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WINTER 1970
How Does Revelation Occur?

BERNARD RAMM

Two cultural factors of the nineteenth century virtually determined that revelation would be the dominant theological topic of the twentieth century.

First, many successes in the nineteenth century gave the so-called scientific method impressive esteem and credentials and, both by implication and directly, raised the whole problem of how we know (epistemology) in both philosophy and theology. Second, from John Locke on, modern philosophy has become more and more concerned with the theory of knowledge (epistemology) and less and less concerned with general theories of reality (metaphysics). In fact, to some of the philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, philosophy was virtually reduced to the theory of knowledge. This meant that the problem of knowledge became the foremost preoccupation of theology — and that is precisely the problem of revelation. So science and philosophy forced the concept of revelation to the center of theological attention.

Karl Barth made the original breakthrough at this point and also in many ways set the course of the discussion. Unfortunately the Barthian materials are massive, for Barth discussed not only revelation itself but also such allied subjects as the various meanings of the expression "the word of God," the concept of inspiration, the concept of canon, and the concept of tradition. It is amazing how fast the materials on revelation grew in the 1920's.¹

The questions I want to pose are these: Where does revelation take place? That is, in what realm or territory or area does it occur? Where is its material content or its decisive action to be found?

I shall discuss leading alternatives and then sum up with my own view.
I. REVELATION AS INSIGHT

Religious liberalism (or religious modernism, or neoprotestantism) is that movement which was begun by Friedrich Schleiermacher and which dominated the theology of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century. It lost its theological leadership with the emergence of men like Barth, Emil Brunner, and Rudolf Bultmann; but it still has representatives today and is making some sort of comeback in America in connection with "process theology." There were several kinds of liberalism and different versions of revelation, but they all had one thesis in common: the rejection of the orthodox view of revelation as supernatural disclosure of truth recorded in divinely inspired Scripture. If there was one concept that pervaded liberalism or modernism, it was the conviction that revelation is primarily insight.3

That is, man has ethical or moral or spiritual or perhaps even metaphysical convictions that come to him as insight. But if one were to describe the process as part of God's work among men, it would be called revelation. The remarkable character of Holy Scripture, and particularly of Jesus, lies in the number of unusually rich spiritual intuitions to be found in them. These intuitions or insights have an empirical verification in the fact that the great spirits of all centuries have found them to be valid.

There was also a metaphysical undergirding of this view in the religious liberals. They did not wish to become pantheists, yet they wanted the continuity between God and man as taught in pantheism. Many of them solved this problem with the word *panentheism* — God is in all things, yet not to the degree that the relationship could be called pantheism. So the divine Spirit and the human spirit were joined, as it were, stone-to-stone, brick-upon-brick, in this exaggerated doctrine of divine immanence. Accordingly, what is called insight or intuition as man gropes for spiritual reality can also be seen as revelation as God meets man in man's quest for God.

In a sense, even before it emerged, this theory of revelation had already been refuted by Pascal, who repudiated "the God of the philosophers" in favor of "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," and by Soren Kierkegaard, who was the father of an exaggerated doctrine of transcendence in the early Barth of the 1920's. Certain works by Kierkegaard contain the philosophical and theological roots of the destruction of the doctrine of revelation as insight.4 Barth's own work includes vigorous assaults on the liberal theology of revelation,5 and a book by Brunner, directed primarily at Schleiermacher, is another refutation of the liberal view.6

But such criticisms have not eliminated this view. As I have mentioned,
religious liberalism is attempting to take on new life in an alliance with "process philosophy." This philosophy is built basically on categories taken from biology and on the more dynamic notions of matter in recent atomic physics. Its patron saint is Alfred North Whitehead, a mathematician and scientific philosopher who gives process theology a hoped-for scientific blessing. Other prominent names in this philosophical lineage are Henri Bergson, Samuel Alexander, and (later) Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.

A recent representative of process theology is Kenneth Cauthen, who holds that there is a normative core in Scripture for Christian theology, and that Christ gives us the normative basis for our understanding of God. Within this context, Cauthen at times speaks of revelation as though it were doctrinal, propositional, conceptual, revealed truths. When he gets to the specifics, however, revelation is not of this order but is essentially an *experience of meaning*. We are thus back to the older liberal definition, now set forth in a more modern and more sophisticated manner that profits from the recent history of theology.

In America and Great Britain there is a kind of consensus about the nature of philosophy, which is considered to be "analytic" or "linguistic." Ordinarily this kind of philosophy regards all statements about art, poetry, ethics, and religion as nonsense statements — meaningless statements in the sense that they are incapable of verification (according to certain stipulations about the nature of verification). Hence analytic philosophy is looked upon as a harsh critic of Christian theology.

However, Christians informed in this kind of philosophy have said that the so-called "linguistic veto" of this school does not, as a matter of fact, put an end to Christian theology. Christian theology, in fact, may be rewritten from just this standpoint.

The theologians who use philosophical analysis as their philosophical method (and who represent a spread of theological opinions) do not speak so much of revelation as they do of the nature or character of theological sentences. But in expressing the character of theological sentences they indicate a functional or operational view of revelation. In general, these theologians believe that theology is a certain way of putting our experience together, or a certain angle from which we look at the world and man, or a certain perspective we have from a particular vantage point, or a certain kind of grid through which we look.

Implicit in all of this is the idea that revelation is not so much special knowledge or divinely revealed truth as, rather, a special way in which man looks at God, man, and the universe, and the special kind of language he
uses to express himself in this regard. At this level, and if this is the only level intended, this view becomes another version of revelation as insight.

Or, to put it another way: modern analytic philosophy does not believe that revelation as traditionally understood (as conveying to man truth as propositions about God and salvation) can stand up against logical analysis, which shows that such propositions cannot really be informative or cognitive. Therefore if there is such a thing as revelation, it must be different from the older idea of it. Revelation, then, is more like suddenly seeing the plot in a clever book or drama, or getting a sudden insight into the character of a friend. Here the old liberal doctrine of insight has been set forth in a more guarded way so that it will not run counter to contemporary analytic philosophy.

II. REVELATION AS SPECIAL CONFIGURATION

On the surface, the theology of Bultmann and the theology of Paul Tillich seem to differ greatly. Their common root in Martin Heidegger and Kierkegaard, however, gives them certain similarities that are obscured by the two men’s differing approaches to theology. Both men reject what they consider to be the old orthodox view of revelation, namely, the communication of divine truth through supernatural means. Furthermore, both have rejected the liberal theology of the nineteenth century and therefore do not duplicate the older liberal notions of revelation. They present views of revelation that are essentially existential or governed by existential structures.

First, they believe that revelation is something "special." It is not insights or intuitions that a spiritual man may have in moments of meditation or contemplation. Yet it is not supernatural revelation in any sense of the term, as both men are firm antisupernaturalists. Revelation is "special" in a non-supernatural way that I have called configurational revelation.

Revelation is essentially a special kind of existential experience: it has an existential pattern or structure or constellation or configuration. Not all existential experience is revelation, but revelation is a special kind of existential event. One may coin expressions like "existential-spiritual" or "existential-theological" or "existential-kerygmatic" to suggest what revelation is to Bultmann and Tillich.

In the pattern set by Kierkegaard, these men believe that we may speak of two kinds of knowledge and two corresponding kinds of reasoning processes. There is objective or scientific or empirical knowledge, which is attained (in its most accurate form) by the scientific method. At a lower
level it includes any kind of knowledge a man may have of his external or objective world. Then there is existential territory, which is known by "existential reason," if one may so speak. Religion is in this territory of the existential, and therefore is some form of "existential reason" — or, better, "existential kind of reasoning or structuring."

Revelation, then, is a special configuration of factors in existential territory. Bultmann, writing as a New Testament scholar, sets forth his ideas of revelation in a more exegetical way than does Tillich, who writes more philosophically.

To Bultmann the message of the New Testament is kerygmatic and existential. By the use of the term "kerygmatic" he wishes to express his conviction that revelation is something addressed to us (Anreden). Something that is truly addressed to us is not to be treated as though it were merely a matter of being true or false, but as something that makes a demand and calls for decision. Thus the gospel is not a general religious message to man, but a specific word of address to a specific man in a specific situation. Bultmann understands the gospel in existential terms because he believes that existentialism details exactly how men dispose or manage or govern their lives. He sees existentialism not so much as another version of modern philosophy but as a kind of neutral, objective description (hence "phenomenological" in the primitive sense of this term) of the manner in which men concretely and specifically order or manage their existence. Revelation occurs in this context.

Revelation, then, is not communication of doctrine, not impartation of new knowledge about God, not religious information which hitherto we did not have. It is an "existential communication" in the Kierkegaardian tradition. It is an existential transformation whereby man moves from an "old man" or an "old nature" manner of living to that of the "new man" or the "new nature." From God's standpoint, revelation is the kerygma or the Word; from man's standpoint it is a new self-understanding. But revelation is an event in which there is both God's kerygma and man's faith, or else there is no revelation. Revelation is thus a dyadic concept.

Hence revelation is by configuration. The kerygma is not part of man's ordinary knowledge; so revelation is not ordinary insight or intuition. Nor is revelation a supernatural disclosure. It is a special existential-kerygmatic constellation or configuration within the wider context of a universe governed unvaryingly by law.10

Tillich's theory of revelation is also a constellation or configuration theory.11 What I wish to discuss here is the point at which he regards revelation
as special but not supernatural. Tillich uses three words to express the special character of revelation: *mystery, ecstasy*, and *miracle*. Each of these terms indicates that the experience of revelation is not an ordinary event. Each also indicates that it is an intensely existential experience. And each also shows that revelation is a constellation of known elements within our experience (symbols, "myths") which can be grasped only in the existentialist mode. Hence the constellation is dyadic: revelation is revelation when it is both given and received. If there is no reception there is no revelation.

In Tillich’s theology of revelation, however, there are complexities not found in Bultmann, whose theology is at times an almost naive restatement of Heidegger’s philosophy in theological terms. Tillich is not a pure existentialist (as he is sometimes represented). He was profoundly influenced by German idealistic philosophy; and he also had a very articulate theory of religious symbols. These elements are part of his doctrine of revelation, and with them he advances beyond Bultmann. For example: the Ground of All Being (derived from German idealism) radiates its nature through the universe, and these radiations appear to man as symbols. Revelation then occurs when one of these symbols (reflecting some valid aspect of the Ground of All Being) is grasped existentially in miracle, mystery, and ecstasy. Yet revelation never becomes a supernatural event; for in all its specialty it remains within the natural sequence of events in the universe.

Two objections apply to both Bultmann and Tillich. First, neither really presents a biblically based concept of revelation grounded in a meticulous study of words and texts. Second, what is said of revelation seems to be far more grounded in philosophical considerations than in the phenomenon of revelation itself.

Kierkegaard taught existentialism as subjectivity, not as subjectivism. But all forms of existentialism, theological or philosophical, are between a rock and a hard place (and that without relent) in having to show that subjectivity is nothing but a sophisticated version of subjectivism (or perhaps, even worse, solipsism). And this requirement plagues existentialist versions of revelation.

III. REVELATION AS ENCOUNTER

If we grant that these various views of revelation overlap each other, or that parts of one are incorporated in another, it is plain that there are existential elements in Brunner and Barth. Brunner confesses that he is a
faithful disciple of Kierkegaard; and although Barth has declared his independence from existentialism, some critics feel that he is doing the same sort of thing in theology that Heidegger does in philosophy.

But in Barth and Brunner there are significant additions that move them beyond the positions of Bultmann and Tillich. Barth and Brunner put much more objectivity and history into their doctrines of revelation than do Bultmann and Tillich, and so distance themselves enough to warrant a separate classification. The difference centers in the concept of encounter. Although Bultmann's and Tillich's views might also be called "encounter" theories (as "encounter" is one of the more stable terms in the vocabulary of existentialism), Barth and Brunner greatly enlarge the concept.

 Liberalism and existentialism, they say, make revelation too subjective, and thus the word of man and the word of God become confused. But orthodoxy so objectifies revelation that the mystery, hiddenness, and transcendence of God are betrayed. Only in a strong doctrine of divine act and of the divine word conjoined to the proper internal response of faith can justice be done to the concept of revelation. This is the concept of encounter in an expanded sense.

I shall not try to separate Barth from Brunner but instead spell out elements they have in common.

First, both believe that the supreme instance of revelation is Jesus Christ as God-Incarnate. Immediately this means that the center of gravity for the doctrine of revelation is "out there" — before me, with me, and after me. Furthermore, revelation is understood christologically: the "Word of God" in its primary historical instance is Jesus Christ, the God-man.

Second, both believe that whatever normative or authoritative character Holy Scripture has is based on its christological character ("Christ hidden in the Old Testament; Christ revealed in the New Testament"). This christological approach to Scripture and to doctrine in general has called forth the adjectives "christocentric" and "christomonistic." Scripture itself it not immediately revelation nor in a direct sense the word of God. In Barth's overworked expression, it is the witness to revelation. It is a witness that revelation has occurred and a promise that it will occur again. However, even though Barth and Brunner continuously affirm that Holy Scripture is not revelation per se, nevertheless they use it in a way that functions as revelation (or at least revelational).

If the objectivity A in this doctrine of revelation is the Incarnation, and if objectivity B is Holy Scripture (christologically and functionally understood), the objectivity C is doctrine. Faith is not a sigh, a moan, or a shout.
Faith has content, and that content is doctrinal. There is no ineffable mysticism here. So doctrine, then, is part of the nexus of revelation. Again, doctrine in and of itself is not revelation; but doctrine points toward, witnesses to, informs of revelation. Doctrine is not revelation; but there is no revelation without doctrine. Thus Christ is a person and not a doctrine, but he is a person known in, and understood by, doctrine.

The third assertion of Barth and Brunner is that revelation also includes the acts of God. If revelation were purely doctrinal or conceptual, Christianity would be a kind of gnosticism. If revelation were solely man’s religious experiences, he would never get outside his human skin to a divine revelation.

But here is a fine point. The act of God is supernatural, but not in any traditional understanding of the supernatural. God’s act never breaks out into the open in such a way that it becomes obvious to all men — men without faith — as an act of God. Yet, contrary to the opinion of the liberals and of Bultmann, God is not here merely shadowboxing in history. God does act supernaturally, and that makes a difference in history — but always in such a way that the act is known only in faith. Thus to the eye of ordinary men Jesus was a rabbi from Nazareth about whom some unusual stories had collected. But to the disciples he was the Son of God, for they saw him through the enlightened eyes of faith.

This view of the supernatural activity of God displeases many theologians. Some orthodox critics believe that Barth in particular has shoved the real acts of God in history into a vague kind of spiritual history (Urgeschichte, Gottesgeschichte) that is indeed shadowboxing and not confronting reality. Liberal and existentialist critics think that Barth’s version of history destroys the very meaning of history, for a history of the supernatural acts of God is incomprehensible to man. Man can manage only causal or immanent relationships, not supernatural ones.

Fourth, Barth and Brunner build up a strong doctrine of the reception of revelation by man, thus rounding out the concept of encounter.

Revelation is (a) received by faith. Both Barth and Brunner have extensive, existential discussions of the powerful and active nature of faith. Revelation is (b) realized in the sinner by the power of the Holy Spirit. (Here is a restatement of the Reformation doctrines of (i) the union of Word and Spirit and (ii) the witness of the Holy Spirit.) And revelation is (c) an encounter with God himself. In revelation we truly meet God. Thus the doctrinal or theological element is important but not central. Divine confrontation is at the center.
Barth’s view of revelation has come in for further criticism in regard to the way he relates revelation to Scripture. His critics on the liberal side believe that he is caught in a contradiction. On the one hand he admits that human and “worldly” character of Scripture as one with every man’s own human and worldly existence. Just as no man is inerrant or free from contradictions, so Scripture itself, to be truly human and worldly, must have error even in its theology. An inerrant Scripture would be out of man’s orbit. But, on the other hand, when Barth actually uses Scripture in his theology, he uses it in the same authoritative and definitive way as the orthodox theologians do.

Barth’s critics on the conservative side state that he has a faulty view of Scripture. He has worked up a magnificent structure in his theology of revelation, but when he comes to the doctrine of inspiration, his work is inferior from both scholarly and logical points of view. In short, he attempts to rest an immense doctrine of revelation on a very fragile and defective view of inspiration.

IV. REVELATION AS INTERPRETED EVENT

A number of scholars in the nineteenth century attempted to formulate a view of revelation that would grant biblical criticism its rightful claims and at the same time preserve the fundamental authority of Scripture for theology. This they did by making an act of God, an event of history, the primary datum of revelation. This event was then interpreted by prophet and apostle, and these collected interpretations form the canon of Holy Scripture. In that these interpretations may be wrong, there is a genuine function for biblical criticism. But in that they are mainly right, the Holy Scripture is a record or a witness or a document about revelation — but it is not the primary datum of revelation itself.

This view has received a fresh interpretation by the so-called “Pannenberg circle,” a group of German scholars led by Wolfhart Pannenberg. The question is: How does this interpretation differ from that of the nineteenth century scholars who seemed to say much the same thing? The following exposition indicates Pannenberg’s main contributions.

First, he thinks that both Barth and Bultmann represent a flight from history. Bultmann, for example, says that the meaning of the cross is not open to ordinary historical science but is existential and known only in faith. So the investigating historian is stopped right there. Barth says that revelation is a special kind of history (Urgeschichte) which cannot be treated by ordinary methods of historical research. So he too stops the his-
torian. But Pannenberg says we cannot ignore historiography in a scientific age. So he boldly declares that the events which make up the "stuff" of revelation are open to objective, scientific, historical investigation and can be demonstrated to be factual. In spite of all the critical problems associated with the resurrection accounts in the New Testament, Pannenberg believes that ordinary historical methods can validate the resurrection of Jesus.

Second, in Pannenberg's view revelation is indirect. It is not an immediately given body of information. Revelation is in the implications of the acts of God. The acts of God are at the primary level; revelation is at a level once removed.

Third, there is a special way in which these events are interpreted as revelation. Each such event occurs within a tradition of interpretation, which has its own history (Traditionsgeschichte, Überlieferungsgeschichte). Thus the resurrection of Christ is interpreted in the light of the traditions of the Jews about apocalyptic events and especially about the resurrection of the dead.

Fourth, the resurrection of Christ is the clue to the meaning of history. History's meaning can be known only at the end of history, but the resurrection of Christ is "proleptic;" it anticipates the meaning of history that will be discovered at its end. The resurrection of Christ does not disclose the totality of the meaning of history, but it does give us some idea of what history is all about.

Pannenberg's intention is obvious: he wants to make the Christian faith an intellectually respectable option for the educated man. This he does by stating that the acts of God are open to historical investigation and by proposing that such investigation does verify the essentials of biblical history. This thesis then forces him to the concept of indirect revelation, that is, revelation as the interpretation of the acts of God.

The problem that remains is whether it can be shown that all revelation is secondary to an event. In the Old Testament, are not Proverbs and Ecclesiastes and Job intended to be direct revelation? And in the New Testament, can one speak of such books as Ephesians, Colossians, and Romans in terms other than direct revelation? I generally agree that the prior elements in all of Scripture (prior to inspiration and revelation) are the acts of God in history. This is what gives Christianity its rugged, empirical rootage in fact, not in theological speculation. Furthermore, certainly much of what we call revelation is interpretation of past events. But I must demur when it is suggested that all revelation is of a secondary, derived, or indirect nature.
V. Revelation as Composed of Images

Austin Farrer, a very capable British philosophical theologian, believes that studies about the inspiration of Scripture have reached a stalemate and that something new must be said. This must not be some sort of new version of an infallible inspiration, for biblical criticism shows that such a view is no longer an option for Christian theology. On the other hand, the real authority of scriptural revelation must be maintained.

One of the chief passions of Farrer's life is poetry. And so he wishes to break the stalemate between a liberal view of Scripture (in which nothing is left of any theological consequence in Scripture) and the orthodox view (which presents the theologian with the impossible task of defending a verbally inspired text in the context of a century of real advance in biblical criticism) by deriving a new idea of revelation from poetry.

The essence of poetry is its nonliteral character; that is, it is not prose. Poetry lives in the atmosphere of figures of speech of all kinds — metaphors, "pictures," images. These figures of speech reveal the deep insights of the poet (and so explain the claim that the poets are the true metaphysicians). Farrer transfers this concept of poetry to Scripture and says that what is really revealed is not so much words or propositions but great images, or "theological pictures" (my expression). Thus we really understand Scripture only when we understand its images. Exegesis can no longer be considered simply in grammatical or philological terms. The exegete has to be something of a poet himself to go beyond the words and sentences to the great images mirrored in the words and sentences.

The advantages of this view, Farrer thinks, are many. It gets the theologian off the hook of trying to defend a verbally inspired Scripture; it gives biblical criticism its rights; it preserves the authority of Scripture at the right place, namely, theological content; and it opens up a whole new method of interpreting Christian theology.

There can be no formal objection to revelation as consisting of literary images (and I doubt that any theologian has argued that revelation must have a particular literary form). The real question is whether all of Scripture, the whole content of revelation, is, as a matter of fact, contained in images. I can think of any number of passages that can hardly be called "image" passages but are rather prose in form. Further, the way some of the New Testament passages interpret the Old Testament depends on the use of a word or an expression; this means that revelation must be verbal to some degree, even if one maintains that the major concepts of revelation are inspired images.
VI. A HISTORICAL PROTESTANT POSITION

Although there is no unified Protestant theology of revelation,\(^1\) there are certain beliefs about revelation that in a general way have characterized the history of orthodox Protestant thought.\(^2\) I now wish to spell them out, with the implication that I generally concur with them, although for my own personal satisfaction I would prefer to give them a far lengthier exposition than is feasible here.

First, revelation is *supernatural*. We are not thinking here of "general revelation" (as indicated in Psalm 19) but of what is usually called "special revelation." From the time of English deism, and from the pioneering theology of Schleiermacher, there has been a persistent conviction that, whatever it is, revelation is not supernatural. The rejection of the supernatural is based on the conviction that both science and philosophy have taught man the uniformity of nature, and this uniformity can be challenged neither by religion nor by revelation. On the theological side it has been argued that God is not a patcher or fixer or meddler in his creation but that he works through the laws and processes of nature.

However, all of this can be said only if a doctrine of real sin is ignored. If man is actually sinful (as such doctrines as original sin and total depravity attempt to state), then he can be rescued only supernaturally. He needs both a supernatural redemption and a supernatural revelation. In formulating a doctrine of revelation, orthodox Protestants have felt that man's "sinnership" is a bigger problem to wrestle with than the scientific and philosophical demand for uniformity.

Second, revelation is *soteric*. Its concern is not abstract or general or philosophical or speculative. It is not a polite discussion on how man may know about God. The intention of special revelation is that it be part of the total redemptive activity of God. Just as man needs forgiveness of sins and justification, he also needs illumination about the true God. Therefore revelation must be seen as one of the major products of the love and grace of God who seeks the redemption of man.

Third, revelation is *doctrinal*. Modern theology (neoorthodox, existentialist, liberal) repeatedly insists that revelation is not doctrinal. We are told that in revelation God himself (and not a doctrine) meets us; or that revelation is a rearrangement of the existential furniture of the self, with no new furniture added; or that revelation is an insight or intuition of a moral or spiritual structure or a special kind of meaning.

This is all logical nonsense to me. Unless there is a conceptual element in the very fiber of revelation itself, then revelation is a meaningless sound
or a meaningless vision or a meaningless emotion. To say that I encounter God and not a doctrine is utter confusion. If I encounter God apart from some concepts, apart from some meanings, or apart from some interpretations, it is a senseless encounter. I encounter God in and along with concepts and doctrines, and therefore these concepts and doctrines must be revelational in some sense.

Certainly not all revelation is "propositional" or straight doctrinal statement. The Holy Scripture is filled with all kinds of literature and figures of speech. Certainly revelation may be in a symbol, in a dramatic event, in the character of a person. But revelation must eventually also become conceptual, or the root of true theology is destroyed. Although Barth and Brunner say in theory that revelation is encounter and not doctrine, in practice they have each produced a small library of doctrinal books — as if there is an enormous booty of concepts and doctrines in the revelatory event. And the notion that doctrinal materials can be drawn from a non-doctrinal revelation is a patent absurdity.

Fourth, revelation is inscripturated. Not all of God's revelations are in Scripture, nor need be. But Scripture contains those revelations of God that are intended as normative or authoritative for all the ages of God's people. When it is said that Scripture is the revealed word of God, it is not meant that every line of Scripture is given by direct revelation or that all that is known in Scripture is known only through divine revelation. Holy Scripture is the revealed word of God in that it contains that body of revelation which God has wished preserved for all ages in his church. In orthodox Protestantism, Holy Scripture is understood to be the special document of divine revelation and so to possess divine authority in what it teaches, as well as infallibility in what it intends to accomplish in the church and through the church in the world.

Fifth, revelation is inspired. That is, it is seen as revelation through the Holy Spirit. The real epistemological foundation of the Reformation was not "the Bible and the Bible alone" as the charter of the Reformation churches. Rather it was the union of Word and Spirit, as taught by both Calvin and Luther.17 The Reformers did not believe that unenlightened eyes could read the spiritual word of God, but that God's word was to be read by the illumination of God's Spirit. This view saved the Reformers from an intellectualism in religion, and also it indicated that for the sinner to be reached in his sin there must be not only the external soteric word of God but also the internal renewing of the Holy Spirit.

Sixth, revelation is christological. This has perhaps been the most am-
ambiguous part of the historical Protestant view of revelation. Both Luther and Calvin have rather clear statements of the christological foundation of revelation, but neither makes it a working principle in his theology. In subsequent Protestant literature we find statements about the unique character of Scripture as the word of God, and also statements that Jesus Christ is the supreme Word of God, or the Word of God in its highest sense. But the two assertions were seldom if ever correlated. The theme persists, however, both at an academic level and in the popular devotional material, that that which makes Scripture truly Scripture, or that which really "sells" Scripture as the word of God, is Jesus Christ.

It was Barth and Brunner who announced that they were going to attempt to rebuild the whole concept of revelation and Scripture around Jesus Christ as the one Word of God. And Barth in his christocentrism or christomonism has made the christological approach to revelation the integrating theme of his entire Church Dogmatics.

Although evangelicals have been somewhat testy about some of the statements Barth and Brunner have made about Christ and Scripture (statements which really seemed to them in principle to derogate Scripture), nevertheless the evangelicals ought to be grateful to Barth and Brunner for making it clear that revelation and its chief product, Holy Scripture, are to be understood and interpreted christologically. If one does not like the way Barth and Brunner understand and interpret, one ought to attempt it in his own way. In the final analysis it is Jesus Christ as the God-Man, as Saviour and Lord, who binds us confessionally, intellectually, and, yes, emotionally to Christianity — not any formal theological view of divine revelation or divine inspiration or biblical inerrancy which has been developed in such a way that the argument is not affected whether or not there has been an Incarnation.

Finally, revelation is accommodated. It is "worldly," anthropic revelation, adjusted to and characteristic of human beings. Calvin said that God speaks into the ears of the prophets as a nurse lisps words to a child in teaching it to speak. By this he meant the great condescension of God to man's limited powers. In their accommodated character, the Holy Scriptures are the "lisplings" of God. Luther spoke of the theology of the cross as over against the theology of glory. By the theology of the cross he meant the very human, the very broken, the very partial, the very paradoxical kind of information or revelation we have of God in our sinnerhood and finitude (in contrast to the impression given by some Roman Catholic scholastics, who wrote theology as if they did their research in some library in heaven).
In the nineteenth century, Abraham Kuyper tried to impress on theologians this "worldly" character of revelation, its partial character, and its adaptations to our scene and our modes of comprehension. He did not want to overstate the case for inspiration or to "oversell" the character of Holy Scripture.

In the twentieth century the British theologian Lionel S. Thornton attempted to show that just as Christ in the Incarnation became a humble man, so God's revelation in Scripture partakes of the same kind of humiliation. (By the humiliation of Scripture Thornton meant to remind the church that Scripture was written by men, in human languages, in certain cultural periods, and therefore must of necessity bear a human or a "worldly" character in contrast to the old cliche that the Bible is a book dropped from heaven, which is virtually the Moslem view of the Qu'ran.)

This means two things: (a) Revelation was so given that it really meets us. It gets to us. It is not over our heads. (b) In our defense of the revealedness, inspiration, authority, and infallibility of Holy Scripture, we must never step out of the bounds of its form of humiliation.

Comments

WILBER ALEXANDER, Andrews University

The title of Ramm's article, the questions he raises, his historical overview of modern and contemporary "theology of the Word," and his own analysis and synthesis of the more conservative Protestant position on the nature of revelation all point up the perennial and inescapable problem of the openness and the exclusiveness of theology.

Where philosophical presupposition and thought have determined or dominated the direction of theological thinking, the resultant notions of revelation tend naturally to emphasize the subjective and noncognitive experiences of man in relation to God.

"Exclusive" theology, opposing the use of any concept taken from non-theological or nonrevelational areas, operates with notions derived from Scripture and uses its own inner logic in explicating and verifying the notions thus derived. The notions of revelation developed by theologians holding to a theological method of exclusiveness tend to stress the supernatural and objective element of revelation.

Between these two divergent ways of doing theology is the approach that in varying degrees rejects the exclusiveness of theology to allow for
modes of thought and concepts from parallel disciplines to become a part of the method and of the resulting theology.

Ramm's article, it seems apparent, criticizes most modern and contemporary views of revelation on the basis that they are not biblically based concepts but are "more grounded in philosophical considerations than in the phenomenon of revelation itself." Ramm finds this particularly true of Tillich and Bultmann. He interprets Barth and Brunner as attempting, with some success, to swing the theological pendulum toward relating revelation to Scripture and the supernatural. He recognizes, however, their dependence on some philosophical presuppositions that influence their notions of both natural and supernatural in the occurrence of revelation.

With Ramm's sketch of historical theology and his critique I can agree. I can appreciate as well his fairness and carefulness in setting forth this material when he is so restricted for space in writing the article.

In response to Part VI, which states something of Ramm's own position, I offer the following observations, questions, and comments for his consideration.

1. First a general observation. In the introduction to his article, Ramm poses these questions: "Where does revelation take place? In what realm or territory or area does it occur? Where is its material content or its decisive action to be found?"

Are these locus questions answered in Part VI by saying that revelation is supernatural, is soteric, is doctrinal, is inscripturated, is inspired, is christological, is accommodated? Are these descriptive paragraphs too general in form and scope to get at the reality we point to as "revelation"? Perhaps, though, Ramm intends to show the meaning and the realm of revelation by descriptive implication.

2. If it is agreed that revelation is supernatural, would the argument in the article be strengthened by expanding the theological and experiential implications of the sentence "He [man] needs both a supernatural redemption and a supernatural revelation"? Just a bit more clarity here would help the reader.

3. What is meant in proposition five in the last sentence: "For the sinner to be reached in his sin there must be not only the external soteric word of God but also the internal renewing of the Holy Spirit"? This is a crucial point that is difficult to get at or to spell out.

We say that revelation is supernatural. We say that God's word as revelation is to be read by the illumination of the Spirit. What is the role of man's mind and what is the nature of his freedom in accepting or rejecting the
revelation? When first the Bible is read in his presence or he reads it or hears it expounded, does its message come to him only as bits of other information might come, and can it become a convicting and converting means for the Holy Spirit only if this man is willing to hear further what the revelation says? Or is the sovereignty of God such that each sinner man is confronted by the Spirit through the word whether he wishes to be or not?

These questions form a part of the question of locus — where revelation takes place or is to be found. Is it revelation for the individual only when he apprehends or is apprehended by it, or must we say revelation is revelation regardless of how men respond?

Ramm says, "Revelation was so given that it really meets us. It gets to us. It is not over our heads." By this does he mean anything apart from the notion that revelation is accommodated to man?

Finally, making my own brief statement of faith, I feel that we have a divine activity and a human response (in relation to what we have historically termed "revelation") which is extremely difficult to conceptualize or verbalize.

It is easier for me to understand revelation as it relates to Scripture (I choose this, since the great difference in theological stance is here) in a movement-type model where what God wants man to know and what man must know can be seen contextually yet in dynamic motion historically and experientially. The "word of God" (his will, his message, his communication of that knowledge which is essential for man's well-being and eternal salvation) comes from his own eternal mind and is communicated to his chosen messenger through his chosen method — be it event, impression, vision, or direct message. This "word" under the guidance of the Holy Spirit is further spoken or written through the unique personality of the one who speaks or writes. This guidance, which we term "inspiration," is not fully explicated in Scripture; it is only claimed by those who receive it. We are not able to get at what actually happened.

The words and thoughts which are inscripturated are not the reality to which they point, but they can be used by the Holy Spirit in cooperation with the human spirit to confront man with God's will, judgment, and gospel. Thus the word of God has moved from God to man through Spirit, through spoken, written, transmitted, translated, canonized, proclaimed, and interpreted word of man. "Thus is it true of the Bible, as it was of Christ, that 'the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.' "

In Ramm's article we have in part a review of the various theological positions that pertain to the question at hand. In the last section the author sets forth and defends "A Historical Protestant Position." I have the highest regard for Ramm's theological position and skill, and I acknowledge his significant contribution in the field of revelation. This article, however, as he acknowledges, hardly permits a thorough discussion of the question.

When the writer states that the problem of theory of knowledge "is precisely the problem of revelation," one is led to ask: What is the starting point? Is it axiomatic to say that the locus of revelation is supernatural, propositional, doctrinal, inscripturated, inspired, christological, accommodated? How does one establish these as the proper place to begin? If the starting point is by an appeal to a historical Protestant position, what guarantees the trustworthiness of the position to which the appeal is made? Can we believe this historical position because it claims what we allow to it? Are we left simply with his affirmation as an act of faith?

To the degree that revelation is able to speak its own authentic word as to the locus of that revelation, to that degree will revelation preserve its independence and objectivity. What ensures to us the realm of revelation? To secure certainty, what is the correct point of departure and the prior court of appeal? The starting point is crucial.

Ramm argues for an objective revelation as opposed to the subjectivity of existentialism and neoorthodoxy. He opposes Barth's "shadowboxing" in terms of revelation as historical, but he seems to lend credence to it by neglecting the realm of the historical in the position he defends at the end. He criticizes Pannenberg's emphasis on history as the realm of revelation and the consequent insistence on a definite rational objective foundation. Then he fails to do justice to the realm of history. One gets the impression that the locus of history is of little consequence.

In the development of history, God has unfolded his plan of redemption. There is nothing subjective or mystical about this. The facts of revelation are the facts of history. That revelation occurred in history is basic to the nature of the Christian faith. Historical reliability as it relates to the locus of revelation is essential. God came to man. God wrought out the divine redemption in history. This is where revelation took place. "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us."

If revelation did not occur in history, then it could well be relegated to
the realm of myth. Revelation could be discredited. The apostles, in preach-
ing the gospel, showed the revelation to rest upon sure and incontrovertible
facts. More than five hundred living persons bore witness to Christ’s resur-
rection (1 Corinthians 15:6). The revelation of Jesus Christ is deeply
rooted in trustworthy historical facts. In the human situation of man’s lost
estate, Jesus Christ came down from heaven, lived as a man among men,
bore men’s sin in his body on the tree. That historical event is part of the
revelation, not prior to it. Unless revelation took place in time and space,
no genuine knowledge of God’s movement toward man would be available.
The redemptive attitude and work of God could not be known.

Granted that the standpoint of pure history does not guarantee spiritual
apprehension. Faith is needed. Meaning of the historical revelation cannot
be understood simply by looking at the events. God must speak the word
that reveals his intention and his purpose. Both the event and the word be-
long to the sphere of revelation. These two aspects cannot be separated. If
revelation is propositional, it is also historical. God is responsible for both.
The historical facts are one side of the coin. The revealed word is the other.
God never intended revelation as history to stand by itself. God communi-
cated his message and intent along with the act itself.

The Christian must contend for the trustworthiness of revelation in both
spheres. Both are equally significant for the Christian, the fact and the
meaning. Both constitute revelation. Both are real in time and space. Both
take place because God acted and spoke. Both reveal to man the super-
natural nature of revelation. God moves in history and works in history for
the redemption of man. He alone possesses the meaning to his own work.
There are not two realms of history: Historie and Geschichte. Faith does
not belong to one realm and knowledge to another. Faith reposes in the
objectively given and interpreted facts of history.

Revelation as history is therefore capable of historical authentication.
Revelation is primarily not in man, even though it is for man. The issue
here is not man’s spiritual grasp and understanding of it, but the place
where it occurs. If revelation did not occur in history, then it did not occur
at all. Men are confronted with revelation regardless of the presence of
faith or its absence.

To say that only faith can understand the historical events, can be to
undermine the knowledge basis of truth and to concede the argument to the
existentialist. It is misleading to attempt an interpretation on the basis of
faith alone. Understanding becomes invalid if the historical is made doubt-
ful or is derogated. Correct apprehension of Jesus Christ and God’s movements toward man are well nigh unrecognizable if the historical is discarded.

The biblical view is that God addresses truth to the reason and heart of man in historical events and in Scriptural propositions. Both spheres are realms of revelation. The apprehension of revelation arises out of both (a) the rational impact of the events and propositional truths and (b) the direction of the Holy Spirit on the mind of man.

Only in this way do we have a safeguard against an exaggerated immanence indicated in Tillich’s Ground of Being and existentialist subjectivism. Man is fashioned by God for a rational knowledge of revelation as well as for the response of faith. To reach man, revelation must include an address to reason as well as to faith. No compelling evidence for revelation exists if it is asserted in neglect of the objective sphere of history as the locus of God’s initiative.

Led by the Spirit, the believer can study, investigate, and evaluate the historical facts. The spiritual realities present need to be grasped by faith also. No human historian’s analysis can say all that God performed in the event. Yet the central truth of the revelation remains in that event as portrayed to the eyes of man, even though he often fails to grasp its meaning.

God does not deny man the truth by revealing his purpose in history. To say that the emphasis on the historical makes truth merely rational, rather than existential, is to miss the point. The issue is that God speaks to man in a clear, distinct, and intelligible communication. He condescends and descends to man’s level in order to do just that. The supernatural nature of truth is not denied because revelation occurs on the level of time and space.

The problem in his article is not whether the position Ramm advocates is right, but on what grounds. The coming of God in history locates the revelation. God could be seen in Jesus Christ in the character he lived and revealed in his human person. “God was in Christ.” The tendency is to make a distinction between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith, to fail to blend the supernatural meaning with the historical account. Revelation moves in the realm of objective categories. Men who believed in Christ did not look past the human Jesus to grasp some mystical Christ of faith. They beheld in him “the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.”

The purpose of Ramm’s article is to answer the simple question as to where revelation took place. His main thrust is that God has revealed himself decisively in Jesus Christ and in the Holy Scriptures. With this we agree. But this means also that we must understand revelation in concrete
situations as authentically historical. In Christ the eternal revelation in whom we trust is himself historically present. Thus we may affirm that neither God nor Jesus Christ brought merely a new set of ideas philosophically or ethically conceived. The Son of God was born in history. He lived in human history, died in it, was raised in it. What happened in history lays claims on us.

Although one may sense some tension between revelation history and the application of the critical method in evaluating the events, one must show that the plane of history is the actual arena where God's movements took place. Since God begins here to break through to man, so must we understand and believe.

This is no urge for another "Quest of the Historical Jesus," but rather an affirmation of biblical history as thoroughly trustworthy. I wonder if Ramm's failure to deal more directly with this historical realm is due to the shortness of time and space. Or does he wish to avoid this emphasis because of certain dangers that arise when the critical method is applied to revelation?

The realm of history is crucial. Biblical revelation shows that the prophets and seers were not at all concerned with their own experience with God in some form of immediacy. They were not exponents of inscrutable mystical experiences. The revelations that God gave them were rational, practical events and truths relevant to given historical situations.

The biblical emphasis on an objective historical basis provides a safeguard against all the various deviations exposed in the different theological positions Ramm describes. Once it is insisted that revelation takes place in the realm of history as God intended, the fact of revelation and the necessity of it as objective truth standing over against man becomes obvious.

Thus a genuine Christian consciousness exists, because it is supported by a sufficient factual basis. No biblical basis can be found for the view that man has access to a knowledge of God apart from God's movement in history. A genuine Christian consciousness can exist only where faith is supported by a sufficient knowledge and evidence basis. To deny historical and also propositional revelation actually deprives man of any objective criterion whereby he can discriminate between truth and error.

Being a responsible believer means making one's whole life a response to the salvation history recorded in the Bible. The birth, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ are central historical facts where the supreme revelation took place. It is not because people experience these things that they are true. It is because these are revealed truths on the plane of history that
they are true. Biblical historical revelation is not affected by any personal
discovery of the supernatural. Man’s experience and discovery are tested
by it.

It is for this reason, in any discussion of the realm of revelation, that the
historical should be given more consideration. It would be unfortunate if
a review of the theological positions should prevent Ramm from giving the
historical locus the attention it deserves.

JACK W. PROVONSHA, Loma Linda University

In the interest of brevity, my comments will be of somewhat general nature
and addressed to a limited portion of Ramm’s article.

Let me say first that his attempt to cover the waterfront has enticed
Ramm into an impossible situation. Orthodoxy cannot be opposed to some
of the newer “liberal” uses of the word revelation, simply because they
exist on such differing planes of reality that the contact points necessary to
conversation are missing. The older orthodox meaning and the newer usage
are so unrelated that different words ought to be employed to obviate con-
fusion. To apply the term, for example, to totally noncognitive experience
is so to redefine it that no dialogue is really possible. Therefore I shall limit
my criticism to those stated revelational concepts about which conversation
can take place, that is, where “revelation” and cognition bear some kind of
relation.

My chief negative reaction is to the either-or quality of Ramm’s position.
This is also a criticism that could be lodged against some of the quasi-
cognitive positions he challenges. Both are at least to some extent correct
in what they assert, but mistaken in what they ignore or explicitly deny.

There is an implicit dualism in a view of revelation that stresses only its
supernatural qualities, just as there is implicit dualism undergirding the
opposing naturalistic point of view. Biblical monotheism implies a denial
of radical disjunctions between nature and supernature. God dwells, acts,
and speaks on both floors.

If this is so, revelation has an “objective” element in the sense that Ramm
and most conservatives hold. But who is to say that “insight,” “experience
of meaning,” “self-understanding,” “enlightenment of faith,” “confronta-
tion with God,” or “interpretation of events” (unless we trivialize these
terms into mere emotional titillation) do not also represent God at work at
his more usual level? Most of those who think of revelation as "insight," for example, would not say that insight has nothing to do with understanding. And when a man comes to understand something or some One, a revelation has occurred. Surely Ramm does not intend to imply that something is revealed when it is not received or comprehended — at least revealed to this particular man. In such a case the term "revelation" can, of course, be applied to what is given, but not to the process by which it is given.

The major fault of the early "liberal" expositors (continued with a vengeance in more recent liberal theologians) is that many of them hold a conception of God in which God formerly spelled with a capital G, becomes "god," the quotes denoting special usage — the "god" of order, design, beauty, and whatever, but no longer the God who is personal in the sense of intelligence, awareness, and activity.

The reasons are easy to sympathize with, being a reaction to an older god (note the lower case g), the somewhat stern, or occasionally benign, Jovian grandfather ensconced in splendor on some distant Olympus, hurling thunderbolts or making magic as the situation indicated — a god much "too small," to use Phillip's phrase, for the demands of our present view of things.

But in tidying up the nursery, the "liberals" threw out too much. The alternative to god is not "god" but God. And there can be no reason why the ground of our very being cannot also be intelligent, aware, and active, provided we do not tie those terms to the incidental time-space qualities with which they are associated in man. And if God possesses these personal characteristics — and we need to include a fourth, concern — there is no reason why he cannot also make himself known in a variety of ways limited only by the receivers of that knowledge.

On the other hand, many "conservative" theologians convey something of the older god by limiting him to supernatural activities — even if not quite as in the ludicrous example. There is no reason why God cannot be at work in the affairs, processes, and minds of men — even when the sign seems to read "men at work."

Biblical monotheism suggests that there is no place or process where God is not, that nothing is entirely outside of the divine activity — and, I would add, nothing intrinsically devoid of revelatory possibility.

Rather than either-or, revelation is both-and. God reveals himself in many ways. Whenever man comes to understand what God is saying, revelation — even revelation of the "revelation," if one prefers — has occurred.
Reply

To all responders I wish to say that my article is not the entirety of my belief about revelation. My books *Special Revelation and the Word of God* and *The Witness of the Spirit* would clarify some of the material in this paper.

I do not know if Alexander has read either Barth or Brunner on the absolute uniqueness of Christian revelation and on the immense problems one encounters in writing theology if that uniqueness is in any way qualified or if an alternative is given (as in "inclusive" or "open" approach to revelation). My attitude toward verbal and nonverbal elements in revelation is not either-or. But that revelation must at least be verbal. Otherwise theology would become impressionistic or psychological description.

Heppenstall is right in pointing out the lack of sufficient discussion of the historical dimension of revelation. I agree with most of what he says about revelation and history. A few years ago I published in *Christianity Today* an article on Christianity and history in which I pointed out this historical element so necessary to Christian faith, and in my book *Special Revelation and the Word of God* I do try to bring in the necessary historical ingredients in my theology of revelation.

My reaction to the first paragraphs of Heppenstall’s critique is that he is really asking for apologetical materials. The question he raises is a valid one. But it is a question beyond the intention of the paper. Because Heppenstall had to work in limited space, it is risky to make an assessment of his total position. All I can do is register a feeling of uneasiness that he has not felt through to the bottom of the complex problem of the relationship of revelation, history (and historiography and the problem of a special biblical historiography), and theology.

My article does not contain my doctrine of general revelation nor of common grace. If it did, then some of Provonsha’s feelings (that I have made too sharp a distinction between nature and grace) would be obviated. Nor have I dealt with the process by which revelation is internalized. If I did that, then again some of his objections could be answered or at least modified.

My one rejoinder to Provonsha’s suggestion of a broader definition of
revelation (somewhat in Temple’s mood that unless everything is poten-
tially revelation nothing can be revelation) is that when we inspect these
efforts to broaden revelation in contrast to how I have “narrowed” it, we
find that special revelation, unique and incisive revelation, melts away and
the very specific, authoritative concept of the Word of God becomes dilute
and its biblical character is lost.

REFERENCES AND NOTES
1 Emil Brunner’s inaugural address at Zurich in 1925, Philosophie and Offen-
barung [Philosophy and Revelation] (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr 1925; Zurich:
Zwingli-Verlag 1938), reveals how sophisticated the discussion had become by
that time.
2 Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured De-
3 Kenneth Cauthen, whose book The Impact of American Religious Liberalism
(New York: Harper and Row 1962) marvelously clarifies the subject, states that
in religious liberalism — which he differentiates from the more radical religious
modernism — the concept of revelation was taken as synonymous with “insight,
special moments of intuition, or human discovery” (p. 20).
4 Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments (translated by David F. Swen-
son. Princeton University Press 1936); Concluding Unscientific Postscript
(translated by David F. Swenson. Princeton University Press 1941); On Au-
thority and Revelation (translated by Walter Lowrie. Princeton University Press
1955).
5 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics (volume one of four volumes, parts one and
two. Translated by G. T. Thomson and Harold Knight. Edinburgh: T. and T.
Clark 1936-1956).
6 Brunner, Die Mystik und das Wort (second edition, revised. Tübingen: J. C.
B. Mohr 1928; Zurich: Zwingli-Verlag 1938).
7 Cauthen, Science, Secularization, and God (New York: Abingdon Press
1969).
8 As formulated, for example, in A. J. Ayer’s little classic, Language, Truth, and
9 The pioneering work in this direction is Antony Flew and Alasdair Mac-
Intyre (editors), New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press
1955). Since the publication of this anthology a small library of books, supple-
mented by a plethora of articles in various journals, has been created.
10 Franz Theunis, Offenbarung und Glaube bei Rudolf Bultmann (Hamburg-
bergstedt: H. Reich 1960).
11 There is a long discussion of revelation in Paul Tillich’s Systematic Theology
(volume one of three volumes, part one. University of Chicago Press 1951).
12 Gerhard Noller, in Sein und Existenz (Munich: Kaiser Verlag 1962), insists
that Bultmann simply uses Heidegger in his own way, for he rather systematically
misrepresents Heidegger’s concepts in this theological appropriation of them.
For a very faithful transcript of Bultmann’s theology, one may read Walter
Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (translated


As far as my own studies are concerned, the best statement of what I consider to be the Protestant position is given by Abraham Kuyper, *Principles of Sacred Theology* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 1953). However, in classroom work I observe that students find Kuyper very difficult to understand. I have expressed my own opinion in *Special Revelation and the Word of God* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 1961) and have discussed closely related topics in *The Pattern of Religious Authority* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 1957) and in *The Witness of the Spirit* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 1959).

As far as I know, there is no book surveying the whole history of the concept of revelation from patristic times to the present. For modern times Hugh D. McDonald has given us two volumes, *Ideas of Revelation: An Historical Study, A.D. 1700 to A.D. 1860* (London: Macmillan Company 1959) and *Theories of Revelation: An Historical Study, 1860-1960* (London: George Allen and Unwin 1963).


See note 15.

LYNN SAULS

Concrete sidewalks
ruler-like
try to
force
men's
paths.

Men's
well-worn
paths
quite
often,
though,
show
sidewalks
where
to go.
It has happened!

I AM THE ALPHA AND THE OMEGA,
THE SOURCE-SPRING AND THE FINAL GOAL!
Mr. Pettis, how does it feel to be the first Seventh-day Adventist elected to the United States Congress?

I feel like any Adventist feels who enters a new field of service — like any pioneer ought to feel. I feel a deep sense of responsibility to act as a Christian, whose ethics, behavior, and record in public service must testify to his convictions. I have been given the privilege (if you want to call it that) of setting a precedent, and I want to make it a good one.

Do you feel that the disciplined life that goes with being an Adventist will sometimes be a social or political disadvantage?

It will probably appear so at times. Certainly I cannot drink with the boys, or make deals with shady characters — according to the popular conception, or misconception, of the political officeholder. If I thought that this sort of thing was necessary, I would never have run for office. I have confidence in the fairness and good sense of my constituents and of my colleagues in Washington, so that I have been able to project for myself a behavior pattern consistent with my beliefs.

Actually, in all my association with people during my campaigning, I was never offered liquor. On other occasions it has been offered, and no doubt it will be again; but I ask for orange juice or ginger ale. Time and again people around me have said in effect, "You're smart. I wish I didn't drink." Nobody has ever been unpleasant about it.
On more than one occasion during my first campaign I asked my volunteer field men (some of whom were Catholics, some Mormons, some Protestants, and some without religious affiliation) whether my being an Adventist was any disadvantage as far as they were concerned. These were the men who worked for me with the voting public; so their judgment was important to me. Their consensus, which impressed me greatly, was this: "We want men of integrity in public office. We may not share your theology, although we have more in common with you than we have differences. But the important thing is that we know you cannot be a Seventh-day Adventist unless you live by a rather strict code. This is enough for us."

I would remind you of Walter Judd (formerly a medical missionary, an official in his church, a Congressman from Minnesota for several terms, and a United States representative to the United Nations) and of George Romney (formerly the governor of Michigan and now President Nixon’s secretary of housing and urban development) — both of whom live according to codes of behavior based on their religious convictions. And there are also many others who have demonstrated that a man can hold public office and at the same time follow a strict personal moral code. He may even be more respected because of it.

The late Senator Everett Dirksen, whom everybody knew as a Bible-reading and Bible-quoting public figure, put it to me forcefully when I asked him what he thought my chances were. "Jerry," he said in substance, "I cannot see that being an Adventist need be any handicap to you in Congress or in running for reelection — unless you compromise with your principles. If you do that, then may the Lord have mercy on you, but don’t expect any mercy from the electorate."

In the Comprehensive Index to the Writings of Ellen G. White there is a long list of references to statements advising Adventists against involvement in politics. What do you have to say about this?

I am familiar with these statements and, believe me, I have read them carefully — especially those in Fundamentals of Christian Education, Gospel Workers, Education, and Testimonies to Ministers. As the context in each case shows, most of these statements are addressed to ministers and educators employed by the church. Who can argue with the assertion that for a minister to engage in political action is a misuse of his position, a wrong use of his time, and a misappropriation of the funds the church pays him as salary? But I am a businessman, a member of the church in good and regular standing — but not an employee of the church (although I look
back with pleasure and gratitude to the years when I was employed by the church.

Mrs. White counsels educators in the schools of the church against using their position to involve — or to appear to involve — these schools in political action. This is the same position taken by the State of California in regard to its own colleges and universities, which are forbidden to take sides in political argument or in support of candidates for office. I am in complete agreement with this concept.

There are a number of other statements that Mrs. White undoubtedly addressed to church members generally. A careful reading shows, in my opinion, that her chief concern was that political strife should not invade and divide the church, and that church members should not engage in what (for want of a better term) we call “dirty politics.” I would deny most vehemently, by the way, that holding public office necessarily involves “dirty politics.”

But some Adventists interpret this counsel very differently. How do you support your interpretation?

Take a look at this statement: “Many a lad of today, growing up as did Daniel in his Judean home, studying God’s Word and His works, and learning the lessons of faithful service, will yet stand in legislative assemblies, in halls of justice, or in royal courts, as a witness for the King of kings.”

I had read this statement more than once before it dawned on me that the situation pictured here is not at all like Paul’s defense before King Agrippa, in which the apostle stood in chains to testify to his faith. In the history of the church many Christians have done this and have acted with wisdom and courage, as did Paul on this and other occasions. But this was not at all the experience of Daniel. True, he had been brought to Babylon as a captive. But once there, under Nebuchadnezzar he became a court official and then minister and senior consultant to the king, and later under Darius he became a high-ranking official in the Persian empire. Daniel was a member of the government who had won the confidence of the imperial rulers because of his competence and integrity as a son of God — and in a pagan culture at that. It is this kind of witness in government and public service that Mrs. White, by her reference to Daniel, appears to hold up as a desirable aspiration for at least some Adventists.

The statement you have cited is not always interpreted this way. Can’t you do better than this?
To me the statement seems crystal clear. But if you want something that can have only one interpretation, hear this:

God . . . requires every one of us to cultivate our powers, and attain the highest possible capacity for usefulness, that we may do noble work for God, and bless humanity.

Dear youth, what is the aim and purpose of your life? Are you ambitious for education that you may have a name and position in the world? Have you thoughts that you dare not express, that you may one day stand upon the summit of intellectual greatness; that you may sit in deliberative and legislative councils, and help to enact laws for the nation? There is nothing wrong in these aspirations . . .

Integrity, unswerving integrity, is the principle that you need to carry with you into all the relations of life . . .

Balanced by religious principle, you may climb to any height you please . . .

But never commit so great a crime as to pervert your God-given powers to do evil and destroy others . . . It is a fearful thing to use God-given abilities in such a way as to scatter blight and woe instead of blessing in society. It is also a fearful thing to fold the talent intrusted to us in a napkin, and hide it away in the world; for this is casting away the crown of life. God claims our service.

This is an imperative to be a person of action, a person dedicated to the service of God and man. If the Christian has the ability, the inclination, and the opportunity for public service, Mrs. White clearly commends it — always with the reservation that his motives must be such as to have God’s approval.

If Christians are to be the salt of the earth, they must have enough faith and confidence to be dropped out of the salt shaker and spread over all segments of human society — including government. I have found devout Christians in Congress, and I am honored as an Adventist to join my colleagues at the Christian fellowship breakfasts that are held each week.

Do current world problems suggest areas of special concern to you as an Adventist?

I think that a Seventh-day Adventist must take the larger view on many subjects. Without diminishing his patriotism and loyalty to his countrymen in any way, he must look compassionately on people everywhere. The enslaved, the hungry, and those who (almost without hope) are seeking something better should be on the mind of any legislator. A Congressman should be nonpartisan where stark human need is involved. An Adventist in particular should think and live above the racial strife that threatens the peace and prosperity of our nation and of the world. A genuine feeling of brotherhood should save him from both prejudice and reaction. His sense of values should be anchored in sound, God-given concepts of Christian love.
Has belonging to the Seventh-day Adventist Church influenced your choice of causes or bills to support? Has it made a difference in the way you vote, in the way you function as a member of the House of Representatives?

As I see my general responsibility, it is to serve the nation and my district to the best of my ability, according to my convictions, and to live among my colleagues so they will know me as a Christian.

I have a duty to my district, to discover its needs and to work to meet them; this is the essence of representative government. Beyond this, I am a free American. I have no commitments to any group or organization — not even to my church as an organization. I would be disappointed if the church officially asked me to sponsor this or that legislation, or to support or oppose a particular bill. I am convinced that the church would not make such a request, for it and I both believe in a separation of church and state. Whatever I do as a Congressman, I must weigh according to my own moral and ethical convictions, on my own responsibility as a Christian and as an Adventist.

I have wondered what I would do if some of the events which Adventists expect to involve this country should begin to happen while I am in Congress. I hope that in such a situation the Lord would give me wisdom and courage to express the prophetic insights of Adventism, using the advantage of my position in Congress (including the attention and interest of the news media) to get a hearing for them.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

The foregoing questions and answers are based on a conversation between Congressman Pettis and Keld J. Reynolds, former vice president for academic affairs at Loma Linda University.

Ellen G. White
and the Chicago Mission

JONATHAN BUTLER

Without historical perspective, Ellen G. White's comments on inner-city involvement may appear ambiguous. In 1885 she wrote at length on "The Support of City Missions," which were then evangelistic centers of literature distribution, Bible reading courses, and public meetings, and which were scattered in various major cities of the United States.1 Her article censured those who neglected this work. In 1910, after city missions had evolved into a medical missionary enterprise, usually accompanied by a restaurant and a dispensary, she complained that Adventist city missions had declined. Missions, she said, were to flourish in New York, San Francisco, Chicago, San Diego, and other urban centers.2

In 1904, however, in an article entitled "The Foundation of Our Faith," Mrs. White warned against a "false reformation" that threatened Seventh-day Adventists. If the reformation were realized, it would consist of adopting a "system of intellectual philosophy," and "the founders of this system would go into the cities, and do a wonderful work." A perusal of the entire article places us in a historical setting: the discussion concerns John Harvey Kellogg, who had troubled Mrs. White with the heterodox "intellectual philosophy" of his Living Temple and his intemperate involvement in the "wonderful work" of the Chicago Medical Mission.3 To Kellogg himself Mrs. White wrote that too much of the Adventist resources was being absorbed by the Chicago Mission project.4 At the same time, she wrote that
the "treasury" was not to be dissipated on the "depraved," or the "lowest specimens of humanity." 

Why was it, then, that Mrs. White encouraged the city missions enterprise in the 1880's, was concerned with its decline around 1910, but at the turn of the century characterized inner-city involvement as a "false reformation" and cautioned against its excesses? 

It is our thesis that her criticism of city missions around 1900 must not be understood as a blanket indictment against all inner-city work. Her criticism was localized. She was writing of a particular place, time, and person: the Chicago Medical Mission, around 1900, under the direction of Kellogg. This is clear as we survey her relationship to city missions against the historical backdrop provided us by Schwarz and Rice.

Mrs. White had given her unqualified support to city missions nearly a decade before Kellogg's entrance into Chicago in 1893. In 1883 she wrote the long article on city missions that now appears in volume five of the Testimonies. It was directed to a conference president who was shirking his responsibility in urban areas. She wrote: "Shall the prince of darkness be left in undisputed possession of our great cities because it costs something to sustain missions?" After discussing financial matters, she added these words: "Let those who would follow Christ fully come up to the work, even if it be over the heads of ministers and president. . . . You have shown that you are conservative, and that your ideas are narrow. You have not done one-half what you might have done had you the true spirit of the work."

At this time, in the mid-1880's, Adventist city missions were widespread. There were twenty-two city missions reported at the 1888 General Conference in Minneapolis. Urban missions activity had become a movement in Adventism. Several years later, in December 1894, Mrs. White began a series of articles in the Review and Herald (on "Our Duty to the Poor and Afflicted") to endorse the missions involvement. And it was to these articles, along with several others by Mrs. White, that Kellogg referred in February 1895 as a blueprint for his Chicago Medical Mission. Kellogg, then, was a relative latecomer among Adventists to be concerned with urban missions.

Having reviewed Mrs. White's interest in city missions before the Chicago Medical Mission had matured, now we can discuss her relationship to the Chicago program. Her comments on Chicago can be grouped under
three headings: (1) comments in the early stage of the Chicago mission work, before 1895; (2) statements in the highly developed stage of the work, around 1900, including (a) those directed to Kellogg, which were usually negative at this time, and (b) those directed to David Paulson and others, which were positive; and (3) those on the Chicago enterprise after 1905.

Many of Mrs. White's statements on city missions in the period before 1895 are of a general nature in support of all city involvement, but as early as 1885 she wrote in the *Review and Herald* specifically of a Chicago mission. She commended persons who were active in this mission and encouraged them, though they were having financial difficulties. She wrote that they would not be short of funds if people would not spend so much money on "houses and lands" and would use it, instead, for such worthy causes as this mission.¹¹

Ten years later, in 1895, after Kellogg had inaugurated his program in Chicago, she wrote approvingly of his endeavors in a personal letter. Responding to a previous letter from him, she declared: "I am in full sympathy with the work that is being done there [in Chicago]. I believe in helping along every line in which it is possible to help, following in the steps of Christ. Those who take hold of the Christian Help Work, who will consecrate themselves to God, will find that He will be a present help to them in every hour of need."¹²

Mrs. White's correspondence in the period around 1900 is misunderstood more easily than the earlier letters and articles are. She wrote prolifically; and to the reader without historical perspective for her counsel, she appears to have written ambiguously. We will consider first the negative and then the positive statements.

The negative criticism centers on the activities of Kellogg. He was essentially an egoist, sometimes condescending and even abrasive in his treatment of others. Unwilling to delegate responsibility, when he adopted a project he depended on his own great capacity to get work done. The problems with the Chicago mission are stamped with Kellogg's personal characteristics and intemperate industry.

Mrs. White's primary reason for concern was that the work done at the mission was disproportionately large in comparison with other work.¹³ The laboratory for training field workers had become too large for the field. The work had become overcentralized. She never argued that the nature of the
Chicago work was bad, but only that it should be diffused over a broader area than simply Chicago. A cursory look at the Medical Missionary, a magazine edited by Kellogg, indicates that the medical missionary activity fostered by his Medical Missionary and Benevolent Association was indeed conducted in more than Chicago. There were dozens of mission stations all over the world. In fact, there were more Adventists working for the MMBA in 1901 than there were working for the General Conference. But a trip to Australia (1891-1900) had forced even greater cosmopolitan concerns on Mrs. White.

Not only are other fields than Chicago to be reached, wrote Mrs. White, but other classes than the poor. Not only are the poor to be helped, but the youth are to be educated and the wealthy are to be reached with the gospel. Besides overcentralizing in Chicago, Kellogg had overspecialized on the needs of the poor.

The dramatic problem in Chicago at that time was poverty. The Chicago World's Fair, together with the Great Panic in the 90's and the influx of the hordes of immigrants into the city, had left Chicago staggering. For those who worked there, the needs of the poor tended to eclipse the needs of other classes of people elsewhere. So Mrs. White wrote: "Of late, a great interest has been aroused for the poor and outcast classes; a great work has been entered upon for the uplifting of the fallen and degraded. This in itself is a good work. We should ever have the spirit of Christ, and we are to do the same class of work that He did for fallen humanity. . . . This will have its place in connection with the proclamation of the third angel's message."

But in the same paragraph, she tempered her comment with these words: "There is danger of loading down everyone with this class of work, because of the intensity with which it is carried on. . . . The gospel invitation is to be given to the rich and the poor, the high and the low, and we must devise means for carrying the truth into new places, and to all classes of people." The relatively small Seventh-day Adventist organization at the turn of the century had to economize its efforts to present a balanced gospel.

Another criticism Mrs. White had regarding the Chicago Mission, not unrelated to the overcentralization problem, was the breach being created between the medical missionary work and the clerical ministry. Kellogg had a way of antagonizing the latter with condescending remarks about clergymen. Mrs. White reprimanded him for "exalting the medical missionary work above the work of the ministry." She insisted on a better attitude toward the clergy from Kellogg, for ministers were neglecting sound programs — for example, "Christian Help Bands" and city missions — be-
cause they had associated these endeavors with the unpopular personality traits of the doctor. Also, because Kellogg controlled such a large working force in the MMHA, a division between himself and the clergy implied a schism of disastrous proportions. A schism was untenable. Mrs. White wrote about this matter: "The Lord has signified that the missionary, health-restorative gospel should never be separated from the ministry of the word." About this same time she said, "As the right arm is to the body, so is the medical missionary work to the third angel's message. But the right arm is not to become the whole body."

The missions program was to be a ministry to the whole man. If the medical missionary work and the gospel ministry would stay together, there would be a ministry to the whole man. But in this crucial period around 1900 their relationship was strained. A purely preaching ministry was not a ministry to the whole man, nor was a purely medical ministry. True evangelism included both the gospel meetings and the restaurant and dispensary service. Never one without the other.

Yet another criticism of the Chicago enterprise was related to Mrs. White's holistic concept of man. She wrote of the "depraved" and the "lowest specimens of humanity" that use up church funds but provide no spiritual returns. The church engages in philanthropy but not in evangelism. She called these poor who are fed by the church (but who never enter the full life of the church) "consumers, but not producers." She explained the meaning of this phrase in a letter to William Warren Prescott by saying that every believer is to be "a receiver and then a producer of good works." The "depraved" are those who do not engage in active personal evangelism after their conversion.

To spend time with a hopeless derelict was, in this sense, not ministering to the whole man, for the derelict who would never know the gospel, however often he visited the dispensary, was surely receiving only half a ministry. Of course, early Adventist standards for pronouncing a derelict "hopeless" may have been less rigorous than today's, for any issue of The Life Boat magazine, published by the Chicago Mission, reports conversions of drunkards and exconvicts and prostitutes who developed into responsible citizens and even, on occasion, medical students.

Finally, a criticism mentioned in Mrs. White's correspondence with Kellogg was the nondenominational nature of the Chicago Medical Mission. The mission was essentially evangelical but nonsectarian. Apparently it was affiliated closely enough with Seventh-day Adventists so that Jane Addams declined her support of it in 1889 because of its sectarian ties. But Mrs.
White wrote to Kellogg before the turn of the century that the minuscule Adventist budget could not absorb such a large nondenominational venture. She advised Kellogg at this point to gain financial support only from non-Adventists. It was at this time that Kellogg arranged for various financial projects independent of the Adventist Church, such as publication of *The Life Boat*, which at its peak had about 200,000 subscriptions. With the help of his various investments, Kellogg cut down the church-contributed support until only ten percent of his funds were from Adventist sources.

Later however, around 1900, Mrs. White raised further objection to the nondenominational nature of the mission. It was nearly independent financially, but much personnel and time were being expended on this one mission, and it was not distinctively Adventist. This criticism was expressed by church leaders as discussion became animated over Kellogg’s standing in the church. The Life Boat Mission, a branch of the Chicago Medical Mission, was never called into question by Mrs. White at this time, for it always retained its Seventh-day Adventist label. An indication of the amount of Adventist personnel and time engaged in operating the mission is the fact that in 1910, when Battle Creek College was discontinued and could no longer send its students to the mission, the Chicago Medical Mission collapsed.

Thus, to summarize, Mrs. White’s major objections to the Chicago Medical Mission were primarily of an administrative nature and only secondarily theological. Kellogg was generally criticized for bad administrative implementation of proper theological motives. The mission — largely in the person of Kellogg — was overcentralized in relation to missions work in the world field; it was overspecialized in its service for one class of people; it threatened imbalance with one kind of ministry — medical ministry (again, because of Kellogg’s relationship to the clergy); and finally, it lacked sufficient church distinctiveness, for reasons of finance and personnel.

These are the negative criticisms of the Chicago enterprise. But there is a positive appraisal as well.

III

The Life Boat Mission, which operated in Chicago throughout this period around 1900, was never controversial among Seventh-day Adventists and received only commendation from Mrs. White. In 1905 she visited the Life Boat Mission and the Workingmen’s Home, and lauded their city work in her *“Notes on Travel”*. 25

The mission, under the direction of Paulson, an adjutant of Kellogg’s,
included a dispensary, laundry facilities, a restaurant, and the Working-
men’s Home, which served as a men’s dormitory for the jobless. The Life
Boat magazine, edited by Paulson, reflected the aims of the Life Boat Mis-

sion, which was surely no narrow definition of the gospel. The mission was
apparently not interested in saving the “soul” only, but the soul, mind, and
body — the whole man. The magazine reported treatments given in the
dispensary as well as souls “saved” in the meetings. Issues discussed in The
Life Boat also indicated a broad concept of the gospel; they included juve-
nile delinquency problems and intolerable child labor conditions. Prison
conditions and the problem of an exconvict’s integration into society were
often given editorial attention, and on several occasions, an entire issue of
The Life Boat was devoted to “the prisons.” Of these social problems
Paulson wrote in 1902, that they “will not be settled in prayer meetings or
in conventions, but ... by individual effort on the part of men and women in
whose hearts throbs a genuine love of humanity.”

It was this work that Mrs. White wrote should be multiplied in all urban
centers. The Life Boat Mission was to be an archetype for the city missions
movement. The work done at the Life Boat did not differ fundamentally
from the work done in the rest of the Chicago Medical Mission; the Life
Boat was just smaller. Had Kellogg’s project remained the size of the Life
Boat Mission in Chicago and had he expanded his missions work in other
cities rather than enlarging to enormous proportions in Chicago itself, Mrs.
White’s objections might never have been raised. As it happened, however,
the Life Boat Mission became Mrs. White’s model for the medical mission-
ary work, while its parent — the Chicago Medical Mission — was flawed.

We have reviewed Ellen White’s relationship to Chicago in the early
stage before 1895, and in the ambiguous period around 1900. It remains for
us to mention her relationship to Chicago in the third period, after 1905.

By this time, inner-city activity in Chicago, as elsewhere, had tapered off.
Mrs. White expressed her concern about this on a number of occasions, but
one notable address was at the Life Boat Rescue Home in Hinsdale. The
Rescue Home had been established in Chicago to receive unwed mothers
and to provide a halfway house for prostitutes who had left their trade. In
1909 the home was moved to Hinsdale, a Chicago suburb, so that the young
women who came to the home could enjoy the more amiable atmosphere
outside the city. In addressing the personnel and patrons of the home in a
dedication service for the newly built structure, Mrs. White commented,
“Those who are conducting this home are doing an important work, and
I believe that as a result of such efforts, many souls will be saved.”
Without further reference to Chicago, we will note Mrs. White’s relationship to inner-city work, in general, after 1900. We have already found her in support of the city missions programs as early as the 1880’s, long before the Chicago Medical Mission had been established. The only qualifying statements she made about city work were around 1900, and even then she commended the Life Boat Mission in the very heart of Chicago. Further confirmation for Mrs. White’s interest in inner-city activity came in a number of later statements.

After 1900 she wrote that Adventists should locate outside the cities (as in an article “Our Duty to Leave Battle Creek”), but she also said that “from these outposts [Adventists are to] warn the cities, and raise in them memorials for God. There must be a force of influence in the cities, that the message of warning shall be heard.” In the same article she wrote, “Our restaurants must be in the cities; for otherwise the workers in these restaurants could not reach the people and teach them the principles of right living.” Later she stated that “the principles of health reform are to be promulgated as a part of the work in the cities. The voice of the third angel’s message is to be heard with power.”

In 1900, the same year that she was writing critically of some aspects of inner-city activity in Chicago, Mrs. White wrote of San Francisco: “In San Francisco a hygienic restaurant has been opened, also a food store, and treatment-rooms. These are doing a good work, but their influence should be greatly extended. Other restaurants similar to the one on Market Street should be opened in San Francisco and in Oakland. Concerning the effort that is now being made in these lines, we can say, Amen and amen.”

Rather than advising a tempering of these efforts in San Francisco, Mrs. White recommended that more be done: “Cooking schools are to be established. . . . In the cities this work of instruction may be carried forward on a much larger scale than in smaller places. . . . He [the Lord] will work with those who carry out His plans, teaching the people how to bring about a reformation in their diet by the preparation of healthful, inexpensive foods. Thus the poor will be encouraged to adopt the principles of health reform; they will be helped to become industrious and self-reliant.”

And in 1902, Mrs. White wrote of New York City as she had of San Francisco: “Under the direction of God, the mission in New York City has been started. This work should be continued in the power of the same Spirit that led to its establishment. . . . If in this great center medical missionary work could be established by men and women of experience, those who
would give a correct representation of true medical missionary principles, it would have great power in making a right impression on the people."

Throughout the period after 1900, she continued to write of city missions, often mentioning specific centers where work should be done. Besides New York and San Francisco, missions were to thrive in San Diego, Los Angeles, Chicago, and other major cities. In 1909 she produced a series of articles entitled "The Work in the Cities." In 1912, in a two-part article on "City Work" in the *Review and Herald*, she spoke of "the sympathy that Christ ever expressed for the physical needs of his hearers" and said that it won from many "a response to the truths he sought to teach." As late as 1914 Mrs. White expressed her concern for the foreigners in the major population centers like New York and Chicago. Earlier she had said that the work done for the Swedish people in Chicago should be done for other groups elsewhere."

Thus, it is apparent that Mrs. White gave unqualified support to city missions both in the 1880's and after 1900. Where the prophetic voice was heard, Seventh-day Adventist urban involvement maintained equilibrium. It was not trapped in the social gospel movement (bottom-heavy with humanitarianism) developing in this period; but neither was it like the conservative evangelicism (top-heavy with evangelism) that developed after World War I. Seventh-day Adventism — at least in this period — appears to have struck the golden mean.

What criticism we do find in Mrs. White's writing on city missions is of a specialized nature. It forms an island in time and space around 1900, in Chicago. This criticism, therefore, cannot properly be applied in general terms to all inner-city involvement. The keynote of her objections around 1900 was the intemperate amount of inner-city activity in Chicago compared with other cities. The counsel was not to stop the work, but to diffuse it.

Of course, the Chicago problems of this period that Mrs. White addressed could hardly be more irrelevant to Seventh-day Adventists in urban centers today. Adventism is much larger today than it was in 1900, whereas the proportion of inner-city work in relation to the size of the church is appreciably less today than it was in 1900, or even in the 1880's. And to condone the modicum of Adventist urban involvement now because of Mrs. White's criticism of the work in Chicago in 1900 simply does violence to her intention.

The early growth of inner-city involvement in the 1880's was only en-
couraged by Mrs. White, and its decline in the first decades of the twentieth century was only resisted in her writing. A return, then, to early Adventist tradition on this issue, is not a return to the Adventism of the 1920’s but to the Adventism of the 1890’s. A retreat to the suburbs and tranquil conservatism is not in the spirit of nineteenth century Adventism at all.

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Adventists and Welfare Work: A Comparative Study

RICHARD RICE

The studies of Schwarz and Butler make it evident that the social endeavors carried on by Seventh-day Adventists in Chicago around the turn of the century constituted an important chapter in the life of John Harvey Kellogg and a crucial phase of the developing social consciousness of Adventism in general. The question that remains is how these developments relate to the larger picture of social work during the same time. This article attempts a comparison of Adventist welfare activities in Chicago with general welfare activities at the turn of the century, focusing on three areas in particular: (a) contextual details of place and time, (b) specific welfare activities undertaken, and (c) philosophical presuppositions.

I. TIME AND PLACE

It is difficult to imagine a more auspicious setting for social endeavors at the turn of the century than Chicago, the great city whose broad shoulders and brawling laughter Carl Sandburg eulogized, and whose stench Upton Sinclair fanned across the land. In the first place, the problems of that metropolis were enormous; and in the second place, the social welfare programs begun there were among the most significant in the world. By 1910 Chicago had become the sixth largest city in the world, its population having grown in the space of just sixty years from a mere 4,500 to over two million. The major cause of this rapid increase was immigration on a
grand scale, with the result that fully three-fourths of the city’s inhabitants were either foreign-born or of foreign-born parentage. The widespread inability to speak English coupled with their Old World naiveté rendered the immigrants pathetically defenseless to the "Jungle's" beasts of prey, as Sinclair's classic of social reform graphically portrays.

Because its central location and its vast industries attracted thousands of unskilled and unemployed workers from all over the country, Chicago became the reservoir of an enormous floating population. Estimates of the number of homeless men in the lodging house districts of the city in 1910 alone range from 40,000 to 60,000. Because of the massive influx of workers hoping for employment at the World's Fair, unemployment was especially critical during the early 1890's, just when Adventist work in the city was getting underway. When the exposition closed in October 1893, it left thousands out of work.

No doubt because of its massive problems, the city of Chicago saw a variety of social endeavors begin at the same general time. It was there that Albion W. Small, an eminent American sociologist, founded the American Journal of Sociology. Chicago was the home of Jane Addams' Hull House, the most important settlement house in the world. The National Organization for Public Health Nursing was founded in Chicago in 1912.

The time as well as the place of the early Adventist welfare programs contributed to their significance. Seventh-day Adventists were actively engaged in welfare work in Chicago during the twenty-year period from the summer of 1893, when the Chicago Medical Mission first opened its doors, to the fall of 1913, when the free dispensary closed. The general period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was characterized by a flurry of social concern, including the founding of the American Red Cross, the first strides toward humane treatment of the mentally ill, the beginning of prison reform, and a host of other humanitarian endeavors. The early twentieth century saw the beginning of the great philanthropic trusts by which Andrew Carnegie would dispose of 350 and John D. Rockefeller of 530 millions of dollars. Social concerns of a more general character were also beginning at the same time, as indicated by the emergence of sciences such as sociology and public health.

The Adventist welfare endeavors were thus part of a general mushrooming of welfare programs throughout the country during the last decades of the nineteenth century. They were, nevertheless, a relatively early phase. In the year that the Chicago Medical Mission opened (1893), for example, only two settlement houses were already established in Chicago, a number
which increased to twenty-two during the next eleven years. It seems, then, that, in working in Chicago at the time when they did, early Seventh-day Adventist welfare workers were among the pioneers on the new frontier of awakening American social consciousness.

II. SOME PRECEDENTS

A common feature of all major social endeavors was the tendency toward a greater organization of philanthropic and charitable enterprises. The COS (Charity Organization Society) movement, which began in England in 1869 with a group of public-spirited citizens, epitomizes this trend toward organization. The COS movement saw in Thomas Chalmers, a Scottish clergyman of the early nineteenth century, its spiritual ancestor. What Chalmers contributed to social welfare was the concept that charity could and should be systematically organized and the proof that such an approach was far superior to the haphazard almsgiving that characterized earlier attempts to help the poor. He divided his parish of 8,000 into twenty-five districts for visitation and assigned to a board of deacons the task of distributing relief. As a result of his plan the local residents were able to carry the burden of poverty relief in their parish.

Following Chalmers' precedent, members of the COS movement took organization as their watchword. Each society carefully investigated the recipients of aid, suggested assistance designed to meet their personal needs, and kept accurate records of all the benefits dispensed. The Buffalo COS, for example, the first in America, operated with a volunteer corps consisting preponderantly of wealthy young men. The city was divided into districts and each volunteer was assigned a number of families that he visited on a regular basis, offering them his friendship, counsel, and advice. No funds were distributed directly through the COS. Instead, clients were referred to the most appropriate of several social agencies.

The inclination to organize all activities is reflected in the extensive records of the various Adventist welfare programs in Chicago. Tallies were run on even the number of baths taken and the number of people who used the laundry. The techniques of the COS movement were also employed, with the result that 9,000 persons were visited in the first three years the mission was in operation. Contrary to the practice of the city Charity Organization Societies, however, the Chicago Medical Mission directly ministered to the people by giving treatments, applying dressings, distributing garments, and making penny dinners available.
Another important precedent followed by Adventists in Chicago was the settlement house movement, which accompanied the growth of the Charity Organization Societies. In general terms, a settlement house was a location — usually a large building in the slum or tenement section of a city — that provided a meeting place for the rich (relatively speaking) who worked there voluntarily and the poor who inhabited the surrounding area. The settlement houses served as social centers for inner-city ethnic minorities, provided classes along various lines, and organized young people into clubs. The first settlement house was Toynbee Hall, founded in London in 1884 by a group of Oxford students under the leadership of Canon Barnett. Five years later, Jane Addams and schoolmate Ellen Gates Starr moved into the former Chicago residence of a real estate millionaire, Charles Hull, hoping to provide a social center for the impoverished working people of the surrounding area. Hull House subsequently became the most influential settlement house in the world.

Adventist activities in Chicago also included a settlement house at which numerous programs were conducted: a kindergarten, a day nursery for working mothers, classes on various subjects, health lecture courses for adults and children, exercise programs, a women's club for instruction in homemaking skills, and so forth. It opened in 1896 when there were only six other settlement houses in the city. Since the number had increased to twenty-two by 1908, it is evident that Adventist welfare workers were not reluctant to employ new ideas in social work and were among the first in Chicago to organize a settlement.

In addition to the settlement houses and Charity Organization Societies, with their noble objective of uplifting the social life of the impoverished, there were many humbler endeavors undertaken on behalf of the poor of society. The purpose of the lodging house, for example, was to provide a night's lodging at minimum expense. The need for such facilities has already been indicated, with the large number of homeless and unemployed who frequented the streets of America's great cities. In 1910 a writer noted that "all large cities and some small ones . . . have cheap lodging at a cost of from ten to 25 cents." With the exception of New York City, Chicago's number of such houses was greater than that of any other city, and statistics indicate that they were heavily patronized. During the single winter of 1907-08, for example, the Municipal Lodging House, its annex, and two other houses which it operated gave a total of 79,411 lodgings to homeless men.

Predictably, Adventists also ran a lodging house in Chicago. The Work-
The Workingmen’s Home opened in 1896 and provided sleeping quarters for between 300 and 400 men for ten cents a night, including an evening meal. In one year’s time the lodging house provided over 70,000 individual night’s lodgings and served nearly 600,000 meals. In an industrial department operated in connection with the Workingmen’s Home, the unemployed could support themselves temporarily by weaving rugs or making brooms.

III. DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS

A cursory comparison of three major developments in the area of social welfare in general — Charity Organization Societies, settlements, and lodging houses — and the comparable activities conducted by Seventh-day Adventists reveals that the latter paralleled the work being done by the major welfare movements of the time. For example, it was the tremendous impression Kellogg received from visiting two city missions in New York that made him determine to enter that type of work himself. The Chicago Medical Mission was the result, and its various activities were not unique in the light of all that was taking place at the time.

Nevertheless, several features of the Adventist work in Chicago did set it apart from the welfare movement in general. One was the tremendous scope of activities being conducted under the aegis of a single organization. In 1909 it was noted by Dr. Lena Kellogg Sadler, sister of Kellogg, that since its beginning the Chicago Medical Mission had comprised some eight institutions and twenty-five distinct lines of work, with about 200 people engaged in the various departments. A dispensary, a settlement, a lodging house, along with numerous aspects of reclamation work, all operated within the same rather closely structured organization.

In addition, the coordination of the study of medicine with the operation of numerous welfare programs seems to have been unique. As a result of the decision to integrate the clinical activities of the American Medical Missionary College with the work of the Chicago Medical Mission, the Adventist welfare program in Chicago was greatly expanded. Besides working in the dispensary, AMMC students organized over seventy clubs among newsboys, bootblacks, and street urchins and began a visitation program to the city’s jails. It was perhaps this unusual concept of combining medical training and welfare work that led Dr. Stephen Smith, a founder of the American Public Health Association, to call the AMMC “the most important educational institution in the world.”

Another distinguishing feature of Adventist welfare work was the extent to which rescue work was carried on among the city’s prostitutes. No
single phenomenon reveals more graphically the moral and social conditions prevalent in Chicago at the turn of the century than does the extent of prostitution, or, as it was commonly called, the "social evil." In 1893 the World's Congress on Social Purity, which met in Chicago, estimated the number of prostitutes in the city at 10,000 to 25,000;* and although New York City rivaled its total number, Chicago was without peer in the openness and extent of the practice. The writer of a famous article in 1907 estimated that 20 million dollars annually were made on prostitution in Chicago. He tallied 292 disreputable hotels and 350 good-sized houses of prostitution and estimated that no less than 2,000 women were plying their trade in small flats throughout the city.*

The Adventist welfare work that pertained to the "rescue" work conducted for the thousands of girls who had fallen into prostitution involved three programs in Chicago: a maternity home, the Life Boat Rescue Service, and the Rescue Home. The maternity home was established in 1896 and was ultimately able to provide shelter to twenty girls at a time.*

A more daring enterprise, the Life Boat Rescue Service, began with four women who ventured into the red-light districts of Chicago by night to do personal work among streetwalkers, supposedly the most desperate class of prostitutes. Operating in teams of two, these crusaders worked from 12:00 to 1:30 a.m. and were successful during their first year of operation in persuading seventy-five girls to leave the street and return to a better life.* In this way, the person-to-person encounter that constituted the procedural backbone of the Charity Organization Societies was carried to an extent that the original participants in those organizations probably never foresaw.

Comparable nerve was required for work in the Life Boat Rescue Home for girls, first located in a large converted barroom surrounded by brothels. The following statement reflects the attitude of its spirited staff toward their surroundings: "There was a den of iniquity on each side of us, but that did not matter; we were down in the thickest of the fight and that is where we wanted our snatch station to be."* In harmony with the gospel injunction as to whom Christians should invite to a feast, these determined ladies on one occasion gave a dinner to which every girl on the street was invited, along with some of the most prominent women in Chicago's churches. Thirty prostitutes responded, two of whom changed their way of life as a result of the experience.*

After several years the rescue home was moved to Hinsdale, Illinois, and located in permanent quarters. At the dedication of the new Life Boat
Rescue Home, which served both as a halfway house for former prostitutes and as a home for unwed mothers, the uniqueness of this phase of Adventist welfare work was publicly acknowledged by Judge H. A. Parkin, the Assistant United States District Attorney for Chicago. In his dedicatory speech on July 25, 1909, he described the work of the rescue home as "the first in this district at least, that I know of in the United States, that is meeting the need . . . possibly the greatest need in the suppression of this great evil."

Thus, in spite of numerous parallels to most of its endeavors, the Adventist welfare program in Chicago was noteworthy for the wide range of projects undertaken and the extent to which many of its participants went in their efforts for the unfortunate.

IV. UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY

The most prominent characteristic of the leaders in various phases of the welfare movement was a profound sense of personal responsibility for the well-being of their fellow men. This is evident in activities ranging from the philanthropy of John D. Rockefeller to the settlement work of Jane Addams. It was by direct person-to-person ministration to the unfortunate and impoverished that these crusaders sought to fulfill this responsibility. Thus, the underlying purpose of the settlement program, for example, was to form friendships that transcended social boundaries. This conviction was expressed by Barnett: "Toynbee Hall exists that individuals may tell on individuals, that the knowledge accumulated in the Universities and the experience accumulated in industry may move public opinion through the friendships formed between University men and the inhabitants of industrial neighborhoods."

In an even more explicit way, the participants of the Charity Organization Societies, who went from home to home befriending the underprivileged, sought to discharge what was regarded as a personal responsibility. This was the advice of Octavia Hill, a founder of the first COS, to its visitors:

You want to know them, — to enter into their lives, their thoughts; to let them enter into some of your brightness; to make their lives a little fuller, a little gladder. You who know so much more than they, might help them so much at important crises of their lives. You might gladden their homes by bringing them flowers, or, better still, by teaching them to grow plants; you might meet them face to face as friends; you might teach them; you might collect their savings; you might sing for and with them; you might take them into the parks or out for quiet days in the country, in small companies, or to your own or your friends' grounds, or to exhibitions or picture galleries; you might teach and refine and make them cleaner by merely going among them.
Evidences of the same feeling of personal responsibility are not difficult to find in the various activities of Adventists in Chicago. The relocation of the American Medical Missionary College from Battle Creek to the heart of Chicago might be viewed as resulting from the conviction that students should be involved with the diseased on a personal basis, by practicing the healing arts where they actually were most needed. John Harvey Kellogg's trips to Chicago to treat the sick himself indicate the same concern felt by leaders of all the major welfare endeavors. It was not enough simply to have his plans carried out; he had to become personally involved. The work of the Life Boat Rescue Service dramatically illustrates the personal nature of the concern felt for the unfortunate. In this first important respect, then, the philosophy of Adventist welfare work coincided precisely with that of the welfare movement in general.

It goes without saying, perhaps, that this personal concern was felt for the poor on the part of those who by comparison were wealthy. This is revealed not only by the presence of the Rockefellers and the Carnegies in the sphere of social concern but also by participants on a less auspicious level, the members of a local settlement, for example. A case in point is Toynbee Hall, established by a group of comparatively well-off university students anxious to help the poor of London. Wealthy young men who donated their time to visiting the unfortunate comprised most of the membership of the first cos in America. Jane Addams was born into a family of substantial means, as was Josephine Shaw Lowell, the principal founder of the New York cos. By and large the early phases of the welfare movement were inaugurated by members of the upper classes.

In view of this understanding of social responsibility as primarily personal in character, the observation has been made that the members of the social welfare movement were reformers, rather than revolutionaries, seeking not the transformation of society but the reformation of individuals. It appears that here, as always, the wealthier classes were politically conservative. Although there is some evidence that these early welfare leaders recognized a need for corporate action, they seem to have viewed society as comprising primarily individuals, rather than institutions, and the character of their endeavors (personal visitation, for example) reveals that they thought in terms of individuals rather than institutions. It remained for the social gospel movement to provide a theological rationale for social action and to amplify the concern for corporate responsibility.

As a result of this general frame of mind, men regarded poverty not as a problem of society, but as a problem of the individual. More precisely,
it could be said that the early welfare movements were not really concerned for poverty per se, but rather for the poor person. Poverty was attributed to moral defects — to weaknesses of character, body, or intellect — rather than to undesirable social conditions. Since lack of money was not the cause of the problem, then neither would the provision of money be the solution.

An important feature of each cos was the fact that its members themselves distributed no financial assistance to the poor. "No Relief Given Here," announced signs at the entrance to the Buffalo cos, and the New York cos readily assured prospective donors that "all the organization's funds went for administrative expenses and not one cent to the poor." In addition, there was a strong aversion to public welfare. "Outdoor relief," the practice of supporting the impoverished through funds raised by taxation, was widely opposed and was voted out in Brooklyn and Philadelphia. It was felt that such assistance actually encouraged, rather than alleviated poverty, and that withdrawal of public support would encourage the poor to become self-sufficient.

In this light, Kellogg's aversion to outright charity, seen in his practice of charging a nominal amount for help given (as penny dinners) and in providing the unemployed with work rather than money (as at the Workingmen's Home) was in harmony with the sentiments of all leading social reformers of his time.

Another noticeable aspect of the welfare movement was the religious character of the social concern its leaders manifested. Jane Addams, for example, regarded the settlement movement as an outlet for the sentiments of universal brotherhood, and she appealed to persons to express in terms of social service and action the spirit of Christ.

At the same time, the welfare movement was characterized by a noticeable lack of institutional church involvement. Many church members were involved in the welfare endeavors, and no doubt most of the welfare workers were church members, but the churches as organizations did not take a major role in welfare endeavors. Here again it appears that the personal responsibility which undergirded the entire movement was felt to be incumbent on individual persons rather than on organizations. At any rate, sectarianism was firmly resisted. This is illustrated by Jane Addam's refusal to comply with Kellogg's request to operate a dispensary in connection with her work at Hull House. Knowing his religious affiliation, she no doubt feared that his work would bring an undesired denominational flavor to the work of the settlement.

Kellogg himself took a decided stand against any insistence on the part
of Adventist church leaders that the work in Chicago be given a distinctive denominational color. He saw the work of the International Medical Missionary and Benevolent Association (official name of the Adventist welfare organization) as representing the nondenominational side of Adventist work, stating that "when a man helps the poor in his neighborhood he does it as a Christian, and not a Baptist, a Methodist, or a Seventh-day Adventist. We can join hands with other denominations in that work as Christians." It is evident that here again Kellogg was in full harmony with the sentiment shared by all welfare leaders of the time.

Kellogg's interest in social welfare also appears to have been motivated by the same religious concern for his fellow man that other leading reformers expressed. In fact, the essence of Christianity to him consisted of disinterested service rendered to the less fortunate. He is quoted as saying, "The man who is closest to God is the man that tries to do what God is doing in lifting up humanity, who runs the quickest to help the helpless, who is most ready to assist the weak and succor the afflicted, who sympathizes with the suffering, and comforts the comfortless."

V. A PART OF A LARGER MOVEMENT

This comparison of trends in activity and thought in the social welfare movement around the turn of the century with Adventist welfare activity in Chicago makes possible a tentative conclusion as to the relative significance of the latter. In retrospect it appears that the predominant influence was in one direction, that Adventist welfare work did not contribute any novel ideas or techniques that were influential in other welfare organizations. For one thing, the entire program lasted only twenty years, in contrast with that of Hull House, for example, which is still in operation today. The endeavors undertaken by Adventists were thus largely imitative rather than innovative in character. Even the philosophy that undergirded the Adventist projects, as it was expressed by Kellogg, did not set it apart from the welfare movement at large. What unusual features there were (such as the large number of diverse activities that were conducted by the single organization, and the extent to which there was implementation of some of the techniques begun by other welfare leaders, as the Life Boat Rescue Service demonstrates) were not of such a character as to set the Adventist work in a class by itself.

It seems evident that the welfare work done in Chicago by Seventh-day Adventists at the turn of the century was not essentially different from, either in terms of endeavors undertaken or underlying philosophy, but per-
haps somewhat distinctive within the general welfare movement of which it was a part.

REFERENCES AND NOTES


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10 Schwarz, John Harvey Kellogg, p. 326.

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12 Robert Hamlett Bremner, American Philanthropy (University of Chicago Press 1960), p. 120.


16 Schwarz, John Harvey Kellogg, pp. 328-329.

17 Ferguson, p. 67.


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34 See reference 13.
35 Bremner, p. 100.
36 Ibid., p. 101.
37 See reference 13.
38 Bremner, pp. 98-99.
39 Until the days of the New Deal, welfare was overwhelmingly a private concern.
40 Bremner, pp. 97-98.
41 Ibid., p. 114.
43 International Medical Missionary and Benevolent Association, *The Medical Missionary* 9, 16 (May 1899).
Historians in recent centuries have focused their attention on the rise and fall of the many civilizations that have been known in the past. Why, they ask, has a civilization or a society known a period of great creativity, and why, then, does life seem to have gone from it? Why has the cultural leadership that it held for a brief season passed from it and been taken into other hands?

Arnold J. Toynbee tries to explain this arrest of progress as failure to respond creatively to the challenge of certain difficulties that have to be faced. He reminds us that change is always with us, whether we will it or not, and that we human beings have to learn how to cope with new situations by being not only willing and ready but also actively seeking to change ourselves and our outlook.

The modern mind, acutely conscious of the sweep of history and chronically apprehensive, is quick to ask, "Is it our turn now?" In answer to this question one needs to recall that civilizations, societies, organizations, and institutions do not exist apart from individuals. A civilization or an organization decays and dies when its individuals lose their vitality.

The failure to respond creatively to the challenges and difficulties that lie ahead is one of the greatest dangers the church faces. Many of its college and university students are looking forward to "settling down," "receiving a call," making their own way financially, getting married. All of these are important and desirable things to do. But if they mean, in essence, relaxing...
for a moment the quest for truth, the struggle for self-discipline and self-improvement, the longing for understanding and maturity, then for these young adults it is as T. S. Eliot says: "In my beginning is my end."

According to the familiar words of Alexander Pope,

A little learning is a dang’rous thing;
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring:
There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
And drinking largely sobers us again.3

Most of the rising generation of the church has only tasted of the fullness and richness of life’s experience. They must now drink deeply.

Many people stop learning in several dimensions of their lives long before they are graduated from college. Others settle into rigid and unchanging patterns of views and ideas by the time they are twenty-five or thirty. By their mid-thirties most will have stopped acquiring new skills or new attitudes in any central aspect of their lives. By the time they are ready for the "gold watch" at the end of their careers, it cannot be said of many of them that they have had "forty years’ experience;" in most cases they will more likely have had "one year’s experience forty times."4

As we add years, progressively we may narrow too much the scope and variety of our lives. Of all the interests we might pursue, we settle on a few. Of all the people with whom we might associate, we select a small number. We let ourselves be caught in a web of fixed relationships. We develop set ways of doing things. I am not suggesting that a choosing process is wholly avoidable or undesirable. If the process of maturing did not involve selection, there might be no focus or coherence in one’s life. The danger, however, is that any new relationships and any alternate ways of thinking and acting will be resisted and rejected.

As the years go by, we view our familiar surroundings with less and less freshness of perception. No longer do we look with wakeful, perceiving eyes at the familiar faces of people or at other features of our everyday world. We tend to become intellectually myopic.5

II

Most young Adventists become active, productive contributors to a society that insists that they "join the crowd." They discover quickly the rigidifying that stems from excessive attention to precedent, the imprisonment of men by their procedures, the encircling web of vested interests that entangles new growth in every field of endeavor. They soon learn the real
meaning of such statements as "Let's table it for further study," "Let's refer it to a committee," and "We have always followed the practice of . . .".

A case in point is useful here. Many years ago the leaders of the Seventh-day Adventist Church agreed that it was important that the children of the church be educated in church schools from the first grade through college. This plan was basic in the nineteenth century and remains so in the twentieth. It was decided that this goal could best be achieved by assigning organizational responsibility to the local churches for the elementary level of education, to the local conferences for the secondary level, to the union conferences for the undergraduate college level, and to the General Conference for the graduate and professional level.

The arrangement seemed practical and wise and worked reasonably well for many years. Since World War II, however, educational advances nationally have indicated — in some ways dramatically — that this pattern of organization is no longer adequate. On the elementary and secondary school levels there must be a systematic program of consolidation, and on the college level there must be less attention to geographic boundaries and more attention to cooperation and academic statesmanship. How are suggestions for change received? They are stoutly resisted. But changes must come; and they will come.

A revolution in education in the United States has already begun. There will be no "coat holders" and "interested bystanders." Several prominent national educators suggest that it will be as significantly effective as the American or the French revolution. Adventist institutions of higher learning are faced with several alternatives:

1. To continue functioning as they are, academically and administratively. In time this would lead to cessation of operation of many.
2. To discontinue functioning on the college and university level. This seems inconceivable.
3. To accept federal and state funds in unrestricted amounts. This would abandon policies followed for decades.
4. To assess or tax all church members an additional ten to fifteen percent above the regular tithe.

The alternatives are not pleasing to hear, and, lacking an easier way, the church has thus far, by default, chosen the first option — a preservation of the status quo. But a new structure must be forthcoming. Those now in administrative positions will serve, at best perhaps, as Davids collecting the materials. Members of a new generation will then, as Solomons, build the new structure.
If, then, one of the greatest dangers facing the church and its people is that of intellectual stagnation and decay, of failure to respond creatively to change, what can be done to foster renewal?

No one knows for sure why some persons are capable of self-renewal and others are not. But there are important clues. For the person who is growing intellectually, the development of his own potentialities and the process of self-discovery never end. "Divine perfection is denied to human beings. But to wear out our lives in the pursuit of worthy though imperfectly attainable ideals is the essence of human dignity." But because the circumstances of our lives have never demanded them, the potentialities of most people have never been developed.

Applying himself to the exploration of the full range of his own potentialities is not something that the vital, growing person leaves to chance. It is something he pursues systematically, perhaps avidly, to the end of his days. He looks forward to the continual adventure of encounter between himself and the claims of life — not only the claims he happens onto, but also the claims he himself initiates.

One morning after having received her doctorate the day before, a former colleague appeared in my office and requested permission to take a refresher course at a nearby university. I am certain that for her the development of potentialities and the process of self-discovery will never end.

A self-renewing person makes things happen; he does not trust to "luck," "fortune," and "circumstances." He works, and works hard, at making things happen. He takes the extra course, spends Saturday night with the books instead of the boys, takes additional responsibility when others take it easy. (A graduate student from Sweden asked his professor, "What do you Americans mean by saying, when you part from one another, 'Take it easy'? Do you really mean for the other person to 'take it easy'?" Perhaps we do.)

The maxim "know thyself" — so ancient, so deceptively simple, so difficult to follow — is also basic to intellectual growth. One who has become a stranger to himself has lost the capacity for genuine growth.

"It is not only the most difficult thing to know oneself, but the most inconvenient one too." Man has always employed an enormous variety of clever devices for running away from himself. We keep ourselves so busy with "busy work," fill our lives with so many diversions, stuff our heads
with so many facts, involve ourselves with so many people, and cover so much ground, that we never take time to prove the fearful and wonderful world within. The truth of the matter is that we don't want to know ourselves, nor to live within ourselves. By middle life most of us are fugitives from ourselves.\(^8\)

One reason why younger people may learn more than the middle-aged is that they are more willing to risk, less eager to take refuge in a "consensus." By middle age most of us carry in our heads a tremendous catalogue of ideas we have no intention of trying again, because we tried them once and failed, or tried them once and succeeded less than our self-esteem demanded. But as Elbert Hubbard reminds us, "There is no failure except in no longer trying. There is no defeat except from within, no really insurmountable barrier save our own inherent weakness of purpose."\(^9\)

We pay a heavy price for our fear of failure. It is a powerful obstacle to self-development. It assures the progressive narrowing of the personality and prevents exploration and experimentation. There is no learning without some difficulty and fumbling. A person who wants to keep on learning must keep on risking failure — all his life. "No one ever drowned by falling into the water. He drowned only by remaining there." A prelude to overcoming this fear is the willingness to understand oneself.\(^10\)

V

Another characteristic of the intellectually growing person is initiative. The barriers that once hedged him in become the familiar boundaries that he traces and retraces as he grows older; getting beyond them requires extra drive, enthusiasm, and energy. An old Chinese proverb says, "Man must sit in chair with mouth open very, very long time for roast duck to fly in."

In some degree, initiative is a matter of sheer physical energy. No matter how intellectual or spiritual one's interests may be, there is an immensely important physical element in his capacity to learn, grow, recover from defeats, surmount obstacles, and live with vigor. Anyone interested in leading a creative life will have the deepest concern and respect for the marvelously intricate organism that he is.

Beyond maintaining good health, there is more that can be done. Everyone has noted the astonishing amounts of energy that seem available to those who enjoy or find meaning in what they do. Unless a person has great conviction about the value of what he is doing, he had better find something about which he can have such a conviction. Obviously not everyone can spend all of his time pursuing his deepest convictions; but, either in his
career or in his part-time avocation, every person can be involved in something about which he cares deeply.\textsuperscript{11}

The conventions and artificialities of life — to say nothing of habit, routine, and simple momentum — carry us so far from the sources of our interest and conviction that we need to follow the few basic lessons of relating to our own being. When Emerson said, "Once we had wooden chalices and golden priests; now we have golden chalices and wooden priests," he was concerned with the fetters that shackle the individual.\textsuperscript{12}

VI

A new generation of Adventists is not to be urged to stand a dreary watch over the ancient values, or to cherish ideals that are embalmed in the memory of old battles and ancestral deeds. It must look to the past, indeed — but there it must find truths valid for its own time and place. To look only to the past constitutes one of the greatest dangers to any movement or institution. Each new generation must fight its own battles, and older generations would do well to leave it alone. Each generation must apply itself to defining and solving the problems of its day and of its future in its own way. Its hope is to be ever plagued with the gift of dissatisfaction and discontent.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

This article is the substance of an address given at the Andrews University summer graduation (August 1969).

5 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 15.
11 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
The discarded tools of Doctor Neufeld's profession, dentistry, along with leftovers from everyone's anyday life, can become instruments of hobby. The mouth mirror, hypodermic syringe, spatula, occlusal plane, contra-angle, articulator, prophylaxis cup, anesthesia mask, forceps, and scissors of dentistry seem to go naturally with monkey wrench, pancake griddle, model-A gasoline gauge, gearshift knob, bicycle sprocket, and other oddments when this ingenious son of a Canadian blacksmith cuts loose in his studio with welding equipment and imagination. [EDITOR]
Smaller no doubt than a mustard seed that threw our father upon his face to laugh at the promise of an heir.

Upon the plains of Mamre maybe now a mustard seed that answered the Visitor’s question: "Is anything too hard for the Lord?"

Perhaps as big as Mount Moriah the faith that raised the trembling knife above the heart of his waiting boy.

What size the faith of God Who gave his Son for me?
Archimedes’ yearning for a lever long enough and a prop strong enough to enable him singlehandedly to move the world seems to be replicated by those who anxiously search for the one word that would be powerful enough to transport or transform all men. The perennial parade of respondents is usually led by those who rush forward, pushing to the borders of the ineffable, piously proffering the word God. A close scrutiny of the concomitant verbal qualifiers, however, reveals the anthropomorphic contraband which is so frequently freighted, through the vehicle of language, into the realm of the supernatural, there to be molded into gods that bear the unmistakable image of man. History’s graveyards are crowded with man-made gods. In the myriad contemporary voices calling themselves religious can be heard the clang of human cargo ascending to the nimbus regions where new gods are ever in the making.

Overtly more serene but followed by a vast motley crowd are those who would marshal behind the word love — a word shaded into many meanings and jaded by a contemporary moral abandonment — a panacean force that suddenly dissipates at the sight of pigment in another man’s skin or the probe of another man’s mind and finds its advocates crouching in their sheltered pews praying with a timorous arrogance, “Bless us four and no more.”

Hard on the heels of either of the above, or just as often commingling with them, are those who feel that money is the ultimate term. Money is a particularized form of “everything” and is intrinsically universalistic, since everything can have its monetary equivalent, its counterpart, in “price.”

In worship, men will put God’s name on their money and call it an act of piety. In its nature as a medium of exchange, money is essentially communicative; hence it is a technical counterpart of love. As a generalized abstraction, money introduces the principle of redemption — a payment by substitution or sacrifice. Money becomes a symbol of pseudoservice or even the desirable, more negotiable substitute for service.

To counter these Archimedean terms, Howe offers a requisite human experience, a personal encounter and involvement that he has chosen to label dialogue. Dialogue sees in man, every single man, a priceless uniqueness of essence and potentiality that it seeks to preserve and enhance. It meets every other person as an equal and every person loved becomes more himself. Dialogue (the personal encounter of man with man and man with God) makes men more receptive and responsive, shakes “them free of their conformity and makes them available for transformation” (p. 64).

Herein is the miracle of dialogue. It brings authentic persons into being.

According to Howe, "The purpose of dialogue is to bring the meanings that come
out of men's living in the world to a meeting of meanings that come out of the en-
counter between God and man in Christ. Men must bring their hopes and purposes,
their achievements and failures, their triumphs and their sins, what they are and
what they are not, and offer them as a part of their worship to the One who gave all
that he had in his love for man. The dialogue of worship thus conceived becomes the
dialogue of living; and the Church is just as much the Church when, in its members,
it stands at the work bench or sits in the office or plows in the field as when it kneels
before the altar" (p. 65).

An important contribution to the concept of education is Howe's eight-point de-
scription of the dialogical teacher who "respects the qualities and capacities of the
learner and his right and responsibility to become what only he can become" (p.
141). He seeks a dynamic church through a congregation in dialogue. "Such a con-
gregation, by participating in dialogical thinking and living, has regained for itself
the distinction of being a center of creative thought and action in its community, a
center for experimental living in relation to its community task" (p. 131).

Howe prophetically counters church clannishness with the challenge: "The time
may not be far distant when the laos, the chosen people of God, will have to eliminate
from its membership all 'club members,' whether ordained or unordained, in order
that it may be free to get on with the task given to it by its Lord. People who think of
the Church as their possession are the enemies of the Church and its mission in the
world. The relation is not one of proprietorship, but one in which the members regard
themselves as expendable, possessed by the Spirit, and, therefore, members of his
Body who would do what he would do in this generation" (p. 132).

To be truly human, to accomplish God's purpose in, through, and for humanity,
all men must participate wholly in the personal encounter called dialogue. Thus the
miracle of individual uniqueness, love's living embodiment, and God's abiding pres-
ence is confirmed in each authentic person.

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THE RELEVANCE OF PHYSICS
By Stanley L. Jaki
University of Chicago Press 1966 604 pp  $11.25

The name of this book suggested to me that the subject matter of *The Relevance of
Physics* would be similar to that of *Issues in Science and Religion*, by Ian Barbour
(reviewed by Fraser in the autumn 1969 issue of *SPECTRUM*). After I read the his-
torical section at the beginning, I skipped next to chapter ten, and my first judgment
of this author had to be revised. I found that Jaki presents, not another reasoned and
cautious development on how science, with its limitations, can participate in the for-
mulation of a theology of nature, but rather the idea that science and theology play
separate and distinct roles in the quest for understanding and that they fulfill different
needs. The attempts to combine the two in "natural theology" are described with considerable spice. For example:

For Derham and many others, the vigorously growing body of emerging science appeared indeed a goldmine of proofs pointing to the existence, goodness, and power of a Creator. Unfortunately, it took a long time to realize that many of the shiny bits were only fool's gold. In the meantime theologians and scientists were busy sealing that "holy alliance" between science and religion that extended at least in England well into the nineteenth century. The Continent followed suit, for a while at least, and saw the appearance of books that boasted of such titles as "theology of stones" and "theology of insects," to give only a little detail of a literature which bore witness not so much to God as to a pathetic absence of sobriety of mind.

Theologians, however, are to be blamed only in part. Scientists were no less enthusiastic in preparing fantastic mixtures of physics and sacred history. Halley, in a paper read before the Royal Society in 1694, explained the deluge by huge tidal waves that followed a near collision between a comet and the earth. Newton himself was not safe from indulging in and condoning similar extravaganzas [pp. 430, 431].

In chapter eight it appears that Jaki might be attempting to show that the relevance of physics is to be found in metaphysics. But chapter twelve does not support that viewpoint. Neither does the objective of this chapter seem to be selling good, stiff, up-to-date liberal-arts physics courses. However, publishing articles (in general and professional journals); viewing the human, trial-and-error nature of physics; and studying the history of physics are considered as means that might help bring about the humility that our society so much needs.

The book has an abundance of information on what physicists have thought about the ultimately small or large, the attainment of ultimate precision, biophysical problems, metaphysics, ethics, or theology (chapters four through ten, respectively). Until my memory improves, I will always refer to Jaki's name index before expounding on some scientist's view on the prospect of life on other worlds or of ethics in science.

Jaki treats a staggering total of material. His method (chapters four to ten) is that of one who would split a crystal on one plane, then put the halves together, and then split it on another plane, and then again. Each chapter recycles through the course of history. Because of this consecutive splitting on issues of metaphysics, ethics, and so on, some scientists figure in more than one chapter, and some issues appear more than once (for example, expansion of the universe, indeterminacy). Careful sorting has reduced this confusing aspect to almost zero, however. If Jaki could have done three men's work instead of two, he might have added other chapters between the first three, and the last two. Physics as a pure and/or applied science, physics and aesthetics, physics and government, for example, all seem to be relevant topics omitted.

Scientism occupies all of chapter eleven. Scientism is "the exploitation of a particular stage of science on behalf of dreams (about man and society) far surpassing the competence or range of scientific conclusions" (p. 473). Sarcasm is generous, particularly in regard to Comte:

Deep in his heart Comte was beset by fears. He was horrified at the prospect that further research and more precise measurements might one day play havoc with what he considered to be the final word in astronomy. He could not make a truce with that
ever restive drive in science, the quest for greater precision. Haunted by such fears, he could not restrain himself from making truly desperate utterances wholly alien to the spirit of scientific investigation. "Natural laws," he warned frantically, "could not remain rigorously compatible in any case with a too detailed investigation." He called overprecise measurements "incoherent or sterile," displaying only "childish curiosity stimulated by vain ambition," and he equated concern for greater precision "with an active disorganisation" of science [pp. 470, 471].

Although Jaki "overkills" Comte, his tone grows considerably more serious when he discusses physics in that form of scientism known as Marxism. The grim description of party domination of physics somewhat speeds over the period before 1947. He quotes from D. Joravsky:

Worshipping science, the Bolsheviks had to raise cries of crisis in science. To make dialectical materialism an effective fighting creed in a war against ideologically alien scientists, they had to renounce faith in it as an objective description of the way that scientists discover the natural order. The union of revolutionism and scientism (nauchnost'), which Lenin had described in 1894 as the chief power of attraction of Marxism, could hardly be maintained in the face of these contradictions. To believe in one part of their doctrine the Bolsheviks had increasingly to disbelieve another. At the maddening climax of most intense belief and disbelief they shut off further discussion, 'disarmed' their intellects (the phrase was a catchword of the great break), made their minds wax in the hands of the General Committee and the chief [p. 487].

Jaki comes close to an "error" in a very mild overstatement that matter waves are not a necessary model for explaining particle focussing (p. 109). A more serious matter is his ridicule of natural theology (proofs of God seen in nature). It is not that he disbelieves in the existence of God; he thinks that what one sees in nature is what one has already found on "more unchangeable grounds" (p. 457). Jaki believes it is wrong to illustrate or prove something religious from scientific findings, because these findings have changed in the past and therefore will in the future. This view ignores the enduring power of Christ's parables.

A knowledge of the limitations of physics may produce a humble effect (chapter twelve), but I believe it is unfortunate to destroy confidence in nature illustrations (chapter ten), for I find that these produce a reverent effect.

REFERENCE


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THE SECOND YEAR

As SPECTRUM enters its second year of publication, I am very grateful for the untiring efforts of the many who have worked unselfishly to help make this journal possible: the entire editorial staff, the consulting editors, the members of the board, those who wrote articles, and many others who counseled and encouraged us or who aided the journal financially. To maintain the level of work and to make steady growth during the coming months, SPECTRUM must indeed rely on the continued cooperative efforts of all.

As it addresses itself to the problems of our day, we hope that SPECTRUM can increase the range of interests, issues, and questions explored through thoughtful articles and reviews. In this issue is a symposium centered on the article on revelation by Bernard Ramm. There will be other articles on this important subject, with critical comments by other contributors, and we look forward to having more such symposiums.

In future issues we hope to present reviews of significant articles that have appeared in other periodicals; a section with brief quotes and notes from current publications; lists of new books that may interest and appeal to many readers; and an increasing amount and variety of poetry and art.

To attain all these objectives we need the continued interest and involvement of all friends of SPECTRUM. May God bless us in these efforts in 1970.

MOLLEURUS COUPERUS
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