. Galil also presumed, as Thiele did, that Nisan-type years were used by Ezekiel in dating events according to the year of captivity.

Ezekiel 24:1-2 presents a problem for these assumptions of Thiele and Galil. In these verses, the beginning of the final siege of Jerusalem is dated to the ninth year, tenth month, and tenth day. This should be compared with 2 Kgs 25:1 and Jer 52:4, where the beginning of the siege is dated to the ninth year, tenth month, and tenth day of Zedekiah’s reign. There are two ways of reconciling these verses. One is to assume that this demonstrates that Zedekiah’s reign was measured in 2 Kings by nonaccession reckoning, the same as the years of exile of Jehoiachin. The Ezekiel passage is then in obvious agreement with the Kings and Jeremiah passages, whereas if Zedekiah’s reign is by accession years, there is disagreement. This passage is glossed over by Thiele, who, although citing the texts related to the beginning of the siege, does not mention the problem this presents to his assumption that Zedekiah’s years were by accession reckoning.42 Galil addressed the problem by assuming that because the phrase “of the exile” was not present in Ezek 24:1-2, Ezekiel switched his method of reckoning the years from the years of exile of Jehoiachin to the years of Zedekiah’s reign, without giving any indication to the reader of this change in the mode of reckoning.43

Other texts in Ezekiel are difficult to reconcile with this interpretation of Ezek 24:1-2. One of these is the revelation of Ezek 26:1-2, where Jerusalem’s fall is spoken of as a past event. Neither Thiele (Mysterious Numbers) nor Galil (Babylonian Calendar) mentions the chronological implications of this verse. The revelation is dated to the eleventh year and the first day of the month.

On p. 189 of Mysterious Numbers, Thiele writes: “On the tenth day of the tenth month of the ninth year (15 Jan. 588), a solemn message came from God: ‘Son of man, record this date, this very date, because the king of Babylon has laid siege to Jerusalem this very date. . . . Woe to the city of bloodshed’ (Ezek. 24:1–2, 6). Thus on the very day that the final siege of Jerusalem began, the exiles in Babylon had word of that event. ‘In the ninth year’ of Zedekiah, ‘on the tenth day of the tenth month, Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon marched against Jerusalem with his whole army. He encamped outside the city and built siege works all around it’ (2 Kings 25:1).” There is no mention here of the disparity between nonaccession dates measured by the years of captivity, which Thiele assumes elsewhere for Ezekiel, with the accession years that he assumes for Zedekiah in the Kings and Jeremiah passages.

Galil, 370.
with the month not specified. According to the hypotheses of either Thiele or Galil that have Ezekiel reckoning the first year of exile as 597n, the eleventh year would be 587n. The latest possible date for the revelation would be the first day of the twelfth month of 587n, which was March 15, 586 B.C. This was before, not after, Thiele’s and Galil’s date of July 18, 586 B.C., for the fall of Jerusalem. In order to rescue their chronologies, the assumption would have to be made that Ezekiel (or, according to the various fragmentary hypotheses, Ezekiel’s editor) has again switched the method of reckoning, without informing the reader, to accession years based on the reign of Zedekiah. The eleventh year in Thiele’s system would then be 598t – 11 = 587t, and the latest possible date for Ezekiel 26:1-2 would be first day of the sixth month (Elul) of 587t, which is September 7, 586 B.C. Galil’s chronology also requires an unannounced switching of dates in Ezek 26:1-2, but his system differs from that of Thiele by assuming that regnal years in Judah were counted from 1 Nisan, and that Zedekiah’s reign began on 2 Nisan 597 B.C. For Galil, the eleventh year in Ezek 26:1 was then 597n – 11 = 586n. Although the latter half of this year was after Galil’s date for the fall of Jerusalem, his reckoning that Zedekiah’s reign started in Nisan of 597 B.C. means that the thirty-seventh year of Jehoiachin’s captivity would be 561n, not the 562n that Babylonian records establish as the accession year of Amel-Marduk. Galil’s system also cannot be reconciled with Ezek 40:1 (see below).

A normal reading of the entirety of Ezekiel’s writings makes it difficult to accept such arbitrary switching to dating by the regnal years of Zedekiah. Ezekiel never mentions Zedekiah by name. He regarded Jehoiachin as his rightful ruler, and even when Zedekiah was still on the throne of Judah, he avoids measuring the years by anything to do with Zedekiah, referring the dates instead to Jehoiachin and his captivity. The introduction to Ezekiel’s writing sets the tone by which later references to years, months, and days are to be understood: it was the fifth year of the exile of King Jehoiachin (Ezek 1:2). We have a right to expect that any one biblical author, such as Ezekiel,

44In his book *The Chronology of the Kings of Israel and Judah* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 9, Galil presents as the first postulate of his chronological system the idea that Judean regnal years started on the first of Nisan. Galil cites no evidence in support of his choice in this matter, although he may have derived this idea from *m. Rosh HaAtzirah* 1 and *b. Rosh HaAtzirah* 1a, which are late sources. In contrast, Thiele (*Mysterious Numbers*, 51-53) cites 1 Kgs 6:1, 37-38 and 2 Kgs 22:3; 23:23 as evidence that Judah’s regnal years began in Tishri. As mentioned above, Galil also assumed that Nebuchadnezzar’s capture of Jehoiachin, and his installation of Zedekiah in his place, occurred on 2 Nisan 597 B.C. according to the presumption that the month reckoned as Adar by the Babylonians was reckoned as Nisan by the Judeans.

45Galil acknowledges this difficulty for his chronology, saying that the thirty-seventh year of Jehoiachin’s captivity in 2 Kgs 25:27 and Jer 52:31 is only approximate (“Chronology,” 377, n. 39).
would have been consistent throughout his writing in the way he measured the years, instead of switching between various methods without any clue to the reader, as maintained by scholars who support the 586 B.C. date for the fall of Jerusalem. There is no conflict, however, if Ezekiel was using Tishri years dated from 598 and the fall of Jerusalem was in the summer of 587 B.C. Once the correct date is accepted for that event, no such switching is

The revelation would then be in the calendar year 588, on the first day of either the fifth month (Ab) or the sixth month (Elul) in order to be after the fall of Jerusalem in the fourth month of 587. The latter of these dates (1 Elul = September 18, 587 B.C.) is to be preferred, since the city is said to be “laid waste” (יוֹבֵשׁ, Ezekiel 26:2), which implies a time after the destructions under Nebuzaradan had been carried out (2 Kgs 25:8-10; Jer 52:12-14). The various activities related to Nebuzaradan could not all have been done in one day. In particular, it is unreasonable to expect that as soon as he arrived at the city he would have hastily consulted with the commanders already stationed there, after which he and they together drew up plans, issued orders, and then moved into the city to implement their plans for the various phases of the destruction of the city, all on the same day of his arrival. Instead, the texts indicate that Nebuzaradan came to Jerusalem (יוֹבֵשׁ, סַעַד, . . . נְבֻזָּרָד), that is, presumably to the Babylonian camp just outside the city, on the seventh day of the fifth month (2 Kgs 25:8; see the same grammatical construction in 2 Kgs 18:17b and Dan 1:1, where hostile forces came to Jerusalem, but had not yet entered it). After three days of resting from the journey and consulting with his field commanders, he entered into the city (יוֹבֵשׁ, וַאֲבֻקְתָּא בֶּן אֹבֵד, . . . נְבֻזָּרָד) on the tenth of the month (Jer 52:12) to carry out the plans they had formulated. A parallel can be found in Jonah’s coming to Nineveh on one day (יוֹבֵשׁ, וַאֲבֻקְתָּא בֶּן אֹבֵד, Jonah 3:3) and then starting to come into the city (יוֹבֵשׁ, וַאֲבֻקְתָּא בֶּן אֹבֵד, Jonah 3:4) on a subsequent day. Nebuzaradan’s demolishing of houses and public buildings, the tearing down of the city wall, and the burning of the Temple—then began on the tenth day of the fifth month (Ab). Consistent with this, Josephus (Wars, VI.4.5/250) relates that the First and Second Temples were both burnt on the tenth of Ab. A later Jewish tradition that placed the burning of the Temples on the ninth of Ab apparently originated with Rabbi Akiba, whose hopes that Bar-Koseba was the Messiah were dashed when Koseba’s fortress fell to the Romans on the ninth of Ab, a.d. 135. Rabbi Akiba applied this day and month (ninth of Ab/Tisha B’Av) to the burning of both Temples. He or his followers also applied the Tisha B’Av date to other disasters, including the evil report of twelve spies in Num 13:26-33 and the Roman plowing of Jerusalem by command of Emperor Hadrian. However, as just shown from Jeremiah and 2 Kings, the destruction of the First Temple could not have occurred earlier than the tenth of Ab, and Josephus’s eyewitness account of the burning of the Second Temple definitely dates that event to the tenth of Ab. This artificial “ninth of Ab” symmetry for several catastrophes has been discussed by Yuval Shahar, who has shown by citations from Dio Cassius and by recently discovered numismatic evidence that the rabbinic date of the ninth of Ab, a.d. 136, for the Roman plowing of Jerusalem cannot be supported historically. See Yuval Shahar, “The Destruction of the Temple in the Understanding of Rabbi Akiba and the Establishment of the Fasts of the Destruction,” (in Hebrew) Zion 68 (2003): 145-165.
necessary and all of Ezekiel’s date-formulas will be seen to be consistent with his counting from the capture of Jehoiachin and the installation of Zedekiah in 598t, and also consistent with his reckoning the years according to the conventional Tishri-based years of Judah. There are no exceptions.

A further problem to those who hold to the 586 b.C. date for the fall of Jerusalem is presented by Ezek 40:1, which is dated to the twenty-fifth year of exile and also fourteen years after the city fell. With Thiele’s and Galil’s start of Jehoiachin’s exile in 597n, the twenty-fifth year of exile would be (597n – 24) = 573n, and the city’s destruction, fourteen years previous, would be in 587n. This clearly contradicts their 586 b.C. date for Jerusalem’s fall. Thiele’s mishandling of the chronological markers in this verse is obscured by a trick of arithmetic whereby he subtracts the fourteen years from the twenty-five years to conclude that the city fell eleven years after his date for the beginning of the captivity in 597n, and hence in 586n (using the Nisan/Tishri notation here for clarity). This interpretation assumes that the twenty-five years and the fourteen years in the verse are of the same type—either both are accession years or both are nonaccession years. The grammar of the verse shows they are not the same. It was the twenty-fifth year “of our captivity” (ְָּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּּ#new_paragraph

A study of all the scriptural texts related to the last days of the Judean monarchy in Jeremiah, Ezekiel, 2 Kings, and 2 Chronicles shows that all texts are in agreement with the fall of Jerusalem in 587 b.C. For the demonstration that each of these four books is internally consistent, and all are consistent with each other on the chronology of this time, see Rodger C. Young, “When Did Jerusalem Fall?” JETS 47 (2004): 21-38.

Ezek 40:1, when properly interpreted according to the Hebrew original, provides a rich source of chronological and theological information. See my study, “Ezekiel 40:1 As a Corrective,” 265-283.

Mysterious Numbers, 191.
years. Placing the fall of Jerusalem in 588t, which was in the eleventh year of Zedekiah (2 Kgs 25:2-4; 2 Chron 36:11; Jer 52:5-6) means that his reign from 598t to 588t was ten complete years, so that the eleven years given to him in these texts are calculated by nonaccession reckoning.

Leslie McFall, another advocate of the 586 b.c. date, correctly interpreted the twenty-five years as by nonaccession reckoning, signifying that a full twenty-four years had passed, but he maintained that the phrase “after the city was smitten” (וְאַשְׁרֶנֹהוּ בֹזֶהוּ) in this verse must also be interpreted in a nonaccession or inclusive numbering sense. For McFall, then, Ezekiel’s vision was thirteen years after the fall of the city, not fourteen years after.⁵⁰ This contradicts the meaning of the preposition והנה provided in Hebrew lexicons, where its definition, when used in a temporal sense, is given as identical to the English “after.” McFall is unable to provide any usage from the Hebrew Bible to support his rendering (fourteenth year of the fall of the city), relying instead on the fact that והנה in Ezek 40:1 is translated in the LXX by μετά, and this Greek word is used in an inclusive-numbering sense in places like Matt 27:63.

Extreme interpretations like this are not necessary. A proper reading of all the chronological texts in Ezekiel shows their internal consistency, once a priori assumptions are abandoned in favor of letting the texts themselves demonstrate the chronological method of their author. Interpretations that demonstrate internal consistency should be given preference over interpretations that require the assumption of inconsistencies for a single author, especially if the inconsistency-producing systems require the kinds of strained exegesis demonstrated by advocates of the 586 b.c. date for the fall of Jerusalem.

In a certain sense, however, there will always be inconsistencies in the historical records regarding how the years of the kings of Israel and Judah were measured. These inconsistencies do not have their origin in the authors of Scripture, who had faithfully copied, apparently from court records,⁵¹ the years of their kings. The inconsistencies come instead from the kings themselves, who ultimately were the source for determining how their years of reign were to be recorded. That Ezekiel, Jeremiah, and the authors of the closing chapters of 2 Kings and 2 Chronicles all counted Zedekiah’s reign by nonaccession reckoning is explained quite simply by one postulate: that is how Zedekiah ordered it to be done. The switching of the mode of reckoning for Zedekiah’s years had a precedent in the switching in the middle of the ninth century b.c. Coucke and Thiele both recognized,

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independently, the change at this time, and both gave the same reason for the change: it was a time of rapprochement and intermarriage between the two kingdoms. No such reason is immediately apparent to explain why Zedekiah used nonaccession reckoning for his reign. Although we cannot determine why this was done, it can be stated with certainty that it was done. Any chronology that does not recognize nonaccession years for Zedekiah will fall into serious internal contradictions, some of which were described in the foregoing discussion.

A demonstration of the arbitrariness of the king’s choice in the question of accession or nonaccession years comes from the records of the kings of Assyria. For Assyrian kings, accession reckoning, with a calendar year starting in Nisan, was the rule. Yet Assyriologists do not seem to object to Hayim Tadmor’s statement that Tiglath-Pileser III went against the general convention of his predecessors and counted his years in a nonaccession sense. That Tadmor is right in this matter is established by a comparison of the events given in Tiglath-Pileser’s inscriptions, and dated to his regnal years, with the same events as listed in chronological order in the Assyrian Eponym Canon. This method of comparing a king’s inscriptions with inscriptions from other sources is what should also determine the matter for the chronology of the last kings of Judah. If this procedure shows that Zedekiah did not follow the accession reckoning of the majority of his predecessors on the throne of Judah that should be sufficient to establish the matter. It is of no consequence that neither Tiglath-Pileser nor Zedekiah has left any record justifying their actions. They were kings, and they were under no obligation to explain these things to their court recorders, or to us.

Having come this far with Coucke, we must leave him, because after establishing the date of the fall of Jerusalem by sound historical and exegetical methods, he makes the unsupportable and unreasonable assumption that the years of Jehoiachin’s exile were by accession reckoning, leading to a date for the beginning of the captivity and the first year of Zedekiah that is one year too early (599t). If the Babylonian Chronicle that gave the date when Jehoiachin was captured had been available to him, we could hope that he would have seen the error of this assumption and would have recognized that this new evidence requires that the eleven years of Zedekiah’s reign are to be understood in a nonaccession sense. As it is, we can thank Professor Coucke for demonstrating that the use of chronological texts in Ezekiel, as tied to fixed Babylonian dates, is a proper way of dating the last year of the Judean monarchy, even if his assumption about accession years for

52 Hayim Tadmor, *The Inscriptions of Tiglath-Pileser III, King of Assyria* (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1994), 232, n. 3.
Jehoiachin’s captivity and Zedekiah’s reign led him astray in determining when these monarchs started their reigns.\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{Conclusion}

At the time of writing of the present article, considerable attention was being given in the international news to the announcement of Eliat Mazar that she and her fellow archaeologists had uncovered a wall in Jerusalem that was believed to date from the time of Solomon. If the finding of a wall dating from Solomon’s time has caused such a stir, what would be the reaction in the press and in the scholarly community if the continued excavations in Jerusalem unearth an inscription from this time, and even one that has Solomon’s name on it? Judging from the interest shown in the Tel Dan inscription that names “the house of David” and the controversy over the reading of the Khirbet Qeiyafa ostracan, there would be quite intense interest in the discovery and the consequent interpretation of what this meant for the historicity of the books of Kings and Chronicles. What is ironic in all this is that we already have writings that come from the time of Solomon and before, and which name not only Solomon, but many other individuals as well. The work of Coucke, Liver, Cross, and Barnes has demonstrated that the Tyrian King List has every indication of being historical, and it names not only Solomon, but also a series of Tyrian kings from the time of Abibalus, father of Hiram, in about 1000 B.C., to Pygmalion, who died in the early eighth century B.C.\textsuperscript{54} By means of literary analysis, F. C. Movers and Katzenstein\textsuperscript{55} concluded that the passages in Josephus citing the records of Tyre strongly imply that these are actual translations of those records and not the invention of Josephus. To this must be added what might be called a mathematical demonstration.

\textsuperscript{53}Coucke’s wrong assumptions in this matter do not affect the accuracy of his dates when measuring backward from the thirty-seventh year of captivity to the twenty-fifth year of exile (Ezek 40:1) or to the twelfth year (Ezek 33:21), since the elapsed time is twelve years in the first case and twenty-five years in the second case for both accession and nonaccession reckoning. The two methods, however, differ in when they date the start of the captivity: 598t for nonaccession reckoning (the correct date) or 599t for accession reckoning.

\textsuperscript{54}If Hiram of Tyre was in his twelfth year of reign (\textit{Ag. Ap.} I.18/117) in the year that construction started on Solomon’s Temple, 968t, then his thirty-four-year reign (\textit{Ag. Ap.} I.18/117) began in 980t and ended in 946t. The years of reign of his father Abibalus are not given, so we can estimate that he started his reign about 1000 B.C. The Tyrian King List (\textit{Ag. Ap.} I.18/125) relates that Pygmalion ruled for forty-seven years, and his sister fled from Tyre in his seventh year (825 B.C.), so that Pygmalion’s reign was from 832 to 785 B.C. Coucke (\textit{Chronologie}, 328, n. 3) says that the figures of the Tyrian King List show that Tyre was using accession reckoning for its kings.

of their authenticity, because if these records were not both authentic and accurate, then the proper date for the beginning of construction of Solomon’s Temple could never have been derived from them, as was done in the work of the scholars who have studied their chronological data. To this rather amazing demonstration of the authenticity of the Tyrian King List, we can add, thanks to Coucke, one other item from the archives of Tyre: the statement that construction began on Solomon’s Temple 240 years after Tyre was (re)founded. As has been shown, this statement is in agreement with modern scholarship that relates this event to the dislocations caused by the Sea Peoples in the reign of Merneptah.

The Tyrian King List gives the names of twelve kings of Tyre over a span of two centuries, and although there are some textual problems related to the spelling of the various names and sometimes to their individual lengths of reign, the total number of years is well established. For the same period of time (Abibalus in about 1000 B.C. to the death of Pygmalion in 785 B.C.), the Scriptures name twelve monarchs who sat on the throne of Judah (David through the beginning of the Amaziah/Uzziah coregency) and seventeen who sat on the throne of Israel (Jeroboam I through Jeroboam II). In contrast to the Tyrian King List, there are no real problems in the forms of the names of the monarchs, nor in the figures for their lengths of reign as given in the MT. More importantly, the many reign-length figures and synchronisms given for these twenty-nine monarchs have allowed the construction of a coherent and precise chronology for the entire period by those scholars who have followed the basic chronological principles laid down by Coucke and Thiele, with only the slight modifications to their systems that have been discussed in the present article. There are more than sixty items of a precise nature (reign lengths and synchronisms) for these twenty-nine monarchs given in Kings and Chronicles. For someone trained as a systems analyst, it is remarkable—indeed surprising—that all sixty-plus of these statistics fit together into a system of chronology that has shown itself accurate by correlation with well-established dates in Assyrian history, with no emendation required for any of the texts. For chronological schemes that are not built on the general principles laid down by Coucke and Thiele, no such claim can be made. These schemes all require that the texts must be declared in error at various points because they do not conform to the modern scholar’s theories. Such scholars sometimes complain that Thiele’s theories are “artificial” or “too complicated,” even though Thiele, and Coucke before him, were careful to document each

56There are problems, however, in the LXX variants for some of these lengths of reign. The superiority of the MT in its chronological data for the kingdom period is argued extensively by Thiele in Mysterious Numbers, especially in the first edition, as well as in his original publication in JNES (“Kings of Judah and Israel”). No one has been able to construct a coherent chronology of the kingdom period that uses the variant readings of the LXX.
of the tenets underlying their systems as based on known practices in the ancient Near East. Thanks to the work of Coucke, we can now add to the “surprising success” of the system built on Thiele’s principles the success of the resultant chronology in matching data not only from Assyrian history, but also from selected data in the history of the classical Mediterranean world. This includes the records for the kings of Tyre as preserved in the writings of Josephus, and the connection between the date of construction of Solomon’s Temple, as given in Scripture, with the dates of the Trojan War given in the Parian Marble.

Barnes, 137, refers to the methodology of Thiele and its “surprising success in accounting for nearly all of the biblical chronological data,” but then complains about “its resultant violence to the Dtr editing of those data.”
A DOG UNDER THE TABLE AT THE MESSIANIC BANQUET: A STUDY OF MARK 7:24-30

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Mark 7:24-30 records an encounter between Jesus and a Syrophoenician woman. Nearly all commentators of this passage note the remarkable faith of this woman and underscore Jesus’ breaking down of barriers between Jews and Gentiles.1 Few, however, notice that the story follows one of the Gospel of Mark’s leading motifs, the Messianic banquet.2 The purpose of this article is to propose that Mark 7:24-30 is enriched when the Messianic banquet motif is applied.

The OT background that the Gospel of Mark draws upon for the Messianic banquet motif is illustrated most clearly in Isa 25:6-9 (NIV):

On this mountain the LORD Almighty will prepare a feast of rich food for all peoples, a banquet of aged wine—the best of meats and the finest of wines. On this mountain he will destroy the shroud that enfolds all peoples, the sheet that covers all nations; he will swallow up death forever. The Sovereign LORD will wipe away the tears from all faces; he will remove the disgrace of his people from all the earth. The LORD has spoken. In that day they will say, “Surely this is our God; we trusted in him, and he saved us. This is the LORD, we trusted in him; let us rejoice and be glad in his salvation.”

This promise is made in response to God’s victory over Israel’s enemies; particularly here referring to the destruction of Tyre (Isa 23:1-18).

By way of contrast, however, the partakers of the Messianic banquet, as later shown in Isa 55:1-5, include

the righteous remnant within Israel along with the righteous of other nations. The banquet of these righteous ones represents the promised future prosperity of the messianic reign after Yahweh defeats the enemies of Israel. This future time of prosperity is extended to the righteous followers


2R. T. France noticed that “Bread here is an image for the blessings of the Messiah’s ministry to his own people and, following on from this incident, among the Gentiles” (The Gospel of Mark, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 296; R. Pesch argues that together with the two feeding stories, the present story depicts the banquet of salvation for Gentiles as well as Jews (Das Markusevangelium [Freiburg: Herder, 1977], 1:391).
of Yahweh from all the nations who are invited to participate alongside restored Israel in these blessings.3

During the Second Temple period, however, the Messianic banquet promised in Isaiah becomes exclusively reserved for the nation of Israel alone. The Gentiles were said to be “nothing,” as in 4 Esd 6:55-59: “O Lord, because you have said that it was for us that you created this world. As for the other nations which have descended from Adam, you have said that they are nothing, and that they are like spittle, and you have compared their abundance to a drop from a bucket.”4 Thus the future participation of other nations in the blessings of the Messianic age does not appear to be assured. According to Second Temple Jewish mentality, all Gentiles belong in the same category as the people of Tyre in Isaiah 23, who not only have no share in the Messianic banquet, but who will also be destroyed so that Israel as a nation can be vindicated.

In the Gospel of Mark, the Messianic banquet theme begins with the feeding of the five thousand in Mark 6:30-325 and ends with the feeding of the four thousand in Mark 8:1-10. Between these passages are three stories concerning the partakers of the Messianic banquet: Jesus eats, or feasts, with his disciples (Mark 7:1-23); Jesus’ encounter with the Syrophoenician woman (Mark 7:24-30); and Jesus’ healing of a deaf man (Mark 7:31-37).

In Mark 7:1-23, Jesus, the Messiah, eats with his disciples. However, the religious elite, the Pharisees and Scribes, who have made participating in the Messianic banquet to be their lifelong goal, appear to be totally unaware of the significance of Jesus’ actions. Instead of participating, they criticize Jesus and miss out on the banquet.

In Mark 7:24-30 and 31-37, however, the responses of the participants are significantly different. The Pharisees and Scribes, commonly regarded as the most holy among God’s holy people, were considered to be exemplars of those who have a place at the Messianic banquet and who have a share in the life to come.6 However, Jesus condemns them as unclean due to their sin-defiled hearts (Mark 7:20-23). The Gentile woman and the deaf man stand in stark contrast to these holy ones. They are among those condemned by the Pharisees and Scribes as unclean (m. Toh. 7.8), who by their very presence in a Jewish house make it ceremonially unclean (m. Toh. 7:6). According to the Pharisees and Scribes, they have no chance of attending the Messianic banquet. Nevertheless, it is these unclean Gentiles who participate in the

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4The texts quoted from Jewish apocalyptic writings in this paper are all taken from James H. Charlesworth, ed., The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, Volume 1: Apocalyptic Literature and Testaments (New York: Doubleday, 1983).

5Jesus’ walk on the sea can be considered to be a climax of the feeding of the five thousand.

6See the discussions of the rabbis in m. Sanh. 10.
Messianic banquet and who receive the Messianic blessings because of their faith in Jesus.

The location of the story of the Syrophoenician woman is worth pondering. Could it be that Jesus intended to encounter this woman in this particular location of Tyre for the purpose of demonstrating that the Messianic blessings are not for the Jews alone, but for all people who believe in him? Could it be that he is drawing a parallel between the Messianic banquet of Isaiah 25 and the destruction of Tyre in Isaiah 23? The ancient land of Tyre, hostile to the people of Israel, becomes a land of blessings. This is the ultimate manifestation of the inclusiveness of the Messianic banquet. If Tyre could enjoy the blessings, couldn’t anyone? Jesus’ answer is, Yes.

This point becomes clearer when considering the underlying submotifs of the story of the Syrophoenician woman. In the story, there are two submotifs, each containing two contrasting metaphorical expressions: the children and dogs, and the bread and crumbs. The woman apparently understands Jesus’ metaphors, giving a response to him that appears to contradict Jesus’ meaning. The bread-and-crumbs metaphors represent the Messianic blessings. Jesus’ words, “First [πρῶτον] let the children eat all they want,” acknowledges the fact that Israel is God’s chosen nation and the blessings of the Kingdom are first of all for the Jewish people. The reference to dogs is a Jewish metaphor for the Gentiles. In the Mishnah, the Gentiles are often mentioned together with dogs in relation to clean and unclean matters. That the Jews viewed Gentiles in this manner was probably well known, as indicated by the woman’s response to Jesus’ remarks.

As noted, Mark places the story of the Syrophoenician woman between the two miraculous feeding stories of Mark 6:30-32 and 8:1-10. In these stories, Jesus miraculously feeds fish and bread to thousands of people. However, the location of the two stories is different. The feeding of the five thousand takes place in a region populated by Jews. His statement to the Syrophoenician woman correlates with this story, “First let the children eat all they want.” However, the feeding of the four thousand takes place in the region of Decapolis, a Gentile-populated land, illustrating the woman’s response, “Even the dogs under the table eat the children’s crumbs.” Thus the two miraculous stories of Jesus’ provision of food are acted out in the story of the Syrophoenician woman, illustrating the bounty provided by the Messianic King for both the children of Abraham and the Gentiles.

The woman’s confident response to Jesus is puzzling. Why is she not discouraged by Jesus’ apparently typical Jewish response to her request? Wasn’t Jesus attempting to purposely insult her by his reference to dogs? Or was he showing that there are loopholes in apparently insulting language that provide opportunities even for the despised Gentiles?

There is an important clue to be found in Jesus’ terminology. The Greek word for dog is κύων. However, the term that Jesus uses is the diminutive κυνάρια, meaning “little dog.” The use of this form appears nowhere else in the LXX or NT writings, with the exception of the same story in Matthew.

7See, e.g., m. Ned. 4:3, m. Bekh. 5:6, and m. Toh. 8:6.
15. The little dogs that Jesus refers to are not semiwild, homeless animals, but household pets. The affections and attachment shown by the ancient Syrophoenicians to their household pets such as small dogs has been revealed to the surprise of modern archaeologists upon the excavation of a large dog cemetery at the site of ancient Ashkelon, a former Syrophoenician city. About 60 to 70 percent of the 700 dogs buried there were small dogs, all proven to have died of natural deaths. Archaeologists called these pets the “Phoenician’s best friend[s].” One archaeologist comments on the burial of these dogs that “The proper burial of what in some cases were probably dog fetuses reflects an intense relationship between dogs and humans.” So, by referring to them, Jesus presents a common household scene that would have been familiar to the woman. Perhaps the word conjures up in her mind the scene of her young daughter lying sick, with her beloved pet beside her. Or perhaps she remembers the animal receiving a treat from her daughter’s hand or its cleaning up the crumbs under the table. Such a creature would surely have become a member of the household, protected and cared for by the entire family.

Thus Jesus’ use of κυρίῳ reveals his tender feelings, betraying his love for this Gentile woman. This single word is saturated with the gospel message to the Gentiles, announcing that they already belong to the household of God and are eligible to receive the Messianic blessings even though they are not considered to be first in the Kingdom by the Jews. Jesus’ words are an announcement to the woman to expect great wonders from him for her daughter.

The woman accepts this blessing from Jesus without further pleading, calling him “Lord.” She understands his message. Perhaps the absence

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8There are regulations in the Babylonian Talmud concerning the breeding of dogs, indicating that this practice was popular among the Jews (see, e.g., b. Talmud Baba Kamma 79b, 80a, 80b, 83a).

9For details of the report see Lawrence E. Stager, “Why Were Hundreds of Dogs Buried at Ashkelon?” BR-J 17 (1991): 27-42. The same article also mentions that in classical Greek society dogs were greatly appreciated as household pets, with moving epitaphs written especially for them. The author gives one example: “The stone tells that it [the grave] contains here the white Milesian dog, Eumelos’ faithful guardian. They called him ‘Bull’ while he still lived, but now the silent paths of night possess his voice” (ibid., 38).

10Ibid., 33.

11Ibid., 38.

12The word κύριος could simply mean a form of address showing respect. However, it is also used as a designation and personal title for God (Matt 1:20) and Jesus Christ (John 20:18) in much the same way as the Hebrew name “Adonai” replaces the tetragrammaton YHWH in the public reading of the Scriptures (Freiberg Lexicon, s.v., “κύριος,” [BibleWorks 5.0]). Thus, based on the context of the story, it is appropriate to consider the woman’s use of the word “Lord” in the sense of “Adonai,” making it a faith statement and public confession of her belief in Jesus as the Messiah. See also Robert H. Stein, Mark, Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
of the word “Lord” from the beginning of this Markan story is deliberate, intentionally left out until the crucial moment to demonstrate the woman’s progression in faith. She sees Jesus’ use of κυνάρια, combined with πρώτον, to be revolutionary and extraordinary. Even a dog can be beloved. Actually, some scholars even suspect her answer to Jesus was her conscious repetition of what may have been a common Hellenic maxim:13 “dogs will clean up every scrap of what diners leave, a model of scavenging.”14 The picture of a household dog cleaning up the scraps under the table brings her hope that she too can be a partaker in the Messianic blessings. The faithfulness of God in fulfilling his covenant with Abraham (Gen 12: 1-3) to pour out Messianic blessings to all nations is demonstrated by Jesus’ words. Thus the woman could reply eagerly with an open confession of Jesus as Lord, “Yes, Lord, but even the dogs under the table eat the children’s crumbs.”


INVESTIGATING THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL REALM OF BIBLICAL-THEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY, PART IV: CRITIQUE AND TRANSFORMATION

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4.1 Introduction

The fourth article of this article series will conclude my investigations of the conditions of biblical-theological methodology. After I introduced Dooyeweerd's and Canale's critical analysis of the human rational activity in the first two articles, the third article demonstrated the practical use of their thinking, which deliver excellent frameworks of analysis when methodological means and results of applied methodologies are to be assessed. The final article will display limitations and problems in Dooyeweerd's and Canale's thinking. This is a necessary step if a fruitful dialogue between both thinkers should inspire a transformation of their thinking and create even more clarity on the conditions of biblical-theological methodology. This article will then begin by highlighting some critical elements in Canale's phenomenology of Reason and Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique of theoretical thought. The critique will then pass into reflections that suggest a transformation of their analysis of the human rational activity and improve our understanding of the conditions of biblical-theological methodology in specific.

4.1.2 Critique on Canale

Canale's motivation to uncover the inner structure of Reason and develop a biblical interpretation of the dimensionality of Reason has not yet led him to develop the ontological and epistemological frameworks. His dissertation did not attempt the establishment of an entire philosophy, but only the laying-bare of Reason's structure and the exploration of a biblically founded ontology in order to set the stage for a criticism of theology. Because of this, a criticism of Canale will be much more limited than a criticism of Dooyeweerd. In general, there are only three areas in which one could criticize Canale's thinking: his phenomenological analysis of Reason; his criticism of ancient and Western philosophy; and his interpretation of Reason's dimensionality in the light of Holy Scripture.

In this final article, my criticism will focus only on Canale's phenomenological analysis and his interpretation of the biblical ground

of Being, with its subsequent consequences for a further interpretation of Reason's frameworks.

4.1.2.1 Critiquing the Description of the Phenomenological Structure of Reason

4.1.2.1.1 Universalization of Reason without Ontology?

From a Dooyeweerdian perspective, the central role of Reason in Canale's thinking is dubious. Dooyeweerdian thinking limits the rational realm to an aspect of meaning-being. Doesn't Canale absolutize Reason when he does not limit its scope? This question needs to be answered negatively. Canale's use of the term “Reason” as universalized Reason hinders the absolutization or autonomy of rational thinking. Canale's Reason does aspectualize components of rational thinking. In this matter, it is important to acknowledge the different meaning Dooyeweerd and Canale attach to rational thinking. Canale does not use rational thinking in its narrow sense. To him, rational thinking cannot be reduced to mathematical-logical thinking. The critical question then remains to what extent it is legitimate to use the term “Reason” when the object of critical inquiry is that which enables the establishment of Knowledge. Seeing the parallel between Canale's Reason and Dooyeweerd's knowledge, the universalization of Reason should not be mistaken for an absolutization of reason in its classical sense. But how does Canale legitimize the universalization of Reason without assuming a minimum of ontological understanding? Is it possible to make analytic-logical thinking a part of Reason's whole without assuming an ontology? Canale claims that his analysis involves the onticity of the phenomenon “Knowledge” (necessity of a specific Being), but does not imply any specific logic of the ontic. The onticity of Knowledge can be interpreted both as timeless- and temporal-grounded. The unsolved question, however, is how a logical-analytic description of the phenomenon of Knowledge, i.e., its onticity, can avoid a specific Logos as Being.

Because Canale claims that any logic receives its specific logical ground through an interpretation of Being, one could conclude that the phenomenological analysis as phenomenological analysis includes a logos. However, this logos is not allowed to receive its specific logical ground through an interpretation of Being if its structural analysis of the phenomenon of Reason wants to be of universal character. This is contradictory as long as the


3 As far as I can see, the notion of Reason focuses much more on the subject's activity as contribution to the subject-object relation than the notion of knowledge does.
condition for the latter possibility is not clear. Canale does not, however, seem to recognize this tension in his phenomenological analysis.

These critical remarks led my analysis to the conclusion that Canale’s phenomenological analysis of Reason cannot claim to be purely descriptive or without ontological assumption, since he takes a specific philosophical standpoint at the very beginning of his inquiry: universalized Reason and the possibility of a neutral phenomenological logic that is not grounded in a specific Logos. His analysis builds upon this philosophical claim.

4.1.2.1.2 Meaning as Constituted by Reason

In Canale’s work, Reason is understood as the constitutive element of any understanding. As far as I can see, this understanding can be problematic, depending on what Reason involves. Canale seems to introduce two slightly different understandings of Reason. On the one hand, Reason is understood as “the human activity for the constitution of meaning.” Here Reason is understood as an act of the subject. This act, however, is of universal character in the sense that it involves not only a human being’s analytic-logical cognition, but human consciousness in general. On the other hand, Reason is universalized in the sense of all-encompassing humanity’s many aspects of knowing as subject and object. I assume that Canale’s first understanding of Reason does not truly reflect his thinking, because it would contradict his entire analysis. These two different understandings can, however, be deduced from his work because of his unclear definition of Meaning: Meaning requires a subject-object relation, but the understanding and consciousness that flow out of this relation as an expression of Meaning is an action of humanity alone. Thus the expression of the Meaning flowing out of the consciousness of human experience of the subject-object relation is a subjective action. In this sense, humans do generate Meaning as an expression or logical concept. However, the Meaning that flows out of the subject-object relation is never identical with the expression or concept of it. Expressed Meaning is, rather, a translation of the subject’s insight (generated in the subject-object relationship) into a concept. Canale does not make this clear distinction between Meaning and the expression or concept of Meaning. In my understanding, Canale focuses in his work on the phenomenological analysis of the structure that enables an expressing and conceptualization of Meaning rather than the structure that enables Meaning itself. Consequently, if Canale’s claim that there is no Meaning outside of human’s rational activity refers to the concept of Meaning alone (understood in the wide sense as “humanity’s becoming conscious”), I agree with his understanding.

“Truth can be only that which is allowed by Reason and its particular categories” (Fernando Luis Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertations Series, 10 [Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1987], 2).

Ibid., 10.

Ibid., 32.
4.1.2.1.3 The Self and Reason

In comparison with Dooyeweerd, there is no clear conception of the subject as self in Canale’s phenomenological analysis of Reason. However, the phenomenological analysis of the epistemological framework assumes a self, but is not concerned with its interpretation. Canale relegates the interpretation of the self to the ontological framework. The ontological concept of the self is then assumed in the interpretation of the epistemological framework. As Canale is only concerned with a structural and not an interpretational analysis of Reason, he does not offer an interpretation of the self, but emphasizes its existence as a formal part of Reason. The formally required existence of the subject is, however, characterized by the spontaneity that allows for the interpretation of Reason’s structure, which emphasizes that the formal structure of knowledge cannot constitute meaning because it is empty of concrete content (interpretation).

Dooyeweerd’s two ways of transcendental critique lay bare the important role the self plays in theoretical thinking. This discovery allowed for his persuasive critique on humanistic philosophy. The interpretation of the self’s origin as the foundation of self-understanding functioned as hermeneutical horizon for any thought act. Hereby the self received its central role in Dooyeweerd’s analysis. In my opinion, it is a part of the structure of Reason that the ontic and the epistemic realms come together within the subject in a radical dependence on their common origin. I think Canale did not discover this structural given because he put emphasis on the interpretation of Being rather than the choice of a theos. The phenomenological analysis should have been able to show that self-understanding (belonging to the ontological-anthropological framework of Reason), as dependent on an understanding of the self’s origin (theos or the One), is a basic formal condition of the structure of Reason because the ontic and epistemic structurally come together in the subject. Consequently, an understanding of the self, which is dependent on an understanding of its origin, will have direct influence on the ontological and epistemological conceptions. Thus self-understanding, basically understood as an understanding of one’s own being, will determine the epistemological categories of the self, which are applied to all of human cognition as hermeneutical guidelines. This formal interrelation, lacking in Canale’s work, would enrich his critical investigation of classical, modern, and postmodern thought.

Aside from the structural level, a biblical interpretation of Reason must strongly address the self of humanity in the form of the imago Dei and the biblical idea of the heart or soul. Thus, although the self and its formal relation with an understanding of its origin should have been discovered in the phenomenological analysis, it can surely not be missed in the biblical interpretation of Reason. Thus I conclude that both the phenomenological structure of Reason and the biblical interpretation of the structure of Reason call for an awareness of the dependence of self-understanding on an understanding of the self’s origin.

Glanz, 58.
4.1.2.1.4 Foundational Ontology and Transcendental Ideas

The comparison between the application of Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s structural understanding in my earlier article has shown that Dooyeweerd’s transcendental idea of origin is of most practical value. This does not mean that the two thinkers contradict each other in regard to the central function of the transcendental idea of origin. I assume that as Canale was searching for the possibility of a criticism of theological thinking, foundational ontology played a much more important role in his investigation than the choice for theos, since most theologians accept God as the true origin of all creation. His question was concerned much more with how it is possible that the same choice leads to different dogmatic beliefs, different explanations of the relation between God and his creation, and different theological methodologies.9

Here the dimensionality that is attributed to the chosen theos becomes most crucial. However, foundational ontology cannot determine the choice for a theos, but only the dimension in which the chosen theos is placed. Even though Canale did not focus on the choice for a theos, the theos clearly plays a crucial role in the variety of philosophical and scientific ideologies (e.g., biologism, physicism, psychologism).

Foundational ontology cannot explain this important influence of the theos, representing the ontic and noetic independence status, on theories and more specifically ontological and epistemological conceptions. Because the independence status, i.e., the idea of origin in its noetic and ontic senses, plays such a determining role as direction-giver, especially in theoretical thinking, it does not seem to be a lucky choice of terms to speak about the dimensionality of Reason. It would make more sense to refer to Canale’s dimensionality of Reason with another term that helps to clarify that man’s thinking is not just “dimensionalized” by the ground of Being, but also by the choice for a theos. The dimension of thinking is, then, determined by the ground of Being and the chosen theos.

4.1.2.1.5 Abstract and Pre-theoretical Thinking

In Canale’s phenomenological analysis of the structure of Reason, he also refers to the terms “abstraction” and “pre-theoretical.”11 Although he does not make it explicit, these two terms, as belonging to the structure of Reason, need an interpretation in the course of interpreting the frameworks of Reason. Canale speaks vaguely of abstract or theoretical knowledge as...
the place where the systematization of Knowledge (Reason's frameworks) is technically made explicit so that it can become a foundation and tool for science and philosophy. In contrast, in the pretheoretical attitude of the human thought-act Reason's system remains implicit and hidden. Therefore, the pretheoretical attitude is not a part of the noncognitive realm, but rather points to the naively experienced subject-object relation. This pretheoretical cognitive experience is, in fact, the condition of a theoretical interpretation of Reason's structure.12

How the thought-act-attitudes relate to each other and to the theological framework, however, remains unexplained. This criticism can be so sharply stated because Dooyeweerd has shown that in theoretical thought we need a supratheoretical and supramodal standpoint for our theoretical synthesis. This need is nonexistent in our naive attitude of thinking, since the modal diversity is not abstracted from its coherence. As Canale makes clear in his work, the understanding of “abstraction” that is grounded in temporal Being is distinctively different from the classical understanding of abstraction. Consequently, the meaning of the theoretical synthesis will also find a reinterpretation. The need for a supratemporal point of synthesis will be rejected. The point from which a synthesis is made possible will not be disconnected from the temporal flux. A synthesis, however, whether grounded in timeless or temporal Being is needed in the sense of giving the Gegenstand of thought its proper place within the totality of reality. Although having a critical stance toward Dooyeweerd's description of the Gegenstand relation, he has, however, pointed at something inherent to scientific thinking, namely, the act of bringing something into focus by abstracting it into a level that allows for closer insight (a microcosmic look) by losing the macrocosmic totality from which it was abstracted.13 Because Canale does not develop the structural difference between naïve and theoretical thinking, he cannot see the crucial impact that a high level of abstraction can have on science and philosophy. The subject's theoretical image is different from the subject's naive image of an object. This difference cannot be explained in Canale's terms of “making explicit” or “making implicit” as if it would relate to different levels of consciousness. Theoretical thinking, in contrast to naive thinking, is in crucial need of a transcendental idea of origin in order to allow for a theoretical synthesis. A further development of a clear distinction between naïve and theoretical reasoning would have helped Canale to see the important function of the universal structural datum as something that needs to be accounted for by any thinker in the process of theoretical conceptualizing.

12Ibid., 134.

13Although Dooyeweerd's description of theoretical thought as Gegenstand-relations received a lot of critique, especially by thinkers within the Reformed tradition, the basic difference between naïve and scientific/theoretical thinking was acknowledged. This distinction, however, was worked out differently. See René van Woudenberg, “Theorie van het Kennen,” in Kennis en Werkelijkheid, ed. René van Woudenberg (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperhijn, 1996), 43-47.
4.1.2.2 Critiquing the Interpretation of the Phenomenological Structure

4.1.2.2.1 Subject, Object, and Normativity

In Canale’s description of how the subject-object relation should be interpreted on the basis of a biblical temporal foundational ontology, the question arises as to how he can defend himself against subjectivism when accepting Being as the temporal flux, i.e., temporality. Is there anything in this temporal flux that guarantees unchangeable norms?

Before describing the problematic in more detail, two things need to be underscored: First, the formal structure of Reason allows for neither subjectivism nor objectivism, since both subject and object are needed for the generation of Knowledge. The normativity of thinking is derived from the contents and categories that the ontological interpretation receives.

In Canale’s biblical interpretation of the structure of Reason, he recognizes a divine normativity in the ontic existence of God’s creation. This ontic normativity as expressed in ontology sets the parameters of humanity’s cognitive capacities, i.e., the brain, with its neurophysical characteristics. But the cognitive capacities do not yet determine in a full sense the outcome of rational thinking. A variety of rational articulation is still possible because within a biblical understanding of Reason God did not place human knowledge under the administration of all-encompassing normativity. What is meant hereby is that God did not determine humanity in such a way that all human beings will think in the same way or they will not be rational. This understanding is due to the biblical concept of individual freedom and responsibility. Normativity comes from the outside of the cognitive sphere of the subject, i.e., from the ontic, and not from inside reason or the self.

Although the structure of Reason as subject-object relation allows for neither subjectivism nor objectivism, and although Canale’s biblical interpretation of this subject-object relation knows of normativity, there is a need for more clarity and explanation if subjectivism really is to be overcome. In his conception of the object’s temporal lines of intelligibility, gathered in cognitive tension, seems to lie the answer that helps to prevent subjectivism. But as there is no clear explanation of what these temporal lines of intelligibility represent and what it is that makes these lines intelligible, the problematic of how a subject-object relation is possible remains. Although the structure of Reason does not allow for either subjectivism or objectivism, and although the grounding of this structural subject-object relation in biblical temporal Being promises to overcome the “thing in itself,” i.e., the “thing as it appears” dualism, that which establishes the structural subject-object relation is not explicated with clarity. Although the problems seem to be removed, the solution is still awaited, unless the ontological and epistemological framework is developed in more detail. Until then, the question still remains as to which normative element is able to establish a temporal subject-object relation.

In Canale’s interpretation of the structure of Reason, the subject needs to account for the object’s lines of intelligibility and its own interpretation of the structure of Reason. However, if the interpretation of the structure of Reason is generated by the spontaneity of the subject, and if the naive state
of the subject in which an implicit interpretation of the structure of Reason is at work is structurally not different from theoretical thinking, the possibility of a subject-subject relation in which the second subject has interpreted its own Reason differently is nearly impossible. A subject-subject relationship is possible only when both subjects have a common ground for which to provide answers. This common ground cannot be Reason, since Reason can be interpreted in different ways. A common ground in which both subjects share interpretational frameworks is needed if communication is to be possible. It is conceivably possible that naive communication between two different people, belonging to two different or even opposing thought traditions, can be mutually comprehensible. An evolutionist can talk to a Christian about family problems, the weather, and how to cook rice without experiencing communication problems. A person can make himself understood even when he explains the arguments for his own worldview to someone who does not share his or her worldview. From a biblical perspective, this fact can be explained by God’s creatinal law to which all creation is subject. It is surprising that Canale does not include this biblical idea of normativity in his sketch of a possible temporal interpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworks, as normativity clearly belongs to the biblical conception of reality.14

Because of this lack, Canale cannot show as clearly as Dooyeweerd does that, although logical concepts are partly constructions of the human mind, they are still bound to normativity. The biblically interpreted structure of Reason shows that Reason is not fully “empty” before its ground of Being and frameworks are interpreted, but has intrinsic normativity. Any interpretation of the structure of Reason will be subject to a multiplicity of modal laws (e.g., logical laws of distinction), without which an interpretation of Reason would not even be possible. The fact remains that although there are many possible interpretations of Reason, all can be judged on their inner coherence or consistency of logical arguments, thereby pointing to a normativity that undergirds all interpretations.

The lack of specific normativity does not mean that Canale’s interpretational conception of the subject-object relation is necessarily problematic, but that he needs to explain, from a biblical perspective, what it is that establishes both an ontic and epistemic relationship between subjects and between subjects and objects. This implies that both the lines of intelligibility and the idea of dynamic being-appearance need to receive clearer conceptualization.

4.1.2.2.2 Appearance and the Thing in Itself

The need for a clearer understanding of the subject-subject and subject-object relations hints at a further problem. Within a temporal dimensionality of Reason, Canale makes being-appearance co-appear with Being. Consequently, in a temporal framework the gap between being and appearance no longer

exists: appearance is being thing in itself.\textsuperscript{15} However, experience (the structural datum) shows that objects and subjects do not fully appear with all their attributes to the subject with which they have a structural relationship. This is not just due to time in the sense that, at a particular point in time, not enough lines of intelligibility have been gathered. The incomplete appearance of the structural datum is inherent to the subject’s perceptive limitations. Many examples could be given. For example, humans do not perceive infrared light, but a deer does. We, therefore, need to conclude that being-appearance does not mean that all characteristics of a certain object are perceived by the subject. Thus, the temporal “thing in itself” should not be considered identical to its appearance.

My critique here concerns the question of how appearance, as limited being-appearance, can be understood without falling back into the distinction between being and appearance.

4.1.2.2.3 Abstract and Pretheoretical
Canale’s redefinition of “abstract” within the temporal framework triggers questions. On one hand, he reformulates the abstract as having a “promise character” that is neither right nor wrong since the temporal extension of Being into the future has not yet taken place.\textsuperscript{16} On the other hand, the lines of intelligibility, as far as they are understood, are themselves of abstract character, since they reveal themselves through time as characteristics of a certain being. By means of the cognitive gathering act, these lines are abstracted from the diversity of being in extended time.\textsuperscript{17} I think that a reformulation of the abstract as being of a promise character alone is, however, problematic if an idea of the abstract is to find some usability in the world of nontheological, scientific disciplines. Canale should have integrated his ideas about the lines of intelligibility in his redefinition of the abstract. In fact, I think that an interconnection between the lines of intelligibility and the promise character is possible, as even the lines of intelligibility are of relative character and need to be proven true while extending into the future. They are, therefore, of promise character as well. In this context, Canale could have elaborated his indication of “determinable indeterminancy”\textsuperscript{18} as an understanding of temporal-grounded abstraction (see. 2.6). By this term, Canale refers to the expression of patterns the object reveals in its temporal extension (as the determinable part), which requires the temporal openness of the object as it extends further into the future, expressing and refining its lines of intelligibility. Both the promise character and the abstraction process as cognitive gathering act should have been integrated.

Associated with these critical remarks is Canale’s unelaborated distinction between abstract and pretheoretical thought.\textsuperscript{19} I think that when the lines of

\textsuperscript{15}Canale, 361.
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 379-380.
\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., 374-382.
\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., 137.
\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., 27, n. 4; 374-375.
intelligibility are included in the definition of the abstract, a theoretical tension-gathering process could be distinguished from a nontheoretical tension-gathering process. The absence of this differentiation hinders Canale’s ability to easily uncover the different absolutizations within contemporary scientific disciplines. It is helpful to speak of high and low levels of abstraction. The abstraction process, including the promise character and gathering process of the lines of intelligibility, is not only characteristic of theoretical thought, but pertains to all human ways of understanding. However, this abstraction process can be differently performed in different thought-act-attitudes: naive (low level of abstraction) and theoretical (high level of abstraction).

4.1.3 Critique on Dooyeweerd

Dooyeweerd’s thinking is much more detailed and developed than Canale’s. His thinking also has had a much greater impact than Canale’s. His influence has been tremendous, especially within the Reformed Christian tradition of philosophy.20 Because of this popularity, he has been discussed and critiqued in various ways by many people both from within and without his own thought tradition.21

A brief look at the critique on Dooyeweerd shows that it mostly targets his transcendental critique of theoretical thought. I will, therefore, try to include in my critique some of the critical remarks that have been expressed against the transcendental critique and that are of interest for the encounter with Canale’s work.

4.1.3.1 Phenomenology and Interpretation

A critique on Dooyeweerd considered from the perspective of Canale’s structure of Reason requires the understanding that Canale’s object of analysis, Reason, is not identical with Dooyeweerd’s object of analysis, theoretical thought. In Canale’s work, theoretical thinking is a part of Reason as a whole, while in Dooyeweerd’s work theoretical thinking is just one of the many ways of knowing.

It is clear that both a dimensionality and an ontological framework are already involved and active in Dooyeweerd’s “structural analysis”: his understanding of theoretical thought is dependent on his modal theory and


view of cosmic time. It is his modal theory as ontology that makes his specific arguments within the first and second ways of his transcendental critique possible. My critique is that Dooyeweerd's analysis did not lay bare the systematization of Reason, but rather the biblical interpretation of a part of it as system. Dooyeweerd's analysis of the structure of thought is, therefore, a laying-bare of a structure that can only be expressed on the basis of a distinct interpretation of Reason's structure.

However, the general phenomenological structure of Reason does not exclude the possibility of more specific phenomenological structures within the basic structure of Reason that are not yet dependent on any interpretation. The description of naive and theoretical thinking that both have a clear analytic character could be a part of a regional formal structure of Reason that needs to receive an interpretation.

4.1.3.2 Analogy and Ontology

As discussed in my earlier article,22 Dooyeweerd's basic critique of Thomistic philosophy and other non-Christian philosophy is that cosmic time is wrongly interpreted and that the heart is not accepted or seen as the religious root-unity of humanity. It is the understanding of the supratemporal heart as the religious root-unity of humanity that enables the correct interpretation of cosmic time. Dooyeweerd's reinterpretation of cosmic time automatically led to a new understanding of analogy.23 However, his proposal that it is through the supratemporal unity that cosmic time breaks into the irreducible diversity of modalities demonstrates the timeless dimensionality of his concept of Reason.24

From the perspective of the structure of Reason, we then need to say that Dooyeweerd's critique does not go far enough. He also should have critically inquired into the ground of Being on which the Thomistic interpretation of the basic relational framework between Creator and creation rests. Just as with Thomistic philosophy, Dooyeweerd's philosophy is grounded in timeless Being, even though there are differences between the Dooyeweerdian and the Thomistic-Aristotelian understandings of timelessness.25 The consequences of this understanding of Being is that the borderline between God and the created world is not between God and the created world as such, but between temporal creation and a timeless God, and it is this understanding that helps to technically delineate the relation between unity and diversity in Dooyeweerd's argument.

22Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical-Theological Methodology, Part III.”


24It has been suggested by other Christian thinkers that the modal diversity can also be explained on the basis of the architecture of God's law. See Choi, 53.

The question we, therefore, need to consider is how Dooyeweerd’s view of the relation between creation and Creator (continuity and discontinuity) is to be evaluated if it is grounded in an understanding of Being that is foreign to the biblical message itself.26

4.1.3.3 Time and Timelessness

Although Dooyeweerd does elaborately criticize the different interpretations given to the time-timeless frameworks, he does not criticize timeless Being as such.

Dooyeweerd’s choice for a timeless dimensionality of Reason can be traced back to the traditional Reformed Christian idea that time was created at the moment of creation. There was thus no time before creation. This conclusion does not find any textual biblical support and seems to be much more rooted in the philosophy of Parmenides, which became mixed with the Christian understanding that God, as Creator, exists independently from his creation.27 Because time was considered an essential part of creation in classical philosophy, the independence of God from his creation had to demand timelessness. By identifying God as Creator with timelessness, the understanding of his sovereignty and absolute independence from his creation found a philosophically valid yet unbiblical explanatory possibility.

A complete rejection of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy on the basis of his dimensionality of Reason would, however, result in the failure to uncover his original attempt to find a solution to the subject-object relation.28 Such a rejection would only demonstrate that the distinct influence of the theos-framework of Reason, understood independently of the foundational ontology, is not understood properly. It is true that foundational ontology sets the basic structure of all of Reason’s frameworks, but the interpretation of foundational ontology does not set the direction of the interpretation of ontos or logos. As the history of philosophy has shown, the basis of a single interpretation of foundational ontology allows for different interpretations of the ontological and epistemological frameworks. The cause for these different interpretations can, therefore, not be found in foundational ontology since a


large extent of the pluralism of ontologies and epistemologies is grounded on the same foundational ontology. The source of this pluralism is thus not foundational ontology, but the interpretation of the theological framework.

One could question whether Dooyeweerd's dimensionality is Aristotelian, which would be of a great importance, if the object of study is biblical philosophy. A hasty rejection, however, would prevent one from seeing how Dooyeweerd's philosophy, even though grounded in timeless Being, attempted to fundamentally break with classical and Aristotelian conceptions of ontology and epistemology by choosing a different interpretation of the theological framework. By means of his modal theory, Dooyeweerd basically breaks with the classical hierarchical ontology, and by using his understanding of the subject-object relation he creatively tries to overcome the gap between subject and object. The whole idea of substance and essence (e.g., form-matter, nature-grace, and nature-freedom) is also claimed to be overcome by the modal theory. Dooyeweerd's attempt to overcome subject-object dualism takes place in Reason's timeless dimensionality. The explanation of diversity is found within the time-supratemporal-[non-Greek]-timelessness tension.

From a Canalian perspective, it is doubtful whether Dooyeweerd is really able to overcome the form-matter problem since Canale locates the origin of the problem in timeless foundational ontology. There is reason to question whether a dualism remains between the supratemporal "heart" and the temporal "body," although Dooyeweerd rejects such a possibility. Additionally, one might wonder if the specific understanding of the Gegenstand-relation with its intentional abstraction from temporal coherence is not a relict of classical-dualistic thinking. It is certain that, by his dimensionality of Reason, Dooyeweerd maintains a dualism between creation and Creator, which leads to a certain mysticism necessary for achieving knowledge of God. As far as I can see, this must be the reason why Dooyeweerd did not spend much effort explaining in detail how the supratemporal heart receives its ideas of origin, unity, and coherence. It remains a mystery how it is possible

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29Although Dooyeweerd takes distance from a Greek-Aristotelian understanding of timelessness, one should wonder whether the explanation suffices to say that Dooyeweerd does not at all have a non-Greek notion of timelessness. What his explanation does is to avoid a reductionistic version of timelessness (cf. Glanz, “Time, Reason and Religious Belief: A Limited Comparison, Critical Assessment, and Further Development of Herman Dooyeweerd's Structural Analysis of Theoretical Thought and Fernando Canale's Phenomenological Analysis of the Structure of Reason and Its Biblical Interpretation”), it does not argue for an eternal temporality of God, even though it seems that Dooyeweerd understands that the timelessness of God does not hinder God from acting temporally.

30Zuidervaart, 76.


32Cf. Glanz, “Part III: Application and Comparison,” §3.3.3.
that through revelation we receive these transcendental ideas. In biblical thinking, the divine act of revelation is not of a timeless or supratemporal nature, but is rather placed within the temporality that characterizes created reality and is, therefore, detached from mystic paths to divine knowledge. Therefore, the process of revelation is not understood as a problem for man’s onticity. Knowledge of God does not need to be achieved through methods of ecstasy, asceticism, rational abstraction, or spiritual mysticism.

It is, however, crucial to observe that Dooyeweerd’s modal theory does not necessarily need to derive its ideological legitimization from a timeless foundational ontology. The necessary ingredient of the modal theory is merely the ontological conception of creation’s dependence on an independent Creator. To interpret this dependence-independence relation as cosmic time-timeless relation is just one possibility. The crux of the modal theory as a tool to criticize theoretical thought is its explication of the need for an Archimedean standpoint through which unity and coherence can be explained. The theory shows that many modalities could theoretically offer this Archimedean standpoint through the theoretical Gegenstand-relation in combination with the dogma of the autonomy of rational thought. It thus seems that Dooyeweerd targets, in the first place, something supramodal rather than supratemporal to overcome the danger of reductionism. The modal theory can thus also be applied within a temporal dimensionality of Reason. The need for identifying the true Archimedean standpoint with supratemporality is only because the modal diversity is understood to be different expressions of time necessarily referring to a basic supratemporal unity.

To conclude my critical remarks on Dooyeweerd’s understanding of time, I want to stress that his critique especially targets the absolutization of any Gegenstand-relation on the basis of the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought as it can be found within the history of philosophy and the modern humanistic thought tradition. He strongly inquired into and criticized this absolutization. H. G. Geertsema similarly states: “Het theo-ontologisch kader als zodanig, waarin het theoretisch denken zich sterk gemaakt heeft, had minder zijn kritische belangstelling.” He seems to point out an undiscovered dimensionality in Dooyeweerd’s thought that had not received a critical inquiry. That a classical timeless understanding of Being seems to be still at work can be seen in the fact that (a) the heart and (b) the transcendental ideas are interpreted as supratemporal, making it difficult to

33Van Woudenberg, 55.


35Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 133.

36Eng.: “The theo-ontological framework as such, in which theoretical thought grew strong, was of less interest to him” (Geertsema, “Transcendentale Openheid: Over het Zinkarakter van de Werkelijkheid in de Wijsbegeerte van H. Dooyeweerd,” 54).
understand divine revelation and inspiration. A further trace of timeless Being can be seen when (c) theoretical thought is characterized as abstracting from the temporal coherence of reality and the unclear description of how the transcendental ideas are received. The latter especially allows for critically questioning whether the problematic dualism between Creator and created humanity was really overcome by Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.

Contrary to Dooyeweerd’s critique on absolutization, Canale’s critique would go further and challenge the very foundation on which such an absolutization is placed.

4.1.3.4 General Logical Slip in the Argument

The critique in this section targets the logical consistency of Dooyeweerd’s argumentation. This more analytic critique will help to discover what value Canale’s analysis may have for a further development of Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique.

Along with others, Lambert Zuidervaart, as a Reformed philosopher, finds a central contradiction in Dooyeweerd’s line of argument. In his transcendental critique, Dooyeweerd performs precisely that which he claims to be impossible, i.e., to give a theoretical explanation of that which surpasses the limits of theoretical thought. In doing so, his argument for the universally valid conditions of theoretical thought is disqualified, thereby revealing a logical slip in Dooyeweerd’s argument for the nonneutrality of theoretical thought. Zuidervaart summarizes the flow of the argumentation in eight steps:

1. No one could engage in theoretical thought were it not for universally valid conditions that make such thought possible.
2. Any philosophy can identify these conditions by analyzing the structure of theoretical thought itself.
3. Such an analysis shows three universally valid conditions that make theoretical thought possible:
   a. the Gegenstand-relation between the logical and nonlogical aspects,
   b. the supratheoretical unity of aspects found in the theorizing agent,
   c. the agent’s radical dependence on something other than itself.
4. The agent can either be dependent on the absolute origin of everything or on some substitute that is itself dependent on the absolute origin.

37This difficulty can be clearly seen where Dooyeweerd argues for the religious ground-motive as having supreatemporal character, although they seem to have a clear historical characteristic (cf. Glanz, “Time, Reason and Religious Belief,” §5.2.5).

38Van Woudenberg, 54-55.
39Zuidervaart, 77-78.
5. No system of theoretical thought can avoid employing ideas about the ontological status of the conditions that make theoretical thought possible. These ideas concern coherence, unity, and origin.

6. The sources of these ideas are found in the supratheoretical religious ground-motive.

7. The biblical ground-motive is the crucial and unavoidable source of the true transcendental ideas.

8. In detail, the transcendental ideas concern:
   a. the temporal and intermodal coherence of meaning,
   b. the deeper common identity (unity) of the modal aspects of meaning,
   c. the divine origin of meaning in its coherence and unity.

Dooyeweerd's *Gegenstand*-relation is impossible to conceptualize without assuming diversity within reality. This assumption should not be considered a problem of argument, because agreement can be found among different philosophers on the existence of reality as diversity. However, the specific understanding of the *Gegenstand*-relation presupposes an understanding of theoretical thought that is abstracted from the coherence of a specific diversity of meaning-being. Such an understanding is only possible on the basis of the modal theory as a theory on time in which an abstraction from temporal coherence is possible. Thus steps 5-8 in Dooyeweerd's argument are presupposed in premises 1-4. With the help of Canale's analysis, I agree with Zuidervaart that Dooyeweerd's "formal" results of analysis are quite dependent on his presupposed "content."

4.2 Transforming the Analysis

After having refined the phenomenological analysis of the structure of Reason, it can be fruitfully used for a systematic development of biblical philosophy in general and exegetical methodology in specific. In the process of such development, one will need to recognize the depths and insights Dooyeweerd's philosophy testifies to by its different biblically inspired motives (e.g., creation-fall-redemption, the heart, human responsibility, meaning-being). On the basis of a temporal dimensionality of Reason, the development of an interpretation of Reason's frameworks can be accompanied by the integration of important aspects of Dooyeweerdian thought. Yet such integration will need to entail the transformation of these aspects from timelessness in temporal grounding.

Within this final section, I will show in what way it would be possible to integrate insights and aspects of Dooyeweerd's philosophy into a temporally grounded interpretation of Reason's formal structure. Although I will not claim

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40Choi, 67.  
41Zuidervaart, 79. For a more detailed description, see Glanz, "Time, Reason and Religious Belief," 127-130.
to develop a suggestion of a truly biblical interpretation of Reason's formal structure, I do think that my suggestion is inspired by biblical insights both on the level of Being and on the level of the ontological and epistemological frameworks. The integration of, especially, Dooyeweerd's modal theory and the conception of the subject as imago Dei will allow for an interpretation of the ontological framework, which, in turn, will function as the background of the development of the epistemological framework. By this, a distinction between naive and theoretical thinking can be worked out, which will allow for a much better understanding of scientific disciplines and the limits of theoretical thinking.

In such a project of refinement, one needs to be constantly aware of the critique on and fruits of the work of both Canale and Dooyeweerd. Such a project represents a very complex task that cannot be accomplished within the scope of an article series, here I can try only to selectively outline the contours of the refinement of Canale's formal structure of Reason and the development of a biblical interpretation of Reason's frameworks by an integration of Dooyewerdian elements. A broader outline of my transformational suggestions can be found in my Masters' thesis.

4.2.1 Meaning and Phenomenological Analysis

To make the phenomenological analysis of Reason more transparent, it is necessary to explicate its ontological assumptions. Such an explication must clarify the term “Reason” as phenomenon and the term “logical” as principle of the analytic-phenomenological method (cf. 4.1.2.1.1).

The explanation of the term “Reason” as the realm of Logos should be distinguished from the realm of Meaning. The existence of Meaning is a necessary presupposition of Reason's functioning. Meaning is not constituted by Reason, but rather is experienced through Reason when Reason is taken as the subject-object relation from which knowledge and meaning flow. Meaning is only constituted by theos/the One, through which it receives its radical relational dependence character. The realm of Reason as the realm of Logos should be explained as the realm of subjectively expressed Meaning. Knowledge then always concerns the subject's understanding (in its broadest sense) of Meaning. Hence the phenomenological analysis of Reason focuses on the formal structure that allows for a subject's generation of meaningful knowledge.42

The term “Reason” must be explained as universalized Reason. Universalized Reason should be made plausible on the basis of the existence of Meaning as a presupposition of Reason's functioning. Meaning cannot, therefore, be a product of Reason's functioning. Further, the diversity of Meaning is not experienced as a reality that allows for a complete Knowledge determination. Additionally, it should be stressed that universalized Reason

42From a biblical perspective, Meaning is not constructed, but already present. Existence is intrinsically meaningful. Meaning is not created by humanity's rational thinking (even taken in its broad sense), but conceptualized through humanity's rational involvement.
includes the existence of a subject and an object that interrelate. The possibility of the relation between subject and object is accounted for by their complementarity that finds its source in a theos and his coappearing Being. Since the object in its relation with a subject also belongs to Reason, universalized Reason consequently cannot be limited to the analytic thinking of a subject, but must include ontology.

The “logical” principle by which the phenomenological analysis of Reason is made possible should be explained as a formal analytic manner of distinction and a formal analytic manner of synthesis. The formal analytic manner of distinction will give access to the different parts of the whole of Reason, while the formal analytic manner of synthesis will allow for making explicit the existing structural interrelations between the different parts of Reason as a whole. The need for explaining the possibility of formal analytic distinction and synthesis in opposition to the material analytic distinction and synthesis is important if one wants to prevent a vicious circle in regard to the discovery that any logic needs to be grounded in a specific Logos. Regardless of whether logic is grounded in temporal or timeless Logos, the phenomenological analysis should arrive at the same formal description when it restricts itself to the formal function of logic. If this is not possible, consequently suspicion will rise, if the result of the phenomenological analysis is not religiously influenced and determined by a specific interpretation of Being. While one may try to develop an interpretation that suggests that only “material” logic (necessarily involved in the interpretation of Reason’s structure) is grounded in a Logos, nevertheless a “formal” logic has universal “trans-Logos” character. Hereby explicit distance can be taken from the possible misunderstanding that the phenomenological analysis already constitutes an interpretation of the phenomenon.

4.2.2 The Place of the Transcendental Idea of Origin and Coherence in the Phenomenological Structure of Reason

The idea of origin is linked with the theological framework of Reason. Without theos, there is no theological framework; nor is there any other framework of Reason. The structural independence status of the theos guarantees the existence of ontic and epistemic coherence. It, therefore, plays a major role in the development of the ontological and epistemological frameworks. The formal function of the theological framework is its independent status in contrast to being as dependent being that finds its interpretation in the ontological framework. The formal ontic dependence on the idea of origin demonstrates, in the relation of the ontological framework to the theological framework, that ontic dependence is accompanied by a formal epistemic dependence on the idea of origin. Without a primary belief, synthetical

43“Material” logic would work as “formal” logic, which is grounded in a specific Being-interpretation.

44See Clouser, 9-58.
conclusions and concepts are impossible. Thus the formal structural relation between the theological and ontological/epistemological frameworks is of an independence-dependence character. In the construction of any philosophical or scientific concept, this structural relation must necessarily be interpreted, as is recognized throughout the history of philosophy. This is Dooyeweerd’s great insight that remains of much value, as this structural understanding is not dependent on the specific argument he developed on the basis of his modal theory and within his dimensionality of Reason. Henceforth, I will refer to the necessary choice for a theos or “the One” as the necessary choice for Reason’s direction while it functions in its coappearing of Being as the ultimate horizon for any understanding.

As the formal structure of Reason and the comparison between Dooyeweerd and Canale show, the interpretation of the independence status does not fully determine all the other frameworks since the independence-dependence relation is structurally attributed by foundational ontology. This implies that Dooyeweerd’s cosmic time-timelessness dichotomy should be understood not merely as a problematic interpretation, but also as a hint of an underlying formal structure. On one hand, Dooyeweerd’s cosmic time-timelessness framework points to the structurally necessary dependence-independence relation. On the other, it points to the structurally necessary concept of Being as nonbeing and the source of coherence in which the structurally necessary dependence-independence framework can be placed. In Dooyeweerd’s case, this structurally necessary concept is interpreted as timeless Being. This interpretation helped him to understand that creational

As far as I can see, the theos functions on a formal level as the independent origin of the dependent ontic reality, as well as the origin of the epistemic ideas of coherence and unity. This is also true for pantheistic thought, as Clouser has shown (see ibid., 48-50). Consequently, the relation between independence status of the theos versus the ontic and epistemic dependence status of creation has a universal formal character and needs to be interpreted. Contrary to Canale, who sees the theos formally only functioning as the source for articulating coherence and unity, I would, therefore, suggest that independence appears and can be argued for not only at the level of the interpretation of the formal components of Reason, but on the very level of the formal structure of Reason.

Compared to Clouser, the theos on which the ontic and epistemic are dependent functions as noetic and ontic primary belief.


Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 63, n. 1.

The term “Reason’s direction” is chosen, as it refers to the direction given to Reason by Reason’s origin (the subject, object, and possibility for their relationship). The “backward direction” to the self’s origin determines the understanding of Reason, and the “forward direction” as Reason allows for further rational expression of Meaning.

Glanz, “Part II: Canale on Reason,” §2.2.3.
aspects were considered autonomous because they were identified with timelessness.

Formally seen, autonomy is not necessarily connected with timelessness, and the answer to the question of Being allows for multiple independence status. A refinement of the phenomenological structure of Reason will need to emphasize this. Any concept of the independence-dependence structure can be attributed by different interpretations of foundational ontology. The interpretation of foundational ontology is thus structurally not derived from the interpretation of the independence-dependence relation, but is the background in which the interpretation of the independence-dependence relation takes place. Being's characteristic of coherence as nonbeing can only be guessed at or derived from a self-revelatory theos and points out the possibility for hypothesis of Reason. From a Christian perspective, Reason's ability to be hypothesized is interpreted as the necessity of faith.

A Christian who believes in the words of the prophets preserved within Scripture will ask whether the independent Creator of all creation does not himself reveal his ground of Being to humanity. In search of this answer, the Christian thinker will be able to derive his understanding of foundational ontology from the independent biblical God as theos, not because of God's independent status, but because of the thinker's trust in Holy Scripture. The ground of Being can find expression, but is not necessarily determined by that which has independent status (e.g., evolutionism can be connected with temporal or timeless Being). Only there, where the chosen theos expresses its ground of Being, it must determine the interpretation of the dimensionality of Reason. Consequently, Christian theology should reflect on the implications of the biblical revelation of God's Being as coappearing with his being. Henceforth, I will refer to the coappearing Being as Reason's setting.51

Seeing Reason's direction and setting as primordial presuppositions for any interpretation of Reason, the understanding of Canale's dimensionality of Reason would be broadened. Reason's dimensionality would no longer simply refer to the ground of Being (Reason's setting), but also to the content of the primary belief (Reason's direction). Such a use of terms could also help to overcome the lack of clarity found in Canale's writing regarding the location of the source of coherence.

The content of Reason's setting and its direction as its dimensionality cannot be found or generated from the formal structure of Reason itself. The content of the dimensionality of Reason cannot be autonomously deduced by humans, but only guessed at or accepted through revelation. The biblical interpretation of the dimensionality of Reason is not guessed at, but revealed as God reveals himself as theos (Reason's direction), coappearing with temporal Being (Reason's setting).52

Knowing that coherence is established through Being as the Logos of logic (Reason's setting), the specific interpretation of Being will provide the

51The term “Reason's setting” is chosen, as it refers to the setting in which the origin is put or reveals itself.

52Canale, *A Criticism of Theological Reason*, 373.
basic framework for the development of a detailed concept of ontic coherence as the interpretation of the ontological framework. This is especially necessary if the existence of the subject-object relation is to be theoretically explained. Reason's temporal setting enables the avoidance of the dualism between the various forms of the “thing in itself” and “thing as it appears.” The possible avoidance of the theoretical subject-object problem is, however, not the same as the establishment of a theoretical explanation of the subject-object relation. I find Dooyeweerd's explanation of the inner modal coherence by means of analogical moments particularly persuasive. If Dooyeweerd's idea of coherence is transformed in such a way that it is disconnected from the idea of supratemporal unity, an incorporation of the modal theory into the biblical interpretation of the ontological framework should be possible and fruitful. The specific idea of coherence received from the theos and developed in the ontological framework is secondary to the general coherence that is provided by Being. A biblical development of specific coherence will need to be placed into temporal Being.

Inspired by the biblical idea of the God-given laws and norms to which all of creation is subject, a modal theory can be developed. The modal theory with its multiple laws in specific law-spheres related through multimodal analogical moments enables a developed idea of temporal coherence. This detailed idea of coherence must, however, be grounded in temporal Being in order to be biblical. This implies that no law or norm is to be understood as timeless, but as temporal and given by a truly autonomous God.

So far I have tried to argue that the idea of origin is formally connected to theos. The identification of the theos, i.e., the interpretation of origin, is a matter of the subjective choice. Further, the idea of coherence is formally connected to foundational ontology as coappearing with theos, but formally being undetermined by theos. It is only in the case of a self-revelatory theos, such as the biblical God, that humanity can know the ground of Being through the theos, which allows for the complementarity (coherence) of all of Reason's frameworks.

4.2.3 The Self, Its Unity, and the Source of Self-understanding

Theos as origin and foundational ontology as ground of coherence lead us to the question as to which part of Reason the idea of unity is to be connected. As far as I can see, this question cannot be answered without further developing the formal function of the self within the structure of Reason.

In his phenomenology, Canale describes the structural necessity of a subject characterized by its spontaneity that allows for the interpretation of Reason's structure. A more detailed interpretation of the self, including a further interpretation of the spontaneity of the subject as human freedom, belongs to the ontological framework. In my critique (cf. 4.1.2.1.3) I have pointed out that the phenomenological analysis should be able to give a more detailed insight into the nature of the formal requirement of the self. Such elaborate analysis would show that structurally, the ontic and epistemic
realms come together in the subject in a radical dependence on their common origin. This structural dependence of the concept of the subject on its origin emphasizes that self-understanding, as dependent on an understanding of the self’s origin (theos), is a basic formal condition of the structure of Reason. That the ontic and epistemic structurally come together in the subject implies that self-understanding, as dependent on an understanding of the self’s origin, directly influences ontological and epistemological conceptions and allows for their unity. I think that this insight is still of descriptive and not yet of interpretative nature. Any further understanding will, however, move beyond the scope of phenomenological description.

Leaving the formal description of Reason with the self as its part, I will now look upon the interpretation of the self as belonging to the development of the ontological framework. From a Christian perspective, it is crucial to understand the heart as the center of a human’s existence. I think that Dooyeweerd paves the way for a biblical interpretation of the self by means of his concept of the heart as the religious root of human existence. However, a biblical interpretation of the self as heart or soul does not imply the idea of supratemporality. Dooyeweerd’s supratemporal understanding of the heart is only demanded because of his timeless ground of Being. A conceptual understanding of the heart that overcomes the danger of identifying the self with one of its functions demands the implementation of the modal theory. Accepting the heart as humanity’s religious center and expression of divine unity allows for the understanding of it as an expression of the unity of modal coherence in its radical dependence on its true origin. Of paramount importance for the development of the epistemological framework will be that the heart or self is interpreted as temporal within the development of the ontological framework. This will have influence on the understanding of theoretical abstraction, and the generation of hermeneutical principles as I have outlined elsewhere.

A biblical interpretation of the spontaneity of the self as human freedom will necessarily receive a spiritual dimension. The necessity of an understanding of one’s origin as a choice of faith that interprets Reason’s direction in order to allow for the rational expression of Meaning implies a concept of freedom that describes humanity as not free from but free for responsibility—a religious choice. Humanity will need to accept a Creator or Arche of its existence in order to have a lookout tower from where it can have an overview of the diversity around it. This lookout tower will, in fact, be “the place where he finds himself.” A biblical interpretation of the self is therefore strongly dependent on the biblical conception of God as it finds expression in the theological framework.

A further implication of the biblical insight into the radical freedom of humanity is that a concept must be formed that accounts for the fact that the

54Ibid., 93.
I can be simultaneously aware of its current choice and its ability and freedom to choose any time for different interpretations of Reason's direction and setting. There is thus a structural independence accompanying the self's choice of origin.

The implication of the biblical interpretation of the self regarding the idea of unity is that the heart or self is created with the ability to experience and understand the diversity of creation as a unity as the epistemic and ontic unite in the subject. This ontological understanding finds its ontic and epistemic origin, however, in the revelation of God. As the interpretation of God belongs to the theological framework, the idea of unity is to be located within the theological framework as it originates there. As Meaning implies the unity of the self since the diversity of being is not experienced antithetically but coherently, I think that the formal description of the structure of Reason could include the unity of the subject as a formal structural fact. The interpretation of this unity-subject-fact, however, is received from the theological framework.

Herewith I have placed all Dooyeweerd's transcendental ideas within the formal structure of Reason. Dooyeweerd's transcendental ideas function as hermeneutical formal presupposition within the structure of Reason. Content needs to be given to these ideas if an expression of Meaning is to be possible.

4.2.4 The Need for Normativity in the Establishment of Subject-Object Relations

As far as I can see, Canale's interpretation of the phenomenological structure of Reason does help to overcome the dualism between being and appearance, but that which establishes the structural subject-object relation is not explained. One can say that the problem of dualism seems to be removed, but that the solution is still to be awaited. The general understanding of temporal coherence is not sufficient for developing a theoretical concept of that which constitutes the subject-object relation. A more detailed understanding of coherence within Reason's temporal dimensionality (setting and direction) needs to be developed as part of the ontological framework.

In the subject-object relation, the activity of interpretation always belongs to the subject side and stands over against the objective fact. There where the interpretation of the subject-object relation does not involve a normative-factual side, the subject-object conception easily falls into the danger of relativism. Because the epistemological side always depends on the ontological for its contents, the development of an ontological framework that has normative characteristics is crucial to overcome the danger of subjectivism. I think that Canale's current development of the interpretation of the structure of Reason will not lead to relativism if the biblical law-idea is introduced in the further development of the ontological framework. Here Dooyeweerd with his wetsidee (law-idea), conception of the

57Ibid., 100.
law-subject relationship, and explanation of the subject-object and subject-subject relations can be of much value.

The modal laws, inherent to all creation, guarantee the possibility of the subject-object relation as both sides share the same laws. As such, the law of God as revealed through Scripture makes interdependent creaturely being possible. There where within the temporal dimensionality of Reason creation is understood as bound to the law, and the God who has independence status as subjecting himself to these laws, knowledge and understanding do not start with the subject as if knowledge has to bridge an original gulf between God and the individual subject. There is no gap that needs to be bridged—on the contrary, knowledge presupposes that we are in a relationship already! This interpretation corresponds with naive experience: we experience coherence between ourselves and the world around us, even when two different subjects talk differently about the same object. The phenomenological structural relationship that exists between the knowing subject and the knowable object can, from a biblical perspective, be interpreted as a relationship, enabled by the subjection of both subject and object to a common creational law-design.

As we have seen through the analysis of the phenomenological structure of Reason, all interpretation is done by the subject. In a biblical interpretation of the structure of Reason, the subject is subjected to creational norms and laws, according to which the trustworthiness and validity of any interpretation and other acts can be judged. The creational law that all creation inherently shares and by which human beings live and think allows no ontological gap, but enables the existence of justified and unjustified interpretations of the object.

It is then the positive form of living our religiosity, i.e., our trust in God expressed in positively answering his call to walk in his ways, which are the laws and norms to which all creation is bound, that allows for true relations with the world around us. The law as creational ontic and ethical order that binds the diversity of creational diversity together makes, on one side, the subject-object relation possible and has therefore a strong relational character, and functions, on the other side, as a call for responsible interpretation. This call cannot be ignored or resisted, since we live through and by this law. The only freedom human beings have in this regard is to either respond responsively or unresponsively as transgressing the law, i.e., the creational order that characterizes the universal structural datum. In both cases, humanity is subject to the law. The epistemic freedom of human beings consists in the ability to rationally construct an ontology that stays in a dualism with the real creational order. Any rational construction needs to be assessed from the perspective of formal logic and from the perspective of the structural datum, which both function as universal states of affairs.

In such an interpretation of the structural subject-object relation, knowledge is never a precise copy, as the object is temporal and always moving forward by its future extension. Knowledge is much more the creation of a dynamic temporal relationship that receives the contributions of both the

58Wolters, 12-18.
59Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique,” 100.
subject and the object. This dynamic temporal relationship-by-law asks for
doing justice to the normative side of both object and subject. Knowledge
is therefore never absolute, but it is not just a human projection either.\(^{60}\) I
would like to clarify this by sharpening the definition of Canale’s “lines of intelligibility.”

By implementing Dooyeweerd’s law structure in the interpretation of the
different frameworks of Reason, Canale’s term “lines of intelligibility”
could be clarified as data that come from the object’s temporal extension.\(^{61}\) I
think that Canale’s “lines of intelligibility” can be understood as the temporal
lines that are drawn by the constant living under the law by responding either
positively or negatively to it. These lines of intelligibility represent the manner
of living out, and the attitude toward, the Creator’s call. This means that
through the lines of intelligibility the intentionality of the free, responsible
subject (and the object as well) appears constantly—in fact, there is no
intentionality without the lines of intelligibility. Such an interpretation would
also correspond to Canale’s understanding that in the subject-object relation,
the object can never be understood as just a “brute fact,” but as a reality from
which temporal lines of intelligibility flow to the cognitive subject.\(^{62}\)

Knowledge is, however, not only nonabsolute because of the different
individual possibilities of responding to the law, but also because knowledge
is always temporal and dynamic. Because subject and object are not static, but
dynamically extended from past into future, knowledge is always increasing,
depended with the future extension of the lines of intelligibility.

As the subject never has full access to the object in the subject-object
encounter, it is in need of continuing the subject-object relation. The
knowledge of God thus calls for an enduring covenant.

4.2.5 Understanding, Theoretical
Thought, and Religion

In their interpretation of thought/Reason, both Dooyeweerd and Canale
make a distinction between naive and abstract thinking. For both of them,
thinking takes place within time. Canale’s thought is, however, not fully
developed when it comes down to a more detailed understanding of the
difference between naive and theoretical thought.

Contrary to Canale, Dooyeweerd’s distinction between theoretical and
nontheoretical thought, in connection with his modal theory, is of persuasive
character. In fact, I think that Dooyeweerd has seen something that is typical
for theoretical thought: the *Gegenstand*-relation. In regard to naive thinking,
theoretical thinking is of a crucially different character in terms of both the
object the “*Gegenstand,*” and the subject that applies the logical function of

\(^{60}\) H. Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*, 4 vols., vol. 2 (Lewiston,

\(^{61}\) Cf. Glanz, “Part II: Canale on Reason,” §2.3.3.3.

\(^{62}\) Canale, *A Criticism of Theological Reason*, 396.
thought in a specific abstract way. Clouser explains the Dooyeweerdian distinction in an accessible way. In naive thinking, the object’s properties (e.g., odor, size, actions) are never extracted or isolated from the objects themselves. As Clouser opines, “this level of abstraction does not focus on a thing’s odor or size or whatnot to such a degree as to disrupt the continuity of those properties with all the other properties of the things that have them. At this level of abstraction, a property, though distinguished and singled out, is still experienced as a characteristic of the thing that exhibits it.”

Clouser calls this level of abstraction the “lower level of abstraction.” Contrary to the naive attitude of thought, in the theoretical attitude of thought we intensify “the focus of our attention to such a degree that we actually do isolate a property from whatever exhibits it, and thus focus our attention on the property itself.” Here we specify our subject-object relation in such a way that a Gegenstand-relation is established within the general subject-object relations. Clouser calls this level of abstraction the “higher level of abstraction.”

The Dooyeweerdian distinction between “abstract” and “pretheoretical” knowing can help to create more clarity on this topic in the further development of the interpretation of the structure of Reason within the dimensionality of biblical Reason. Nevertheless, whatever idea of abstraction will be developed, it needs to be grounded in temporality through which an intentional dissolution of temporal coherence will be incompatible to the understanding of the Gegenstand.

In Canale’s phenomenological analysis of Reason, abstract or theoretical knowledge is understood as knowledge in which the system of Knowledge (Reason’s frameworks) is technically made explicit so that it can become a foundation and tool for scientific and philosophic analysis. In pretheoretical knowledge, on the other hand, the system of Knowledge remains implicit. Pretheoretical and theoretical knowledge are different approaches to the structural datum. In the naive experience of the structural datum, the interpretation of the hermeneutical structure is used implicitly, while in the theoretical approach the interpretation of the hermeneutical structure is much more explicit because of the need for theoretical synthesis. The dimensionality of Reason, however, often remains hidden in both ways of knowing.

As I have shown, Canale’s biblical interpretation of the structural difference between abstract and naive thought creates some confusion. On one hand, the abstract is reformulated as having a “promise character.”
that is neither true nor wrong, as the temporal future-extension of Being has not yet taken place. On the other hand, I would understand the lines of intelligibility as being themselves of an abstract character. The lines of intelligibility express only a limited part of the object. This “part” refers to that which is made known as temporal-relative characteristic of the temporal open object-identity. I suggest that the lines of intelligibility are to be understood as the expression of the subject’s and object’s individual historical responses (intentionality) to the creational laws and norms. In order to come to an understanding of the object’s intentionality, the lines of intelligibility need to be cognitively gathered by abstracting them in cognitive tension from the diversity of a specific object-being in extended time. By means of the temporal-relative characteristics (past lines of intelligibility) of a specific object, the future being of that object is partly predictable as one gets access to its individual intentionality.

We see then that the word “abstract” has received two different meanings in Canale’s work: “promise character” and “lines of intelligibility.” Since it is possible to see an interconnection between the lines of intelligibility and the idea of the promise character, I think a new definition of the word “abstract” is possible without compromising either of them. The understanding of the received lines of intelligibility is of temporal-relative character and needs to be proven true or false, while the lines of intelligibility extend with the object into the further future extension. On the basis of the law-idea, I suggest that the lines of intelligibility have, as an expression of the intentionality of an object, a promise character since they suggest how the intentionality of the object will respond to the laws and norms, to which creation is subjected, in the future-extension. The lines of intelligibility are thus meant as the expression of contents and patterns the object reveals in its temporal extension, which requires the temporal openness of the object as it extends further into the future. The further the lines of intelligibility extend into the future, the more clearly is the individual intentionality of any object revealed.

My suggestion is thus that the promise character should be understood as a characteristic of the lines of intelligibility. The lines of intelligibility include a promise character. Consequently, “abstraction” refers to the cognitive gathering-tension of the object’s temporal extension.

Abstraction, therefore, belongs to any understanding, whether of a theoretical or pretheoretical nature. The gathering process of the lines of intelligibility is not only characteristic of theoretical knowledge, but pertains to all human ways of understanding. However, this abstraction process can be differently performed according to different thought-act-attitudes. Here I would like to integrate Clouser’s distinction of high and low levels of abstraction. In the naive attitude, we abstract the object’s lines of intelligibility in order to understand the object’s being in its temporal identity, by which we distinguish the particular object from all other objects. The temporal identity is characterized by the object’s specific way of answering the divine call for

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70Ibid., 374-382.
living. In the theoretical attitude, we abstract the object's lines of intelligibility in order to understand the call to which creation in general needs to respond. In both attitudes, the human being involves himself or herself in abstraction. However, one can distinguish between different levels of abstraction. Regarding science, it would make sense to see the highest form of abstracting as the attempt to uncover the laws and norms by which creation lives and to which it needs to respond. These laws and norms are the ground of the generation of all lines of intelligibility.

The Dooyeweerdian distinction between laws and norms can be helpful here. On one hand, the highly abstract involvement of uncovering and understanding laws enables the most trustable predictions. On the other, some abstract involvement of uncovering norms leads to less trustable guesses, since the free, responsible human subjects can respond differently to the call to live justly and creatively. Still, both norms and laws are temporally grounded, and our understanding of them increases and changes, while the subject-object relations we are involved in extend to the future.

Having introduced the law-structure in the development of interpreting Reason’s frameworks (see 4.2.4), the development of a modal theory is made possible within the ontological framework of temporal Reason. This development would help to make a clearer distinction between lower and higher levels of cognitive abstraction. It would also show that especially in the theoretical attitude, there is the need for an explicit formulation of Reason’s direction and setting for coherently interpreting our structural data as a process of creating an image of reality. In the theoretical attitude, the idea of origin (independence status) can no longer be found in the object (Gegenstand) or reality as given in experience, but must be sought in the subject and his self-understanding as dependent on an understanding of its own origin (theos).71

4.3 Conclusion

I conclude that a fruitful dialogue between the two thinkers is possible and that a further development of Canale’s thought, especially concerning the interpretation of the ontological framework, can be stimulated by use of Dooyeweerdian concepts. When this is done, a tool for deconstructing biblical methodologies is made available, and a clear framework is laid out that inspires the scholar in general and the biblical theologian in particular to construct methodologies that do justice to the spirit and the data of the biblical testimony.72 Only then are we enabled to realize the call of Brueggeman: “our situation needs to be submitted to the text for a fresh discernment. It is our situation, not the text that requires

71Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique,” 89.

72Such a deconstruction of exegetical methodologies on the basis of a further development of Canale’s thoughts has been performed in Oliver Glanz, “Who is Speaking? Who is Addressed?: A Critical Study into Conditions of Exegetical Method and Its Consequences for the Interpretation of Participant Reference-Shifts in the Book of Jeremiah” (Ph.D. dissertation, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 2010), 44-145.
a new interpretation. . . . [T]his text subverts all our old readings of reality and forces us to a new, dangerous, obedient reading.73

A clear understanding of Reason’s phenomenology and a strong biblical interpretation of this phenomenology will not only allow developing a better methodology for biblical theology, but it also will enable the many different disciplines (e.g., missiology, and systematic, biblical, pastoral, and aesthetical theologies) and subdisciplines of theology to unite under one matrix and develop a diversity of scholarly results that are compatible with each other, promoting unity and meaningful interdisciplinary dialogues. All disciplines of theology are called to engage seriously in methodological reflections if the reputation of our craft is to be saved.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF BENEFICENCE: AN ACCOUNT OF NONTOTALITARIAN BEAUTY

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Introduction

While much work has been done in recent decades to restore the centrality of beauty to its rightful place in constructive theology, such an aesthetic turn, as I will note in this article, is far from problem-free. Specifically, suspicions about the ideological character of aesthetics have been voiced by a number of postmodern thinkers, for whom the identification of beauty and justice—already present in pre-Socratic cosmogonies—is irrevocably dissolved. The broader assumption underwriting my approach is that such dislocations of beauty from goodness, when transposed to the religious sphere, are but contemporary modulations of the “Great Controversy” theme central to Seventh-day Adventist theology and piety.1 After delineating the basic contours of this problematic, I will turn to Jonathan Edwards’s Trinitarian aesthetics and its rich relational ontology in an attempt to provide a constructive engagement with these issues. While retaining reservations about certain aspects of his thought, I will nevertheless suggest that his understanding of the nature of true beauty adds an important voice to current debates. In the final section of the article, I will turn to a theological interpretation of Andrei Rublev’s Trinity icon as a form of art to help me further elaborate on Edwards’s proposal, eventually pointing to the biblical Sabbath as a possible focal point for a distinctive Adventist approach to theological aesthetics. The account of theodramatic beauty that will be articulated in that context, furnishes us with a credible apologetic platform from which a response to (postmodern) qualms about the ethical viability of beauty can be cogently crafted.

Genealogies of Beauty

“We can be sure that whoever sneers at [beauty’s] name as if she were an ornament of a bourgeois past . . . can no longer pray and soon will no longer be able to love,”2 so writes Hans Urs von Balthasar in the opening pages of his

1The “Great Controversy” concept as present in Adventist discourse is a shorthand expression for the cosmological conflict between good and evil as evidenced in salvation history.

With a virtually unmatched erudition and depth of insight, Balthasar weaves an intricate philosophical, theological, and historical account, tracing the marginalization of beauty in Christian theology. He observes how, among other things, “the word ‘aesthetic’ automatically flows from the pens of both Protestant and Catholic writers when they want to describe an attitude which, in the last analysis, they find to be frivolous, merely curious and self-indulgent.” Balthasar laments such deaesthetization of theology and its adverse effects on the Christian practices of worship, spiritual formation, and evangelism. After all, he argues, “in a world without beauty . . . the good also loses its attractiveness, self-evidence why it must be carried out.” Why not prefer evil over good? “Why not investigate Satan’s depth?”

Fortunately, much has changed in regard to the treatment of beauty as a key theological category since Balthasar first voiced his clarion call. The steady outflow of scholarly literature dealing with various questions of theological aesthetics clearly attests to an increased attention given to this important conundrum. Yet the evocation of beauty for Christian theology remains fraught with significant challenges. The rejection of beauty in favor of the postmodern sublime, the commodification of beauty in our hypersignified culture, the mass media diffusion of the aesthetic ideal into an “absolute and unstoppable polytheism of Beauty,” the feminist critique of beauty as a vestige of patriarchal exploitation, the Protestant suspicions of beauty as a “meretricious Hellenistic import,” the sociohistorical location of taste, the unavoidable dialectic of subjective/objective entailed in any aesthetic perception, the frequent degeneration of beauty into self-indulgent sentimentality—these and other sardonic dismissals present serious challenges of how to speak of beauty in any meaningful way. Beauty is simply too nebulous, as it seems, too tame, too easily complicit with oppression and evil, too escapist in the face of rampant injustice to be able to function as a

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3Ibid., 1:51.
4Ibid., 1:19.
central theological category. It would thus appear that in contrast to the other
two transcendentals—the truth and the good—beauty is not in the position
to claim invariable and unconditional beneficence. As Roman Guardini
rightly puts it, “Beauty ought to be reserved only for that which is valid, good,
and true, and in a certain sense it is so—but the other aspect of beauty is also
undeniable and disturbing, namely that it is not in fact so, and that it can shine
forth in evil, in disorder, in indifference, and even in stupidity.”

The tenuous way in which beauty and justice are related is well illustrated,
in Peter Cohen’s documentary, *The Architecture of Doom*, in which the
calamitous connection of beauty and evil is hauntingly explored. More than
just chronicling the different ways in which art both reflected and informed
the *Weltanschauung* of the Nazi elite, the film is a well-documented exposé
of National Socialism as a “pervasive manifestation of a perverse aesthetic
doctrine: to make the world beautiful by doing violence to it.” As Cohen
poignantly shows, the concoction of Hitler’s genocidal madness led him to
decry “doom as art’s highest expression.” What a triumph of the grotesque!
No special measure of moral astuteness is required to tag such a chilling
amorality of beauty as positively deviant and ghastly.

Given this and other, perhaps less drastic, examples of the misuse of
beauty, it does not come as a surprise that some postmodern thinkers are highly
doomed to deconstructive implosions. In response, various “detoxification
therapies” are proposed intent on uncovering the interplay of vested interests
embedded in ostensibly innocuous appeals to beauty. Pierre Bourdieu’s
sociological analysis, for example, leads him to assert that the aesthetic sphere
is never one of innocent enjoyment and simple human pleasure. Aesthetics
is always deeply political in that a set of values is established “according to
which the dominant class automatically comes out on top. Their political and
natural supremacy is recast as natural supremacy.” Given the exploitative

9 For an illuminating account of how beauty came to be considered as one of the
transcendentals of being during the Middle Ages, see Umberto Eco, *Art and Beauty in
the Middle Ages* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), chap. 2.

10 Romano Guardini, *Dostoevsky: Il mondo religioso*, 4th ed. (Bresica: Morcelliana,
trans. David Glenday and Paul McPartlan (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 45. Again,
this is not a novel observation. Already in Leonardo da Vinci we find the statement
that “beauty is not always good.” See Władysław Tatarkiewicz, *History of Aesthetics*,


12 See Farley, 7.

Beholder* (New York: Penguin, 2004), 98. For an extended discussion of this issue,
character of the aesthetic, even seemingly laudatory endeavors such as art education, have a menacing undertone to them. The very cultivation of art means that we are “constructing a cruel instrument for exclusion. In loving beauty we are not—as we may have innocently supposed—doing something essentially good.” Beauty, in other words, is not what it appears to be.

Admittedly, I find much sympathy with such cautionary remarks, particularly when broader issues of economic exploitation are brought to the table. The project of genealogical uncovering is certainly not inimical to the task of Christian theology; in fact, it is principally invited and welcomed by it. After all, Christianity is a religion informed by a deep realism about the fallenness of the world and its proclivities to violence and untruth, and, as such, carries a strong presumption against viewing reality, including beauty, through rose-tinted glasses. My reservations begin to emerge, however, when such deconstructive strategies become hostage to forms of essentialist discourse—“such and such always amounts to such and such”—and, in the process, succumb to an unmitigated apotheosis of scope that posits strife and malevolence as foundational cosmic principles.

Gilles Deleuze serves as a case in point. In his nocturnal revisionism, the apocalyptic vision of the New Jerusalem becomes an ultimate embodiment of panoptical oppression. Its streets of gold and precious stones amount to nothing less than an “architecture of doom”—a ploy intended to hide the fact of an “all-encompassing control of society by the state.” Thus what Christians would see as embodying the ultimate outpouring of divine benevolence is stunningly transmuted into or “uncovered” as the final takeover of a totalitarian regime; an apokalypsis indeed. Deleuze writes:

The Apocalypse is not a concentration camp (Antichrist); it is the great military, police, and civil security of the new State (the Heavenly Jerusalem). . . . The New Jerusalem, with its wall and its great street of glass, is an architectural terror. . . . Involuntarily, the Apocalypse at least persuades us that what is most terrifying is not the Antichrist, but this new city descended from heaven, the holy city “prepared like a bride adorned for her husband.” All relatively healthy readers of the Apocalypse will feel they are already in the lake of sulfur.


14 Armstrong, 98.


It does not take much to see the specter of Friedrich Nietzsche looming here in a menacing fashion. After all, for him Christianity's self-presentation as an announcement of peace masks a sinister calculus at work, camouflaging as a “will to power at its most vulgar and debased: power representing itself as the refusal of power, as the negation of strife, as the *evangel* of perfect peace—only in order to make itself stronger, more terrifying, more invincible.”17 Such a stance is understandable in light of Nietzsche's genealogy that renders “every regime of power as necessarily unjust. . . . No universals are ascribed to human society save one: that it is always a field of warfare.”18 In contemporary philosophy such deconstructive suspicions are expressed by Jacques Derrida, who claims that any act of hospitality, regardless of its aesthetic appeal, inevitably hides subterranean proclivities toward violence and exclusion. Hospitality, and more fundamentally giving, is always a part, however oblique, of an “economy of exchange” that is never fully extricated from narcissistic impulses. Clearly, the wider philosophical assumption at work here is that the moment you have a concrete expectation, a determinate future, or the moment you speak about a definite “presence”—in other words, the moment you have any sort of determinacy of content, being, proclamation, or expectation—the shadow of totality emerges. Thus John Caputo's claim that he cannot envision “how any religious tradition or theological language can take shape *without* violence,”19 because “as soon as a confession or institution takes on a particular, determinate shape, it is necessarily exclusionary and therefore violent.”20

One cannot but see these sentiments pointing in the direction of Genesis 3—I am speaking hyperbolically here, of course. There the serpent's strategy, part of it anyway, is one of dislodging beauty from the idea of a primordial good or hospitality21 only to be cast as an ideological cover for


20Smith, 116. This is Smith's restatement of Caputo's position.

21As I will develop it more clearly in the subsequent section of this article, I am employing the word “hospitality” to name concrete actualizations of benevolent intent.
oppressive intent. God’s gifting, so it is argued, is simply a modality of seductive beauty; an exercise in hypernarcissism, hiding stratified proclivities toward totalitarian domination. Thus in Gen 3:1 we find, however implicitly, a primordial transvaluation of beauty. Yes, the garden is beautiful; you may enjoy its harmonious fruitfulness; yes, you are free to delight in its pleasure-affording richness, but beware! All of it simply masks a sinister antihumanistic ontotheology, a veritable “architecture of doom.” Do not be tricked by the ultimate Purveyor of “Turkish Delight”—to evoke C. S. Lewis’s famed The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe for a moment. The hospitality offered by the White Witch is but a subterfuge of an “omnivorous empire” built on “original strife.” Adam and Eve, of course, assent to the serpent’s twisted “genealogy”—an act of a proto-Nietzschean deconstruction one could say—and the rest is, pun intended, (human) history.

Undoubtedly, these issues concerning the relationship of aesthetic persuasion and agential intent are of enormous significance not only for theology, but for Christian praxis as well. As one can easily attest, scarcely any element of the church’s apologetic, kerygmatic, diaconical, missional, and formative task is left untouched by some modulation of this problematic. After all, the deep underlying issue here—the correlation of God and human flourishing—is one that profoundly informs all these considerations and endeavors. With that in mind, a number of questions need to be addressed: What is the relationship of the good and the beautiful, if any? What do we mean by beauty and, specifically, the “beauty of the Lord”? Is an apologetics of beauty possible at all? After all, “who is to say,” to borrow from Hart, “that the beautiful is self-evidently free of violence or subterfuge? How can one plausibly argue that ‘beauty’ does not serve the very strategy of power to which it supposedly constitutes an alternative?”

Quite clearly, it is impossible to address the full range of those concerns here. My goal is a more modest one in that I simply want to suggest one possible, yet hopefully plausible approach. Specifically, I want to engage some key insights of Edwards’s Trinitarian aesthetics as they pertain to the topic at hand. As is widely known, the relationship of the good and the beautiful as it relates to the doctrine of God and to wider metaphysical considerations is

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23Hart, 2.

24Unfortunately, there is not sufficient space here to engage more fully the seminal study by Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Some of the central claims of this article deeply resonate with his account of moral and nonmoral excellencies in relation to God as the ultimate Good.

something that occupied Edwards for the better part of his life. My broader goal in doing so here is to propose a conceptual appropriation of a traditional Adventist philosophy of history—in the sense of a harmonious and faithful development of its thematic cantus firmus—in order to unearth some plausible ways in which its theological and philosophical markers might be employed to address postmodern critiques of Christian metadiscourse and its incarnational particularity.

Jonathan Edwards’s Vision of Hospitable Beauty

In his helpful overview of theological aesthetics, Faith and Beauty, Edward Farley notes how in Edwards’s thought

beauty is more central and more pervasive than in any other text in the history of Christian theology. Edwards does not just theologize about beauty: beauty (loveliness, sweetness) is the fundamental motif through which he understands the world, God, virtue and ‘divine things.”

Roland Delattre seconds this observation when he writes that “beauty is one of the things Jonathan Edwards was most concerned with understanding.” For Edwards beauty is “the first principle of being,” “the measure and objective foundation of the perfection of being—of excellence, goodness, and value,” “the first among the perfections of God,” “a major clue to his doctrine of the Trinity” as well as his anthropology, “the central clue to the meaning of conversion” and personal holiness, and the nature of true virtue. In other words, beauty for Edwards is not simply incidental to how we are to think about the nature and character of God, or the structure of reality in general. Rather, it should be seen as the key ontological category through which other coordinates of being, such as unity, truth, and goodness are mapped out.

As is widely known, Edwards’s intricate theological aesthetics rests on a differentiation between two kinds of beauty. First, he posits a secondary or natural beauty that greatly resembles the “great theory” in aesthetics, famously encapsulated in Thomas Aquinas’s definition of beauty as integrity or completeness (integritas), right proportion or harmony (proportio), and radiance or resplendence (claritas). Edwards defines secondary beauty as

26Farley, 43.
28See ibid., 2.
“mutual consent and agreement of different things, in form, manner, quantity, and visible end or design; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, etc.”

Notably, and I take this to be an essential point, such beauty is manifested not only in material objects, but also in the right-ordering of society and the practice of justice.

That such beauty would possess a sacramental character is self-evident to Edwards. His stand on this issue echoes a long intellectual tradition resembling, among others, different modalities of Pythagorean, Platonic, Neoplatonic, and, of course, Christian thought. Long indeed is the list of philosophers and theologians who have reflected on beauty—specifically transcendental beauty—as a sacramental manifestation of God’s presence, variously articulating the core idea that “beauty happens when the Whole offers itself in the fragment,” the idea that in encountering beauty, we encounter, however dimly, the Source of beauty himself. The fifteenth-century Neoplatonist Marsililio Ficino, for example, notes how “by its utility, harmony, and decorativeness, the world testifies to the skill of the divine artist and is proof that God is indeed its Maker.”

Or perhaps one might recall the well-known lines from George Herbert’s poem, “The Elixir”:

A man that looks on glass,
On it may stay his eye;
Or if he pleaseth, through it pass,
And then the heaven espy.

Similarly, Edwards emphasizes the revelatory capacity of natural beauty precisely because of its “resemblance of spiritual beauties.” In fact, “that beauteous light with which the world is filled in a clear day is a lively shadow

32See ibid., 568-570. This point will be elaborated at greater length below.
33Forte, vii.
34I am aware that this claim immediately thrusts one into the middle of the longstanding debates surrounding, e.g., analogia entis versus analogia fidei, theologia gloriae versus theologia crucis. Addressing this problematic, however, goes beyond the scope of this article.
35Tatarkiewicz, History of Aesthetics, 102.
of [Christ’s] spotless holiness and happiness, and delight in communicating himself.”

This, in brief, is how Edwards approaches natural beauty. As is well known, however, he does not stop there. There is, after all, a need to speak of beauty beyond the realm of mere material objects—a point, incidentally, already made by thinkers such as Plotinus and Boethius. Such primary or spiritual beauty, as Edwards calls it, bespeaks of the sort of “consent” or “harmony” appropriate to moral agents, which he goes on to define as “benevolence to Being in general”—that is, a disposition of well-regard not only to the immediate circle of natural bonds or self interests, but to whatever there is. More than simply being a form of aesthetic sensibility, therefore, beauty is rendered into “propensity and union of the heart to being in general, which is immediately exercised in a general good will.”

Beauty, accordingly, is not incidental to hospitality—by which I refer here to phenomenological instantiations of benevolent intent—but is, in fact, its desire-evoking “form” or embodiment. It is not something added to the good; it is, with some reservation, to be identified with moral rightness or ethical self-transcendence. In fact, Edwards’s entire aesthetic and metaphysical edifice is built on the supposition that “the primary and original beauty or excellence that is among minds [or moral agents] is love,” in other words, benevolent relatedness. In Amy Plantinga Pauw’s words:

Beauty was irreducibly relational for Edwards. His aesthetics “does not, therefore, begin with the assumption of the ontological independence of

39An interesting comparison, that cannot be developed here, is the one between Edwards and Plotinus on the nature of soul beauty. While they operate on different metaphysical assumptions, there are noteworthy similarities in their respective accounts. For a helpful summary of Plotinus, see Armstrong, chap. 8. See also Farley, 20.
40If “men had the use of Lynceus’ eyes,” writes Boethius, they would see that Alcibiades, “so very handsome on the surface,” was, in fact, “totally ugly once his inner parts came into view” (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy [New York: Oxford University Press, 1999], III.8).
42Ibid.
43On the idea of “ethical self-transcendence,” see Farley, chap. 5.
the [beautiful] thing; it is not a thing first and only afterwards designated as beautiful." Rather, beauty is a matter of proportion and harmony within the thing itself, and in its relations with other objects. . . . Anything that is beautiful exhibits consent and agreement, and so must be [in Edwards's words] "distinguished in a plurality some way or other." Beauty does require complexity.45

That explains why, for Edwards, primary beauty by definition can never remain purely internal, purely individualistic. The only exception to this basic rule is the being of "God, Who is being-in-general, both the sum and the fountain of all being" and, therefore, "has primary beauty internal to Himself."46 The Trinitarian subtext of Edwards's thought comes clearly to the fore here. Since "there is true 'plurality' in God," as Pauw puts it, "there can be consent and thus true beauty within the Trinity itself. God's 'infinite beauty is his infinite mutual love of himself.'"47

What becomes evident in this context is that Edwards's metaphysics rests on a dynamic reciprocation at the heart of divine and human gifting. He believes that "in the framework of desire that all creatures possess, self-love is a logically necessary and unavoidable desire that accompanies any attraction, that is, all love is a reflexive desire and need for something that we find lovely, worthy, valuable, pleasant or beautiful."48 Far from being an instantiation of psychological egoism or mercenary interestedness, therefore, such appropriate self-love is implicit in this ontology of participation. It is this point that is repeatedly stressed in Edwards's Dissertation,49 where God's self-glorification is postulated as the ultimate end of creation. To the charge that such claims present a thoroughly narcissistic and megalomaniacal God, Edwards simply responds that such a critique quite wrongly feeds off a barren image of potestas Dei absoluta, betraying a loss of theological nerve at a crucial point. For him, to restate the point already made, divine self-regard is a form of ethical self-transcendence that is synonymous with benevolent consent. God is most passionate about his glory, but what characterizes that glory is a donative disposition toward his creation. That is to say, God's self-regard


46Delattre, 18.

47Pauw, 83. The reference in this paragraph is to Edwards, "The Mind," 363.


and kenotic other-regard perfectly coincide in Edwards’s metaphysical and theological scheme.⁵⁰

A point of practical intent is worth stressing here. One of the reasons why Edwards is so intent on seeking after beauty is because it points to the proper modality of knowing God. He variously writes of such knowledge as having a “real sense,” “heart knowledge,” or true “apprehension” of the inner beauty of God as contrasted to a mere noetic grasp. Consider, for example, the following statement from his sermon “A Divine and Supernatural Light”:

There is a twofold understanding or knowledge of good that God has made the mind of man capable of. The first, that which is merely speculative or notional: as when a person only speculatively judges. . . . And the other is that which consists in the sense of the heart: as when there is a sense of the beauty, amiableness, or sweetness of a thing; so that the heart is sensible of pleasure and delight in the presence of the idea of it.⁵¹

Balthasar’s own phenomenology of spiritual sight strongly resonates with Edwards’s sentiments on this issue. For him, “there is something provocative and disturbing about the truly beautiful; it cannot simply be admired blandly but must be seen and taken in, dealt with.”⁵² Attraction and assent are fused, so to speak, in the moment of perception. Thus the arresting appeal of beauty fosters a grammar of ocular metanoia, a conversion of sight, that is, where the beauty of the Christian gospel overwhelms us with its suasive loveliness, gracing us with “the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ” (2 Cor. 4:6). Here apologetics is “not so much arguing as showing.”⁵³ In Balthasar’s words (summarizing Pseudo-Dionysius’s position): “No explanation can help him who does not see the beauty [of God]; no ‘proof of the existence of God’ can help him who cannot see what is manifest to the world; no apologetic can be any use to him for whom the truth that radiates from the center of theology is not evident.”⁵⁴ In pursuing that line of thought, Balthasar sides with Augustine’s contention in his De Libero Arbitrio

⁵⁰For a helpful development of this theme, see Farley, 89.
(On Free Choice) that theology proper is apologetics; once we “see” God for who he is in his beauty and glory, Augustine argues, all objections to God fall away. To this point, Edwards would gladly accede.

To summarize, Edwards presents a complex metaphysics in which the idea of beauty plays a key role in the apprehension of Being as good. His version of the “erotics of redemption,” rooted in the idea of an eternal consent of being to being within the immanent Trinity, doxologically fuses the elements of beauty and goodness into a cosmic vision of kenotic hospitality. As he so eloquently states in his Dissertation:

God in seeking his glory, therein seeks the good of his creatures: because the emanation of his glory (which he seeks and delights in, as he delights in himself and his own eternal glory) implies the communicated excellency and happiness of his creature. And that in communicating his fullness for them, he does it for himself: because their good, which he seeks, is so much in union and communion with himself. God is their good. Their excellency and happiness is nothing but the emanation and expression of God’s glory: God, in seeking their glory and happiness, seeks himself: and in seeking himself, i.e. himself diffused and expressed (which he delights in, as he delights in his own beauty and fullness), he seeks their glory and happiness.

To this vision of God, I readily assent. On a more critical note, however, I feel that a stronger Christological basis would have strengthened Edwards’s argument considerably. I do not intend to suggest that Christology is entirely absent from his aesthetics—one needs only to recall his landmark sermon, “The Excellencies of Christ”—but I do wish there was a stronger narrative component to his edifice. After all, the best response that Christianity can give to the subversive logic of those such as Nietzsche and Deleuze is one that comes in the form of an alternative story, a cruciform aesthetics, a metanarrative of self-giving love dramatically enacted in “God with us,” attesting to the unselfing hospitality of the triune God. I take this to be a point of great importance, and it is one that I would like to develop further through an examination of Andrei Rublev’s painting, Trinity (ca. 1410 A.D.). While it is impossible to here do justice to Orthodox iconographic history with its various renderings and interpretations of Genesis 18 (the story of Abraham’s visitation by the three heavenly beings at Mamre), I will nevertheless utilize some of the icon’s profound symbolism to engage some of the central planks of Edwards’s vision.

**God’s Iconic Gesture**

Pavel Florensky, in his Iconostasis, offers the following “irrefutable” argument for the existence of God: “There exists the icon of the Trinity by St Andrei

Rublev; therefore, God exists.57 Setting aside the validity of such a “proof” for a moment, intriguing as it is, the theological and spiritual appeal of this fifteenth-century icon is undeniable.Undoubtedly the highest expression of Russian Orthodox iconography, the Trinity symbolically represents some of the essential elements of Christian trinitarian theology and aesthetics.58 In it, the ousia of the triune God is represented by the three hypostases of the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, viewed from left to right. The three persons of the Trinity are perfectly contained within the circumference of a circle, thereby symbolizing the essential oneness of God. Each figure holds a staff, a sign of authority; has hues of blue pointing to their eternity; and overlapping wings communicating intimacy. They differ in the color of their noninterchangeable garments (chiton and clamys) that point to the glory of the Father (pale purple interspersed with hues of gold), the royalty and suffering of the Son (purple with a golden clavus), and the life-giving mission of the Spirit (green). Additionally, there is a table (representing fellowship)—or rather an altar, giving the icon a liturgical cast—a house (representing the fact that “In my Father’s house there are many mansions”), a tree (symbolizing the cross), and a cracked rock (implying the outflowing of water by the Spirit of life). In other words, the table, or the space of fellowship, exists for us as a possibility only because of the willingness of the primordial love to go beyond itself and desire the presence of an “other.”

As we contemplate the theological meaning of the icon, we are pointed to the idea of divine bounteousness, where the ecstatic (ek-stasis) rhythm of God’s bullitio (immanent “boiling”) and ebullitio (economic “boiling over”) is rooted in an aesthetics of benevolent desire.59 This notion is beautifully articulated in Canto XIX of Dante’s Paradiso, where Dante finds himself in the Primum Mobile, the ninth sphere of heaven. He is addressed by his guide, Beatrice (divine grace), who attests that God does not create to “increase [his] good, . . . but that reflections of his reflection might declare ‘I am.’”60 Thus contra Derrida, God’s “gift” of creation is not an exercise of hypernarcissism, but rather a bestowal of superabundant goodness through an act of aesthetic


excess. That, of course, is one of Edwards’s main contentions. As we have noted in our discussion above, Edwards points to God’s self-glorification as the ultimate “end” (terminus) of creation. The potential charge of divine self-absorption is fundamentally subverted by identifying God’s glory and beauty precisely with that of self-giving love. After all, for Edwards, “God’s beauty consists in the first instance . . . not in His seeking, receiving, or loving beauty but in His exhibiting, communicating, and bestowing beauty by his love of being.”

This relationship of beauty and benevolent intent or “virtue” seems to be additionally enforced in the Rublev icon through the seemingly laconic gesture by the middle angelic figure (the Son) pointing toward the cup entailing a lamb’s head. It is in that gesture, it would seem, that a link between the immanent and economic Trinity is provided, reminding us that the symmetry of beauty and goodness is established foremost through the historical enactment of God’s theodrama, a redemptive “play” in and through which beauty is “performed for us” with the climax being the three days of Easter. Accordingly, in seeking to provide a Christian account of primary beauty we are not permitted to flinch from the index finger of John the Baptist—to appropriate Karl Barth’s meditation on Matthias Grünewald’s Isenheim Altarpiece for a moment here—pointing to the crucified Christ. Paradoxically it is there, in the very formlessness of beauty, that the “consent of Being to being” is most clearly exhibited, giving the divine emanation—that selfless outpouring of the triune God as the bonum est diffusivum sui (the self-diffusive Good)—its full revelatory expression. In that sense, Rublev’s icon reminds us that Christ is indeed “God’s greatest form of art,” “the transcendent archetype of all worldly and human beauty.” In truth, the church has no arguments for its faith more convincing than the form of Christ. . . . Christian thought must remain immovably fixed alongside Christ, in his irreducible particularity. . . . What Christian thought offers the world is not a set of “rational” arguments that (suppressing certain of their premises) force assent from others by leaving them, like the interlocutors of Socrates, at a loss for words; rather, it stands before the world principally with the story it tells concerning God and creation, the form of Christ, the

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61Delattre, 169.
62For a Pentecost-centered interpretation of the icon, see Bunge, 79.
63Begbie, 22. Not, of course, as the terminus of redemption, but as the true foundation of glorification.
loveliness of the practice of Christian charity—and the rhetorical richness of its idiom. Making its appeal first to the eye and heart, as the only way it may “command” assent, the church cannot separate truth from rhetoric, or from beauty.  

It becomes clearer at this point why the connection of primary and secondary beauty is so central to Edwards. As discussed before, both represent a certain kind of consent, an appealing harmoniousness of constitutive parts. And again, the sort of harmoniousness that is proper to moral agents over against inanimate objects is one that consists in benevolent intent. Thus for Edwards, justice and beauty, ethics and aesthetics have a common ontological grounding. The same way that “justice concerns right relationships,” so also “the beauty God desires for the human community is the proper dynamic ordering of lives in relation to each other. Justice is beautiful.”

That is to say, beauty and justice are deeply intertwined. Elaine Scarry concurs when she claims that “beautiful things give rise to the notion of distribution, to a lifesaving reciprocity, to fairness not just in the sense of loveliness of aspect but in the sense of a symmetry of everyone’s relation to one another.” Any treatment or evocation of natural beauty at the expense of a wider transcendental nexus of values and excellencies presents a flattening of vision that will always be susceptible to manipulation and misuse. While, to the certain displeasure of most postmetaphysical philosophy, this is a recourse to metadiscourse, it is one, I believe, that needs to be defended at all cost.

Finally, one of the more important symbolisms of the Rublev icon is found in its inverted perspective in that its depth is not found behind the three angelic figures, but in front of them, so to speak. It is as if we were invited to step into the space, to join the table of the trinitarian fellowship. “God draws near to us in such a way,” writes Thomas Torrance “as to draw us near to himself within the circle of his knowing of himself.” It is an expression of ultimate interestedness, but one that is liberating, fully actualizing, and

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67 Hart, 3.
68 Begbie, 65.
exponentially gracing. The idea of participation and \textit{theosis} is clearly evoked here, one that is pivotal to Edwards’s theological aesthetics. As noted above, it is his contention that “God possesses an effulgent nature that emanates throughout created existence and communicates to intelligent creatures the desire for knowledge and union with God as the ground of all being.”\textsuperscript{73} After all, as Edwards’s tirelessly emphasizes,

God’s respect to the creature’s good, and his respect to himself, is not a divided respect; but both are united in one, as the happiness of the creature aimed at is happiness in union with himself. The creature is no further happy with this happiness which God makes his ultimate end than he becomes one with God. The more happiness the greater union: when the happiness is perfect, the union is perfect.\textsuperscript{74}

It is there, in that “open space” of the icon, that the Sabbath as a symbol of God’s availability becomes the heart of Rublev’s symbolic representation, although not in the sense that he intended—the biblical doctrine of the Sabbath most certainly was not at the forefront of his thought—but in the sense that the Sabbath epitomizes the hospitable gesture at the focal point of the icon. The Sabbath is the halo of that space, an intensified elaboration of benevolent Infinity that gifts us with its kenotic immanence. As Jürgen Moltmann puts it:

The Sabbath of God’s creation already contains in itself the redemptive mystery of God’s indwelling in his creation, although—and just because—he is wholly concentrated in himself and rests in himself. The works of creation display in God’s act the Creator’s continual transcendence over his creation. But the Sabbath of creation points to the Creator’s immanence in his creation, In the Sabbath God joins his eternal presence to his temporal creation and, by virtue of his rest, is there, with that creation and in it. . . . [The] sabbath, in its peace and its silence, manifests the eternal God at once exoterically and directly as the God who rests in his glory.\textsuperscript{75}

It is in God’s rest that a completely new theme of liberating and empowering gifting is being enacted. As the apex of God’s created work, the final act of God’s creation, the Sabbath memorializes our dependence on prevenient grace—totally irreconcilable with even a hint of meritorious legalism—pointing to a God who creates, acts, invites, blesses, guides, sustains, provides, sanctifies, and beautifies.\textsuperscript{76} As such, it radiates as an effulgent backdrop to a peaceable metadiscourse, or rather metapraxis, enacted in

\textsuperscript{73}Danaher, 205.

\textsuperscript{74}Edwards, “Dissertation,” 533.


\textsuperscript{76}For a rich treatment of this theme, see Sigve K. Tonstad, \textit{The Last Meaning of the Seventh Day} (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 2009), chap. 24.
“Immanuel—God with us.” The Sabbath is God’s dramatic response, so to speak, to the serpent’s ideological deconstruction of primary beauty. That is to say, it is both the formal and the material cause of an apologetics of “showing”; a shape of performative theodicy fully to be realized only in “the coming beauty of the kingdom of God.”

Conclusion

In this article I have sought to address the following questions: How is one to speak of God’s beauty when the very notion of aesthetic persuasion is rendered into an ideological, violence-bent smokescreen? What place is there for the aesthetics of faith when beauty is transmuted into a deceptive front for the purpose of oppression, manipulation, duplicity, and totality? In other words, how should one properly emulate the longing to “gaze at the beauty of the Lord” (Ps 27:4) when the relationship of aesthetics and ethics is rendered void? Admittedly, these are complicated issues, carrying the weight of a long history of theological and philosophical reflections and thus need to be approached with caution and interdisciplinary awareness. The strategy in this article was to pursue two different tracks of reasoning. On one hand, I have suggested that such deconstructive reservations are not necessarily inimical to the Christian worldview and its account of human fallenness. Christianity is a profoundly nonsentimental religion and is accordingly realistic about the possibility of malformed beauty and the ways it might become implicated in different forms of subjective, objective, and symbolic violence. One only needs to recall Augustine’s Confessions, for example, and the way the dialectics of seductive and benevolent beauty is played out in Augustine’s conversion story.

At the same time, I have taken issue with those (postmodern) approaches that axiomatically consign any form of (aesthetic) persuasion to violent intent, however implicitly manifested. Quite apart from the question of whether such postmetaphysical hermeneutics itself feeds off a cleverly concealed “ontology of violence” (Milbank), I have attempted to provide an account of nontotalitarian aesthetics within which God’s benevolence is revealed as desire-evoking form (species) and splendor (lumen). Taking my cue from Edwards’s account of primary beauty, I have tried to argue that a Christian defense of the third transcendental cannot simply take the form of a generalized philosophical aesthetics, but must remain irrevocably fixed on God’s Trinitarian history of “God with us.” That is why in distinction to Edwards—again, I take this to be more a matter of emphasis than


substance—I have tried to provide a more robust Christological foundation to my account, that, together with Augustine, affirms that Christ’s *kenosis* is the ultimate revelation of divine beauty and a theodramatic fusion of the three transcendentals.

It should be clear by now, I trust, that I have simply tried to address the “Great Controversy” problematic in a different key. After all, the “Great Controversy” between good and evil revolves around the question of the character of God in that his benevolent intent is creating, offering, promising, proclaiming, and redeeming beauty—of which the Sabbath is the primordial memorial—as evidenced in election, creation, redemption, and glorification. So when we speak of a correlation of God and human flourishing, the parameters of a humanistic God, the announcement of the *evangel* of peace—in other words, all the multifaceted rhetorical and performative responses of the Christian faith to various subversions of divine benevolence—we are inevitably thrust into the realm of aesthetic discourse.

Of course, so much more could be added to this investigation. For one, additional space is needed to provide more detailed phenomenological analyses of beauty and justice and their respective interactions. Similarly, the question of why a defense of benevolence should resort to an account of theological aesthetics also deserves further exploration. That applies as well to various issues concerning the subjective turn in aesthetics that are nibbling at the outskirts of this problematic. In the meantime, however, I would like to simply gesture toward Thomas Traherne’s words from his *Centuries of Meditation*, that encapsulate the theological terminus toward which such explorations should be ineluctably directed. What matters most, after all, is that

> God is life eternal. There must therefore some exceeding great thing be always attained in the knowledge of him. To know God is to know goodness. It is to see the beauty of infinite love. . . . It is to see the king of heaven and earth take infinite delight in giving. Whatever knowledge else you have of God, it is but superstition. . . . He is not an object of terror, but delight. To know him therefore, as he is, is to frame the most beautiful idea in all world. He delights in our happiness more than we, and is of all other the most lovely object.  

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DISSEYATION ABSTRACTS

PRINCIPLES OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN THE WRITINGS OF ELLEN G. WHITE

Name of researcher: Marcio D. Costa
Name of faculty adviser: Jerry A. Moon, Ph.D.
Date completed: April 2010

The Topic

Since the beginning of Seventh-day Adventism there has been real or perceived tension between two contrasting perspectives of church-state relationships: (1) the “eschatological view” that a union of church and state will lead to persecution in the times preceding the Second Coming of Christ, and (2) the “temporal view” that in order to accomplish its mission in the present, the church needs to work in an independent but nonconflictual relationship with the state as far as it can do so without violating its primary allegiance to God.

The Purpose

In order to discover Ellen G. White’s position on the two perspectives, the study analyzed all of White’s writings on the topic of church-state relationships, searching for her principles of church-state relationships. Her principles were compared with the views of others during the Colonial and early Federal periods of American history, and with the historical records of the church-state debate among Adventists until the end of her life.

The Sources

The search for principles used all relevant published and unpublished writings of Ellen G. White. The studies of the American historical background and the progression of the debate among Adventists used both primary and secondary sources.

Conclusion

Ellen White’s principles of church-state relationships grew out of her worldview of a Great Controversy between good and evil. She believed that church and state had been established by God as separate institutions with distinct purposes for the benefit of humankind. However, in the conflict between good and evil, both church and state are objects of Satan’s attack. According to White, the state has divinely given authority to enforce the last six of the Ten Commandments, which define human responsibilities to other humans, and to safeguard the freedom of humans to obey the first four commandments, which describe their responsibilities to God. Thus the proper role of government is to protect both the religious and civil liberties of its citizens.

White expected the church to pursue its mission in compliance with the laws of the land, but with nonnegotiable loyalty to God, and that Adventist participation in social and political activism should always be subordinate to the requirements of the church’s mission.
This research aims to rediscover mission as taught by the OT and to show how that mission is consistent with God’s loving and just character as reflected in the whole Bible. Toward this end, the research surveys assumptions that influence OT mission theology and evaluates ways in which current theologies of mission and theological currents relate to the unity and continuity of the Bible. With this background, the study then proposes a comprehensive theological framework that preserves the unity of God’s character and his mission.

Chapter 1 shows how the traditional understanding of centrifugal and centripetal mission is often based on uneven assumptions and indicates the need for a balanced approach to God’s character and his mission.

Chapter 2 reviews the main mission theology works of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries that deal primarily with the OT. The chapter shows that the development of mission theology was influenced by an array of events and extrabiblical assumptions that affected God’s mission by assigning a different type of mission to each Testament, thereby missing the unity of Scripture.

Chapter 3 analyzes the basic assumptions of theological currents such as dispensationalism and covenant theology and shows how belief in the superiority of the NT over the OT affects the understanding of mission in the Bible. The chapter also shows how the outward focus of ecumenical mission leads to a distortion of the biblical text.

Chapter 4 looks first at basic biblical assumptions that should inform the reading of the text and uses these assumptions in an attempt to discover a comprehensive framework for building a mission theology. The second part of the chapter proposes the cosmic conflict as an all-encompassing framework that preserves the unity and continuity of Scripture. It addresses main thematic concerns of previous mission theologies and restores mission’s rightful motivation and purpose.

Chapter 5 concludes the study by summarizing correctives to the popular understanding of God and mission (missio Dei) in the Bible that come from recognition of the universal dimension of the cosmic-conflict framework. This chapter also suggests further missiological implications of that framework.
A HISTORICAL-CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL-GENERATION THEOLOGY OF M. L. ANDREASEN

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Date of completion: July 2010

Topic
This study analyzes the teaching of the early twentieth-century Seventh-day Adventist writer M. L. Andreasen regarding a final-generation perfection that vindicates God in the great controversy between good and evil, comparing Andreasen’s views with related concepts in the writings of previous Adventist writers.

Purpose
The study has the limited objective of attempting to trace possible antecedents for Andreasen’s final-generation theology in the writings of other Adventists, in order to determine the degree of uniqueness or variance in Andreasen’s views. By means of this historical-contextual analysis, relationships are clarified between Andreasen’s views and those of other prominent Adventist writers, such as Joseph Bates, Ellen White, J. N. Andrews, Uriah Smith, E. J. Waggoner, and A. T. Jones.

Since non-Andreasen Adventist writings subsequent to Andreasen’s 1937 *The Sanctuary Service* are not examined, later reaction to Andreasen’s last-generation concepts is not addressed by this study. Further, an examination of the validity, or biblical foundation, of final-generation theology lies outside the scope of this work.

Sources
Andreasen’s published books and articles were examined for his final-generation views, which are stated most fully in the penultimate chapter of his 1937 *The Sanctuary Service*, entitled “The Last Generation.” The principal secondary source used was Dwight Eric Hayne’s M. A. thesis on Andreasen’s final-generation theology; Haynes’s categorization of Andreasenian motifs was adapted for the purposes of this study.

The views of other pre-1937 Adventist writers were researched primarily with the aid of digitized libraries; the two primary collections used were (1) the second edition of the Adventist Pioneer Libraries *Words of the Pioneers* and (2) version 3.0 of the Ellen G. White Estate’s *The Complete Published Ellen G. White Writings*. The Online Document Archives of the Office of Archives and Statistics of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists also made possible the location of a few key documents not found in the other collections.
Conclusion

This study found all of the basic components of Andreasen’s final-generation theology expressed by previous Adventist writers. In regard to complete overcoming of sin on the part of believers anticipating translation, a rather consistent correspondence was observed over the period investigated. Less agreement was seen regarding the relationship between an end-time blotting out of sins and an end-time maturation of the saints, with A. T. Jones and Andreasen seeing a clear connection, while Ellen White, significantly, refrained from explicitly joining these two end-time phenomena.

When attention was turned to the relationship between the end-time overcoming of the saints and the vindication of God in his controversy with evil, much less correspondence was observed. While antecedents for this part of Andreasen’s theology seem implied in several passages from Ellen White, they became quite explicit in the writings of E. J. Waggoner. In the post-1888 years, Waggoner’s view of an end-time vindication of God, based on the overcoming of his people, seems to have been spreading, as witnessed in the writings of W. W. Prescott, I. H. Evans, and Uriah Smith.

The study concludes that while Andreasen did not invent the concepts on which his final-generation theology is based, he did craft them into an end-time scenario by which he links the end-time saints to the outcome of the cosmic controversy much more emphatically than did any previous Adventist writer.
THEOLOGY OF BLINDNESS IN THE HEBREW SCRIPTURES

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Date of completion: May 2010

Problem
A number of passages in the Hebrew Scriptures discuss blindness. Scholars have studied them individually, but not with a view to developing a theology of blindness. The purpose of the present dissertation, then, is to analyze theological implications of blindness in the Hebrew Scriptures systematically.

Methodology
This dissertation systematically analyzes blindness in the Hebrew Scriptures against their ancient Near Eastern background. The study looks at cultic implications, causation, social justice, healing, and social and religious meanings of blindness. Both physical and metaphorical aspects of blindness are examined.

First, blindness in the ancient Near East is considered, with emphasis on Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Hittite Anatolia. Next, Hebrew words associated with blindness are investigated. Then, in the next three chapters, respectively, each passage discussing blindness in the three portions of the Hebrew Bible (Torah, Prophets, and Writings) is examined. The focus is on translation and exegesis of each passage, with synthesis of the findings at the end of the chapter. The final chapter presents a general synthesis of the topic, setting forth theological conclusions regarding blindness in the Hebrew Scriptures.

Conclusion
In the Hebrew Scriptures, blindness is described as a most devastating condition, especially when compared with other physical disabilities. In relation to the ritual system, blindness could be a blemish, disqualifying a priest from officiating and an animal from serving as an offering. Whether caused by old age or an act of divine or human agencies, blindness was an undesirable deviation from God's original design at Creation. Concerning social justice, the Hebrew Bible places right treatment of the blind in the context of true holiness. Other ancient Near Eastern cultures, if addressing the topic at all, simply mention right treatment of the blind in wisdom literature as an act of good conduct.

In the Hebrew Bible, physical blindness carries meanings of weakness and imperfection. Metaphorically, blindness could represent lack of mental or spiritual insight. Nearly all types of blindness could be associated with the consequences of rebellion. It is recognized that complete reversal of blindness would never be fully realized until the Messianic era.
BOOK REVIEWS


In addition to speaking in tongues and healing, early Pentecostals associated “the power of the baptism of the Holy Spirit with the power to be a cross-carrying, enemy-loving, Jesus-following crucifist” (115), writes Paul Alexander with regard to the starting point of the dramatic historical trajectory he traces in this volume. When the United States entered World War I in 1917, the just-organized Assemblies of God, which eventually became the largest of the Pentecostal denominations, affirmed pacifism—the refusal to engage in “destruction of human life”—as its officially favored position. By the 1960s, however, combatant military service had become not only allowed, but supported in denominational statements and literature. From the 1970s, military combatancy has gone on to become “highly promoted, as ideal, honorable, and what any ‘conscientious’ Christian would do” (261).

Indeed, after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the board of regents of the Southwestern Assemblies of God University passed a resolution to “express concern regarding any faculty member taking a public stand in opposition to the war situation currently facing America” (277). Alexander, whose research on the history of Pentecostal attitudes toward war and peace had prompted him to initiate the formation of “Pentecostals and Charismatics for Peace and Justice” in 2001, was on the university’s faculty at the time. When the institution declined to renew his faculty contract in 2006, he accepted a post at another Assemblies of God university, Azusa Pacific in California.

Peace to War provides an account of the Assemblies of God’s transition from pacifism to promilitary fervor that is forcefully nuanced and grounded in extensive primary sources and is expertly contextualized. While some scholars have argued that pacifist conviction never ran deeply enough to be truly dominant in early Pentecostalism, Alexander makes an impressive case that it was, in fact, the majority position in the early years of the Assemblies of God, attested not only by published statements and articles but by the disproportionately high percentage of conscientious objectors in World War I who identified with the new denomination.

At the same time, World War I marked the beginnings of a shift in which loyalty to the government began to take greater prominence than loyalty to Christ’s commandments and kingdom in denominational statements. During the years between the world wars, articles advocating pacifism and critiquing militarism and religious nationalism occasionally appeared in Assemblies of God periodicals, and conscientious objection remained the favored position. By World War II, though, pacifism clearly had become the minority position in practice, though the minority that did seek noncombatant forms of service when conscripted appears to have been substantial.

It was during the Cold War and the local hot wars it involved—most notably in Korea and Vietnam—that articles linking the nation’s success in the military struggle against Communism with the fortunes of the church’s mission began to pervade denominational periodicals. Then, in 1967, the
General Council took a momentous step, making participation in combat entirely a matter of individual conscience. No impediment remained to the comfortable companionship of a promilitary ethos with fervent, individualistic faith that characterized the Pentecostalism in which Alexander grew to adulthood. The pacifist heritage was all but forgotten.

While he does not attempt in-depth social scientific explanations for the underlying causes of the great shift, Alexander’s narrative includes valuable analytical insights on the forces at work. He notes the appeal of military service to culturally marginal groups as a way of gaining acceptance while maintaining distinctive identity and doctrines. For the Assemblies of God, the draw of the religious mainstream went together with the appeal of patriotism in an era when the overwhelming majority of Americans felt certain about the basic righteousness of the nation’s military causes. The denomination’s membership in the National Association of Evangelicals, formed in 1941, also marked the beginning of a crucial turn toward embracing American exceptionalism. Also, support for military chaplaincy grew in the post-World War II decades. By 1969, the Assemblies of God had forty-five military chaplains, and four decades later the number had increased to more than three hundred, a growth that Alexander sees as “inversely proportional to the decrease in concern for a Pentecostal peace witness” (283).

Alexander also charts striking changes in the usage of passages and themes drawn from Scripture. New Testament references to Christ—his example, teaching, divine authority and kingdom—pervade early Assemblies of God documents speaking to matters of war and peace. By the latter part of the twentieth century, these largely disappear, with OT references and the passage concerning governmental authority in Romans 13 taking the controlling position. One book widely touted in the denomination as a source of guidance to young men facing the possibility of military service argued that Romans 13 mandated an obedience to government that could require Christians to serve as its agents in punishing evil. Though that role “includes the taking of life,” said the author, “it does not contradict God’s law of love but somehow fulfills it” (231).

The ethical implications of eschatology also shifted. In 1916, Stanley Frodsham set the kingdom of God over against the warring kingdoms of the present age, and asked, “Is any child of God going to side with these belligerent kings? Will he not rather side with the Prince of Peace under whose banner of love he has chosen to serve?” (146). In the 1990s, the principal significance of apocalyptic eschatology with regard to peace and war was that violence and warfare must continue in the evil world until Christ establishes his future kingdom. In the meantime, deplorable though war may be, “accountability, sensibility, and responsibility” may require Christians to participate on America’s behalf. Such eschatology, in Alexander’s distillation, declares, “Jesus is coming back soon, but just in case he doesn’t we need to kill our enemies” (276, 338).

Along with its obvious interest to Pentecostals, Peace to War should be particularly instructive to adherents of other American-born movements
who find their identity and mission in restoration of the “everlasting gospel,” thereby preparing the way for the return of Christ, and whose history includes refusal to participate in military combat in the name of loyalty to that gospel.

Washington Adventist University
Takoma Park, Maryland

Douglas Morgan


This volume comprises the final report of the excavations conducted, with some interruptions, from 1982 to 1996 at Horvat ‘Uza and Horvat Radum, two Iron Age II sites in the eastern Negeb that were reoccupied as paramilitary posts during the Hellenistic and Roman periods. It must be noted that Horvat ‘Uza should not be confused with a site that shares the same name located east of Akko in the Galilee, which was also recently excavated and published (N. Getzov, R. Liebermann-Wander, H. Smithline, and D. Syon, Horbat ‘Uza: The 1991 Excavations, Vol. I: The Early Periods, Israel Antiquities Authority Reports 41 [Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities Authority, 2009]; N. Getzov, D. Avshalom-Gorni, Y. Gorin-Rosen, E. J. Stern, D. Syon, and A. Tatcher, Horbat ‘Uza: The 1991 Excavations. Vol. II: The Late Periods, Israel Antiquities Authority Reports 42 [Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities Authority, 2009]).

The author, I. Beit-Arieh, served as director of this joint Tel Aviv University and Baylor University excavation project. Beit-Arieh was also a student of the late Yohanan Aharoni and, following in his master’s footsteps, has spent much of his career excavating and surveying sites in the biblical Negeb and the Sinai. One of the reasons Aharoni and his disciples were drawn to this arid region was their recognition of its well-preserved remains, coupled with the strategic importance of the Negeb in antiquity. The book under review is the third in a series of final reports of Negeb sites excavated by the author and follows volumes on the Edomite Shrine at Horvat Qitmit (I. Beit-Arieh, Horvat Qitmit: An Edomite Shrine in the Biblical Negev [Tel Aviv: Emery and Claire Yass Publications in Archaeology, 1995]) and the fortified town at Tel ‘Ira (I. Beit-Arieh, Horvat Qitmit: An Edomite Shrine in the Biblical Negev [Tel Aviv: Emery and Claire Yass Publications in Archaeology, 1999]).

Chronologically, the excavators have dated both ‘Uza and Radum firmly to the seventh and early sixth centuries B.C. They present their case on the basis of datable pottery forms (120) and the lack of multiple phasing, indicating a relatively brief occupational history. Interestingly, Aharoni (Arad Inscriptions, trans. J. Ben-Or from Hebrew, ed. cccs rev. A. F. Rainey [Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1981], 147) claims to have recovered sherds from the tenth to the seventh centuries B.C. during his earlier survey work at ‘Uza. Freud’s comparative study of the Iron Age pottery includes clear photos of whole forms and the usual diagnostic profiles (77-121, 318-322). She draws parallels from a wide selection of Judahite and Edomite sites with seventh-
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Freud's comparative study of the Iron Age pottery includes clear photos of whole forms and the usual diagnostic profiles (77-121, 318-322). She draws parallels from a wide selection of Judahite and Edomite sites with seventh-
century B.C. occupational levels. Earlier forms are rare. Interestingly enough, at least one “Rosette”-style storage jar was recovered from both ‘Uza and Radum. However, no rosette- or lmlk-stamped handles were found. A more extensive ceramic comparison with the Lachish material (e.g., O. Zimhoni, Studies in the Iron Age Pottery of Israel: Typological, Archaeological and Chronological Aspects [Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1997]), and the reports from the British expedition and other Judahite sites such as Beit Mirsim, Kadesh Barnea and Halif may still be a worthwhile endeavor.

About forty inscriptions were recovered from the two sites and are published here in full by Beit-Arieh, with the assistance of Frank Moore Cross. Such a large number of ostraca, like the rich epigraphic finds from Arad, testify to the inherent preservation qualities of the dry eastern Negeb climate. While a useful table comparing the various letter forms is found on p. 182, this reviewer failed to discover any attempt to date the corpus based solely upon paleographic evidence. Perhaps a comparative paleographic study utilizing the ‘Uza, Radum and Arad material may someday help to answer the stratigraphic questions that still plague the latter site. Nevertheless, we are in Beit-Arieh’s debt for presenting this important epigraphic collection to scholarship.

The biblical toponym (place name) for ‘Uza is disputed (Beit-Arieh, 1999, 15; idem, 2007, 1-4). However, this reviewer agrees with the excavators (e.g., I. Beit-Arieh and B. C. Cresson, “Horvat ‘Uza: A Fortified Outpost on the Eastern Negev Border,” Biblical Archaeologist 54 [1991]: 128) that ‘Uza should be identified with Qinah (Josh 15:22), since the Wadi al-Keini, which runs below the site, preserves the biblical name. Y. Aharoni (“The Negeb of Judah,” Israel Exploration Journal 8 [1958]: 30, 35, n. 18) originally suggested equating ‘Uza with Qinah and also posited a possible connection between Qinah and the biblical Kenites (Jdg 1:16 [LXX], 1 Sam 15:6), who settled in the general vicinity. Later, based upon his interpretation of an ostracan found at Arad (Inscription 24), Y. Aharoni (“The Negeb and the Southern Borders, in The World History of the Jewish People: The Age of the Monarchies: Political History, 4-I, ed. A. Malamat and I. Eph‘al [Jerusalem: Massada, 1979], 297; idem, Arad Inscriptions, trans. J. Ben-Or, ed. and rev. A. F. Rainey [Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1981], 146-147) identified ‘Uza with Ramat Negeb (Josh 19:8; 1 Sam 30:27). To be sure, ‘Uza occupies a commanding topographical position that guards the entrance to the road descending from the Negeb (Judah) across the Aravah into Edomite territory. This is the easiest, most convenient route between the two kingdoms and should be identified as the biblical “Way of Edom” (2 Kgs 3: 8, 20). However, forts and border posts are, by nature, characteristically located at strategically prominent, easy-to-defend sites, and scholars such as Lemaire, Rainey, and Na‘aman have demonstrated that Tel ‘Ira’s more centralized location and its more imposing topographical position make it a superior candidate for Ramat Negeb (Beit-Arieh 1999, 15; idem, 2007, 4).

What do the excavations at ‘Uza and Radum tell us about the geopolitical status of the eastern Negeb during the final century of the Davidic monarchy? Aharoni (1979, 296) believed that the administrative and demographic center of southern Judah moved to the eastern Negeb in the wake of Sennacherib’s
campaign and the destruction of Beer Sheba. The author, followed to some extent by Tatum and Finkelstein, suggests that the Negeb of Judah reached its *floruit* during the seventh century B.C. in the Negeb (e.g., Beit-Arieh, 1999, 1). L. Tatum (“King Manasseh and the Royal Fortress at Horvat ‘Usa,” *Biblical Archaeologist* 54 [1991]: 136-145) interprets the archaeological data to indicate that an economic and construction boom occurred during the seventh century B.C., not only in the eastern Negeb, but throughout Judah. I. Finkelstein (“The Archaeology of the Days of Manasseh,” in *Scripture and Other Artifacts: Essays on the Bible and Archaeology in Honor of Philip J. King*, ed. J. C. Exum, M. D. Coogan, and L. E. Stager [Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1994], 176-178) equates this development, at least initially, as reflecting the harsh political realities Judah faced in the wake of Sennacherib and the necessity to utilize every bit of arable land for agricultural production and settlement. A. G. Vaughn’s (*Theology, History, and Archaeology in the Chronicler’s Account of Hezekiah* [Atlanta: Scholars, 1999], 45-58) reassessment of the evidence points toward a different interpretation and conclusion. He argues that while Negeb settlements expanded during the seventh century B.C., this growth was by no means dramatic. Judah during the eighth century B.C. was much more populous and economically prosperous.

The growth of Judah’s Negeb settlements and the (re)garrisoning of its fortresses during the seventh century B.C. does not imply a strong resurgent nation rebuilding its defenses, as Beit-Arieh concludes (332). Rather, in the opinion of this reviewer, it reveals the *permanent* military and economic realities that underlie the loss of much of the Shephelah as well as Elath, Tamar, the Arabah, and possibly all of the Negeb Highlands and, with them, the crucial loss of control over the lucrative Arabian trade routes that traverse these areas. Judah never recovered these regions (e.g., 2 Kgs 16:6). Consequently, she was faced with the refortification and garrisoning of a new southern border, now dangerously close to her population centers in the hill country.

Indeed, one of the contributions this report offers to biblical scholars is the data it provides regarding the role that ‘Uza and Radum played in the ebb and flow of Judah’s hegemony in the south and the changing lines of her borders during the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. In the opinion of this reviewer, the comparison of ‘Uza with ‘En Haseva (biblical Tamar), a huge fortress that guarded the Aravah and the road to Elath, is of paramount importance when attempting to reconstruct and understand this important issue. Comparing the history of these two sites is a fascinating study in contrasts. R. Cohen (“The Fortresses at ‘En Hazeva during the Roman Period and in the Days of the Kingdom of Judah,” in *Eilat: Studies in the Archaeology, History and Geography of Eilat and the Aravah*, ed. J. Aviram, H. Geva, R. Cohen, Z. Meshel, and E. Stern [Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society and Israel Antiquities Authority, 1995], 164-165, Hebrew) published two illustrations with side-by-side scale plans comparing the various Judahite Negeb fortresses. ‘Uza’s relatively thin walls and small size become dramatically apparent, especially in comparison with the massive casemates and huge size of Haseva. From preliminary reports, Haseva apparently served as a Judahite fortress until the late eighth-early seventh
century B.C., when it probably slipped into Edomite control, as evidenced by the Edomite shrines uncovered at Haseva and at Horvat Qitmit and Malhata (R. Cohen and Y. Yisrael, “The Iron Age Fortresses at ‘En Haseva,” Biblical Archaeologist 58 [1995]: 224-228; see also Beit-Arieh 1995; idem, 1999, 3-4, 176-177). Shortly after Haseva was lost, ‘Uza and Radum were apparently built. The Negev Highland settlements, apart from the fortresses at Tell el-Qudeirat, Har Boqer, and Har Raviv, were apparently not occupied during this time either, suggesting that this region lost its geopolitical significance to Judah during the last two centuries of Judah’s existence (M. Haiman, “The Iron Age II Sites of the Western Negev Highlands,” Israel Exploration 44 [1994]: 61). While the data from ‘Uza provides clues, but no conclusive evidence for the roles of Judah and Edom vis-à-vis the eastern Negeb during the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., there is virtually no doubt that this was a contested region. In fact, Vaughn (1999, 53) enlist an Edomite ostracon from ‘Uza to question whether the site functioned as a Judahite or Edomite border post during the late seventh-early sixth centuries B.C. However, while the two Edomite inscriptions and pottery recovered at ‘Uza demonstrate a certain degree of Edomite cultural influence at the site, they most likely do not reflect Edomite control of ‘Uza during this time. Moreover, the location of both ‘Uza and Radum reflects strategic planning for a garrisoned border that protects against threats approaching from the east (and south), not from the west. L. M. Zucconi (“From the Wilderness of Zin alongside Edom: Edomite Territory in the Eastern Negeb during the Eighth-Sixth Centuries B.C.E.,” in Milk and Honey: Essays on Ancient Israel and the Bible in Appreciation of the Judaic Studies Program at the University of California, San Diego, ed. S. Malena and D. Miano [Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2007], 249) has recently proposed that “Edomite domination (of the eastern Negeb) occurred through slowly developing cultural assimilation.” While this “peaceful infiltration” theory is possible, at least during its initial stages, the well-known cache of ritually destroyed Edomite cultic figurines at Haseva seems to demonstrate that a more complex and violent geopolitical history of this region existed during the seventh-sixth centuries B.C. than is currently understood.

At Radum, the remains of a tower were exposed in the center of the courtyard (314-317). This building served to facilitate long-range observation as well as communication purposes. It also functioned as an inner fort or “keep” in the event of a sudden attack. While the author points to parallels at Khelief (accepting Glueck’s reconstruction), as well as other sites in Transjordan, he overlooks several Iron Age forts with central towers that have either been surveyed or excavated in the Judean desert and along the Dead Sea (e.g., Z. Meshel and A. Ofer, “A Judahite Fortress and a First-Century Building Near the Top of the ‘En-Gedi Ascent,” Israel Exploration Journal 58 [2008]: 51-59; esp. 57-58). Despite the dating of most of these “tower” fortresses to the end of the monarchy or even later, it is difficult to overlook the biblical passages that attribute identical structures in the same region to eighth-century kings Uzziah and Jotham (2 Chron 26:10; 27:4). In the opinion of this reviewer, it is plausible that these strategic outposts were
the heirs to ninth-eighth-century B.C. towers. Perhaps some of these towers were also constructed earlier than their excavators suggest. As observation towers, these posts were garrisoned only occasionally, when the geopolitical situation demanded it. This supposition, in turn, would also account for the paucity of small finds apart from those associated with and datable to the final abandonment of these sites (314, 318).

The production of the book is well thought out and attractive. Moreover, the price is reasonable for a technical report of this nature. One complaint concerns the detailed plan that spreads over two pages (18-19), diminishing its usefulness for scanning purposes; for instance, in preparing a series of site plans for a comparative study. A folded plan on a single sheet would have been much more helpful.

A few editorial errors were noted. Spot checking revealed several mistakes on p. 331, where misspelled words such as “fulfil” were noted. The word “event” should be “events” on p. 334. A cited reference found on p. 338 to an article by Biran and Cohen (Eretz Israel, vol. 15) is dated 1985, when its publication date is actually 1981. For some reason, works cited as forthcoming in the text, including the author’s name, are not listed in the references. It would seem more appropriate to designate these sources as “unpublished,” “personal communication,” or simply not reference them at all if they comprise the author’s own work. As with most English-language publications originating from Israel, sources in Hebrew are occasionally cited when English translations of these works already exist.

With the appearance of this monograph, Beit-Arieh deserves to be heartily congratulated for fulfilling nearly all of his publication obligations—an extraordinary achievement among active archaeologists working in Israel and Jordan. We eagerly await his report on Tel Malhata.

Berrien Springs, Michigan

JEFF HUDON


In her first book, May-Ellen Colón attempts to create order in the cross-cultural chaos and confusion of Seventh-day Adventist Sabbath-keeping etiquette. In doing so, she does not focus on technical matters of the day or time-setting, but rather tries to paint a picture of the Person behind the Sabbath. Thus the book is not concerned with the why of the Sabbath, but with the how. How to Keep the Sabbath is the result of Colón’s dissertation research (2003) on Sabbath-keeping practices in fifty-one countries, which she rewrites in a practical and descriptive manner. The objective of the book is, in her own words, “How to ‘do’ Sabbath in real life” (44).

Colón focuses on the Person behind the Sabbath, Jesus, asserting that by our having a relationship with him, the Sabbath will become a delight (Isaiah 58). She proposes that “When we have a profound relationship with Jesus and understand the meaning of the Sabbath, we can more easily find guiding principles to keep the Sabbath well” (49). To this end, she suggests fifteen
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guiding principles in regard to keeping the Sabbath, which in turn are based on three general principles: (1) “Sabbath is a special vacation” (2) during which “we strengthen our ties with God” and (3) “strengthen our ties with God’s family and with ours” (160). The first of Colón’s fifteen guiding principles describes Sabbath preparation. The Personhood of God is grounded on God as Preparer. He prepared, for example, the home of Eden and the Plan of Salvation. Sanctifying, remembering, worshiping, basking, responding, and trusting are based on the second general principle: strengthening our ties with God on the Sabbath day. Fellowshipping, affirming, serving, and caring are based on the third general principle: strengthening our ties with one another during the Sabbath.

In chapter 4, Colón describes a three-part “Test of Truth” for establishing guidelines for Sabbath activities. She notes two important points in regard to Sabbath-keeping practices: they are not chosen at random, and they are based on the character of God. Posed in this way, the guiding principles function as filters, moving from the character of God to specific guidelines for Sabbath-keeping.

Having established the ground upon which Sabbath-keeping principles are built, Colón shares “practical” ideas on how to apply the principles (51). In chapter 11, for example, she applies the principles to situations that could possibly pose a difficulty for biblical Sabbath-keeping and tries to find a solution that best fits with the true meaning of keeping the Sabbath holy. She reminds the reader that it may not always be possible to reduce a Sabbath-keeping situation to an equation of rational principles to be solved. Certain situations essentially revolve around trusting God against all common sense, leaving the consequences to him.

Although this book contains refreshing insights that contribute to positive Sabbath-keeping experiences for both the beginning and experienced Sabbath-keeper, it seems that Colón attempts too large an agenda for one book—partly scholarly, partly Bible study, and partly a practical guidebook filled with detailed metaphors and personal stories. These varying writing styles lend a somewhat repetitive character to the content of the book. Nevertheless, the essential points and differing perspectives invite reflection about the why and how of one’s own Sabbath-keeping practices and the guiding principles behind them. This criticism aside, How to Keep the Sabbath adds a positive contribution to the discussion concerning the keeping of the Sabbath. Due to its partly storytelling character, this book lends itself well to the seminar-type setting.

Noordscheschut, The Netherlands

LINDA WOONING VOERMAN


The Quest for the Historical Israel is the result of a series of lectures delivered in 2005 at the Sixth Biennial Colloquium of the International Institute for
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Secular Humanistic Judaism by two leading archaeologists, Israel Finkelstein and Amihai Mazar. In many respects, these scholars share many similarities: they are professors in the most important Israeli institutes of archaeology (Tel Aviv and Jerusalem); both have excavated many sites and are now supervising strategic digs (Megiddo, the Beth-Shean Valley Archaeological Project); the former is renowned for the book he coauthored with Neil Silberman (The Bible Unearthed [New York: Touchstone, 2002]); the latter published a classic handbook for students in archaeology (Archaeology of the Land of the Bible [New York: Doubleday, 1992]). In spite of these similarities, they have, nevertheless, been strong opponents during the last decade in one of the most important debates in Syro-Palestinian archaeology. The argument began when Finkelstein made a new proposal regarding Iron Age chronology. It is against this background that they were asked to deliver their own historical syntheses in this colloquium.

After a general introduction concerning the relationship between archaeology and the Bible when writing history (Part 1), this series of lectures addresses most of the periods in the history of Israel: the Patriarchs, the Exodus, and the Conquest (Part 2); the origins of Israel (Part 3); the tenth century (Part 4); and the Divided Monarchy (Part 5). The last section (Part 6) consists of conclusions. Each part follows the same threefold pattern: a brief summary of the section by Brian B. Schmidt, followed by Finkelstein’s and Mazar’s respective chapters. The scope of the book is obviously ambitious and provides a unique opportunity to hear from competent archaeologists in a vivid and clear manner about a large range of subjects. In this respect, the present volume knows no equivalent.

With regard to the second millennium B.C.E., Finkelstein dates the composition of the narratives on the Patriarchs and on the Exodus, devoid of historical value, to the late monarchic period, while Mazar admits that they retain (very) limited memories of actual practices and events. Although both dismiss the historicity of an Israelite Conquest, the former explains the origins of Israel by a process of sedentarization, whereas the latter tries to combine various theories. The most interesting chapters deal with the epoch of David and Solomon, in which Finkelstein and Mazar respectively advocate a “low chronology” and a “conventional modified chronology.” In particular, Mazar still adheres to the concept of a United Monarchy and believes that Yigael Yadin was correct about the Solomonic architecture at Megiddo, Hazor, and Gezer. Despite a strong disagreement on the development of Judah in the ninth century, the differences diminish between the two scholars concerning the Divided Monarchy. Their contributions on it are interestingly complementary.

Overall, the contributions are well written, and the reading proves to be flowing and fascinating. One admires the clarity with which the authors succeed in presenting so many subjects in short chapters (especially Finkelstein, who is always brilliant in explaining his ideas for a general public). The flip side of the coin, however, is that there are some inherent limits to this book, so that readers should not expect to find in it what it does not offer.
First, strictly speaking and contrary to the subtitle, this book does not provide a real debate. This is rather a juxtaposition of parallel personal syntheses on similar subjects. Ideally, it would have been extremely interesting to provoke an interactive discussion, or to let the two scholars write rejoinders. At the least, the short chapters written by Brian B. Schmidt could have provided the opportunity to compare their lines of argument, but he is content to sum up their lectures, which is not really indispensable since the contributions are themselves short and clear. Moreover, due to their original context, the chapters contain no technical details or apparatus (there are neither foot- nor endnotes, but only a general bibliography).

Another difficulty, which is admittedly unavoidable, lies in the bipartite structure of the presentations, which could give the reader the impression that both Iron Age chronologies advocated here are on the same level with regard to their plausibility. The scholarly publications in the field indicate rather that a majority of archaeologists still reject the proposal made by Finkelstein, who faces what he himself labels as the “Finkelstein stands alone” argument (I. Finkelstein, “A Low Chronology Update,” in *The Bible and Radiocarbon Dating*, ed. T. E. Levy and T. Higham [London: Equinox, 2005], 38-39).

Moreover, while the authors are authorities in archaeology, their expertise on textual data is naturally limited, which is problematic since they make numerous decisions on the texts in their historical reconstruction. As for the Pentateuch, Finkelstein is still using the documentary hypothesis and speaking of the Elohist document (17, 47), which will look somewhat outdated to most scholars. He paradoxically repeats the “Albrightian” reading of the book of Joshua, according to which numerous cities are supposed to have been destroyed during the Settlement (61), whereas this biblical book mentions only three burned towns (Jericho, Ai, and Hazor). Furthermore, he considers 1 Kgs 9.15 as Dtr, although a majority of commentators treat it as a pre-Dtr, annalistic verse. His contention that the description of Goliath reflects Hoplite armor of the seventh century (19) is interesting, but debatable (see, e.g., A. Millard, “The Armor of Goliath,” in *Exploring the Longue Durée*, ed. J. D. Schloen [Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2009], 337-343).

More importantly, both authors reproduce the widely repeated statement that the real starting point of the compilation of biblical texts is the eighth century B.C.E. (more precisely, the end of it for Finkelstein, 19-20). As a result, the more one looks back in time from this period, the less the depiction of the events by the biblical authors can be accurate. According to Finkelstein, “archaeology demonstrates” (!) that neither “J,” “E,” nor the written sources of the Deuternomistic History can date from the tenth century (17). On one hand, to put into writing such large compositions would require an urban society with a high level of knowledge and the spread of literacy among the elite, in the capital and the countryside alike (17). On the other hand, “over a century of archaeological investigations in Judah has failed to reveal any meaningful scribal activity before the late-eighth century” (112). However, both points prove to be largely disputable. With regard to the former, as A. Lemaire proposes, “with the same arguments, one would demonstrate that
Bo o k re v i e w s

the El-Amarna letters sent from Jerusalem by Abdi-Hepa could not exist!" ("Review of T. Römer, J.-D. Macchi, and C. Nihan, eds., Introduction à l'Ancien Testament," RBL. September 2005 [www.bookreviews.org]; cf. N. Na’aman, “The Contribution of the Amarna Letters to the Debate on Jerusalem’s Political Position in the Tenth Century B.C.E.,” BASOR 304 [1996]: 21). As for the second argument, in addition to recently published inscriptions (Tel Zayit abecedary, Khirbet Qeiya ostracon) dated to the tenth century and stemming from the border region of Judah, the discovery of ten seals and 170 fragments of bullae, which sealed papyri in the city of David, assigned by the excavators to the beginning of the eighth century or even to the end of the ninth century, make it outdated (R. Reich, E. Shukron, and O. Lernau, “Recent Discoveries in the City of David,” IEJ 53 [2007], 153-169). Furthermore, as Mazar correctly points out (135), most of the writing materials (e.g., papyri) were perishable. He acknowledges the existence of archives in the early monarchy (35), but seems to exclude larger redactions for the very reason that he felt obliged, as “an outsider in textual research,” to choose between several current hypotheses among exegetes about the redactional history of the Pentateuch and Deuteronomistic History (29). Nevertheless, strictly speaking, we simply have no means to measure the extent and the nature of the documents that disappeared, so that the existence of books in the early monarchic period cannot be easily dismissed (cf. A. Millard, “Books in Ancient Israel,” in D’Ougarit à Jérusalem, ed. C. Roche [Paris: De Boccard, 2008], 255-264). Significantly, the last peer-reviewed article to date on the redaction of the books of Samuel assigned it a composition in the tenth century (M. Garshiel, “The Book of Samuel: Its Composition, Structure and Significance as a Historiographical Source,” Journal of Hebrew Scriptures 10 [2010] [www.arts.ualberta.ca/JHS/Articles/article_133.pdf]). In any case, rather than taking into account the lack of knowledge on the material data, both Finkelstein and Mazar adopt a relatively precise terminus à quo for the biblical writings: the former on questionable archaeological presuppositions, and the latter because he feels obliged to take a stand on the issue of diachronic theories. This, it should be emphasized, largely determines the way they use the biblical texts as historiographical sources.

This book will no doubt be useful to various kinds of readers, providing they are aware of its limits. Scholars and students will enjoy reading the opinions of two distinguished archaeologists on many aspects of the history of ancient Israel. The general public will discover a pleasant, readable book summarizing what two specialists think on these subjects, but should be forewarned that they are authorities only on archaeological matters and that their historical reconstructions involve options about the textual sources that are debatable.

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While Thomas Gaston’s previously published work includes an exposition on the book of Revelation (*Come and See: An Exposition of Revelation* [India: Culcreuch Exports Pvt. Ltd., 2007]), in this book, as the title indicates, he reappraises the historicity of the key events and persons mentioned in the book of Daniel. Higher Critical scholarship of the nineteenth century placed the origin of this book in the Hellenistic period, and some scholars still work within this framework. Later research and archeological discoveries, however, have led other scholars to conclude that the historicity of this biblical book should be taken more seriously (see, e.g., Donald J. Wiseman, *Nebuchadnezzar and Babylon*; Kenneth Kitchen, *Notes on Some Problems in the Book of Daniel*; and Arthur Ferch, *Daniel on the Solid Ground*).

In his approach to Daniel, Gaston first attempts to reestablish the historicity of the book’s hero. He contends that Daniel and Ezekiel were two contemporary prophets, “both in terms of date and location” (10). The opening verses of Daniel correctly report that the first group of exiles from Judah was taken to Babylon shortly after the Battle of Carchemish, which took place in May/June of 605 B.C. King Jehoiakim had most likely been taken as captive, but was later released “in return for his allegiance to Nebuchadnezzar and served him as a vassal for three years” (35). As for Daniel and his friends, “their successful careers in Babylon paralleled the careers of scholars in the ancient Near East” (49).

When considering the stories about foreign kings, Gaston deals briefly with Neo-Babylon’s most important king, Nebuchadnezzar II. The historicity of this ruler’s madness cannot be confirmed from extrabiblical sources. A later work, known as the *Prayer of Nabonidus*, should be understood as a product rather than a source of the Danielic narratives. As for Belshazzar’s relationship to Nebuchadnezzar, Belshazzar may have been his maternal grandson, although in the story of Daniel 5 “it is the dynastic relationship, rather than the familial, that is of significance to the author” (81). Gaston also rightly observes that the focus of Daniel 5 “is on the character of Belshazzar, rather than the downfall of a mighty nation” (97). A definite historical identification of Darius the Mede “still eludes us” (131). The two most likely candidates for this title from history are Ugbaru, the general who captured Babylon, and Cyrus the Great. Between the two, Gaston is more inclined toward Wiseman’s idea that, based on “dual nomenclature,” King Cyrus was given the title Darius in Daniel’s book. Instead of being a throne name, “Darius” was a colloquial name perhaps used only among the Jews (132).

In chapter 7, Gaston evaluates and rejects the proposal that the author of Daniel believed that an independent Median kingdom succeeded Neo-Babylon. This is important for the interpretation of the Four Kingdom visions from Daniel 2 and 7. There are strong indications in the Bible that the Medo-Persian Empire was considered to be a single unit, both legally and militarily. One of Gaston’s insightful comments is the reference from Isa 21:2 that depicts the participation of Persia in the destruction of Babylon alongside Media. I submit
that the words “the destruction of Babylon” are an overstatement about the events of 539 B.C. and should be replaced by “the capture of Babylon.”

Doubts have been expressed by some scholars regarding the accuracy of Persian and Greek histories as presented in Daniel’s book. Alleged inaccuracies in Jewish chronology as presented in Daniel 9 have also been proposed, betraying “the a priori emphasis on the Maccabean period in the critical interpretation of Daniel 9” (140). Gaston concludes that Daniel’s prophetic synopsis is entirely accurate for the level of detail it includes (147). In the conclusion to the book, this conviction is broadened and applied to the whole book of Daniel. The author says that there are strong reasons to believe that the stories about Daniel and his friends are rooted in historical events and centered on real individuals (150). Similarly, to rob Daniel’s “visions and prophecies of their authority is to rob them of their purpose” (155).

Following a conclusion, the book contains a bibliographical list of selected studies on Daniel, past and present. Also included are several appendices, including genealogical charts, lists of kings, and a chronological table. Unfortunately, indices to biblical references or to modern authors are lacking.

Gaston’s work can be commended on several accounts, but I will limit my comments here to only two. First, I appreciate his insistence on the importance of the historicity of the book’s hero. This approach stands in contrast with Higher Critical scholarship on one hand, and very conservative interpretations on the other, both of which have tendencies to detach passages from Daniel’s book (especially prophetic ones) from his life and career in Babylon. This type of approach to the book of Daniel is inadequate, and Gaston is correct in stating categorically that “a fictional prophet cannot utter factual prophecy” (155).

The second commendable element in Gaston’s work is his determination to connect debates on the historicity of biblical events and persons with the practical issues of faith that affect the lives of believers and the way they relate to God and his revelation. To the reader of today who may wonder why the historical issues about Daniel’s book are so important, Gaston provides a straightforward answer: the historical issues justify the believer in taking the book seriously. Although I am not advocating here the concept of biblical inerrancy, I still believe that the sacred text begs its reader’s respect and trust. These two are the main reasons for which I recommend Gaston’s work to all serious students of Daniel’s book.

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Michael J. Gorman teaches at Princeton Theological Seminary and St. Mary’s Seminary and University. He considers Bruce Manning Metzger his mentor; in fact, the book is dedicated to his memory. The current work is
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a revision of *Elements of Biblical Exegesis* (2001), which is itself a revision of *Texts and Contexts* (1994, 1998). In essence, it is the fourth revision of the author's original publication. In 2005, Hendrikson published a companion volume, *Scripture: An Ecumenical Introduction to the Bible and Its Interpretation*. The companion is truly ecumenical; it is the work of fifteen Protestant (including the author) and Catholic scholars, all of whom are faculty members of the Ecumenical Institute of Theology at St. Mary's Seminary and University in Baltimore.

*Elements of Biblical Exegesis* is founded on the notion that the task of exegesis is the careful historical, literary, and theological analysis of the biblical text. As a result, the author prefers to focus on the methodology of the synchronic approach, which deals primarily with the final form of the biblical text. He believes that exegesists of all levels primarily meet the text as it stands in the biblical canon rather than engaging or interacting with the original source or the development stage of the text. The *synchronic approach* is not concerned with oral traditions or hypothetical sources; rather, it analyzes the text in relation to the context or worldview in which it first appeared. In his opinion, for a book that is concerned with the elements of exegesis, this methodology is better suited to achieve his goal. Whereas he does not invalidate the value of the *diachronic approach* (historical-critical method), which deals mainly with the formation of the text, he devotes limited attention to this methodology because it requires technical historical and linguistics skills that not all readers possess (23). Perhaps the most revealing reason he notes for avoiding the diachronic approach is the fact that in recent years this methodology has come under critical questioning as a viable tool for biblical exegesis. Another approach to biblical exegesis is the *existential approach*, which deals primarily with a fundamental spiritual encounter with God through meditation on the text, an instrumental approach that is also known as *theological* or *transformative*. The author also limits the use of this approach not only because it requires sophisticated theological perspectives not readily available to the average reader, but primarily because this methodology relies heavily on elements that the synchronic approach already covers, therefore accomplishing a similar goal. The eclectic and integrated approach of Gorman's elementary methodology proposes a systematic approach to exegesis that addresses three major areas that his definition of the task points out, while maintaining a delicate balance of the scholarly and scientific demands of biblical research: (1) the academic need for seminary students to write successful exegesis papers without being overwhelmed with unnecessary details at such an early stage, (2) the pastoral need of ministers who write sermons on a weekly basis, and (3) the acknowledgment of the divine and supernatural origin of the Scriptures.

Perhaps the author's most valuable philosophical contribution to the task of exegesis, in my opinion, is his threefold view of exegesis as investigation,
conversation, and art. As an investigation, exegesis involves asking thoughtful questions about the multifaceted dimensions of the biblical text; Gorman's elements are built on this premise. All the sections of investigation throughout the book model how these questions are asked and which questions are appropriate to ask depending on the type of literature the exegete encounters in the NT, be it the Gospels, Acts, Epistles or Revelation. The task of questioning the text as a whole—its historical context (tradition, source, and redaction), its contextual setting and intertextual (literal and cultural) revelation, and implications—clearly guides the student in understanding the importance of asking the proper questions that a particular type of text demands. As a conversation, Gorman sees the task of the exegete as one who carefully “listens” to various views regarding the text under analysis from informed sources in order to learn from the process and, if necessary, adjusts the conclusions of the literary, historical, and cultural investigations. This aspect of Gorman's approach is assumed or ignored in other approaches such as the synchronic and existential approach and often are not included in modern methodologies. Yet it is essential for those who are learning to exegete Scripture to learn this humble aspect of a careful investigation—namely, to consider the views of others, even those with whom we disagree; this is a time for reflection and self-evaluation. Finally, the author sees the task of exegesis as an art which differentiates his work, in his estimation, from other authors, an art that requires carefully following the steps needed to arrive at a sound conclusion. Rather than just applying principles, rules, or research skills, he believes that exegetes need to use their imagination, intuition, sensitivity, and openness to be creative in the way the tools of exegesis are used. This threefold approach to exegesis fosters the preparation of a living document that theoretically could be updated as new discoveries are made in the process of investigation, implementation, reflection, and refinement.

It is appropriate at this time, however, to mention that Gorman assumes that almost everyone using his elements of exegesis will work from a translation rather than Greek or Hebrew, even though the exegete may have these language skills. Whereas Gordon Fee's *New Testament Exegesis* is founded on the analysis of the original text, Gorman's *Elements* focuses more on the analysis of the translated text, devoting just a few paragraphs to generally mentioning certain tools for exegesis in the original language. His intent is for beginning exegetes to follow his general principles whether they are using a translation or the original biblical text. The downside to his approach, in my opinion, is that it does not provide a tutorial for how these tools are to be used; Fee, on the other hand, offers a basic guide so that the student can get started using them immediately. Another aspect of Gorman's methodology to consider is that his approach is only suitable for analyzing short passages of Scripture, at most an entire chapter. Other methodologies, including Fee's, are designed to analyze entire biblical books. This could perhaps be due to
two things: the lack of support for analysis of the original text, and the fact that the book has been designed primarily for beginning students of exegesis and pastors, while eliminating the unnecessary details of advanced exegesis at this early stage. As a result, Gorman does not include a section for Greek or Hebrew word analysis, a guide to the Critical Apparatus, or a Lexicon.

The book may appeal to general audiences seeking to master the basics of the task of biblical exegesis. It could also be useful for students beginning to explore the Scriptures from a sound platform. Pastors would benefit greatly by adopting basic principles of exegesis to inform their weekly sermons. Perhaps the strength of the book lies in the time it spends in defining the task and preparing the student to understand the implications of exegesis and the enormous task that lies ahead as he or she matures to more advanced skills. Fee’s methodology, on the other hand, does not provide this type of background so critical to those who embark on the journey toward fine scholarship; rather it assumes that the student already understands the issues of exegesis. In Gordon’s estimation, many approach the study of the Scriptures loosely; a methodology that is too complex or that assumes the rudiments may discourage serious students who would like to get started. This is where Gorman’s methodology fulfills its purpose by providing an insightful guide that can inspire students, laity, and ministers alike to take the study of the Scriptures more seriously by applying solid elementary principles with effective scholarly skills that can lead to sound conclusions.

Berrien Springs, Michigan


Jo Ann Hackett is Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas, Austin. Before this she worked for many years at Harvard University as Professor of the Practice of Biblical Hebrew and Northwest Semitic Epigraphy. Her experience with teaching and researching Biblical Hebrew adds to the merit of this book.

According to the author, the book is meant to be taught in one semester or quarter. It is implied that the target audience is graduate and undergraduate students as they are first introduced to Biblical Hebrew. The book is divided into thirty lessons, has a detailed table of contents, suggested bibliography for further reading, and a useful index. The introduction includes a section on how to use the book, which is helpful to both teachers and students and which helps to maximize the use of the book. The book also contains eight helpful appendices. Of particular notice is appendix D, “Clues for Finding the Root of Weak Consecutive Preterites,” which is a tool rarely found in Biblical Hebrew textbooks.

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Victor M. Reyes-Prieto


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The book is written in clear and simple language, conveying all the information students need without overwhelming them with unnecessary
detail. It makes Hebrew simpler to understand, while still providing a solid foundation for further studies. Even though charts for the alphabet and vowels are missing, the charts in the remaining chapters are abundant and clear. The exercises provided at the end of each chapter are straightforward and increase in difficulty at a good pace. The student is introduced to translation from the beginning, starting with short sentences. The exercises also include translating from English to Hebrew, which helps solidify students' knowledge of Hebrew. Another valuable tool that comes with the textbook is an audio CD, which supplies the pronunciation for most of the exercises, contains a reading of Gen 22:1-19, and the answer key for the exercises at the end of each chapter.

The author's choice of terminology for the verbal system is well thought out, and the concerns expressed with traditional terminology are valid. The author has opted for descriptive terms such as "prefix conjugation" and "suffix conjugation" for what are traditionally known as "imperfect" and "perfect." For what is commonly known as the "converted imperfect" she has introduced a new term, "consecutive preterite," which is also descriptive and is consistent with the terminology for the other forms. However, she has opted for the term "vo-qatal" instead of the "converted perfect." This term seems out of place in that it is not descriptive like the other terms she has chosen. It might have been better to assign a descriptive term for this form also, or to have gone with the terminology following the Hebrew forms of the verb qatal for all the forms in the verbal system; i.e., qatal, vo-qatal, yiqtol, va-yiqtol.

The verb system is introduced in an unusual order: the prefixed conjugation, the "consecutive preterite" as she calls it, imperatives and volitives, and only then the suffix conjugation. The reason given in the introduction is to quickly introduce the student to the consecutive preterite, so common in biblical prose. However, this methodology may prove more confusing to students than the traditional introduction of the suffix conjugation, which allows the student to understand and build on the Hebrew system of word roots. This is inconsistent with her methodology for other sections of the book that keep in mind what is simplest for the student; for example, Hackett chose to list the verbal paradigms in the less traditional order from first to third person and has in the same fashion listed pronouns and pronominal suffixes in the same order. Since this is the order in which most modern languages are taught, it is the most familiar for the students.

It is stated in the introduction that the verbs will be introduced by starting with the strong verb in all stems and then be followed by the weak verbs in all stems. This division is better for the students in that it gives them a more solid foundation of Biblical Hebrew before bringing in the details and irregularities of the weak verbs. However, in practice some weak verbs are introduced soon after the lesson on the prefixed conjugation, the first introduction to verbs in the book.

The overall pace of the lessons seems a bit inconsistent. While the alphabet is introduced in the course of four lessons, the prefixed conjugation, imperatives, and negative imperatives are all contained in one lesson. By
introducing the verbs at such a quick pace the student is not given enough
time or examples to truly understand and practice the verbs.

The overall assessment is that this is a good textbook to be used
in a college or seminary setting, provided the teacher keeps in mind the
weaknesses listed above by, for example, setting a pace more in tune with his
or her students, and perhaps using the chapters of the book in a different
order. This book is not recommended for individuals trying to learn Hebrew
without the assistance of a teacher. The strongest point of this book is the
manner in which it is written, clearly and concisely, with good explanations of
Hebrew grammar and helpful exercises.

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C. J. Goulart

Hartlapp, Johannes. *Siebenten-Tags-Adventisten im Nationalsozialismus unter
Berücksichtigung der geschichtlichen und theologischen Entwicklung in Deutschland von
1875 bis 1950* ["Seventh-day Adventists in the Time of National Socialism,
with Consideration of the Historical and Theological Development
in Germany from 1875 to 1950"]. Kirche—Konfession—Religion 53.

“As the ability to forget is indeed grace, remembering . . . belongs to a
responsible life” (Dietrich Bonhoeffer). It is with this fitting quote of the
theologian and martyr of the Nazi era that Hartlapp opens a book that
challenges the reader in many ways. Perhaps the greatest challenge is to reflect
on the way of doing theology and being authentic Christians, especially the
Adventist way, after Seventh-day Adventists, like so many other Christians,
made terrible mistakes in the darkest hours of the twentieth century.

Hartlapp, who teaches church history at Friedensau Adventist University in
Germany, wrote this study as a doctoral dissertation at the Faculty of Theology,
University of Halle-Wittenberg. Its scope reaches back to the beginnings of
Adventism in Europe and particularly in Germany. Rather than focusing on
the Nazi period as such—the center of Hartlapp’s interpretative focus—the
book also gives accounts of the first generation of the Adventist Movement
in Germany (chap. 1), the conflicts surrounding military service and the
beginnings of the “Reformation Movement” during World War I (chap. 2),
and the development of German Adventism in the Weimar Republic (chap. 3).
While other authors highlighted particular aspects of these periods in earlier
studies (e.g., Jacob Patt, “The History of the Advent Movement in Germany”
[Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1958]; Gerhard Padderatz, *Conradi und
Hamburg* [Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kiel, Hamburg]), Hartlapp’s oeuvre
can rightly be called the first comprehensive history of Seventh-day Adventists
in Germany with significant interpretative results. His main contribution,
however, is a thorough treatment and in-depth analysis of Adventists in the
Third Reich.

It is difficult to do justice to a monumental 600-page study, which is the
result of the author’s pursuit of the topic during almost three decades, in a
short review. What is clear, however, is that the book will remain unrivaled
introducing the verbs at such a quick pace the student is not given enough
time or examples to truly understand and practice the verbs.

The overall assessment is that this is a good textbook to be used
in a college or seminary setting, provided the teacher keeps in mind the
weaknesses listed above by, for example, setting a pace more in tune with his
or her students, and perhaps using the chapters of the book in a different
order. This book is not recommended for individuals trying to learn Hebrew
without the assistance of a teacher. The strongest point of this book is the
manner in which it is written, clearly and concisely, with good explanations of
Hebrew grammar and helpful exercises.

Berrien Springs, Michigan

C. J. Goulart

Hartlapp, Johannes. *Siebenten-Tags-Adventisten im Nationalsozialismus unter
Berücksichtigung der geschichtlichen und theologischen Entwicklung in Deutschland von
1875 bis 1950* ["Seventh-day Adventists in the Time of National Socialism,
with Consideration of the Historical and Theological Development
in Germany from 1875 to 1950"]'). Kirche—Konfession—Religion 53.

“As the ability to forget is indeed grace, remembering . . . belongs to a
responsible life” (Dietrich Bonhoeffer). It is with this fitting quote of the
theologian and martyr of the Nazi era that Hartlapp opens a book that
challenges the reader in many ways. Perhaps the greatest challenge is to reflect
on the way of doing theology and being authentic Christians, especially the
Adventist way, after Seventh-day Adventists, like so many other Christians,
made terrible mistakes in the darkest hours of the twentieth century.

Hartlapp, who teaches church history at Friedensau Adventist University in
Germany, wrote this study as a doctoral dissertation at the Faculty of Theology,
University of Halle-Wittenberg. Its scope reaches back to the beginnings of
Adventism in Europe and particularly in Germany. Rather than focusing on
the Nazi period as such—the center of Hartlapp’s interpretative focus—the
book also gives accounts of the first generation of the Adventist Movement
in Germany (chap. 1), the conflicts surrounding military service and the
beginnings of the “Reformation Movement” during World War I (chap. 2),
and the development of German Adventism in the Weimar Republic (chap. 3).
While other authors highlighted particular aspects of these periods in earlier
studies (e.g., Jacob Patt, “The History of the Advent Movement in Germany”
[Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1958]; Gerhard Padderatz, *Conradi und
Hamburg* [Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kiel, Hamburg]), Hartlapp’s oeuvre
can rightly be called the first comprehensive history of Seventh-day Adventists
in Germany with significant interpretative results. His main contribution,
however, is a thorough treatment and in-depth analysis of Adventists in the
Third Reich.

It is difficult to do justice to a monumental 600-page study, which is the
result of the author’s pursuit of the topic during almost three decades, in a
short review. What is clear, however, is that the book will remain unrivaled
Boo k rev iews
in its field. A significant part of the sources that Hartlapp brings to life have not been used in any previous works. He consulted fully seventy (!) church and state archives, and his bibliography is more than 50 pages long. What is more, alongside his major contribution to knowledge, Hartlapp provides most helpful listings of anti-Adventist polemical literature (67-68, 80-81, 128, 170-182, 197), detailed accounts of encounters with other denominations in Germany (66-78, 170-195, 307-315, 577-580), and a fascinating record of self-made prophets (195-199, 255) and apocalyptical speculations (83-86). It is interesting to note that even Ludwig Richard Conradi, the outstanding leader among early European Adventists, believed it would be only “one generation” until the end of history!

With regard to the focus of the study, Siebenten-Tags-Adventisten im Nationalsozialismus presents a detailed chronicle of state repression and Adventist attempts to survive under the Nazi government (chap. 4), a description of postwar reactions (chap. 5), and an attempt at interpreting this chapter of history by expounding German Adventists’ worldview (chap. 6). Hartlapp succeeds in weaving together historical developments, critical analysis of factors that influenced denominational decisions, and an account of individuals’ positions and contributions, e.g., those of Hulda Jost, who was in charge of the church’s welfare activities and whose writings and actions revealed attitudes that resembled Nazi ideology rather closely (332-353). Of central importance is the account of church leaders’ major failures, such as attempts at distancing themselves from Jews (281, 287, 587) or the dissolution of practically all Sabbath-keeping principles (356-368, 450-457, 550-558).

Hartlapp’s evaluation of factors that contributed to many German Adventists giving up even fundamental principles of faith is accurate. It was not simply the consequences of Conradi’s leadership, as a comprehensive postwar analysis by David Rose explained (499-502; Conradi had already left the church in 1932). Rose was a missionary from the Southern European Division and had been commissioned to investigate the real situation of German Adventism in Nazi Germany. But precisely because Rose’s interpretation had the potential for “explaining away” what had happened, it did not help Adventists to learn from the mistakes that had been made.

It is certainly more helpful to realize, as Hartlapp suggests, that Adventists both in Germany and in the General Conference were politically naïve to some extent (515). No one anticipated the Nazi tyranny and a world war, and therefore the German church leadership was left without guidance and external advice during those trying years. Moreover, the denominational eschatology had no place for National Socialism; the experiences of the period simply did not fit in with the traditional rational and schematic prophetic interpretation (524). Moreover, Hartlapp correctly shows that some aspects of eschatology had changed even in the years before the war (527). Therefore, the apocalyptical ground on which the denomination had grown was not as firm anymore as it had been in the nineteenth century. This situation contributed to a shift in emphasis from eschatological to ecclesial concerns, leading to the avoidance of persecution and, finally, the attempt at
saving the organization at almost all costs. Since this principle seemed to be sanctioned even by the General Conference (570-572), Hartlapp argues that these years were not simply a period of German Adventist apostasy; rather, evading persecution arose from an ecclesiological basis and thus revealed an implicit theology. With the same logic, church leaders avoided any thorough review of this history and the leadership decisions in the following decades (529): a declaration on Adventist actions in Nazi Germany was published only in 2005. After the war, the general eschatological orientation led to looking forward rather than reflecting on what had happened.

This leads to the question of how this period of history should be interpreted after more than two generations. Hartlapp’s own evaluation is that Adventist remnant ecclesiology did not make any evident difference in the way the denomination acted during the Nazi period; as did other free churches, Adventists made compromises to an extent that put their very Christian identity in question (14). Ecclesiologically, this calls for further reflection on the question of whether failures are unavoidable elements of God’s church this side of the eschaton, and whether the distinction between ecclesia visibilis and invisibilis is a necessary ingredient of thinking “church,” even in Adventist ecclesiology.

The main theological contribution of the study is, however, not ecclesiological, but a reflection on eschatology. Hartlapp argues that changes in Adventist eschatology after the era of the denomination’s pioneers have not yet been properly reflected upon. He reasons that this is the case because in the first half of the twentieth century—and even now—many Adventists were and are not much interested in theological thinking, but in their particular current situation in the light of what they believe to be the final events of earth’s history. Thus, according to Hartlapp’s analysis (chap. 6), a subtle development of emphasis away from the parousia to the Sabbath happened in Adventism (552) and, later in Germany, from the Sabbath to the church. This led to the practical maxim that sustaining the church as an organization had the highest priority even when this implied far-reaching compromises.

Such an implicit logic can indeed explain how Adventist leaders and members went ever farther in bending to the demands of an anti-Christian government. One is tempted to ask what would have been the alternatives. The answer is probably the dissolution of the denomination, life in the underground, and persecution. While Hartlapp does not state it openly, his call for a theological return to focusing on the Second Coming would imply a relativization of the importance of an organized church in extreme situations such as Nazi Germany, and Christian readiness for martyrdom.

Hartlapp must be congratulated for clarifying many aspects of a history that is loaded with difficulties while trying to remain true to the demands of utter neutrality in historical scholarship. Of course a few questions can also be asked. One concerns the interpretative paradigm, which is not fully clear. While Hartlapp takes eschatology as a point of reference in his concluding analysis, at times the history he presents seems so descriptive that no clear framework emerges. This seeming weakness may turn out to be a strength,
however, because the multifaceted nature of the history is taken seriously; the different lines of development all stand alongside one another in their own right. Likewise, some detail mistakes (e.g., the emperor donation money that Adventists received for mission purposes does not imply that Catholics recognized Adventists—distribution was made for Protestants separately [77]; the language of the Pare is not “Mamba” but Chasu [51]) should not be taken too seriously in light of the overall contribution that the study makes. The only place where the reader might wish a different approach is in a few cases where detailed interpretations appear a bit overstated. Whether the “founders of the denomination did not construct in any way a closed system of beliefs” (213) is debatable; on their newly found “pillars,” they were very much united. Conradi certainly had an irenic attitude toward other Protestant missions, but calling this “close cooperation” (223) is somewhat exaggerated. The view that Adventists had the tendency of dissolving instances of biblical dialectic such as justification and sanctification rationally and one-sidedly (607) is probably true for some Adventists but not necessarily for the mainstream.

Still, with its careful account of Adventists’ actions in the Nazi context and the first systematic interpretation of the logic behind them, this book represents the finest scholarship regarding the history of twentieth-century Christianity, a lasting contribution to Adventist studies, and an example of a sympathetic, yet critical, historiographic approach to Adventism that is worthy of imitation. Thus, all students of Adventism and those interested in twentieth-century church history will find the book enlightening.

Theologische Hochschule Friedensau

Stefan Höschle

Friedensau, Germany


Johannes Hartlapp is a professor of church history, philosophy, ecumenics, and history of religions in Friedensau Adventist University, Germany. The current work constitutes his slightly revised and adapted doctoral dissertation that he submitted to the Faculty of Theology at the Martin Luther University at Halle-Wittenberg, Germany, in 2007. He has dealt with the matter already in a major research paper at Friedensau Seminary in 1979 (162 pp.), and in his M.A. thesis at Andrews University in 1992 (170 pp.), and in a dozen articles in periodicals and professional journals.

In his study of the history of German Adventism the author focuses especially on the questions of Sabbath observance, the expectation of Christ’s Second Advent, the way Adventists coped with the delayed parousia, and the relation of these points to the exclusive claim of the denomination (19). Chapter 1 describes the beginnings of Adventism in the German
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Empire and the tense relationships with governmental authorities and other denominations (1864–1914). Chapter 2 addresses the military participation in World War I, the resulting disunity in the church, the development of the Reform Movement, and the fruitless reconciliation meeting after the war (1914–1920). The enthusiastic period of the Weimar Republic (1920–1932), with Adventists striving for public acknowledgment is portrayed in chapter 3; various developments—new critics, great political events in the mid-1920s, the planned calendar reform, as well as questions regarding E. G. White and the sanctuary doctrine—are presented that had an impact on the next period. Chapter 4, constituting the heart of the book (240 pp.), describes the difficult time under the Nazi regime (1933–1945). The denomination was prohibited (November/December 1933), and after it was permitted again it assimilated, and with increasing isolation and restrictions tried to do almost everything to avoid another prohibition and possible persecution. Hence, in this wake it compromised various ethical values and foundational beliefs. In chapter 5, the relationship to the General Conference is described and how the German church leadership dealt with its own past (1945–1950s). Chapter 6 concentrates specifically on the focus points mentioned above, and draws conclusions about the why of both the Adventist Third Reich experience and the inability to face the past.

Hartlapp finds that since Adventists in their interpretation of the eschatological prophecies concentrated primarily on the activities of the Roman Catholic Church, they overlooked the anti-Christian features of National Socialism, which did not even exist in their prophetic framework (474, 581). Yet, while they assumed that God uses prophecy to show specific historical fulfillments that are of significance for God's people throughout the ages, the author of the book starts from the premise that there are various interpretational levels in the symbolic language of the prophets (606). Thus, although one may disagree with his basic premise in regard to prophecy, German Adventists admittedly had difficulties in applying the ethical values of Christ to the Nazi ideology. Here, a separate section on the treatment of Jewish citizens and church members—brief references are interspersed in the book (347, 415, 584-591)—might have provided a better disclosure of that aspect, especially since a history of the Third Reich is unthinkable without mentioning the Shoah. Unfortunately, the book takes no account of the articles on this issue by E. T. Decker, R. Blaich, and D. Heinz in *Thinking in the Shadow of Hell: The Impact of the Holocaust on Theology and Jewish-Christian Relations*, ed. J. B. Doukhun (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 2002), 155-208.

It may be true that an elite and exclusive concept of the church/remnant was the primary reason why it took German Adventists sixty years for an apology (512, 513). However, such prominent figures as E. G. White promoted a rather functional understanding of the church. The ontological understanding of the church that caused German Adventists to consider Jews as being rejected by God for all time (587), to deny any mistakes of the church during the Third Reich, and to move guilt simply on individual members (512,
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597), could have been caused also by such German virtues as loyalty, order, diligence, and striving for perfection, as well as by the felt need to defend themselves against charges of the Reform Movement.

The author's view of the joint guilt of the General Conference for the mistakes of German Adventists during the Nazi period (599, 600) is not really convincing. While after World War II the German leadership lamented the lack of advice and direction from the General Conference (604), it must be noted that they declined the advice of the General Conference in 1932 to contact the German government to obtain a noncombatant status (237); that they were unable to derive practical steps from the 1923 declaration of principles (157); and that they apparently did not take notice of various articles, directives, and books on the issue of civil government and service in the army, such as F. M. Wilcox, *Seventh-day Adventists in Time of War* (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1936). It is questionable that W. H. Teesdale's voice for National Socialism was so influential that the officers of the General Conference were paralyzed in their actions (512, 593). Hartlapp emphasizes that avoidance of persecution was viewed by L. H. Christian as the higher priority in his list of two principles (571, 604). However, a reader of Christian's advice to the German workers in 1939 gets the impression that the two have at least equal importance, if the second—holding fast to God's Word, his commandments, and the gospel—received not even more emphasis. It may be possible, after all, that North American Adventists regarded the noncombatant position as an ideal, but they did not realize that this position was not transferred to other fields in the world (562, 600). They provided principles merely expecting that others would be able to apply them in their national context.

It may be easier to classify the intensity of the General Conference's reaction to the Reform Movement in 1920 (143) with L. R. Conradi and people who seemed to share similar views, such as W. Michael, in 1932/1933 (217), and with the German church leadership after World War I and World War II, when one realizes that the leadership of any church finds it usually more difficult to deal with schismatics than with nonschismatic heretics.

Throughout the book appear various factual and bibliographic mistakes that should be corrected in a second edition: (1) D. Heinz (Church, State, and Religious Dissent, Archives of International Adventist History, 5 [Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1993], 35) in describing J. N. Andrews’s fruitless missionary efforts—temperance and health—does not mention that E. G. White had to acknowledge that her experience from North America was not applicable in Europe; thus Hartlapp’s reference to Heinz is misleading (30). (2) L. R. Conradi did not experience his conversion at the camp meeting in the summer of 1878 (35), but during his stay with an Adventist family during the early months of that year (L. R. Conradi, “God’s Opening Providences,” General Conference Bulletin, June 4, 1913, 268). (3) It is true that only a little research was done on the history of Sabbath-keeping among the Anabaptists in Central and Eastern Europe (45), but it would have been worthwhile to mention D. Liechty, Sabbatarianism in the Sixteenth Century: A Page in the History of the Radical Reformation (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1993). (4) Hartlapp concludes that L. H. Christian distorted historical facts by suggesting E. G. White had settled the military and school question while being in Europe (144). However, Christian did not say that the issues were settled; he just referred to a statement about the Sabbath that White made in 1886 while in Europe (see E. G. White, “Notes of Travel,” in Historical Sketches of the Foreign Missions of the Seventh-day Adventists [Basel: Imprimerie Polyglotte, 1886], 216-218; cf. L. H. Christian, Pioneers and Builders of the Advent Cause in Europe [Mountain View: Pacific Press, 1937], 150). (5) R. S. Owen’s Review and Herald article could not have been published on June 3, 1917 (213); no issue was printed on that date. (6) When E. G. White stated that she never claimed to be a prophetess, that was not a denial of a prophetic ministry as such (215), but she was afraid of the negative reputation of people who claimed that title for what they were doing, and she pointed out that her ministry encompassed more than just the work of a prophet (E. G. White, Selected Messages [Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1958], 1:34-36). (7) E. G. White made the statement, “I have had no special light on the point [the definition of šāmîd in Dan 8:9-13] presented for discussion, and I do not see the need of this discussion,” in response to the leaders in the United States in 1910 rather than to L. R. Conradi in 1898 (228) (see E. G. White, “Pamphlet 20—A Call to the Watchmen,” 1910, 5, 6). (8) Der Hausfreund was edited by “Klemis” or “Klemens” A. Offermann—both spellings were used—rather than “Karl” Offermann (254, 255, 676). (9) There was no denomination called “Antitrinitarians” in mid-nineteenth-century North America (518); it should probably refer to the New England Branch of the Christian Connexion, which maintained a semi-Arian view. (10) K. F. Mueller’s thesis that W. Miller eventually accepted Snow’s proclaimed October 22, 1844, date does not contradict Miller’s statement that he had not preached a fixed date (520). His self-testimony suggests that he adopted that date about October 6, 1844 (quoted in F. D. Nichol, The Midnight Cry [Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1944], 270, 277). (11) Although J. Bates had written a letter to T. M. Preble, after reading his pamphlet on the Sabbath, he did not visit him but F. Wheeler (545). (12) L. E. Froom’s four-volume series The Prophetic Faith of Our
Fathers was published already between 1946 and 1954; the 1982 edition was merely a reprint (549). (13) H. Edson had been a member of the Methodist Church rather than the Christian Connexion (560). (14) The 1915 edition of Leben und Wirken was not the first publication that contained E. G. White’s first vision, but it was already published in Erfahrungen und Gesichte sowie Geistliche Gaben ([Hamburg: Internationale Traktat-Gesellschaft, 1899], 12-20).

It would have been helpful for readers if sometimes a connection had been made to related data. One example may suffice: After World War II, various German leaders claimed that their workers had served almost exclusively in noncombatant positions and had free Sabbaths in the Wehrmacht (491, 496). Yet, statistics from the wartime manifest that just a minor part were able to serve as medics (461). Adventist soldiers initially had free Sabbaths; later such privileges were only seldom granted (459-462).

Hartlapp’s volume represents the most comprehensive work on Seventh-day Adventism under the Nazi regime. Everyone interested in the history of Adventism in Central Europe and church and state relations in the Third Reich should consult this massive product of thorough research. The few random imperfections should not disturb the main study, and even if one would interpret some sources differently, the book shows how easily one may be willing to give up basic rights, core doctrines, and ethical values, thereby losing the very identity one tries to protect.

Berrien Springs, Michigan

Denis Kaiser


In contrast with many current offerings in the field of Greek pedagogical tools, which tend to divide basic grammar and more advanced syntax into different volumes, James A. Hewett’s *New Testament Greek: A Beginning and Intermediate Grammar*, newly updated from the 1986 edition, combines these components in one volume.

This new edition, revised and expanded by C. Michael Robbins and Steven R. Johnson, has altered the original work in several ways: first, the expected correction of small errors in chart data and, second, the expected corrections of spelling or modifications to formatting, making the overall layout easier on the eye and more intuitive.

More than this, however, as the new preface specifies, some material has been expanded, deleted, or moved to the appendix. For instance, the rules for accentuation, originally found in the first chapter, are now located in the appendix, as are tables and paradigms, which have been greatly expanded since the first edition. Additionally, many footnotes pointing to secondary literature have been deleted “in the interest of pedagogy” (xiv).

The first two chapters, new to the revised edition, provide basic grammatical explanations of how language works that had previously been scattered
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The first two chapters, new to the revised edition, provide basic grammatical explanations of how language works that had previously been scattered
throughout the book, a boon to students for whom English is not their first language or for those without a solid foundation in English grammar.

Chapter 3 introduces the Greek language by presenting the alphabet with traditional Erasmian rather than modern Greek pronunciation, syllabification, and punctuation. Further chapters attempt to bring the student quickly to a basic reading level through an introduction to verbs and nouns. Unlike other grammars that organize and teach the nominal system first, and sometimes even in its entirety, Hewett presents the verbal system in chapter 4, covering both present and future tenses.

Most of the nominal system based on first- and second-declension noun endings (such as personal, relative, and demonstrative pronouns) is covered in chapters 5-9 and part of chapter 13. The verbal system is revisited and the rest of the indicative paradigm is covered in chapters 9-14, while nonindicative moods, including participles, liquids, contracts, and μι verbs occupy chapters 17-24. It's not until chapters 15 and 16 that the third declension and related systems are discussed; this may seem a bit late in the game, but at least it's covered before participles are addressed. The main instruction of the book concludes in chapter 25, and finally devotes needed space to the more complex syntactical functions of the genitive, dative, and accusative cases that were introduced much earlier.

Each chapter concludes with practice exercises, the standard Greek-to-English and newly added English-to-Greek. For those wishing to self-correct their translations, the book is accompanied by a CD containing a “Key to Exercises” in Adobe Acrobat format, along with forty-three pages of paradigm charts and a short lexicon of the most common Greek vocabulary, similar to the material found in the appendix. The CD has an option to install software to help the student with verb identification and to build vocabulary through a flash-card module, including a vocalization of each word.

According to Hewett, the book’s anticipated application is primarily as a classroom textbook; however, he also believes it can be useful for the individual wishing to learn NT Greek outside an institutional setting. The book must, then, be evaluated with these two main purposes in mind.

How does New Testament Greek function as a delivery tool? This work is admittedly a hybrid, an attempt to merge two intimately related yet distinct features of the language into one condensed package. As such, it struggles to be good at both. The grammatical aspects are the book’s strength. Explanations are crisp, albeit brief and sometimes without explanation as to why certain paradigms function as they do; but this need not prevent a student from learning the necessary material. Initially, I was concerned by the jumps back and forth between the nominal and verbal systems, and the confusion this might create. On further consideration, however, giving students the ability to cover basic sentences after only three lessons in the Greek has the obvious benefit of motivation through discernable progress and achievement. One downside of the exercises is that actual text from the Greek NT (UBS, 1994 edition) doesn’t often appear in the exercises until after chapter 13.
If grammar is the book’s strength, it comes at the expense of in-depth syntactical explanations of various categories, which are too few, brief, and understated. For the student in an undergraduate theology program, Bible college, or seminary who takes Greek in two semesters, or even over a couple of years, such brevity will leave holes in his or her ability to evaluate the various usages of nouns and verbs, on whose very interpretation an accurate theology often hinges. Well-written volumes covering advanced syntax and grammar are readily available, and must be used to supplement this work.

But can average people pick up this book and learn to read the NT on their own? If an individual is a strong self-starter, motivated, and takes time to read the book closely, the content will cover the basics. The benefits of the accompanying CD are to be most realized in this scenario: the student reading the chapter, doing the exercises, self-correcting with the provided key, and then searching previous chapters for why the answer was wrong. The diligent student will find that in just a few lessons, basic Greek sentences very similar to NT Greek will be readable.

So while Hewett attempts to merge both grammar and syntax of NT Greek into one volume, he has only succeeded in adding slightly more syntax to his book than other popular grammarians, while still offering only basic coverage of the essential grammatical systems, a combination that may not be attractive to most teachers of Greek. It may, still, catch the eye of those wishing to learn on their own.

Berrien Springs, Michigan


Christ and Caesar addresses the issues of how Paul, and Luke who told Paul’s story, understood the relationship of the gospel to Roman imperial power. Kim opens the book by revealing that he began his research on this topic anticipating the validity of the counter-imperial interpretation of Paul, and its value for NT interpretation. By the end of the study, however, Kim concludes that Paul and Luke are agreed in both “their dialectical attitude to the Roman Empire . . . and in their avoidance of expounding the political implications of the gospel and formulating it in an anti-imperial way.” Instead, he states, they stress personal change “over against institutional change” and “the imminent parousia of the Lord Jesus Christ for the consummation of salvation” (199). Kim comes to this conclusion after thoughtful consideration of the Pauline passages most often used to support the anti-imperial hypothesis (1 Thessalonians, Philippians, Romans, and 1 Corinthians), and of Luke’s presentation of Jesus’ redemption and of the apostles’ work. Particular attention is given in the book to identifying problematic methodology and other challenges with the anti-imperial interpretation.

Part 1 addresses the Pauline passages, beginning in chapters 1 and 2 by considering the readings of a number of leading theorists on this topic. Kim grants the use, in these passages, of terms used to extol Christ and his
If grammar is the book’s strength, it comes at the expense of in-depth syntactical explanations of various categories, which are too few, brief, and understated. For the student in an undergraduate theology program, Bible college, or seminary who takes Greek in two semesters, or even over a couple of years, such brevity will leave holes in his or her ability to evaluate the various usages of nouns and verbs, on whose very interpretation an accurate theology often hinges. Well-written volumes covering advanced syntax and grammar are readily available, and must be used to supplement this work.

But can average people pick up this book and learn to read the NT on their own? If an individual is a strong self-starter, motivated, and takes time to read the book closely, the content will cover the basics. The benefits of the accompanying CD are to be most realized in this scenario: the student reading the chapter, doing the exercises, self-correcting with the provided key, and then searching previous chapters for why the answer was wrong. The diligent student will find that in just a few lessons, basic Greek sentences very similar to NT Greek will be readable.

So while Hewett attempts to merge both grammar and syntax of NT Greek into one volume, he has only succeeded in adding slightly more syntax to his book than other popular grammarians, while still offering only basic coverage of the essential grammatical systems, a combination that may not be attractive to most teachers of Greek. It may, still, catch the eye of those wishing to learn on their own.

Berrien Springs, Michigan


Christ and Caesar addresses the issues of how Paul, and Luke who told Paul's story, understood the relationship of the gospel to Roman imperial power. Kim opens the book by revealing that he began his research on this topic anticipating the validity of the counter-imperial interpretation of Paul, and its value for NT interpretation. By the end of the study, however, Kim concludes that Paul and Luke are agreed in both “their dialectical attitude to the Roman Empire . . . and in their avoidance of expounding the political implications of the gospel and formulating it in an anti-imperial way.” Instead, he states, they stress personal change “over against institutional change” and “the imminent parousia of the Lord Jesus Christ for the consummation of salvation” (199). Kim comes to this conclusion after thoughtful consideration of the Pauline passages most often used to support the anti-imperial hypothesis (1 Thessalonians, Philippians, Romans, and 1 Corinthians), and of Luke’s presentation of Jesus’ redemption and of the apostles’ work. Particular attention is given in the book to identifying problematic methodology and other challenges with the anti-imperial interpretation.

Part 1 addresses the Pauline passages, beginning in chapters 1 and 2 by considering the readings of a number of leading theorists on this topic. Kim grants the use, in these passages, of terms used to extol Christ and his
kingdom, which parallel those used of Roman imperial rule, as well as the presence of the imperial cult in a number of these cities. He also grants that Paul did at times present the gospel of Jesus in antithesis to the gospel-good news of Caesar’s Pax Romana, while seeking to shape the people of God as an alternative society to the ways of the Roman world. He argues, however, that in the context of each book as a whole, Roman imperial rule is just one example of a much broader problem. He argues further that Paul neither opposed Roman rule, advocated resistance to Rome, nor gave any clear or extended criticism of the Roman government.

Chapter 3 and 4 address the methodological problems and interpretative difficulties common in the defense of the anti-imperial hypothesis. Kim contends, for example, that it is illogical to argue that the Roman parallels in Paul’s terminology for Christ and his rule would have been clearly understood as attacks on Roman power, while at the same time arguing that attacks on Rome cannot be seen elsewhere in the Pauline writings because safety needs forced him to place his attacks in code. Kim demonstrates instead, that Paul believed that the oppression and injustice of the Roman Empire would be resolved only at the parousia, which was imminent. In places in Part 1, it is not clear whether Kim allows for Christ’s kingdom to be presented as in anyway antithetical to Rome, but this is eventually made clear in the summary and conclusion to the section.

Part 2 of the book deals with Luke and Acts, arguing that one purpose of Luke-Acts was to demonstrate the inaccuracy of any political interpretation of Jesus’ Messiahship, and of Paul’s gospel. Chapters 6-10 demonstrate that while Luke was critically aware of the evils of the Roman Empire and did not flinch from proclaiming Jesus and not Caesar to be the true Lord, he portrays the redemption brought by the Messiah Jesus not as a deliverance from the Roman Empire, but from the kingdom of Satan. Thus Jesus, in his life and death, dealt with many and varied manifestations of evil—including sin, suffering, oppression, and death—not in a political way, by trying to change the socioeconomic systems of his day, but through spiritual deliverance and the formation of a community acting in love and peace. While Luke’s early chapters present Jesus as a kingly figure bringing deliverance from enemies, Luke and Acts go on to demonstrate that, rather than calling for vengeance on the Gentiles, Jesus criticized violent revolution and redefined the people of God to include Gentiles. Further, Acts shows that Jesus, upon his exaltation to the right hand of God, continued this same work through his apostles. Kim ascribes this approach by Luke-Acts not to a single reason but to a variety of factors that he explores in chapter 11.

In his conclusions, Kim switches course abruptly to suggest that Luke’s ascension Christology, as well as several Pauline passages, provide the church with a theological model calling the church, now freer, more numerous, and less eschatologically focused, to extend Christ’s saving work also to the political sphere. Though he briefly gives several justifications for this view, including precedents he sees in the books of Revelation and Hebrews, this final assertion does not necessarily follow from the preceding chapters, and
requires more extensive argumentation to be credible. The weakness of this final argument does not, however, detract from the value of Kim has done in analyzing and responding to the hypothesis that Luke and Paul advocated opposition against the Roman Empire. This book will be useful to anyone interested in what the NT has to say about political involvement by Christians and the church.

Andrews University


Many theologies of John have approached the book from a variety of directions. Typically scholars approach the Fourth Gospel in terms of its relation to the OT or other ancient sources. Others approach the book in terms of the Greco-Roman context or of proposed earlier stages in the development of the Gospel. Without disparaging these other approaches, Koester chooses to limit himself to careful attention to the text of John as we have it.

According to Koester, to read the Gospel of John theologically is to ask a series of questions: “Who is the God about whom Jesus speaks? Who does the Gospel say that Jesus is? And how does the Gospel understand life, death, sin, and faith?” Koester finds these issues coming up again and again in the narrative of John’s Gospel, each time disclosing a fresh dimension of these themes. He believes, therefore, that the best approach to a theology of the Gospel of John is to draw on the Gospel as a whole.

Koester, however, does not limit himself to the theological language of the Gospel’s author. Instead, he approaches John’s theology primarily on the basis of classical categories such as God, Christ, humanity, sin, Spirit, and faith. However, he breaks down each of these using categories drawn from the Gospel itself, such as word, light, life, flesh, world, truth, and witness. This unusual intersection of John’s language and classical themes, is, however, extremely successful, in my opinion. The outcome is by far the most fruitful and interesting theology of John I have read.

The book is elegantly written, a model of clarity and organization. I don’t mean to suggest that the book is light reading. It is not. But Koester has thought deeply about recognizable themes in the Gospel and has brought fresh wording and insight to bear on them. In the process, he has a knack for contemporary analogies that clarify inner connections within the Gospel without oversimplifying. To put it in other words, the more you know about the Fourth Gospel, the more you will appreciate this book.
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Andrews University

TERESA REEVE

Koester, Craig R. *The Word of Life: A Theology of John's Gospel*. Grand Rapids:

Craig Koester is Professor of New Testament at Luther Seminary in St. Paul,
Minnesota. Previous books from his pen include *Symbolism in the Fourth Gospel:*
*Meaning, Mystery, Community* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2003); *Revelation*
and the End of All Things* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001); and *Hebrews: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary,* Anchor Bible Commentary,

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the Fourth Gospel, the more you will appreciate this book.
Koester repeatedly illuminates connections and themes in this book in a way that made me marvel that I had not seen things that way before. You could say he points out the obvious, except the obvious wasn't obvious before he pointed it out. Biblical theology doesn't get any better than this. If there is a weakness in the book, it is that Koester's elegant language packs so much into so few words that a quick reading of this book is not possible. Genuine engagement with the book requires line-by-line thoughtfulness and analysis.

The power of Koester's language is better experienced than described. “The prologue takes readers to an elevated vantage point, where they can see things that those confined to the flat plain below cannot see.” (98) “If people are created for life, they will seek whatever they think will bring it. The issue is not whether people will seek life—that is a given. The issue is where their pursuit of life will take them and where their faith will be centered” (171). In context these statements are even more powerful than they are in isolation.

Let me summarize the flow of the book as a whole. After a short introduction to the Fourth Gospel and the history of its theological interpretation, Koester offers a chapter on the theme of God in John’s Gospel. The purpose of the Gospel is to make God known through the story of Jesus. The next chapter focuses on the world and its people. The people in John ask who Jesus is, but their encounters with Jesus also disclose who they are.

The fourth chapter focuses on the identity of Jesus, brought out in a series of stages. After a chapter on the death and resurrection of Jesus, in which he reemphasizes the holistic nature of humanity, the sixth chapter explores the Spirit in the Gospel of John. It is the Spirit that provides a real sense of the risen Christ and his Father to the believing community. Therefore, wherever someone comes to know the risen Christ, it is evident that the Spirit of God is at work. The seventh and best chapter is on faith; I will have more to say about that chapter below. Finally, the eighth chapter is on discipleship. The life of Jesus’ disciple is not so much bound up with abstract teachings as with a living relationship with Jesus. Disciples are to observe what Jesus does, and that is the norm for how they are to treat others.

This book is far too insightful to effectively review in a couple of pages. A longer version of this review is on the web site www.thebattleofarageddon.com. Here I would like to highlight two of the many helpful themes of the book. The first is Koester’s position on the human condition in death. According to Koester, John does not work with a dualistic view in which people have an immortal soul that can be separated from the mortal body. In death the whole person dies. He summarizes the Gospel’s position with the provocative statement, “Someone who falls asleep can remain in the care of someone else until he or she is awakened” (182).

In my opinion, the very best part of the book is the first half of the chapter on faith (163-174). While firmly grounded in the text and setting of the entire Gospel, Koester offers the clearest explanation of how faith works and the practical struggle for faith in today’s world that I have ever read. This part of the book brilliantly blurs the line between scholarship and devotional writing, along the lines of Richard Hays or N. T. Wright.
Koester correctly points out that everyone sees the miraculous “signs” in the Gospel from a different point of view. Characters in the Gospel respond positively to Jesus’ signs if they have already been brought to faith through the words from or about Jesus. It is the words that bring faith, not the “signs.” The signs can only confirm faith. Readers who live after the resurrection of Jesus cannot see the actions of the earthly Jesus. Yet they have what is essential. They have received the words from and about Jesus through the Gospel. They need not look elsewhere for wonders to believe in. John’s text has all the works and words that they need to come to faith.

For John, then, faith is the context in which genuine understanding develops. Those who show an initial trust in Jesus do not have all their questions answered at the outset. They come to understand Jesus as they follow him. So if faith is the context in which understanding develops, relationship with a Jesus we cannot see can begin in the absence of understanding. It is triggered by the words and works of Jesus and acted upon by his surrogate, the Holy Spirit. To those of a modernistic worldview, Koester’s outline of faith in John’s Gospel may seem naive in a scientific world. But a younger, postmodern generation will find the stories of the Gospel fertile ground for faith.

As one who has written a couple of books on the Gospel of John, I find Koester’s scholarship impeccable. As one who loves to blur the line between scholarship and popular devotional writing, I was deeply nourished by this book. For those who appreciate the combination of great scholarship and great writing, this book will be a challenging read but an extremely rewarding one.

Loma Linda University
Loma Linda, California

Jon Paulien


*Seventh-day Adventists and the Civil Rights Movement* by Samuel London is a pioneering work in Adventist scholarship. It is the first study, that I am aware of, that provides an in-depth analysis of Seventh-day Adventist participation in the Civil Rights Movement. The writer explores how Adventist theology, especially its eschatological vision and ecclesiology, influenced the way its members responded to sociopolitical activism. He explains why the church leadership advocated nonparticipation, but why some members became involved anyway.

London points out that there is a dearth of literature that deals with Adventist political involvement; however, three works are worth mentioning that could be considered part of this dialogue: Holly Fishers, “Oakwood’s College Student Quest for Social Justice Before and During the Civil Rights Era” (*Journal of African History* 2003, 88); James Kyle Jr., “SDAs and the Civil Rights Movement: The First Decade” (unpublished, 1977); and Roger Dudley and Edwin Hernandez, “Citizens of Two Worlds: Religion and Politics among American Seventh-day Adventists” (Andrews University Press, 1992).
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In chapter 1, London explores the roots of the Seventh-day Adventist Church and recounts the efforts of Ellen G. White (one of the cofounders of the Seventh-day Adventist Church) and her son to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the newly freed Black slaves living in the South.

Chapter 2 examines the key ideological and theological concepts that were used by White American Adventist leaders in the 1950s and 1960s to justify the nonparticipation of the church in the Civil Rights Movement and their justification for segregation within the denomination. This chapter also looks on the other side, by addressing the intellectual and theological justification for social activism by several prominent Black Adventist leaders.

Chapter 3 explores the emergence of African-American activism by highlighting the contributions of prominent Black Adventists like Matthew Strachan and Irene Morgan toward sociopolitical reform in the 1940s. The chapter also argues that a heightened sense of community consciousness motivated these Adventist activists to become involved in the struggle for greater equality and justice for Blacks.

Chapter 4 focuses on the involvement of Black Adventist lay persons in the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s, especially the contributions of Alfonso Green Jr., Terrance Roberts, and Frank Hale Jr. “in combating social injustice within the Seventh-day Adventist church and secular society.” London demonstrates how factors such as community awareness gained from personal experience with racism, the example of Adventist pioneers, and Bible teachings on social justice played a key role in motivating these activists.

Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the sociopolitical activism of Black ministers from the South Central Conferences, in particular Charles E. Dudley Sr., Charles Joseph, and Earl Moore; and from the South Atlantic Conference and the General Conference, focusing on men such as Warren S. Banfield Jr., Franklin Hill II, and Edward Earl Cleveland. The narrative describes the efforts of these men to encourage their church to embrace the social changes sweeping the nation. The writer also pointed to the fact that these men faced stern opposition from some of the White Adventist leaders who were reluctant to adopt these changes.

The final chapter reexamines some of the critical issues raised in the book, including, for example, how community awareness motivated Adventists for social justice, the role of the Adventist pioneers, liberationist interpretations of the Bible, the role of Adventist eschatology and ecclesiology in impacting Adventist views of political involvement, and the role of Black Adventist activism.

London’s book is an outstanding historical analysis of Seventh-day Adventists’ views and behavior concerning a sociopolitical issue during one of the most tumultuous periods in the nation’s history. The judgment of history on the leadership of the church in light of its behavior toward issues of social justice is not a favorable one. The Adventist Church’s nonparticipatory stance may have arisen from a number of factors, including premillennialism, apocalyptic eschatology, sectarian ecclesiology, conservatism, and the all-consuming focus on evangelism. But these are not the only factors. Many of
the early Adventist pioneers exhibited many of these same values, yet they were not afraid to address the great social issue of their days. They spoke eloquently against slavery, although most were not true social activists. These early pioneers, such as Joseph Bates, J. N. Andrews, James and Ellen White, and John Loughborough, lambasted the United States for its involvement with the evil of slavery. They were not afraid to be out of step with American society. Socially and politically they would not be considered conservatives in their day. In spite of this countercultural beginning, however, how did the Adventist Church by the turn of the twentieth century find itself so unconcerned with sociopolitical issues and so politically conservative? London does not answer this critical question. This is the major weakness in his book. The author might have helped us to better understand the Adventist role in the Civil Rights Movement if he had explored the evolution of Adventist involvement with sociopolitical issues from the time of the pioneers (midnineteenth century) to the 1950s and 1960s and helped to explain how and why the church lost its way.

London's analysis shows a church leadership conservative in its political and social ideology and an organization practicing racism in many of its institutions. One of the most shameful revelations of this research was that, even after the United States’ government had outlawed segregation, Adventists continued to practice racial segregation in their institutions. Instead of providing a moral example to the nation on equality and social justice, they allowed secular society to lead the way in this vital area. They were not apolitical, as they claimed, which is the reason they gave for their nonparticipation in the Civil Rights Movement. This was a racist denomination justifying its behavior based on the counsel given by E. G. White, which was ripped out of its original context to suit its purpose. Injustice and inequality were dressed up in the garb of piety and religiosity and presented to the people as if it were divine counsel. Black Adventists were systematically barred from Adventist hospitals, schools, and churches; and when they were admitted, were treated as second-class citizens. Several Black worshipers were barred from attending White churches and some were even threatened with death in God’s house. The behavior of God’s remnant people was shameful and disgraceful, and it begs the question, How did the church reconcile the claims of being “the chosen remnant” when its members were blatantly violating the most basic of Jesus’ commandments: “then shall men know that you are my disciples when you have love for one another”?

Seventh-day Adventists and the Civil Rights Movement is an excellent book and highly recommended for those who have an interest in this area. It provides a good beginning and a window to explore further in an area of study that has been long neglected.

Andrews University

TREVOR O’REGGIO


Scholars of the African American experience in Adventism have long focused on Charles Kinney as the preeminent African American figure in the early
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Scholars of the African American experience in Adventism have long focused on Charles Kinney as the preeminent African American figure in the early
history of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. Indeed, Kinney has been called the father of Black Adventism, which is understandable given the fact that he was the first African American ordained to the Adventist ministry. Unfortunately, the focus on Kinney has relegated other notable Blacks to the margins and obscured some of them altogether. Such has been the case with Lewis C. Sheafe, who, for the most part, has been unknown within and beyond Adventism in spite of the significant role he played in early Seventh-day Adventist history.

In *Lewis C. Sheafe: Apostle to Black America*, Douglas Morgan rescues Sheafe from anonymity and obscurity. Morgan, who earned a Ph.D. in the History of Christianity and is a professor of history at Washington Adventist University, is eminently qualified to write this important book, which was published by the Review and Herald as part of its Adventist Pioneer Series. Passionate about the African American diasporic experience, Morgan is also secretary of the Sabbath in Africa Project, an initiative of the African American former church leader Charles E. Bradford, which argues that the seventh-day Sabbath was known and observed in Africa long before European slave traders descended on the continent.

Born and raised during a volatile period of our nation’s history, Sheafe was an outstanding Baptist minister who early displayed a dislike for the inequities and injustices he saw being meted out to African Americans. While others may have chosen to stand in solidarity with Blacks in covert ways, Sheafe chose to do so openly and vigorously. Learned and lettered, he was an eloquent, articulate spokesman for the Black cause, never letting go of an opportunity to publicly stand up for his people, and his large intellect and keen wit combined to make him a formidable force with whom to contend. Yet Sheafe also knew how to be discreet and diplomatic in his dealings with the powerful and those in authority. Sheafe, who left the Baptist denomination for Adventism after receiving medical treatment at the denomination’s Battle Creek Sanitarium, quickly blazed through Adventism’s ministerial ranks to a position of prominence, ultimately organizing the first overwhelmingly African American congregation in Adventism—the People’s Church in Washington, D.C.

The book is deftly divided into six sections that span Sheafe’s life chronologically. Readers are therefore able to walk with Sheafe through his personal and professional development, seeing him grow from the young, gifted, charismatic leader that he was, to the complex, if not complicated, figure that he became. Complex or complicated, throughout the book Sheafe remains a compelling study that defies simple analysis.

“Section One: ‘Go Preach to Your People’” traces Sheafe’s life as a Baptist minister, fresh out of seminary, in Minneapolis. Energetic and visionary, he plunged into ministry, displaying a penchant for social activism and community engagement, and believing that churches were the “most powerful agency for social advance” (61). In “Section Two: ‘Eminent Baptist Divine’: The Ohio Years,” he emerges as a powerful leader whose influence transcended the precincts of his parish. Indeed, Sheafe’s parish seemed to be the entire African American community, if for no other reason than that
he never declined an opportunity to minister wherever and whenever such ministry involved the Black community. This was especially the case if the occasion had to do with the plight and uplift of his people.

Beginning in “Section Three: ‘This Message for All my People,’” Sheafe is a Seventh-day Adventist minister who “quickly became a controversial and threatening figure” (114). The multitalented Sheafe joined the Adventist Church because he believed Adventists “applied the principles of the gospel to race relations in a thorough and consistent manner” (150). His passion for and success in the area of evangelism quickly distinguished him, and he was viewed as without peer as a preacher and pastor by significant figures in the denomination, including John Harvey Kellogg. Yet what really set Sheafe apart throughout his preaching ministry was his ability to captivate not only Black audiences but White ones as well.

“Section Four: ‘Noted Apostle of Seventh-day Adventism’” captures Sheafe’s fifteen-year tenure as an Adventist minister in Washington, D.C. that ended with his decision to sever his relationship with the denomination over what he perceived as injustices in the way denominational leadership dealt with his congregation. The break is covered in “Section Five: ‘The Separation Was a Sad Mistake.’” “Section Six: ‘One Minister Who Thinks for Himself’” traces Sheafe’s tenure as a repentant Adventist minister serving in southern California and his return to Washington, D.C., where he ended his ministerial career outside the realm of Adventism.

Not content to simply tell Sheafe’s story, Morgan delves into the legacy of the talented preacher and leader in a concluding chapter. Morgan’s analysis of Sheafe’s legacy is balanced and meaningful, with a telling observation being that, their best intentions notwithstanding, no independent Black Adventist denomination has ever survived. Yet, while Morgan’s claim that “the pattern of separate Black denominations among Baptists, Methodists, and Pentecostals . . . did not replicate itself in Adventism” is true, his claim that “Adventism today stands out among American Protestant denominations for racial diversity” may be challenged by some. The volume is enhanced by a collection of pictures in the middle that contributes life, energy, and dynamism to it.

One strength of this book is that Morgan places Sheafe squarely in his historical and political context. Thus, readers are made aware that Sheafe’s hopes for his people reflect the ideals and principles of progressivism, the political ideology that characterized turn-of-the-century and early-twentieth-century America. Morgan is to be commended for spinning the narrative’s themes, all reasonable and profound, around historical events and incidents, and for resisting the temptation to jump to convoluted conclusions that would have left the reader confused and confounded.

Another strength of this volume is that Morgan draws heavily from an astounding array of primary sources to spin the story of his controversial subject. This book reflects the many hours of careful, diligent research that went into it, and Morgan is methodical and scholarly in the way he orders the material. The author’s integrity is evident in that he makes no apologies.
for the flaws he sees in his subject. Morgan portrays Sheafe with candor and clarity, warts and all.

A major contribution of this book is that it provides one rationale as to why African Americans have remained loyal to the Seventh-day Adventist denomination in spite of their experience of disenfranchisement within it. According to Morgan, the reason is that, for the most part, African Americans believe that “the organized Adventist work is ordained of God as the instrument through which His final message is to be taken to the world” (329). That sterling conviction, Morgan contends, trumps the often negative experience of Blacks within Adventism.

If anything is lacking in this volume, it is that it does not contain more about Sheafe’s personal life, especially his two wives and children. Readers are left to speculate whether Sheafe’s children attended Oakwood College, on whose Board Sheafe sat, the course of study his children pursued, and the careers upon which they embarked. Morgan says little about Sheafe as a father. Morgan, true to form, focuses on the historical significance of Sheafe, and may have veered away intentionally from an in-depth portrayal and analysis of Sheafe’s personal life. Given the complexity of Sheafe’s personality, and his penchant for provoking tension, some psychological exploration and analysis may also have been helpful. Yet, the absence of it does not discount the value of this important book. Morgan, after all, is a historian, not a psychologist or psychiatrist.

Morgan could also have examined the relationship, or lack thereof, that Sheafe had with Charles Kinney, “the father of Black Adventism.” One is left to wonder how well they knew each other, whether they ever conferred or collaborated, and whether, given Sheafe’s enormous talents and charisma, professional jealousy may have had an impact on their relationship.

In writing this biography, Morgan has rendered the Seventh-day Adventist denomination an invaluable service. Lewis C. Sheafe: Apostle to Black America is not just the biography of a charismatic personality, but a moving account of a particular era of Adventist Church history. It provides a window into the inner circle of General Conference leadership and shows how that inner circle functioned around the turn of the twentieth century. Two major developments in the denomination’s history were the relocation of its headquarters from Battle Creek, Michigan, to Washington, D.C., and the establishment of union conferences in 1901. Both events occurred while Sheafe was a powerful force with which to contend in the nation’s capital, and Morgan skillfully situates Sheafe near, if not at, the center that drove denominational decision-making. That Sheafe, an African American minister, had the ear of denominational leadership and knew on a first-name basis several of the key figures in Adventism at the time (e.g., A. G. Daniells, A. T. Jones, and J. H. Kellogg) is noteworthy.

Yet this book is most helpful in that it provides a snapshot of the way the Adventist denomination struggled with the issue of race during its infancy. The complexity of Sheafe’s personality is mirrored in the complexity of the strategies Adventism utilized in its early dealings with the race issue, one of
which was the creation of the Negro Department of the General Conference in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Readers will find this book immensely helpful. Though it is lengthy (440 pages), it reads quickly and interestingly, a testament to the author’s ability. I highly recommend it and applaud Morgan for a well-researched, well-written, scholarly biography that fills a gap in African American and denominational religious history.

Andrews University

Clifford Jones


This volume is an expanded version of the lexicon published in 2002 and reviewed previously in *AUSS* 45 (2007): 277-278. The coverage of that volume was “Chiefly of the Pentateuch and the Twelve Prophets” and was itself an expansion of a 1993 volume dealing with the Twelve Prophets. Septuagint lexicography has been on Muraoka’s mind at least since his publication on the subject as early as 1984! This volume, then, is the completion of an expanding project. Like its predecessors, it begins with an Introduction, which outlines the scope of the project. The lexicon covers the entire LXX including the so-called “apocrypha,” proto-Lucianic 4 Kgdm’s, Antiochene text of Judges and that of codices A and B, the Old Greek and Alpha text of Esther, the Old Greek and Theodotionic versions of Daniel, Job, a later recension of Sirach, both Tobit versions from the Hanhart edition, and the Prayer of Manasseh (Ode 12).

As in his prior versions, Muraoka recounts his approach to lexicography. His concern is with the LXX primarily as a Greek document, to “try to find out what sense a reader in a period roughly 250 B.C. – 100 A.D. who was ignorant of Hebrew or Aramaic might have made of the translation” (viii), though Muraoka did compare the LXX with those texts in his work. An alternative is to understand the LXX Greek in relation to its Semitic original, as in *A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint* as compiled by J. Lust, E. Eynikel, and K. Hauspie (rev. ed. [Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2003]). Muraoka regards the language of the LXX to be a “genuine representative of the contemporary Greek . . . of the Hellenistic and Early Roman periods” that is necessarily “influenced by the grammar and usage of Aramaic and Hebrew,” which, of course, varies from one translator to the next (ix).

The textual bases are the Göttingen critical editions, where completed, otherwise from Rahlfs’s *Handausgabe* (1935), with occasional use of the *Cambridge Larger Septuagint*. Only on a rare occasion does Muraoka depart from these. As a “fully fledged lexicon” (x), this volume provides morphological, syntagmatic, paradigmatic, and semantic information. What differs from the prior edition seems to be the removal of his (very helpful!) Semitic background information. The prior edition listed corresponding Hebrew terms for entries, whereas that seems to be removed since it “is not integral to LXX lexicography” (xv). He
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remarks in a footnote (xvi, n. 35) that he does hope to provide that information in a separate publication as he has done with the 1998 Baker edition of the Hatch and Redpath's *Concordance the Septuagint*. This is an understandable but unfortunate omission, for which one will need to return to Muraoka's earlier edition, forthcoming work, or the Lust volume.

Muraoka's outline of his “working methodology” (x-xi) cites the need for more context than that provided by Hatch and Redpath for accurate lexicographical work. One requires analysis of semantically related lexemes to establish “the semantic ‘profile’ of the word concerned.” This necessarily allows the lexicographer to distinguish between it and like words, determine what sort of adjective a given noun is qualified by, or what sort of nouns or nominal entities a given verb takes as its grammatical subject or object. This description is followed by some examples and references, along with a helpful articulation of what Muraoka conceives as true “definitions” rather than simple translation equivalents. The introduction to the lexicon is followed by a list of abbreviations and key to symbols (xix-xxiii), an extensive bibliography (xxv-xl), and at the very end a list of lexemes found in Hatch and Redpath, which are primarily variant readings not accounted for in the present work (753-757).

The layout (described in full on pp. xi-xvi) provides three parts to each entry in identical form to prior editions. The first section provides the bold-faced headword, along with morphological information and symbols designating the scope of data considered. The second section is the main body of any entry, defining senses of the headwords and describing its usage. A “sense definition” is given with occasional listing of a translational equivalent(s) enclosed with single quotes is marked off by a colon from the following description of the uses of the headword in the sense so defined (xiii). Muraoka's third section lists, where appropriate, a word or group of words semantically associated with the headword. The final section from the prior edition, concerning the relationship between the LXX and its Hebrew original, has been removed from this edition.

As with prior editions, the strength of Muraoka's lexicon is its preference for a true “definition” rather than simple “translation equivalents.” Indeed, this is an important distinction between it and the other English LXX lexicon, that of Lust et al. The problem of prior editions of the lexicon, which provided a bibliography but no connections to the lexical entries, has been resolved. Lust's lexicon also provides bibliographic references (where they exist) to articles and portions of books (especially in *L'Bible d'Alexandrie* volumes) specifically related to the particular entry under consideration. For this information, one can still consult the new Muraoka volume together with that of Lust with profit. I find myself keeping both within reach while working in the LXX. Yet the comprehensive nature (9,548 lexemes!), up-to-date texts and methodologies, and careful attention to semantic domains exclusively within the word's Greek contexts renders Muraoka's careful work a reliable guide for LXX research.

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Daniel M. Gurtner

Mark Noll's brief but incredibly insightful survey of *God and Race in American Politics* offers one of the most significant analyses of race and religion in American political history. He asserts that race and religion constitutes the nation's deepest and most enduring moral problem and also its broadest and most enduring political influence. He describes the complicated interaction of race and religion as it has shaped the politics of the nation from the Antebellum period until the presidential election of 2004. He takes the reader on a journey of “superlative good and pervasive malevolence where neither simple trust in human nature; nor simple cynicism about American hypocrisy is adequate” (179). It is a story of paradox, the exercise of exploitation and domination over others, coexisting with the human longing for freedom. It is the commingling of “false consciousness with genuine idealism, economic dependence with economic exploitation, tribalism with universalism, and hatred with love” (ibid.).

Noll has rightfully pointed out that Christianity has had a very positive impact on the American political system, making it one of the most humane, enlightened, and good systems in the world. Yet for all its positive benefits, the practice of Christianity, which has provided and done so much good for so many people for so many years, has never been able to overcome race. On this matter, America has failed the test; somehow, in spite of all its other virtues, race remains its major stumbling block. This idea was summarized in the words of a former governor of Mississippi, and quoted by Noll, who said, “I must tell you that the problem of race, despite all the progress that we have made, remains the thorniest, trickiest and most difficult barrier that we confront to achieve a truly successful and united region” (174). The words of the governor can be applied not only to the Deep South, but to the entire nation.

Chapter 1 describes that from the earliest days and, in particular, during the Antebellum period, the political history of the United States was driven by debates about slavery, debates that became more intensely religious as the nation veered toward Civil War. Antebellum religious controversy about slavery overwhelmed and confused religious consideration of race. The Civil War destroyed the legitimacy of slavery, but left the question of race open, and it remains unanswered to the present. Philip Schaff was correct when he said, “the negro question lies far deeper than the slave question” (40).

Because the Civil War was fought by religious people, it was a religious war in which both sides trumpeted the righteousness of their cause. Before and during the war, advocates on both sides employed the Scriptures to defend their own convictions and excoriate the convictions of their opponents. The Bible was used to defend and condemn slavery, but neither side of the issue showed much interest in revealing what the Bible said about racism. It is no wonder that at the end of the war slavery may have died, but racism remained alive and would torment the nation until today.

In chapter 2, Noll shows how the African American religious tradition and institutions were established and how they became the major voice
against racism. Slavery was dead, but racism, a far more intransigent demon, was very much alive and was plaguing the Black community. Two writers of the time described it this way: Pauline Hopkins wrote: “We thought that with the abolishment of slavery the black man’s destiny would be accomplished. . . . [Yet today] a condition of affairs confronts us that [abolitionists] never foresaw: the systematic destruction of the Negro by every device which the fury of enlightened malevolence can invent. . . . This new birth of the black race is a mighty agony. God help us in our struggle for liberty and manhood” (58). Dubois was even more uncompromising in his analysis of the Black man’s place in society: “The Negro race in America, stolen, ravished, and degraded, struggling up through difficulties and oppression, needs sympathy and receives criticism; needs help and is given hindrance, needs protection and is given mob violence, needs justice and is given charity, needs leadership and is given cowardice and apology, needs bread and is given a stone” (59). These sentiments reflected some of the despair that was felt in the Black community about the racism that was part of their daily lives.

In chapter 3, Noll discusses the resurgence of a virulent racism at the very moment the central government power was weakening due to its own inaction. Evangelical Christianity caved in to the “redemption” of the racist faith and may have facilitated this upsurge of racism against Blacks. This cooperation with racist America was true for both Protestants and Roman Catholics. Even as Christian American abandoned Blacks to the racist terrorism of the period and excluded Blacks from most of their congregations, it provided the impetus for the rise of a distinctly African American form of Christianity. It seems as if America’s politics and religion conspired to produce a counterrevolution that stripped the recently freed slaves of their newly won rights. The racist bigots of the South coopted one of the most iconic concepts, (redemption) of the Bible to describe their restoration to power. To Blacks, however, redemption now meant a kind of restoration to “hell.” The restoration of many of the former confederacy leaders in the South resulted in the reinstitution of a new and more pernicious kind of slavery for Blacks.

In chapter 4, Noll analyzes the Civil Rights movement and religion, showing that religion propels the movement while also acting as a resistant force against the movement, but not nearly as resistant as in former times. It was the impetus provided by Black Christianity and the dynamic spark of the African American faith that facilitated the success of the Civil Rights movement. The sense of conviction that “God was on their side was foundational in driving the advocates of civil rights and sustaining them until at last some of their goals were met” (167). Many of the civil-rights leaders were deeply religious figures in their community. The songs of the movement were religious, and the major institution that supported and nurtured the movement was the Black church. Although the aims and the goals were clearly political, the movement itself could be described as a somewhat religious movement being propelled by religious people.

Noll’s book is a must-read for all those interested in the study of race, politics, and religion in America. He has exposed America’s original sin, which
is not slavery but racism. The volatile interaction of race and religion has shown America at its best and its worst. Race remains an enduring presence in American society. Racism ironically has both been defended and condemned by religion and politics. Noll's analysis reveals that the more religious Americans are, the more they tend to vote conservatively, supporting less government intrusion into local affairs, which has had the effect of reinforcing racism in many parts of the country. Conservative governments are less willing to use the power of the government to ameliorate the historic and continuing wrongs committed against Blacks. In this sense, religion becomes an ally of racism. It appears that racial solidarity invariably trumps loyalty to truth and justice.

Knoll's analysis of these most complicated issues in American history reveals a narrative of often contradicting religious and moral complexities. He wrestles with his subject, not shying away from this difficult assignment, with moral dexterity, skilful analysis, and solid historic research. Knoll has provided much food for thought.

Andrews University

TREVOR O'REGGIO


Ranko Stefanovic now teaches New Testament at the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary at Andrews University. This second edition of his commentary on Revelation is not greatly different from the first edition, but it does make some subtle improvements in a few areas, apparently in part at least to feedback received from readers of the first edition. Aside from the correction of a few editorial errors or misstatements, the major content changes involve a number of additions and a few revisions in selected areas of the commentary.

The first major revision is with the methodological approach to the text. One finds that Stefanovic has added some clarity to the approach that he follows in the commentary. Although he still notes that all of the various approaches “have some elements of truth” (12), a debatable premise, he ends up concluding, “Despite the fact that historicism has generally been denied and marginalized by modern scholarship, this commentary shows it to be the most appropriate approach to the book of Revelation” (14; cf. 16). He seemed unwilling to make such a statement in the first edition, adopting rather an eclectic methodology that lets “the text govern the interpretation,” whether it be historicist, preterist, futurist, or idealist (12, 1st ed.). This change will please many Adventists who follow the historicist interpretation of Revelation, but it will not endear him to those who prefer an eclectic—or other—approach. To Stefanovic’s credit, he has followed a historicist approach fairly consistently throughout the commentary.

The clearer and more consistent historicist approach plays out in notable fashion in his exposition of the letters to the seven churches, where he notes that “it would be quite appropriate to read the seven messages of Revelation 2–3 in the final stage of interpretation as Christ’s evaluation of the Christian
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church throughout history” (88). Then at the end of each of the seven letters, he incorporates a “Historical application” that shows how the message of each church applies appropriately to specific consecutive periods of church history. In this way, the new edition moves closer to traditional Adventist historicist interpretation.

Similarly, Stefanovic has attempted to add some material on the parallels between the historicist interpretation of the seven churches and that of the seven seals, positing “specific applications in different periods in Christian history” (227; cf. 235, 242).

In the case of the Two Witnesses of Revelation 11, Stefanovic has revised his statement regarding the failure of the historicist interpretation to one that admits that “such a historical application is quite tenable” (354), although he offers a second, nonhistorical interpretation as well.

Another area in which Stefanovic has attempted to accommodate Adventist historicism more in his revised edition is in his discussion of the 1,260-day/year period at various points where it appears in Revelation (11:2-3; 12:6,14; 13:5). He still does this a bit awkwardly, clearly preferring an approximate period to a specific one, but at least he does acknowledge the existence of the traditional Adventist interpretation beginning in 538 a.d. and ending in 1798 a.d. (346, 387, 392, 411). At the same time, he argues for both a quantitative and qualitative understanding of this time period (346-47, 387), detracting somewhat from a purely historicist interpretation. He still tends to be evasive on the application of the oppressive power during this time period, referring at some points to “the church’s religious-political oppressive power” (346, 415), at another point to the “oppressive power . . . described in Daniel 7:25” (350), again to “the church . . . as an ecclesiastical power” (387, 411, 415), also to “the authoritarian ecclesiastical rule of the Middle Ages” and “the medieval ecclesiastical oppressive rule” (392), and, finally, pressed to come up with an interpretation that fits the 1,260-year period, confesses, “The only religious-political power that matches the description of the sea beast and its activities in Revelation 13 during the Medieval period was the papal ecclesiastical authoritarian rule that, having established itself as an institutional power in the sixth century, dominated the Western world in the name of heaven for more than twelve centuries” (419-420).

However, having finally identified “the Roman papacy” (420), he begins to backtrack:

We must acknowledge, however, that applying the seventh head of the sea beast to the Medieval ecclesiastical power alone is inadequate. History depicts similar behaviors and activities by the hierarchy of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Sadly, religious-political oppression was also demonstrated by the newly established Protestant orthodoxy in the Western world during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries characterized by religious intolerance (420).

In the end, the vision of the sea beast turns out to be far more comprehensive than just the text’s focus on the head that has ten crowned horns, receives the fatal wound, and is healed. Stefanovic assures the reader that “the sea beast
stands as a corporate symbol of all oppressive world powers, civil and religious, that oppressed God’s people from the establishment of the church at the Exodus down to the Second Coming” (419). He thus seems to equate it with the seven-headed Dragon of Revelation 12 and the parallel scarlet Beast of Revelation 17, and he identifies the various heads the same as in Revelation 17 (419, 525).

One area in which Stefanovic has not accommodated himself to traditional historicist interpretation is in the matter of the number of the Beast’s name in 13:18. In fact, he has added arguments against the traditional interpretation (425-426), namely, an identification of the papacy based on gematria, arguing instead for a purely figurative significance based on a purported triple six, “a human number,” which “stands for the satanic triumvirate in contrast to the triple seven of the Godhead in Revelation 1:4-6. . . . This leads to the conclusion that the number 666 functions as a parody of the divine name of perfection” (437). While it is true that the traditional interpretation is not without its problems, this figurative interpretation does not really offer a better textual solution. From earliest until recent times, expositors understood the text as calling for an interpretation based on gematria. The text has not changed, but readers today are seeking for alternative explanations in the face of challenges.

Aside from the issues of historicism, Stefanovic has made some accommodation to the Adventist interpretation of Rev 1:10 in that, while he still leans toward “the Lord’s day” as referring to “the eschatological day of the Lord” (97), he now admits that “John might have used the phrase ‘the Lord’s day’ in a twofold meaning” (ibid.), including the seventh-day Sabbath as an option, which “would fit the eschatological connotation of the Sabbath in the Bible” (ibid.).

Another area in which Stefanovic has made some improvement is in the discussion of the symbolism of Revelation. He clarifies that “it is not John but God who chose the symbols of Revelation,” and that “what John saw in vision he now records, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, in his own words” (59). The messages of Revelation “come not through a literal understanding of its contents but through the interpretation of symbols” (ibid.). “The interpretive key of the book’s symbols is not allegory but typology. The meaning of the symbols must be controlled by the intention of the inspired author as well as by the meaning the symbols conveyed to those to whom Revelation was originally addressed” (59-60). “Careful study indicates that most of the book’s symbolism is drawn from the Old Testament. . . . In portraying the events to take place in the future, inspiration employs the language of the past” (60). This explanation is helpful, countering the literalism of dispensational futurist interpretations.

Still problematic is Stefanovic’s discussion of the structure of Revelation. He has made no revision of this section other than to discuss the “I heard” and “I saw” pattern, which does not affect his structuralizing of the book. The problem is an inconsistency in the structure he proposes—or perhaps I should say, in the structures he proposes, since they are not identical. He begins by arguing that Richard M. Davidson and Jon Paulien “have convincingly
shown” that there is a sevenfold structure in which “each of the seven major divisions is introduced with a sanctuary scene” (30). He goes on to turn this sevenfold division into a chiastic structure in which there is a movement “from earth to heaven and then back to earth again” (31). He concludes, “This literary arrangement indicates that chapters 12–14 form the central portion of the book.” He further describes how there is “a definite progression” that “moves from the continual daily (tamid) services to the yearly services of the Old Testament sanctuary” (32) and how the annual feasts of the Hebrew cultic calendar function as a model for the structure of the book (33). He concludes by suggesting an eleven-part chiastic outline of Revelation that synchronizes “the chiastic parallel segments,” including the prologue and epilogue (37). The problem is that each time he provides an outline, which he defends or proposes, it is different in its details, beginning on p. 30 through his final outline ending on p. 46. When one compares the three major outlines he proposes (31, 37, 43-46), they do not agree. On p. 31, he proposes a seven-part chiasm based on the seven introductory visions he identifies. On p. 37, he proposes an eleven-part chiasm, or a nine-part chiasm if one does not count the prologue and epilogue. The central section of the chiasm is 11:19–13:18, in contradistinction to his statement on p. 32 that the seven-part literary arrangement he proposed on p. 31 “indicates that chapters 12–14 form the central portion of the book.”

On p. 40, Stefanovic revises his proposed structure: “This commentary argues for the threefold structure of the book of Revelation, with a prologue (1:1-8) and an epilogue (22:6-21). Such a structure is self-evident on the basis of Revelation 1:19.” So what was all the former discussion of a seven-part or nine-part chiastic structure about? Now the center of the chiasm appears in the last of the three major parts of the book and any chiastic structure is lost to view. Of course, “self-evident” is a bit of a stretch. There are better alternatives for reading 1:19.

A closely related issue is the matter of what to do with 11:19. Stefanovic follows Paulien and Davidson in making it the introductory sanctuary vision for Rev 12–14 (31). As such, it would belong structurally to the vision of 12:1–14:20, though it is not very clear how it relates to the content of the latter in the way that the other sanctuary introductions do. However, in his final structural outline, Stefanovic properly includes it as the final component of the section on “The Opening of the Sealed Scroll (4–11:19),” and he begins “The Contents of the Seven-Sealed Scroll (12–22:5)” with 12:1 (43-44). In his commentary section, he also closes “The Third Woe: The Seventh Trumpet” with 11:19. However, when he begins the next section, Rev 12:1–22:5, he labels 11:18—not 11:19—a “springboard passage” that “functions both as the concluding statement of the preceding section and as the introduction of the section that follows” (373). He seems unsure, however, of what to do with 11:19. In a brief section on 11:19, he begins by declaring, “With Revelation 12:1 begins a completely new vision in the book” (375). Later in the same paragraph, he refers to “the appearance of the ark in the heavenly sanctuary at the beginning of the completely new section of Revelation” (ibid.). There needs to be a greater degree of consistency in defining the structure of the
There are other serious issues I would comment on if space permitted, but these are samples of some issues that could benefit from further clarification. There are a few items that still need to be corrected editorially. I would suggest that “The New Jerusalem (21:9–22:5)” needs to be indented under the previous line in the outline at the top of p. 31. On p. 63, Stefanovic refers to “the customary Greek greeting word charis (‘grace’).” Actually, the customary Greek greeting was not charis but chaire, which literally meant “Rejoice!” but was used not as a command but as a wishful greeting like “Have a nice day!” Charis was a Christian substitute for chaire. There is also a very strange reference in footnote 10 on p. 363 to “the 43-months/1,600-days prophetic period,” which should refer to “the 42-month/1,260-day prophetic period.”

The new edition is more attractive than the first, with a brighter, more colorful cover; whiter, better quality paper; better layout and easier-to-read fonts, with the exception of numbers, which in the Constantia font are harder to read, with several of the numbers being compressed vertically (0, 1, 2) or dropping below the base line instead of sitting on the line (3, 4, 5, 7, 9). I commend the editors for these improvements (except for the numbers).

Despite some concerns about structure and content (here and there), this is an excellent commentary, one of the very best on the market. I recommend it heartily, with only minor reservations, as an advance over previous commentaries, including Stefanovic’s first edition. I hope that with each new commentary, we will continue to make further advances in our study and understanding of the important book of Revelation. There is a blessing promised to the reader and hearer who put into practice the things that God has revealed in the Revelation of Jesus Christ. Stefanovic’s commentary should aid the reader in discovering that blessing.

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Edwin Reynolds


Imre Tokics is a teacher and a former dean of the Hungarian Adventist Theological Seminary. He holds three doctor of philosophy degrees: two in Old Testament from Pázmány Péter Catholic University, and one in law from Károli Gáspár Reformed University, both located in Budapest, the capital of Hungary. He is the author of eleven books and numerous scholarly articles. While his OT expertise, clearly expressed in the current book, is widely appreciated mostly in his native country, his eloquence in the use of his mother tongue is also to be acknowledged as a major strength of the book.

The current publication is partially the result of the author’s doctoral research. However, as it is said that Socrates brought philosophy and the gods down from heaven to earth; similarly, Tokics tries to communicate the
text and where the various verses belong in that structure. Otherwise one might conclude that there is confusion in the mind of the interpreter.

There are other serious issues I would comment on if space permitted, but these are samples of some issues that could benefit from further clarification. There are a few items that still need to be corrected editorially. I would suggest that “The New Jerusalem (21:9–22:5)” needs to be indented under the previous line in the outline at the top of p. 31. On p. 63, Stefanovic refers to “the customary Greek greeting word charis (‘grace’).” Actually, the customary Greek greeting was not charis but chaire, which literally meant “Rejoice!” but was used not as a command but as a wishful greeting like “Have a nice day!” Charis was a Christian substitute for chaire. There is also a very strange reference in footnote 10 on p. 363 to “the 43-months/1,600-days prophetic period,” which should refer to “the 42-month/1,260-day prophetic period.”

The new edition is more attractive than the first, with a brighter, more colorful cover; whiter, better quality paper; better layout and easier-to-read fonts, with the exception of numbers, which in the Constantia font are harder to read, with several of the numbers being compressed vertically (0, 1, 2) or dropping below the base line instead of sitting on the line (3, 4, 5, 7, 9). I commend the editors for these improvements (except for the numbers).

Despite some concerns about structure and content (here and there), this is an excellent commentary, one of the very best on the market. I recommend it heartily, with only minor reservations, as an advance over previous commentaries, including Stefanovic’s first edition. I hope that with each new commentary, we will continue to make further advances in our study and understanding of the important book of Revelation. There is a blessing promised to the reader and hearer who put into practice the things that God has revealed in the Revelation of Jesus Christ. Stefanovic’s commentary should aid the reader in discovering that blessing.

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The current publication is partially the result of the author’s doctoral research. However, as it is said that Socrates brought philosophy and the gods down from heaven to earth; similarly, Tokics tries to communicate the
result of his exegesis not only to the scholarly audience, but also to a wider public. The difficulty of the marriage between the two styles of writing is well known; therefore, it is not a surprise that the author wrestles throughout his work to speak with both audiences. While, on one hand, a knowledge of Hebrew is a prerequisite for the proper understanding of Tokics’s argument, on the other, he accompanies the exegetical insights with a strong application for those readers whose interest is more directed toward the relevance of the biblical text. In this hard task of balancing, the author sacrifices something on both sides. Viewed from a different perspective, Tokics’s approach could be defended by arguing that he is not merely concerned with exegesis, but goes a step further to use his insights to spiritually form the opinion and character of his readers—his approach is well known from the classroom. The positive reception of the book by the Hungarian scholarly circle is evident in the fact that it was presented at the Hebrew Rabbinical Seminary, where the speakers were the following well-known local authorities: Schönér Alfréd (rector of the Jewish Theological Seminary in Budapest), Pecsuk Ottó (general secretary of the Hungarian Bible Society), and Szigeti Jenő (teacher at the Hungarian Adventist Theological Seminary).

The topic of the book is the prophetic conflict between Jeremiah and the false prophets, who held two radically different perspectives on the situation in Israel. The author follows the lead of Gerhard von Rad, who explains the opposition between the two sides in terms of a strongly positive covenant theology. He argues that the difference between the two opponents rests on the adherence to two different covenants: while Jeremiah himself lines up with the older, Sinaitic tradition, his opponents act as the representatives of the covenant theology of the House of David. Thus both sides controversially called YHWH as the star witness in this conflict.

The book is organized into ten chapters. After two introductory chapters on the Sitz-im-Leben and the challenges of Jeremiah’s ministry, attention is given to the exegesis of the passages, which provides insight into the different aspects of Jeremiah’s conflict with the representatives of nabism, the official prophetic voices of the royal court. The author follows a consistent pattern in the exegetical chapters: his personal translation of the particular Hebrew text is followed by a textual analysis, study of the literary context and structure, form and tradition analysis, and interpretation. The following passages are considered to be the most important for the development of the theme, though they are not the only texts in the book that deal with this topic: 23:9-32; 27:1-11; 28:1-17; 29:4-14.

Tokics’s thesis is that, while there is a clear difference between Jeremiah’s truthful words and the nabis’ false prophecy, still the profile of the nabis is not to be interpreted in terms of a deliberate deception. It is pointed out that this group had a strong nationalistic overtone that surfaced in its unconditional faith in the divine protection of Jerusalem, based upon a belief in the promises of YHWH. These prophets quoted the words of the greatest Hebrew prophets, and it was unconceivable for them that Judah would follow the Northern kingdom to its fateful end. Thus Tokics understands the
profile of the nabis as *extaticus homines religiosi*, contrary to Jeremiah, who was YHWH’s endorsed messenger.

It is persuasively argued that the essence of the conflict is a question of false security. Jeremiah’s goal is to dissolve this false sense of security among not only the prophets themselves, but more widely within the people. His strange deeds are not only to be interpreted as a peculiar pedagogical approach, but as acts with profound theological significance. Tokics correctly notes that the prophetic conflict is to be interpreted at a deeper theological level: it was not merely the embodiment of the tension between Jeremiah and the nabis, but, more profoundly, it is to be understood as a rupture between YHWH and Israel. In the light of this perspective, Jeremiah’s struggle is not to be interpreted primarily as a clash against the prophets, but rather as a struggle for the future of Judah, for the temple, for Jerusalem, and for an orthodox Jahvism. Finally, Tokics suggests that Jeremiah’s solution-pattern, the only way for the survival of crisis, leads through moral renewal. This approach, he correctly suggests, has relevance for our generation. This means that the message should not be peace at any price, but rather renewal as a solution for the crisis.

While *Jeremiah as the Prophet of Crisis* is a crucial reference point for every future Jeremiah research written in Hungarian, the fact that only 15 million people speak this beautiful language makes this valuable research available only for a limited scholarly circle. Therefore, an English translation of the work would be desirable—however, in a slightly revised form in the light of the current research literature about Jeremiah published in the last decade.

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James C. VanderKam is the John A. O’Brien Professor of Hebrew Scriptures at the University of Notre Dame, and a member of the international team charged with editing and translating the DSS manuscripts. He has authored many books and is one of two editors-in-chief of the *Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls*. Since the publishing of the first edition in 1995, *The Dead Sea Scrolls Today* has been an important introduction for readers interested in the study of the DSS.

This second edition comes sixty years after the first scrolls became known in the modern world and at a time when all of them have been published. It has been updated to take into consideration post-1994 debates, as well as the full publication of the texts from the caves. A new section includes information derived from the DSS regarding Second Temple Judaism and the major groups of that time. Finally, the bibliographies at the end of the chapters have been expanded.

*The Dead Sea Scrolls Today* provides a readable and practical survey of the important and valuable historical information that the DSS reveal regarding the beliefs and lifestyle of an actual community from antiquity. This survey
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The Dead Sea Scrolls Today provides a readable and practical survey of the important and valuable historical information that the DSS reveal regarding the beliefs and lifestyle of an actual community from antiquity. This survey
also relates the DSS with the traditions of other groups during the same era, including biblical and extrabiblical sources.

VanderKam begins his book by recounting the discovery of the DSS in the Qumran caves. He shares the history of the caves: how they were found, what happened to the scrolls, and how they became known as ancient literature. He also discusses the ruins of Qumran—the buildings and cemeteries, including the de Vaux excavations and interpretations—and then he provides an overview of the methods used for dating the scrolls and other objects discovered in the caves.

In chapter 2, he surveys the manuscripts found in the eleven caves: biblical texts, apocryphal and pseudepigraphal texts, commentaries, legal texts, writings for worship, eschatological works, wisdom texts, the copper scroll, and documentary texts. For each of these, the author examines the correlation with the Hebrew Bible, and explains what these texts reveal and their relationship with other types of literature.

Beginning with chapter 3, the author analyzes the texts and describes how they reveal characteristics of the Qumran group, including, for example, their way of life, religious views, and social laws.

In chapter 3, VanderKam wrestles with the delicate and yet important questions that often bring division among scholars: Who wrote the scrolls? and Who were the people of Qumran? He shares compelling evidence that the people at Qumran were the Essenes, based on evidences of Pliny the Elder and the similarity of the Qumran community to Essene beliefs and practices. “Scholars have often pointed out that the area Pliny describes has no archeological evidence of any communal center other than the one at Qumran. Some have argued that Pliny places the Essene settlement on the hills above En-gedi” (72-73). However, VanderKam points out that this pagan author would not have had any reason to make up his story. Furthermore, the present tense used by Pliny does not necessarily describe the existence of the Essenes at the time when his book appeared, but perhaps instead at the time when he compiled his notes. While there are some challenges with this hypothesis, VanderKam argues that it is most likely the Essenes were the members of the Qumran community rather than the Pharisees or others from Jerusalem.

Chapter 4 describes the Qumran community’s history, beliefs, and practices over several different time periods. This chapter is a continuation of chapter 3, expanding VanderKam’s treatment of the different views held by the community during these periods.

In chapter 5, a comparison of the DSS with the OT is employed to suggest which books might have been viewed as inspired by the Qumran community. VanderKam argues for the acceptance by the Qumran community of other texts, such as Jubilees, 1 Enoch, and the Temple Scroll, as authoritative and inspired in the same way as the books of the Hebrew Bible. He also suggests that this community may not have viewed all the books found in the MT, such as Esther and Chronicles, to be inspired. Finally, he also points out the relationships among the DSS, the MT, the LXX, and the Samaritan
Pentateuch. He demonstrates that, at times, the DSS support the MT, but there is also support for the LXX in many respects.

In chapter 6, VanderKam demonstrates the similarities and differences between the DSS and the NT including comparing language used in the fragments from Cave 7 and NT words and phrases, specifically those found in the Sermon on the Mount. Characters, practices, and eschatology are also examined, with the author noting some resemblances between the DSS and the OT.

Finally, chapter 7 explores the controversies surrounding the editing and publishing of the DSS.

The Dead Sea Scrolls Today remains an excellent work and an important contribution to the field of archaeology and biblical studies. Unlike many other more complicated resources, it is clear and easy to read. This second edition offers new insights and updated bibliographies to make it a valuable and excellent resource for professors, pastors, and students who wish to enrich their study of the DSS.

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