INVESTIGATING THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL REALM
OF BIBLICAL-THEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY,
PART IV: CRITIQUE AND TRANSFORMATION

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4.1 Introduction

The fourth article of this article series\(^1\) will conclude my investigations of the conditions of biblical-theological methodology. After I introduced Dooyeweerd's and Canale's critical analysis of the human rational activity in the first two articles, the third article demonstrated the practical use of their thinking, which deliver excellent frameworks of analysis when methodological means and results of applied methodologies are to be assessed. The final article will display limitations and problems in Dooyeweerd's and Canale's thinking. This is a necessary step if a fruitful dialogue between both thinkers should inspire a transformation of their thinking and create even more clarity on the conditions of biblical-theological methodology. This article will then begin by highlighting some critical elements in Canale's phenomenology of Reason and Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique of theoretical thought. The critique will then pass into reflections that suggest a transformation of their analysis of the human rational activity and improve our understanding of the conditions of biblical-theological methodology in specific.

4.1.2 Critique on Canale

Canale's motivation to uncover the inner structure of Reason and develop a biblical interpretation of the dimensionality of Reason has not yet led him to develop the ontological and epistemological frameworks. His dissertation did not attempt the establishment of an entire philosophy, but only the laying-bare of Reason's structure and the exploration of a biblically founded ontology in order to set the stage for a criticism of theology. Because of this, a criticism of Canale will be much more limited than a criticism of Dooyeweerd. In general, there are only three areas in which one could criticize Canale's thinking: his phenomenological analysis of Reason; his criticism of ancient and Western philosophy; and his interpretation of Reason's dimensionality in the light of Holy Scripture.

In this final article, my criticism will focus only on Canale's phenomenological analysis and his interpretation of the biblical ground

4.1.2.1 Critiquing the Description of the Phenomenological Structure of Reason

4.1.2.1.1 Universalization of Reason without Ontology?

From a Dooyeweerdian perspective, the central role of Reason in Canale's thinking is dubious. Dooyeweerdian thinking limits the rational realm to an aspect of meaning-being. Doesn't Canale absolutize Reason when he does not limit its scope? This question needs to be answered negatively. Canale's use of the term “Reason” as universalized Reason hinders the absolutization or autonomy of rational thinking. Canale's Reason does aspectualize components of rational thinking. In this matter, it is important to acknowledge the different meaning Dooyeweerd and Canale attach to rational thinking. Canale does not use rational thinking in its narrow sense. To him, rational thinking cannot be reduced to mathematical-logical thinking.\(^2\) The critical question then remains to what extent it is legitimate to use the term “Reason” when the object of critical inquiry is that which enables the establishment of Knowledge.\(^3\) Seeing the parallel between Canale's Reason and Dooyeweerd's knowledge, the universalization of Reason should not be mistaken for an absolutization of reason in its classical sense. But how does Canale legitimize the universalization of Reason without assuming a minimum of ontological understanding? Is it possible to make analytic-logical thinking a part of Reason's whole without assuming an ontology? Canale claims that his analysis involves the onticity of the phenomenon “Knowledge” (necessity of a specific Being), but does not imply any specific logic of the ontic. The onticity of Knowledge can be interpreted both as timeless- and temporal-grounded. The unsolved question, however, is how a logical-analytic description of the phenomenon of Knowledge, i.e., its onticity, can avoid a specific Logos as Being.

Because Canale claims that any logic receives its specific logical ground through an interpretation of Being, one could conclude that the phenomenological analysis as phenomenological analysis includes a logos. However, this logos is not allowed to receive its specific logical ground through an interpretation of Being if its structural analysis of the phenomenon of Reason wants to be of universal character. This is contradictory as long as the


\(^3\)As far as I can see, the notion of Reason focuses much more on the subject's activity as contribution to the subject-object relation than the notion of knowledge does.
condition for the latter possibility is not clear. Canale does not, however, seem to recognize this tension in his phenomenological analysis.

These critical remarks led my analysis to the conclusion that Canale’s phenomenological analysis of Reason cannot claim to be purely descriptive or without ontological assumption, since he takes a specific philosophical standpoint at the very beginning of his inquiry: universalized Reason and the possibility of a neutral phenomenological logic that is not grounded in a specific Logos. His analysis builds upon this philosophical claim.

4.1.2.1.2 Meaning as Constituted by Reason

In Canale’s work, Reason is understood as the constitutive element of any understanding. As far as I can see, this understanding can be problematic, depending on what Reason involves. Canale seems to introduce two slightly different understandings of Reason. On the one hand, Reason is understood as “the human activity for the constitution of meaning.” Here Reason is understood as an act of the subject. This act, however, is of universal character in the sense that it involves not only a human being’s analytic-logical cognition, but human consciousness in general. On the other hand, Reason is universalized in the sense of all-encompassing humanity’s many aspects of knowing as subject and object. I assume that Canale’s first understanding of Reason does not truly reflect his thinking, because it would contradict his entire analysis. These two different understandings can, however, be deduced from his work because of his unclear definition of Meaning: Meaning requires a subject-object relation, but the understanding and consciousness that flow out of this relation as an expression of Meaning is an action of humanity alone. Thus the expression of the Meaning flowing out of the consciousness of human experience of the subject-object relation is a subjective action. In this sense, humans do generate Meaning as an expression or logical concept. However, the Meaning that flows out of the subject-object relation is never identical with the expression or concept of it. Expressed Meaning is, rather, a translation of the subject’s insight (generated in the subject-object relationship) into a concept. Canale does not make this clear distinction between Meaning and the expression or concept of Meaning. In my understanding, Canale focuses in his work on the phenomenological analysis of the structure that enables an expressing and conceptualization of Meaning rather than the structure that enables Meaning itself. Consequently, if Canale’s claim that there is no Meaning outside of human’s rational activity refers to the concept of Meaning alone (understood in the wide sense as “humanity’s becoming conscious”), I agree with his understanding.

*Truth can be only that which is allowed by Reason and its particular categories* (Fernando Luis Canale, *A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions*, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertations Series, 10 [Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1987], 2).


4.1.2.1.3 The Self and Reason

In comparison with Dooyeweerd, there is no clear conception of the subject as self in Canale’s phenomenological analysis of Reason. However, the phenomenological analysis of the epistemological framework assumes a self, but is not concerned with its interpretation. Canale relegates the interpretation of the self to the ontological framework. The ontological concept of the self is then assumed in the interpretation of the epistemological framework. As Canale is only concerned with a structural and not an interpretational analysis of Reason, he does not offer an interpretation of the self, but emphasizes its existence as a formal part of Reason. The formally required existence of the subject is, however, characterized by the spontaneity that allows for the interpretation of Reason’s structure, which emphasizes that the formal structure of knowledge cannot constitute meaning because it is empty of concrete content (interpretation).

Dooyeweerd’s two ways of transcendental critique lay bare the important role the self plays in theoretical thinking. This discovery allowed for his persuasive critique on humanistic philosophy. The interpretation of the self’s origin as the foundation of self-understanding functioned as hermeneutical horizon for any thought-act. Hereby the self received its central role in Dooyeweerd’s analysis. In my opinion, it is a part of the structure of Reason that the ontic and the epistemic realms come together within the subject in a radical dependence on their common origin. I think Canale did not discover this structural given because he put emphasis on the interpretation of Being rather than the choice of a theos. The phenomenological analysis should have been able to show that self-understanding (belonging to the ontological-anthropological framework of Reason), as dependent on an understanding of the self’s origin (theos or the One), is a basic formal condition of the structure of Reason because the ontic and epistemic structurally come together in the subject. Consequently, an understanding of the self, which is dependent on an understanding of its origin, will have direct influence on the ontological and epistemological conceptions. Thus self-understanding, basically understood as an understanding of one’s own being, will determine the epistemological categories of the self, which are applied to all of human cognition as hermeneutical guidelines. This formal interrelation, lacking in Canale’s work, would enrich his critical investigation of classical, modern, and postmodern thought.

Aside from the structural level, a biblical interpretation of Reason must strongly address the self of humanity in the form of the *imago Dei* and the biblical idea of the heart or soul. Thus, although the self and its formal relation with an understanding of its origin should have been discovered in the phenomenological analysis, it can surely not be missed in the biblical interpretation of Reason. Thus I conclude that both the phenomenological structure of Reason and the biblical interpretation of the structure of Reason call for an awareness of the dependence of self-understanding on an understanding of the self’s origin.

\[\text{Glanz, 58.}\]
4.1.2.1.4 Foundational Ontology and Transcendental Ideas

The comparison between the application of Dooyeweerd's and Canale's structural understanding in my earlier article has shown that Dooyeweerd's transcendental idea of origin is of most practical value. This does not mean that the two thinkers contradict each other in regard to the central function of the transcendental idea of origin. I assume that as Canale was searching for the possibility of a criticism of theological thinking, foundational ontology played a much more important role in his investigation than the choice for theos, since most theologians accept God as the true origin of all creation. His question was concerned much more with how it is possible that the same choice leads to different dogmatic beliefs, different explanations of the relation between God and his creation, and different theological methodologies. Here the dimensionality that is attributed to the chosen theos becomes most crucial. However, foundational ontology cannot determine the choice for a theos, but only the dimension in which the chosen theos is placed. Even though Canale did not focus on the choice for a theos, the theos clearly plays a crucial role in the variety of philosophical and scientific ideologies (e.g., biologism, physicism, psychologism).

   Foundational ontology cannot explain this important influence of the theos, representing the ontic and noetic independence status, on theories and more specifically ontological and epistemological conceptions. Because the independence status, i.e., the idea of origin in its noetic and ontic senses, plays such a determining role as direction-giver, especially in theoretical thinking, it does not seem to be a lucky choice of terms to speak about the dimensionality of Reason. It would make more sense to refer to Canale’s dimensionality of Reason with another term that helps to clarify that man's thinking is not just “dimensionalized” by the ground of Being, but also by the choice for a theos. The dimension of thinking is, then, determined by the ground of Being and the chosen theos.

4.1.2.1.5 Abstract and Pre-theoretical Thinking

In Canale’s phenomenological analysis of the structure of Reason, he also refers to the terms “abstraction” and “pre-theoretical.” Although he does not make it explicit, these two terms, as belonging to the structure of Reason, need an interpretation in the course of interpreting the frameworks of Reason. Canale speaks vaguely of abstract or theoretical knowledge as

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11Canale, 27, n. 4.
the place where the systematization of Knowledge (Reason’s frameworks) is technically made explicit so that it can become a foundation and tool for science and philosophy. In contrast, in the pretheoretical attitude of the human thought-act Reason’s system remains implicit and hidden. Therefore, the pretheoretical attitude is not a part of the noncognitive realm, but rather points to the naively experienced subject-object relation. This pretheoretical cognitive experience is, in fact, the condition of a theoretical interpretation of Reason’s structure.12

How the thought-act-attitudes relate to each other and to the theological framework, however, remains unexplained. This criticism can be so sharply stated because Dooyeweerd has shown that in theoretical thought we need a supratheoretical and supramodal standpoint for our theoretical synthesis. This need is nonexistent in our naive attitude of thinking, since the modal diversity is not abstracted from its coherence. As Canale makes clear in his work, the understanding of “abstraction” that is grounded in temporal Being is distinctively different from the classical understanding of abstraction. Consequently, the meaning of the theoretical synthesis will also find a reinterpretation. The need for a supratemporal point of synthesis will be rejected. The point from which a synthesis is made possible will not be disconnected from the temporal flux. A synthesis, however, whether grounded in timeless or temporal Being is needed in the sense of giving the Gegenstand of thought its proper place within the totality of reality. Although having a critical stance toward Dooyeweerd’s description of the Gegenstand-relation, he has, however, pointed at something inherent to scientific thinking, namely, the act of bringing something into focus by abstracting it into a level that allows for closer insight (a microcosmic look) by losing the macrocosmic totality from which it was abstracted.13 Because Canale does not develop the structural difference between naive and theoretical thinking, he cannot see the crucial impact that a high level of abstraction can have on science and philosophy. The subject’s theoretical image is different from the subject’s naive image of an object. This difference cannot be explained in Canale’s terms of “making explicit” or “making implicit” as if it would relate to different levels of consciousness. Theoretical thinking, in contrast to naive thinking, is in crucial need of a transcendental idea of origin in order to allow for a theoretical synthesis. A further development of a clear distinction between naive and theoretical reasoning would have helped Canale to see the important function of the universal structural datum as something that needs to be accounted for by any thinker in the process of theoretical conceptualizing.

12Ibid., 134.

13Although Dooyeweerd’s description of theoretical thought as Gegenstand-relations received a lot of critique, especially by thinkers within the Reformed tradition, the basic difference between naive and scientific/theoretical thinking was acknowledged. This distinction, however, was worked out differently. See René van Woudenberg, “Theorie van het Kennen,” in Kennis en Werkelijkheid, ed. René van Woudenberg (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperhijn, 1996), 43-47.
4.1.2.2 Critiquing the Interpretation of the Phenomenological Structure

4.1.2.2.1 Subject, Object, and Normativity

In Canale’s description of how the subject-object relation should be interpreted on the basis of a biblical temporal foundational ontology, the question arises as to how he can defend himself against subjectivism when accepting Being as the temporal flux, i.e., temporality. Is there anything in this temporal flux that guarantees unchangeable norms?

Before describing the problematic in more detail, two things need to be underscored: First, the formal structure of Reason allows for neither subjectivism nor objectivism, since both subject and object are needed for the generation of Knowledge. The normativity of thinking is derived from the contents and categories that the ontological interpretation receives.

In Canale’s biblical interpretation of the structure of Reason, he recognizes a divine normativity in the ontic existence of God’s creation. This ontic normativity as expressed in ontology sets the parameters of humanity’s cognitive capacities, i.e., the brain, with its neurophysiological characteristics. But the cognitive capacities do not yet determine in a full sense the outcome of rational thinking. A variety of rational articulation is still possible because within a biblical understanding of Reason God did not place human knowledge under the administration of all-encompassing normativity. What is meant hereby is that God did not determine humanity in such a way that all human beings will think in the same way or they will not be rational. This understanding is due to the biblical concept of individual freedom and responsibility. Normativity comes from the outside of the cognitive sphere of the subject, i.e., from the ontic, and not from inside reason or the self.

Although the structure of Reason as subject-object relation allows for neither subjectivism nor objectivism, and although Canale’s biblical interpretation of this subject-object relation knows of normativity, there is a need for more clarity and explanation if subjectivism really is to be overcome. In his conception of the object’s temporal lines of intelligibility, gathered in cognitive tension, seems to lie the answer that helps to prevent subjectivism. But as there is no clear explanation of what these temporal lines of intelligibility represent and what it is that makes these lines intelligible, the problematic of how a subject-object relation is possible remains. Although the structure of Reason does not allow for either subjectivism or objectivism, and although the grounding of this structural subject-object relation in biblical temporal Being promises to overcome the “thing in itself,” i.e., the “thing as it appears” dualism, that which establishes the structural subject-object relation is not explicated with clarity. Although the problems seem to be removed, the solution is still awaited, unless the ontological and epistemological framework is developed in more detail. Until then, the question still remains as to which normative element is able to establish a temporal subject-object relation.

In Canale’s interpretation of the structure of Reason, the subject needs to account for the object’s lines of intelligibility and its own interpretation of the structure of Reason. However, if the interpretation of the structure of Reason is generated by the spontaneity of the subject, and if the naive state
of the subject in which an implicit interpretation of the structure of Reason is at work is structurally not different from theoretical thinking, the possibility of a subject-subject relation in which the second subject has interpreted its own Reason differently is nearly impossible. A subject-subject relationship is possible only when both subjects have a common ground for which to provide answers. This common ground cannot be Reason, since Reason can be interpreted in different ways. A common ground in which both subjects share interpretational frameworks is needed if communication is to be possible. It is conceivably possible that naive communication between two different people, belonging to two different or even opposing thought traditions, can be mutually comprehensible. An evolutionist can talk to a Christian about family problems, the weather, and how to cook rice without experiencing communication problems. A person can make himself understood even when he explains the arguments for his own worldview to someone who does not share his or her worldview. From a biblical perspective, this fact can be explained by God’s creational law to which all creation is subject. It is surprising that Canale does not include this biblical idea of normativity in his sketch of a possible temporal interpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworks, as normativity clearly belongs to the biblical conception of reality.14

Because of this lack, Canale cannot show as clearly as Dooyeweerd does that, although logical concepts are partly constructions of the human mind, they are still bound to normativity. The biblically interpreted structure of Reason shows that Reason is not fully “empty” before its ground of Being and frameworks are interpreted, but has intrinsic normativity. Any interpretation of the structure of Reason will be subject to a multiplicity of modal laws (e.g., logical laws of distinction), without which an interpretation of Reason would not even be possible. The fact remains that although there are many possible interpretations of Reason, all can be judged on their inner coherence or consistency of logical arguments, thereby pointing to a normativity that undergirds all interpretations. The lack of specific normativity does not mean that Canale’s interpretational conception of the subject-object relation is necessarily problematic, but that he needs to explain, from a biblical perspective, what it is that establishes both an ontic and epistemic relationship between subjects and between subjects and objects. This implies that both the lines of intelligibility and the idea of dynamic being-appearance need to receive clearer conceptualization.

4.1.2.2.2 Appearance and the Thing in Itself

The need for a clearer understanding of the subject-subject and subject-object relations hints at a further problem. Within a temporal dimensionality of Reason, Canale makes being-appearance co-appear with Being. Consequently, in a temporal framework the gap between being and appearance no longer

exists: appearance is being thing itself. However, experience (the structural datum) shows that objects and subjects do not fully appear with all their attributes to the subject with which they have a structural relationship. This is not just due to time in the sense that, at a particular point in time, not enough lines of intelligibility have been gathered. The incomplete appearance of the structural datum is inherent to the subject's perceptive limitations. Many examples could be given. For example, humans do not perceive infrared light, but a deer does. We, therefore, need to conclude that being-appearance does not mean that all characteristics of a certain object are perceived by the subject. Thus, the temporal “thing in itself” should not be considered identical to its appearance.

My critique here concerns the question of how appearance, as limited being-appearance, can be understood without falling back into the distinction between being and appearance.

4.1.2.2.3 Abstract and Pretheoretical

Canale’s redefinition of “abstract” within the temporal framework triggers questions. On one hand, he reformulates the abstract as having a “promise character” that is neither right nor wrong since the temporal extension of Being into the future has not yet taken place. On the other hand, the lines of intelligibility, as far as they are understood, are themselves of abstract character, since they reveal themselves through time as characteristics of a certain being. By means of the cognitive gathering act, these lines are abstracted from the diversity of being in extended time. I think that a reformulation of the abstract as being of a promise character alone is, however, problematic if an idea of the abstract is to find some usability in the world of nontheological, scientific disciplines. Canale should have integrated his ideas about the lines of intelligibility in his redefinition of the abstract. In fact, I think that an interconnection between the lines of intelligibility and the promise character is possible, as even the lines of intelligibility are of relative character and need to be proven true while extending into the future. They are, therefore, of promise character as well. In this context, Canale could have elaborated his indication of “determinable indeterminancy” as an understanding of temporal-grounded abstraction (see 2.6). By this term, Canale refers to the expression of patterns the object reveals in its temporal extension (as the determinable part), which requires the temporal openness of the object as it extends further into the future, expressing and refining its lines of intelligibility. Both the promise character and the abstraction process as cognitive gathering act should have been integrated.

Associated with these critical remarks is Canale’s unelaborated distinction between abstract and pretheoretical thought. I think that when the lines of

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15Canale, 361.
16Ibid., 379-380.
17Ibid., 374-382.
18Ibid., 137.
19Ibid., 27, n. 4; 374-375.
intelligence are included in the definition of the abstract, a theoretical tension-gathering process could be distinguished from a nontheoretical tension-gathering process. The absence of this differentiation hinders Canale’s ability to easily uncover the different absolutizations within contemporary scientific disciplines. It is helpful to speak of high and low levels of abstraction. The abstraction process, including the promise character and gathering process of the lines of intelligibility, is not only characteristic of theoretical thought, but pertains to all human ways of understanding. However, this abstraction process can be differently performed in different thought-act-attitudes: naive (low level of abstraction) and theoretical (high level of abstraction).

4.1.3 Critique on Dooyeweerd

Dooyeweerd’s thinking is much more detailed and developed than Canale’s. His thinking also has had a much greater impact than Canale’s. His influence has been tremendous, especially within the Reformed Christian tradition of philosophy.²⁰ Because of this popularity, he has been discussed and critiqued in various ways by many people both from within and without his own thought tradition.²¹

A brief look at the critique on Dooyeweerd shows that it mostly targets his transcendental critique of theoretical thought. I will, therefore, try to include in my critique some of the critical remarks that have been expressed against the transcendental critique and that are of interest for the encounter with Canale’s work.

4.1.3.1 Phenomenology and Interpretation

A critique on Dooyeweerd considered from the perspective of Canale’s structure of Reason requires the understanding that Canale’s object of analysis, Reason, is not identical with Dooyeweerd’s object of analysis, theoretical thought. In Canale’s work, theoretical thinking is a part of Reason as a whole, while in Dooyeweerd’s work theoretical thinking is just one of the many ways of knowing.

It is clear that both a dimensionality and an ontological framework are already involved and active in Dooyeweerd’s “structural analysis”: his understanding of theoretical thought is dependent on his modal theory and


view of cosmic time. It is his modal theory as ontology that makes his specific arguments within the first and second ways of his transcendental critique possible. My critique is that Dooyeweerd's analysis did not lay bare the systematization of Reason, but rather the biblical interpretation of a part of it as system. Dooyeweerd's analysis of the structure of thought is, therefore, a laying-bare of a structure that can only be expressed on the basis of a distinct interpretation of Reason's structure.

However, the general phenomenological structure of Reason does not exclude the possibility of more specific phenomenological structures within the basic structure of Reason that are not yet dependent on any interpretation. The description of naive and theoretical thinking that both have a clear analytic character could be a part of a regional formal structure of Reason that needs to receive an interpretation.

4.1.3.2 Analogy and Ontology

As discussed in my earlier article,22 Dooyeweerd's basic critique of Thomistic philosophy and other non-Christian philosophy is that cosmic time is wrongly interpreted and that the heart is not accepted or seen as the religious root-unity of humanity. It is the understanding of the supratemporal heart as the religious root-unity of humanity that enables the correct interpretation of cosmic time. Dooyeweerd's reinterpretation of cosmic time automatically led to a new understanding of analogy.23 However, his proposal that it is through the supratemporal unity that cosmic time breaks into the irreducible diversity of modalities demonstrates the timeless dimensionality of his concept of Reason.24

From the perspective of the structure of Reason, we then need to say that Dooyeweerd's critique does not go far enough. He also should have critically inquired into the ground of Being on which the Thomistic interpretation of the basic relational framework between Creator and creation rests. Just as with Thomistic philosophy, Dooyeweerd's philosophy is grounded in timeless Being, even though there are differences between the Dooyeweerdian and the Thomistic-Aristotelian understandings of timelessness.25 The consequences of this understanding of Being is that the borderline between God and the created world is not between God and the created world as such, but between temporal creation and a timeless God, and it is this understanding that helps to technically delineate the relation between unity and diversity in Dooyeweerd's argument.

22Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical-Theological Methodology, Part III.”


24It has been suggested by other Christian thinkers that the modal diversity can also be explained on the basis of the architecture of God's law. See Choi, 53.

The question we, therefore, need to consider is how Dooyeweerd’s view of the relation between creation and Creator (continuity and discontinuity) is to be evaluated if it is grounded in an understanding of Being that is foreign to the biblical message itself.26

4.1.3.3 Time and Timelessness

Although Dooyeweerd does elaborately criticize the different interpretations given to the time-timeless frameworks, he does not criticize timeless Being as such. Dooyeweerd’s choice for a timeless dimensionality of Reason can be traced back to the traditional Reformed Christian idea that time was created at the moment of creation. There was thus no time before creation. This conclusion does not find any textual biblical support and seems to be much more rooted in the philosophy of Parmenides, which became mixed with the Christian understanding that God, as Creator, exists independently from his creation.27 Because time was considered an essential part of creation in classical philosophy, the independence of God from his creation had to demand timelessness. By identifying God as Creator with timelessness, the understanding of his sovereignty and absolute independence from his creation found a philosophically valid yet unbiblical explanatory possibility.

A complete rejection of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy on the basis of his dimensionality of Reason would, however, result in the failure to uncover his original attempt to find a solution to the subject-object relation.28 Such a rejection would only demonstrate that the distinct influence of the theos-framework of Reason, understood independently of the foundational ontology, is not understood properly. It is true that foundational ontology sets the basic structure of all of Reason’s frameworks, but the interpretation of foundational ontology does not set the direction of the interpretation of onto or logos. As the history of philosophy has shown, the basis of a single interpretation of foundational ontology allows for different interpretations of the ontological and epistemological frameworks. The cause for these different interpretations can, therefore, not be found in foundational ontology since a


large extent of the pluralism of ontologies and epistemologies is grounded on the same foundational ontology. The source of this pluralism is thus not foundational ontology, but the interpretation of the theological framework.

One could question whether Dooyeweerd's dimensionality is Aristotelian, which would be of a great importance, if the object of study is biblical philosophy. A hasty rejection, however, would prevent one from seeing how Dooyeweerd's philosophy, even though grounded in timeless Being, attempted to fundamentally break with classical and Aristotelian conceptions of ontology and epistemology by choosing a different interpretation of the theological framework. By means of his modal theory, Dooyeweerd basically breaks with the classical hierarchical ontology, and by using his understanding of the subject-object relation he creatively tries to overcome the gap between subject and object. The whole idea of substance and essence (e.g., form-matter, nature-grace, and nature-freedom) is also claimed to be overcome by the modal theory. Dooyeweerd's attempt to overcome subject-object dualism takes place in Reason's timeless dimensionality. The explanation of diversity is found within the time-supratemporal-[non-Greek]-timelessness tension.

From a Canalian perspective, it is doubtful whether Dooyeweerd is really able to overcome the form-matter problem since Canale locates the origin of the problem in timeless foundational ontology. There is reason to question whether a dualism remains between the supratemporal “heart” and the temporal “body,” although Dooyeweerd rejects such a possibility. Additionally, one might wonder if the specific understanding of the Gegenstand-relation with its intentional abstraction from temporal coherence is not a relict of classical-dualistic thinking. It is certain that, by his dimensionality of Reason, Dooyeweerd maintains a dualism between creation and Creator, which leads to a certain mysticism necessary for achieving knowledge of God. As far as I can see, this must be the reason why Dooyeweerd did not spend much effort explaining in detail how the supratemporal heart receives its ideas of origin, unity, and coherence. It remains a mystery how it is possible

29Although Dooyeweerd takes distance from a Greek-Aristotelian understanding of timelessness, one should wonder whether the explanation suffices to say that Dooyeweerd does not at all have a non-Greek notion of timelessness. What his explanation does is to avoid a reductionistic version of timelessness (cf. Glanz, “Time, Reason and Religious Belief: A Limited Comparison, Critical Assessment, and Further Development of Herman Dooyeweerd's Structural Analysis of Theoretical Thought and Fernando Canale's Phenomenological Analysis of the Structure of Reason and Its Biblical Interpretation”), it does not argue for an eternal temporality of God, even though it seems that Dooyeweerd understands that the timelessness of God does not hinder God from acting temporally.

30Zuidervaart, 76.


32Cf. Glanz, “Part III: Application and Comparison,” §3.3.3.
that through revelation we receive these transcendental ideas.\textsuperscript{33} In biblical thinking, the divine act of revelation is not of a timeless or supratemporal nature, but is rather placed within the temporality that characterizes created reality and is, therefore, detached from mystic paths to divine knowledge. Therefore, the process of revelation is not understood as a problem for man’s onticity.\textsuperscript{34} Knowledge of God does not need to be achieved through methods of ecstasy, asceticism, rational abstraction, or spiritual mysticism.\textsuperscript{35}

It is, however, crucial to observe that Dooyeweerd’s modal theory does not necessarily need to derive its ideological legitimation from a timeless foundational ontology. The necessary ingredient of the modal theory is merely the ontological conception of creation’s dependence on an independent Creator. To interpret this dependence-independence relation as cosmic time-timeless relation is just one possibility. The crux of the modal theory as a tool to criticize theoretical thought is its explication of the need for an Archimedean standpoint through which unity and coherence can be explained. The theory shows that many modalities could theoretically offer this Archimedean standpoint through the theoretical *Gegenstand*-relation in combination with the dogma of the autonomy of rational thought. It thus seems that Dooyeweerd targets, in the first place, something supramodal rather than supratemporal to overcome the danger of reductionism. The modal theory can thus also be applied within a temporal dimensionality of Reason. The need for identifying the true Archimedean standpoint with supratemporality is only because the modal diversity is understood to be different expressions of time necessarily referring to a basic supratemporal unity.

To conclude my critical remarks on Dooyeweerd’s understanding of time, I want to stress that his critique especially targets the absolutization of any *Gegenstand*-relation on the basis of the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought as it can be found within the history of philosophy and the modern humanistic thought tradition. He strongly inquired into and criticized this absolutization. H. G. Geertsema similarly states: “Het theo-ontologisch kader als zodanig, waarin het theoretisch denken zich sterk gemaakt heeft, had minder zijn kritische belangstelling.”\textsuperscript{36} He seems to point out an undiscovered dimensionality in Dooyeweerd’s thought that had not received a critical inquiry. That a classical timeless understanding of Being seems to be still at work can be seen in the fact that (a) the heart and (b) the transcendental ideas are interpreted as supratemporal, making it difficult to

\textsuperscript{33}Van Woudenberg, 55.


\textsuperscript{35}Canale, *Back to Revelation-Inspiration*, 133.

\textsuperscript{36}Eng.: “The theo-ontological framework as such, in which theoretical thought grew strong, was of less interest to him” (Geertsema, “Transcendental Openheid: Over het Zinkarakter van de Werkelijkheid in de Wijsbegeerte van H. Dooyeweerd,” 54).
understand divine revelation and inspiration.\textsuperscript{37} A further trace of timeless Being can be seen when (c) theoretical thought is characterized as abstracting from the temporal coherence of reality and the unclear description of how the transcendental ideas are received. The latter especially allows for critically questioning whether the problematic dualism between Creator and created humanity was really overcome by Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.

Contrary to Dooyeweerd’s critique on absolutization, Canale’s critique would go further and challenge the very foundation on which such an absolutization is placed.

4.1.3.4 General Logical Slip in the Argument

The critique in this section targets the logical consistency of Dooyeweerd’s argumentation. This more analytic critique will help to discover what value Canale’s analysis may have for a further development of Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique.

Along with others, Lambert Zuidervaart, as a Reformed philosopher, finds a central contradiction in Dooyeweerd’s line of argument.\textsuperscript{38} In his transcendental critique, Dooyeweerd performs precisely that which he claims to be impossible, i.e., to give a theoretical explanation of that which surpasses the limits of theoretical thought. In doing so, his argument for the universally valid conditions of theoretical thought is disqualified, thereby revealing a logical slip in Dooyeweerd’s argument for the nonneutrality of theoretical thought. Zuidervaart summarizes the flow of the argumentation in eight steps:\textsuperscript{39}

1. No one could engage in theoretical thought were it not for universally valid conditions that make such thought possible.
2. Any philosophy can identify these conditions by analyzing the structure of theoretical thought itself.
3. Such an analysis shows three universally valid conditions that make theoretical thought possible:
   a. the Gegenstand-relation between the logical and nonlogical aspects,
   b. the supratheoretical unity of aspects found in the theorizing agent,
   c. the agent’s radical dependence on something other than itself.
4. The agent can either be dependent on the absolute origin of everything or on some substitute that is itself dependent on the absolute origin.

\textsuperscript{37}This difficulty can be clearly seen where Dooyeweerd argues for the religious ground-motive as having supreatemporal character, although they seem to have a clear historical characteristic (cf. Glanz, “Time, Reason and Religious Belief,” §5.2.5).

\textsuperscript{38}Van Woudenberg, 54-55.

\textsuperscript{39}Zuidervaart, 77-78.
5. No system of theoretical thought can avoid employing ideas about the ontological status of the conditions that make theoretical thought possible. These ideas concern coherence, unity, and origin.

6. The sources of these ideas are found in the supratheoretical religious ground-motive.

7. The biblical ground-motive is the crucial and unavoidable source of the true transcendental ideas.

8. In detail, the transcendental ideas concern:
   a. the temporal and intermodal coherence of meaning,
   b. the deeper common identity (unity) of the modal aspects of meaning,
   c. the divine origin of meaning in its coherence and unity.

Dooyeweerd’s Gegenstand-relation is impossible to conceptualize without assuming diversity within reality. This assumption should not be considered a problem of argument, because agreement can be found among different philosophers on the existence of reality as diversity. However, the specific understanding of the Gegenstand-relation presupposes an understanding of theoretical thought that is abstracted from the coherence of a specific diversity of meaning-being. Such an understanding is only possible on the basis of the modal theory as a theory on time in which an abstraction from temporal coherence is possible. Thus steps 5-8 in Dooyeweerd’s argument are presupposed in premises 1-4. With the help of Canale’s analysis, I agree with Zuidervaart that Dooyeweerd’s “formal” results of analysis are quite dependent on his presupposed “content.”

4.2 Transforming the Analysis

After having refined the phenomenological analysis of the structure of Reason, it can be fruitfully used for a systematic development of biblical philosophy in general and exegetical methodology in specific. In the process of such development, one will need to recognize the depths and insights Dooyeweerd’s philosophy testifies to by its different biblically inspired motives (e.g., creation-fall-redemption, the heart, human responsibility, meaning-being). On the basis of a temporal dimensionality of Reason, the development of an interpretation of Reason’s frameworks can be accompanied by the integration of important aspects of Dooyeweerdian thought. Yet such integration will need to entail the transformation of these aspects from timelessness in temporal grounding.

Within this final section, I will show in what way it would be possible to integrate insights and aspects of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy into a temporally grounded interpretation of Reason’s formal structure. Although I will not claim

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40. Choi, 67.
to develop a suggestion of a truly biblical interpretation of Reason's formal structure, I do think that my suggestion is inspired by biblical insights both on the level of Being and on the level of the ontological and epistemological frameworks. The integration of, especially, Dooyeweerd's modal theory and the conception of the subject as *imago Dei* will allow for an interpretation of the ontological framework, which, in turn, will function as the background of the development of the epistemological framework. By this, a distinction between naïve and theoretical thinking can be worked out, which will allow for a much better understanding of scientific disciplines and the limits of theoretical thinking.

In such a project of refinement, one needs to be constantly aware of the critique on and fruits of the work of both Canale and Dooyeweerd. Such a project represents a very complex task that cannot be accomplished within the scope of an article series, here I can try only to selectively outline the contours of the refinement of Canale's formal structure of Reason and the development of a biblical interpretation of Reason's frameworks by an integration of Dooyeweerdian elements. A broader outline of my transformational suggestions can be found in my Masters' thesis.

4.2.1 Meaning and Phenomenological Analysis

To make the phenomenological analysis of Reason more transparent, it is necessary to explicate its ontological assumptions. Such an explication must clarify the term “Reason” as phenomenon and the term “logical” as principle of the analytic-phenomenological method (cf. 4.1.2.1.1).

The explanation of the term “Reason” as the realm of Logos should be distinguished from the realm of Meaning. The existence of Meaning is a necessary presupposition of Reason's functioning. Meaning is not constituted by Reason, but rather is experienced through Reason when Reason is taken as the subject-object relation from which knowledge and meaning flow. Meaning is only constituted by theos/the One, through which it receives its radical relational dependence character. The realm of Reason as the realm of Logos should be explained as the realm of subjectively expressed Meaning. Knowledge then always concerns the subject's understanding (in its broadest sense) of Meaning. Hence the phenomenological analysis of Reason focuses on the formal structure that allows for a subject's generation of meaningful knowledge.\(^42\)

The term “Reason” must be explained as universalized Reason. Universalized Reason should be made plausible on the basis of the existence of Meaning as a presupposition of Reason's functioning. Meaning cannot, therefore, be a product of Reason's functioning. Further, the diversity of Meaning is not experienced as a reality that allows for a complete Knowledge determination. Additionally, it should be stressed that universalized Reason

\(^42\)From a biblical perspective, Meaning is not constructed, but already present. Existence is intrinsically meaningful. Meaning is not created by humanity's rational thinking (even taken in its broad sense), but conceptualized through humanity's rational involvement.
includes the existence of a subject and an object that interrelate. The possibility of the relation between subject and object is accounted for by their complementarity that finds its source in a theos and his coappearing Being. Since the object in its relation with a subject also belongs to Reason, universalized Reason consequently cannot be limited to the analytic thinking of a subject, but must include ontology.

The “logical” principle by which the phenomenological analysis of Reason is made possible should be explained as a formal analytic manner of distinction and a formal analytic manner of synthesis. The formal analytic manner of distinction will give access to the different parts of the whole of Reason, while the formal analytic manner of synthesis will allow for making explicit the existing structural interrelations between the different parts of Reason as a whole. The need for explaining the possibility of formal analytic distinction and synthesis in opposition to the material analytic distinction and synthesis is important if one wants to prevent a vicious circle in regard to the discovery that any logic needs to be grounded in a specific Logos. Regardless of whether logic is grounded in temporal or timeless Logos, the phenomenological analysis should arrive at the same formal description when it restricts itself to the formal function of logic. If this is not possible, consequently suspicion will rise, if the result of the phenomenological analysis is not religiously influenced and determined by a specific interpretation of Being. While one may try to develop an interpretation that suggests that only “material” logic (necessarily involved in the interpretation of Reason’s structure) is grounded in a Logos, nevertheless a “formal” logic has universal “trans-Logos” character.43 Hereby explicit distance can be taken from the possible misunderstanding that the phenomenological analysis already constitutes an interpretation of the phenomenon.

4.2.2 The Place of the Transcendental Idea of Origin and Coherence in the Phenomenological Structure of Reason

The idea of origin is linked with the theological framework of Reason. Without theos, there is no theological framework; nor is there any other framework of Reason. The structural independence status of the theos guarantees the existence of ontic and epistemic coherence.44 It, therefore, plays a major role in the development of the ontological and epistemological frameworks. The formal function of the theological framework is its independent status in contrast to being as dependent being that finds its interpretation in the ontological framework. The formal ontic dependence on the idea of origin demonstrates, in the relation of the ontological framework to the theological framework, that ontic dependence is accompanied by a formal epistemic dependence on the idea of origin. Without a primary belief, synthetical

43See Clouser, 9-58.
conclusions and concepts are impossible.\textsuperscript{45} Thus the formal structural relation between the theological and ontological/epistemological frameworks is of an independence-dependence character.\textsuperscript{46} In the construction of any philosophical or scientific concept, this structural relation must necessarily be interpreted, as is recognized throughout the history of philosophy. This is Dooyeweerd’s great insight that remains of much value, as this structural understanding is not dependent on the specific argument he developed on the basis of his modal theory and within his dimensionality of Reason.\textsuperscript{47} Henceforth, I will refer to the necessary choice for a theos or “the One”\textsuperscript{48} as the necessary choice for Reason’s direction while it functions in its coappearing of Being as the ultimate horizon for any understanding.\textsuperscript{49}

As the formal structure of Reason and the comparison between Dooyeweerd and Canale show, the interpretation of the independence status does not fully determine all the other frameworks since the independence-dependence relation is structurally attributed by foundational ontology. This implies that Dooyeweerd’s cosmic time-timelessness dichotomy should be understood not merely as a problematic interpretation, but also as a hint of an underlying formal structure. On one hand, Dooyeweerd’s cosmic time-timelessness framework points to the structurally necessary dependence-independence relation. On the other, it points to the structurally necessary concept of Being as nonbeing\textsuperscript{50} and the source of coherence in which the structurally necessary dependence-independence framework can be placed. In Dooyeweerd’s case, this structurally necessary concept is interpreted as timeless Being. This interpretation helped him to understand that creational

\textsuperscript{45}As far as I can see, the theos functions on a formal level as the independent origin of the dependent ontic reality, as well as the origin of the epistemic ideas of coherence and unity. This is also true for pantheistic thought, as Clouser has shown (see ibid., 48-50). Consequently, the relation between independence status of the theos versus the ontic and epistemic dependence status of creation has a universal formal character and needs to be interpreted. Contrary to Canale, who sees the theos formally only functioning as the source for articulating coherence and unity, I would, therefore, suggest that independence appears and can be argued for not only at the level of the interpretation of the formal components of Reason, but on the very level of the formal structure of Reason.

\textsuperscript{46}Compared to Clouser, the theos on which the ontic and epistemic are dependent functions as noetic and ontic primary belief.

\textsuperscript{47}Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique: Transforming It Hermeneutically,” 85.

\textsuperscript{48}Canale, \textit{A Criticism of Theological Reason}, 63, n. 1.

\textsuperscript{49}The term “Reason’s direction” is chosen, as it refers to the direction given to Reason by Reason’s origin (the subject, object, and possibility for their relationship). The “backward direction” to the self’s origin determines the understanding of Reason, and the “forward direction” as Reason allows for further rational expression of Meaning.

\textsuperscript{50}Glanz, “Part II: Canale on Reason,” §2.2.3.
aspects were considered autonomous because they were identified with timelessness.

Formally seen, autonomy is not necessarily connected with timelessness, and the answer to the question of Being allows for multiple independence status. A refinement of the phenomenological structure of Reason will need to emphasize this. Any concept of the independence-dependence structure can be attributed by different interpretations of foundational ontology. The interpretation of foundational ontology is thus structurally not derived from the interpretation of the independence-dependence relation, but is the background in which the interpretation of the independence-dependence relation takes place. Being’s characteristic of coherence as nonbeing can only be guessed at or derived from a self-revelatory theos and points out the possibility for hypothesis of Reason. From a Christian perspective, Reason’s ability to be hypothesized is interpreted as the necessity of faith.

A Christian who believes in the words of the prophets preserved within Scripture will ask whether the independent Creator of all creation does not himself reveal his ground of Being to humanity. In search of this answer, the Christian thinker will be able to derive his understanding of foundational ontology from the independent biblical God as theos, not because of God’s independent status, but because of the thinker’s trust in Holy Scripture. The ground of Being can find expression, but is not necessarily determined by that which has independent status (e.g., evolutionism can be connected with temporal or timeless Being). Only there, where the chosen theos expresses its ground of Being, it must determine the interpretation of the dimensionality of Reason. Consequently, Christian theology should reflect on the implications of the biblical revelation of God’s Being as coappearing with his being. Henceforth, I will refer to the coappearing Being as Reason’s setting.51

Seeing Reason’s direction and setting as primordial presuppositions for any interpretation of Reason, the understanding of Canale’s dimensionality of Reason would be broadened. Reason’s dimensionality would no longer simply refer to the ground of Being (Reason’s setting), but also to the content of the primary belief (Reason’s direction). Such a use of terms could also help to overcome the lack of clarity found in Canale’s writing regarding the location of the source of coherence.

The content of Reason’s setting and its direction as its dimensionality cannot be found or generated from the formal structure of Reason itself. The content of the dimensionality of Reason cannot be autonomously deduced by humans, but only guessed at or accepted through revelation. The biblical interpretation of the dimensionality of Reason is not guessed at, but revealed as God reveals himself as theos (Reason’s direction), coappearing with temporal Being (Reason’s setting).52

Knowing that coherence is established through Being as the Logos of logic (Reason’s setting), the specific interpretation of Being will provide the

51The term “Reason’s setting” is chosen, as it refers to the setting in which the origin is put or reveals itself.

52Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 373.
basic framework for the development of a detailed concept of ontic coherence as the interpretation of the ontological framework. This is especially necessary if the existence of the subject-object relation is to be theoretically explained. Reason’s temporal setting enables the avoidance of the dualism between the various forms of the “thing in itself” and “thing as it appears.” The possible avoidance of the theoretical subject-object problem is, however, not the same as the establishment of a theoretical explanation of the subject-object relation. I find Dooyeweerd’s explanation of the inner modal coherence by means of analogical moments particularly persuasive. If Dooyeweerd’s idea of coherence is transformed in such a way that it is disconnected from the idea of supratemporal unity, an incorporation of the modal theory into the biblical interpretation of the ontological framework should be possible and fruitful. The specific idea of coherence received from the theos and developed in the ontological framework is secondary to the general coherence that is provided by Being. A biblical development of specific coherence will need to be placed into temporal Being.

Inspired by the biblical idea of the God-given laws and norms to which all of creation is subject, a modal theory can be developed. The modal theory with its multiple laws in specific law-spheres related through multimodal analogical moments enables a developed idea of temporal coherence. This detailed idea of coherence must, however, be grounded in temporal Being in order to be biblical. This implies that no law or norm is to be understood as timeless, but as temporal and given by a truly autonomous God.

So far I have tried to argue that the idea of origin is formally connected to theos. The identification of the theos, i.e., the interpretation of origin, is a matter of the subjective choice. Further, the idea of coherence is formally connected to foundational ontology as coappearing with theos, but formally being undetermined by theos. It is only in the case of a self-revelatory theos, such as the biblical God, that humanity can know the ground of Being through the theos, which allows for the complementarity (coherence) of all of Reason’s frameworks.

4.2.3 The Self, Its Unity, and the Source of Self-understanding

Theos as origin and foundational ontology as ground of coherence lead us to the question as to which part of Reason the idea of unity is to be connected. As far as I can see, this question cannot be answered without further developing the formal function of the self within the structure of Reason.

In his phenomenology, Canale describes the structural necessity of a subject characterized by its spontaneity that allows for the interpretation of Reason’s structure. A more detailed interpretation of the self, including a further interpretation of the spontaneity of the subject as human freedom, belongs to the ontological framework. In my critique (cf. 4.1.2.1.3) I have pointed out that the phenomenological analysis should be able to give a more detailed insight into the nature of the formal requirement of the self. Such elaborate analysis would show that structurally, the ontic and epistemic
realms come together in the subject in a radical dependence on their common origin. This structural dependence of the concept of the subject on its origin emphasizes that self-understanding, as dependent on an understanding of the self’s origin (theos), is a basic formal condition of the structure of Reason. That the ontic and epistemic structurally come together in the subject implies that self-understanding, as dependent on an understanding of the self’s origin, directly influences ontological and epistemological conceptions and allows for their unity. I think that this insight is still of descriptive and not yet of interpretative nature. Any further understanding will, however, move beyond the scope of phenomenological description.

Leaving the formal description of Reason with the self as its part, I will now look upon the interpretation of the self as belonging to the development of the ontological framework. From a Christian perspective, it is crucial to understand the heart as the center of a human's existence. I think that Dooyeweerd paves the way for a biblical interpretation of the self by means of his concept of the heart as the religious root of human existence. However, a biblical interpretation of the self as heart or soul does not imply the idea of supratemporality. Dooyeweerd's supratemporal understanding of the heart is only demanded because of his timeless ground of Being. A conceptual understanding of the heart that overcomes the danger of identifying the self with one of its functions demands the implementation of the modal theory. Accepting the heart as humanity's religious center and expression of divine unity allows for the understanding of it as an expression of the unity of modal coherence in its radical dependence on its true origin. Of paramount importance for the development of the epistemological framework will be that the heart or self is interpreted as temporal within the development of the ontological framework. This will have influence on the understanding of theoretical abstraction, and the generation of hermeneutical principles as I have outlined elsewhere.

A biblical interpretation of the spontaneity of the self as human freedom will necessarily receive a spiritual dimension. The necessity of an understanding of one’s origin as a choice of faith that interprets Reason’s direction in order to allow for the rational expression of Meaning implies a concept of freedom that describes humanity as not free from but free for responsibility—a religious choice. Humanity will need to accept a Creator or Arche of its existence in order to have a lookout tower from where it can have an overview of the diversity around it. This lookout tower will, in fact, be “the place where he finds himself.” A biblical interpretation of the self is therefore strongly dependent on the biblical conception of God as it finds expression in the theological framework.

A further implication of the biblical insight into the radical freedom of humanity is that a concept must be formed that accounts for the fact that the

54 Ibid., 93.
I can be simultaneously aware of its current choice and its ability and freedom to choose any time for different interpretations of Reason's direction and setting. There is thus a structural independence accompanying the self's choice of origin.

The implication of the biblical interpretation of the self regarding the idea of unity is that the heart or self is created with the ability to experience and understand the diversity of creation as a unity as the epistemic and ontic unite in the subject. This ontological understanding finds its ontic and epistemic origin, however, in the revelation of God. As the interpretation of God belongs to the theological framework, the idea of unity is to be located within the theological framework as it originates there. As Meaning implies the unity of the self since the diversity of being is not experienced antithetically but coherently, I think that the formal description of the structure of Reason could include the unity of the subject as a formal structural fact. The interpretation of this unity-subject-fact, however, is received from the theological framework.

Herewith I have placed all Dooyeweerd's transcendental ideas within the formal structure of Reason. Dooyeweerd's transcendental ideas function as hermeneutical formal presupposition within the structure of Reason. Content needs to be given to these ideas if an expression of Meaning is to be possible.

4.2.4 The Need for Normativity in the Establishment of Subject-Object Relations

As far as I can see, Canale's interpretation of the phenomenological structure of Reason does help to overcome the dualism between being and appearance, but that which establishes the structural subject-object relation is not explained. One can say that the problem of dualism seems to be removed, but that the solution is still to be awaited. The general understanding of temporal coherence is not sufficient for developing a theoretical concept of that which constitutes the subject-object relation. A more detailed understanding of coherence within Reason's temporal dimensionality (setting and direction) needs to be developed as part of the ontological framework.

In the subject-object relation, the activity of interpretation always belongs to the subject side and stands over against the objective fact. There where the interpretation of the subject-object relation does not involve a normative-factual side, the subject-object conception easily falls into the danger of relativism. Because the epistemological side always depends on the ontological for its contents, the development of an ontological framework that has normative characteristics is crucial to overcome the danger of subjectivism. I think that Canale's current development of the interpretation of the structure of Reason will not lead to relativism if the biblical law-idea is introduced in the further development of the ontological framework. Here Dooyeweerd with his wetsidee (law-idea), conception of the

57Ibid., 100.
The modal laws, inherent to all creation, guarantee the possibility of the subject-object relation as both sides share the same laws. As such, the law of God as revealed through Scripture makes interdependent creaturely being possible. There where within the temporal dimensionality of Reason creation is understood as bound to the law, and the God who has independence status as subjecting himself to these laws, knowledge and understanding do not start with the subject as if knowledge has to bridge an original gulf between God and the individual subject. There is no gap that needs to be bridged — on the contrary, knowledge presupposes that we are in a relationship already! This interpretation corresponds with naive experience: we experience coherence between ourselves and the world around us, even when two different subjects talk differently about the same object. The phenomenological structural relationship that exists between the knowing subject and the knowable object can, from a biblical perspective, be interpreted as a relationship, enabled by the subjection of both subject and object to a common creational law-design.

As we have seen through the analysis of the phenomenological structure of Reason, all interpretation is done by the subject. In a biblical interpretation of the structure of Reason, the subject is subjected to creational norms and laws, according to which the trustworthiness and validity of any interpretation and other acts can be judged. The creational law that all creation inherently shares and by which human beings live and think allows no ontological gap, but enables the existence of justified and unjustified interpretations of the object.

It is then the positive form of living our religiosity, i.e., our trust in God expressed in positively answering his call to walk in his ways, which are the laws and norms to which all creation is bound, that allows for true relations with the world around us. The law as creational ontic and ethical order that binds the diversity of creational diversity together makes, on one side, the subject-object relation possible and has therefore a strong relational character, and functions, on the other side, as a call for responsible interpretation. This call cannot be ignored or resisted, since we live through and by this law. The only freedom human beings have in this regard is to either respond responsively or unresponsively as transgressing the law, i.e., the creational order that characterizes the universal structural datum. In both cases, humanity is subject to the law. The epistemic freedom of human beings consists in the ability to rationally construct an ontology that stays in a dualism with the real creational order. Any rational construction needs to be assessed from the perspective of formal logic and from the perspective of the structural datum, which both function as universal states of affairs.

In such an interpretation of the structural subject-object relation, knowledge is never a precise copy, as the object is temporal and always moving forward by its future extension. Knowledge is much more the creation of a dynamic temporal relationship that receives the contributions of both the

58 Wolters, 12-18.
59 Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique,” 100.
subject and the object. This dynamic temporal relationship-by-law asks for
doing justice to the normative side of both object and subject. Knowledge
is therefore never absolute, but it is not just a human projection either.\(^{60}\) I
would like to clarify this by sharpening the definition of Canale’s “lines of
intelligibility.”

By implementing Dooyeweerd’s law structure in the interpretation of
the different frameworks of Reason, Canale’s term “lines of intelligibility”
could be clarified as data that come from the object’s temporal extension.\(^{61}\) I
think that Canale’s “lines of intelligibility” can be understood as the temporal
lines that are drawn by the constant living under the law by responding either
positively or negatively to it. These lines of intelligibility represent the manner
of living out, and the attitude toward, the Creator’s call. This means that
through the lines of intelligibility the intentionality of the free, responsible
subject (and the object as well) appears constantly—in fact, there is no
intentionality without the lines of intelligibility. Such an interpretation would
also correspond to Canale’s understanding that in the subject-object relation,
the object can never be understood as just a “brute fact,” but as a reality from
which temporal lines of intelligibility flow to the cognitive subject.\(^{62}\)

Knowledge is, however, not only nonabsolute because of the different
individual possibilities of responding to the law, but also because knowledge
is always temporal and dynamic. Because subject and object are not static, but
dynamically extended from past into future, knowledge is always increasing,
deepened with the future extension of the lines of intelligibility.

As the subject never has full access to the object in the subject-object
encounter, it is in need of continuing the subject-object relation. The
knowledge of God thus calls for an enduring covenant.

4.2.5 Understanding, Theoretical
Thought, and Religion

In their interpretation of thought/Reason, both Dooyeweerd and Canale
make a distinction between naive and abstract thinking. For both of them,
thinking takes place within time. Canale’s thought is, however, not fully
developed when it comes down to a more detailed understanding of the
difference between naive and theoretical thought.

Contrary to Canale, Dooyeweerd’s distinction between theoretical and
nontheoretical thought, in connection with his modal theory, is of persuasive
character. In fact, I think that Dooyeweerd has seen something that is typical
for theoretical thought: the \textit{Gegenstand}-relation. In regard to naive thinking,
theoretical thinking is of a crucially different character in terms of both the
object the \textit{“Gegenstand,”} and the subject that applies the logical function of

\(^{60}\)H. Dooyeweerd, \textit{A New Critique of Theoretical Thought}, 4 vols., vol. 2 (Lewiston,

\(^{61}\)Cf. Glanz, “Part II: Canale on Reason,” §2.3.3.3.

\(^{62}\)Canale, \textit{A Criticism of Theological Reason}, 396.
thought in a specific abstract way. Clouser explains the Dooyeweerdian distinction in an accessible way. In naive thinking, the object's properties (e.g., odor, size, actions) are never extracted or isolated from the objects themselves. As Clouser opines, "this level of abstraction does not focus on a thing's odor or size or whatnot to such a degree as to disrupt the continuity of those properties with all the other properties of the things that have them. At this level of abstraction, a property, though distinguished and singled out, is still experienced as a characteristic of the thing that exhibits it."

Clouser calls this level of abstraction the "lower level of abstraction." Contrary to the naive attitude of thought, in the theoretical attitude of thought we intensify "the focus of our attention to such a degree that we actually do isolate a property from whatever exhibits it, and thus focus our attention on the property itself." Here we specify our subject-object relation in such a way that a Gegenstand-relation is established within the general subject-object relations. Clouser calls this level of abstraction the "higher level of abstraction."

The Dooyeweerdian distinction between "abstract" and "pretheoretical" knowing can help to create more clarity on this topic in the further development of the interpretation of the structure of Reason within the dimensionality of biblical Reason. Nevertheless, whatever idea of abstraction will be developed, it needs to be grounded in temporality through which an intentional dissolution of temporal coherence will be incompatible to the understanding of the Gegenstand.

In Canale's phenomenological analysis of Reason, abstract or theoretical knowledge is understood as knowledge in which the system of Knowledge (Reason's frameworks) is technically made explicit so that it can become a foundation and tool for scientific and philosophic analysis. In pretheoretical knowledge, on the other hand, the system of Knowledge remains implicit. Pretheoretical and theoretical knowledge are different approaches to the structural datum. In the naive experience of the structural datum, the interpretation of the hermeneutical structure is used implicitly, while in the theoretical approach the interpretation of the hermeneutical structure is much more explicit because of the need for theoretical synthesis. The dimensionality of Reason, however, often remains hidden in both ways of knowing.

As I have shown, Canale's biblical interpretation of the structural difference between abstract and naive thought creates some confusion. On one hand, the abstract is reformulated as having a "promise character"

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63Geertsema, "Dooyeweerd's Transcendental Critique," 98.
64See Clouser, 64-69.
65Ibid., 64.
66Ibid.
67With the help of the modal theory implanted into temporal Reason, theoretical thought could be understood as abstraction of functions being found in the temporality of creation instead of timeless principles.
68Glanz, “Part II: Canale on Reason,” §2.3.3.4.
that is neither true nor wrong, as the temporal future-extension of Being has not yet taken place. On the other hand, I would understand the lines of intelligibility as being themselves of an abstract character. The lines of intelligibility express only a limited part of the object. This “part” refers to that which is made known as temporal-relative characteristic of the temporal open object-identity. I suggest that the lines of intelligibility are to be understood as the expression of the subject’s and object’s individual historical responses (intentionality) to the creational laws and norms. In order to come to an understanding of the object’s intentionality, the lines of intelligibility need to be cognitively gathered by abstracting them in cognitive tension from the diversity of a specific object-being in extended time. By means of the temporal-relative characteristics (past lines of intelligibility) of a specific object, the future being of that object is partly predictable as one gets access to its individual intentionality.

We see then that the word “abstract” has received two different meanings in Canale’s work: “promise character” and “lines of intelligibility.” Since it is possible to see an interconnection between the lines of intelligibility and the idea of the promise character, I think a new definition of the word “abstract” is possible without compromising either of them. The understanding of the received lines of intelligibility is of temporal-relative character and needs to be proven true or false, while the lines of intelligibility extend with the object into the further future extension. On the basis of the law-idea, I suggest that the lines of intelligibility have, as an expression of the intentionality of an object, a promise character since they suggest how the intentionality of the object will respond to the laws and norms, to which creation is subjected, in the future-extension. The lines of intelligibility are thus meant as the expression of contents and patterns the object reveals in its temporal extension, which requires the temporal openness of the object as it extends further into the future. The further the lines of intelligibility extend into the future, the more clearly is the individual intentionality of any object revealed.

My suggestion is thus that the promise character should be understood as a characteristic of the lines of intelligibility. The lines of intelligibility include a promise character. Consequently, “abstraction” refers to the cognitive gathering-tension of the object’s temporal extension.

Abstraction, therefore, belongs to any understanding, whether of a theoretical or pretheoretical nature. The gathering process of the lines of intelligibility is not only characteristic of theoretical knowledge, but pertains to all human ways of understanding. However, this abstraction process can be differently performed according to different thought-act-attitudes. Here I would like to integrate Clouser’s distinction of high and low levels of abstraction. In the naive attitude, we abstract the object’s lines of intelligibility in order to understand the object’s being in its temporal identity, by which we distinguish the particular object from all other objects. The temporal identity is characterized by the object’s specific way of answering the divine call for

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70Ibid., 374-382.
living. In the theoretical attitude, we abstract the object's lines of intelligibility in order to understand the call to which creation in general needs to respond. In both attitudes, the human being involves himself or herself in abstraction. However, one can distinguish between different levels of abstraction. Regarding science, it would make sense to see the highest form of abstracting as the attempt to uncover the laws and norms by which creation lives and to which it needs to respond. These laws and norms are the ground of the generation of all lines of intelligibility.

The Dooyeweerdian distinction between laws and norms can be helpful here. On one hand, the highly abstract involvement of uncovering and understanding laws enables the most trustable predictions. On the other, some abstract involvement of uncovering norms leads to less trustable guesses, since the free, responsible human subjects can respond differently to the call to live justly and creatively. Still, both norms and laws are temporally grounded, and our understanding of them increases and changes, while the subject-object relations we are involved in extend to the future.

Having introduced the law-structure in the development of interpreting Reason's frameworks (see 4.2.4), the development of a modal theory is made possible within the ontological framework of temporal Reason. This development would help to make a clearer distinction between lower and higher levels of cognitive abstraction. It would also show that especially in the theoretical attitude, there is the need for an explicit formulation of Reason's direction and setting for coherently interpreting our structural data as a process of creating an image of reality. In the theoretical attitude, the idea of origin (independence status) can no longer be found in the object (Gegenstand) or reality as given in experience, but must be sought in the subject and his self-understanding as dependent on an understanding of its own origin (theos).71

4.3 Conclusion

I conclude that a fruitful dialogue between the two thinkers is possible and that a further development of Canale's thought, especially concerning the interpretation of the ontological framework, can be stimulated by use of Dooyeweerdian concepts. When this is done, a tool for deconstructing biblical methodologies is made available, and a clear framework is laid out that inspires the scholar in general and the biblical theologian in particular to construct methodologies that do justice to the spirit and the data of the biblical testimony.72 Only then are we enabled to realize the call of Brueggeman: “our situation needs to be submitted to the text for a fresh discernment. It is our situation, not the text that requires

71Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique,” 89.
72Such a deconstruction of exegetical methodologies on the basis of a further development of Canale’s thoughts has been performed in Oliver Glanz, “Who is Speaking? Who is Addressed?: A Critical Study into Conditions of Exegetical Method and Its Consequences for the Interpretation of Participant Reference-Shifts in the Book of Jeremiah” (Ph.D. dissertation, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 2010), 44-145.
a new interpretation. . . . [T]his text subverts all our old readings of reality and forces us to a new, dangerous, obedient reading.73

A clear understanding of Reason’s phenomenology and a strong biblical interpretation of this phenomenology will not only allow developing a better methodology for biblical theology, but it also will enable the many different disciplines (e.g., missiology, and systematic, biblical, pastoral, and aesthetical theologies) and subdisciplines of theology to unite under one matrix and develop a diversity of scholarly results that are compatible with each other, promoting unity and meaningful interdisciplinary dialogues. All disciplines of theology are called to engage seriously in methodological reflections if the reputation of our craft is to be saved.