

# Christian Aspects of Diplomacy:

## SOME CONCEPTUAL GUIDELINES

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America's role abroad puzzles the most astute observers. This paper, therefore, offers some suggestions for evaluating diplomatic conduct. Taken collectively the suggestions are *conceptual*, in the sense that stress is put on the intellectual assumptions that underlie policy decisions, and *prescriptive*, in the sense that I shall make some judgments and advance a point of view.

That the suggestions should have these characteristics is itself instructive. Fundamentalist Protestants are doctrinaire and nonspeculative. Their "truth," residing literally in depositories such as the Bible, is already extant, awaiting discovery but not formulation. Aside from its role in exegesis, mental effort rather than enriching the truth either does it positive violence or does not affect it one way or the other. As a student once wrote, "To Christians truth is both absolute and knowable. It is an unchanging goal held before all men of the past, present, and future. The duty of the religious person, then, is to reach this truth, and once he has it in his grasp, to close his eyes, grit his teeth, and hang on for dear life." But I hold that there are counterarguments that support the realm of thought, even if their elaboration would take us afield from the point of this paper.

Likewise, I throw off the mask of impartiality and disclose a viewpoint because driven to do so by the very nature of Christian education and of history itself. Here a digression cannot be avoided. Despite popular belief, Christian education is not experienced at its best when one takes a course in religion, attends a devotional, or meets a friendly teacher. Rather, Chris-

tian education, in its essence, is a classroom phenomenon consisting of the metamorphosis that occurs across the board when subject matter is ably handled by Christian teachers. The "mold of God in every department" is Ellen G. White's way of describing it.<sup>1</sup>

This metamorphosis results from a *learning process* through which students must eventually pass, and through which they will more readily pass when the teacher models it. The *process* by which fragmented, compartmentalized learning evolves into integrated knowledge consists of (1) becoming judgmental, not relativist; (2) becoming judgmental on the basis of theory which relates to, or is at least compatible with, one's general philosophy of life. The men of the Enlightenment prescribed for a defective society on the basis of a world view that was mechanistic, Newtonian, and holistic. In like manner, Christian education truly results when a student, after the model of his teacher, fashions judgments about an academic discipline by reference to a world view we normally call the Judeo-Christian heritage.

If self-disclosure is an integral part of Christian education, it is an inevitable feature of the historical profession. The historian's familiar claim to scientific accuracy is muted by the undeniable and now widely acknowledged reality that subject and object belong to the same category, that human beings who are complex and variable are studied by other human beings who are equally complex and variable, not by independent observers from another species. This problem of self-consciousness is no small one: it transforms history into a nearly biographical reflection of the historian himself, his point of view, and the environment in which he lives and writes. "Before you study the history," wrote Edward H. Carr, "study the historian. . . . Before you study the historian, study his historical and social environment."<sup>2</sup>

Because of its inescapable subjectivity, history is not a science even if it strives for scientific exactitude, raises quasi-scientific questions about man and his environment, and allows itself to be influenced by scientific hypotheses such as that of natural evolution. Impartiality is not attained by mere election to be impartial; that is hardly a valid option, the true choice being between conscious self-disclosure and unconscious self-disclosure.

The perspective here, then, is conceptual and prescriptive, and it is both of these things for compelling, if not unavoidable, reasons. I shall now define some Christian precepts that might be made the basis of deduction, and then identify the attributes of diplomacy that are deducible therefrom.

Christianity, considered in the broad, nonsectarian sense, contributes two things to the interpretation of our subject. In the first place, as Ernest Lefever shows, it offers a precise *form* which interpretive work should adopt.<sup>3</sup> That is, biblical religion is expressed in the distinct grammatical moods that are familiar to us in everyday usage. If we say, "It is imperative for you to attend class this morning," we are saying in effect, "You had better attend class" or "You ought to attend class." In the same way, the Bible refers repeatedly to the imperative "thou-shalt" or to the *ought*, as when it deals with the duties imposed on man by a merciful yet particular God.

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The declarative mood also appears in biblical and everyday use. Were we to say, "You should not attend class this morning because you are exhausted from a night on the town," we would be implying that what ought to be stems from an understanding of what is and not from mere desirability. Similarly, biblical religion declares who God is, what man is, and what God has done for man; and on the basis of such givenness it determines what is possible and what ought to be. In illustrating this realism Charles Burton Marshall notes the apostle Paul's reference to himself as childlike for having identified with a movement, earlier in life, that sought to establish an earthly kingdom fully reflective of God's will, without due regard for the contingencies that are given features of historical experience and life.<sup>4</sup>

Apart from inviting precision of thought through the use of, and careful distinction between, the imperative and declarative moods, Christianity presents, as a second major contribution to our subject, the *content* of the Bible which deals with the nature of man and God. Because most systematic philosophies in the Western tradition have begun with assumptions about man, it is not unusual to formulate our interpretation in the same way. As we do so, our notions about man might come from a variety of sources besides historical experience itself. John Herz takes his from Freudian psychology and other scientific discoveries of the late nineteenth century;<sup>5</sup> Edward M. Bennett derives his from the classical image of man;<sup>6</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau's picture seems to be rooted in the intensive secularity of our time.<sup>7</sup> It is to the Bible, the theological sourcebook of the Christian, that I shall turn for a portrayal of man that is both distinct and useful.

The biblical picture contrasts radically with the estimate of man as actually or potentially rational that predominated among writers of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and so decisively affected American thought.<sup>8</sup> Instead, it is conservative, pessimistic, and complex. Man

emerges from the biblical page as irrational, depraved, and corruptible. In the terms of the Old Testament, his "heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked."<sup>9</sup> In the New Testament, where the apostle Paul's realism expresses such deep pathos, we are told, "The good that I would I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I do. . . . I find [it to be] a law, that, when I would do good, evil is present with me."<sup>10</sup> Elsewhere we are informed that "all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God."<sup>11</sup> John the apostle laments that "men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil."<sup>12</sup>

Paraphrasing the biblical notions about men, Blaise Pascal wrote that "man is neither angel nor beast and his misery is that he who would act the angel acts the brute." In a better known statement, Pascal said, "Man would fain be great and sees that he is little; would fain be happy and sees that he is miserable; would fain be perfect and sees that he is full of imperfections."<sup>13</sup> Recent scholars have drawn the same conclusion. Man's tendency to disobey God, Lefever tells us, "is not imposed from without by a cruel destiny or by society, but springs from within — from human pride, inordinate self-regard and the inclination to pursue self-interest at the expense of the interests and rights of other men."<sup>14</sup> In Norman Graebner's view, "The Judeo-Christian ethic . . . has never taught men how to create a perfect world, but [only] how to live in one that maddeningly insists on being imperfect."<sup>15</sup> Morgenthau dismally concedes that "there is no escape from the evil of power, regardless of what one does. Whenever we act with reference to our fellow men, we must sin, and we must still sin when we refuse to act; for the refusal to be involved in the evil of action carries with it the breach of the obligation against the guilt in which the actor and the bystander, the oppressor and the oppressed, the murderer and his victim are inextricably enmeshed."<sup>16</sup>

Because free and unpredictable, the will of man precludes knowledge from becoming automatic virtue, but it also offers a partial exit from gloom. Human volition is the good that man possesses. Were he entirely corrupt in contrast to an exalted God, man could not freely choose his ultimate destination; yet the Bible clearly allows him that freedom. In a resolute denial of individual predestination John, the disciple of Jesus, depicts God as tendering salvation to "whosoever believeth in him."<sup>17</sup> Peter describes God as "not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance."<sup>18</sup> Paul and Timothy assume that God would "have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth."<sup>19</sup>

Continuing this exposition of the good in man, John Bennett reminds us

that man is created in the image of God and susceptible to redemption through Christ.<sup>20</sup> By admonishing man to love God wholly and to treat other men as brothers, the Bible assumes that man is capable of such behavior, or else it would violate its own axiom (mentioned earlier) of determining the *ought* in the light of the *is*. In short, man is complex because morally ambiguous. As Kenneth Thompson has written, “[He] indeed is his own most vexing problem, — for he is both good and evil, rational and compulsive, generous and grasping, compassionate and cruel, human and divine.”<sup>21</sup>

A seminal aspect of the Christian religion is its picture of God. God is ruler of the universe, so that in comparison to his power, nations need not delude themselves about *their* greatness. As the prophet Isaiah put it, “The nations are like a drop from the bucket, and are accounted as the dust on the scales. . . . It is he who sits above the circle of the earth, and its inhabitants are like grasshoppers.”<sup>22</sup> Being universal ruler and Lord of history, God holds in his hands the ultimate destiny of men and nations. Even if some of his other attributes elude finite comprehension, the scriptural God is not vague or ill-defined. He is a revealed Being who acted in history through Christ for the redemption of the world. In sum, we have in the Scriptures a God-figure who is definitely in control and far from wholly inscrutable.

The precise form of Christian discourse and the substantial amount of biblical data about God and man provide a foundation for interpreting American diplomacy. We shall now, by a process of deduction, bridge our notions about Christianity and our conceptualization of American diplomacy.<sup>23</sup>

#### THE ATTRIBUTES OF STATESMANSHIP

The form of discourse just described enjoins statesmen to distinguish between the *is* and the *ought* and to relate the latter explicitly to the former. Without precluding thought about ends that are merely desirable or logical, statesmen eschew the absolute imperative when it comes to decision-making, and favor the practical or derivative imperative. Going a step further, they establish as their first concern, prior to all else, the givenness of life, or what we might call reality. Rather than arrange the world to suit their policies, panaceas, and palliatives, they bring policy into conformity with world realities. They reject the tendency of intellectuals to think in *a priori* terms (i.e., in terms of theory rather than experience). Like students of medicine who know that research is related to human problems, statesmen do not separate experimentation from the actual bedside of practice. In

large degree, they are pragmatic, existential, and oriented toward the *is*.<sup>24</sup>

Because statesmen are keen observers of international realities and of the changing distributions of power and influence among nations, they are seldom amateurs, and scarcely aloof, ivory-tower philosophers. Like Harold Nicolson, the great British diplomat, and George F. Kennan, his American counterpart, statesmen are career men, practitioners well seasoned by exposure to all the realities of international behavior. With Senator J. William Fulbright, the astute critic of American foreign conduct at the present time, statesmen hold that "we must dare to think about 'unthinkable things,' because when things become 'unthinkable,' thinking stops and action becomes mindless." And with Fulbright they concur that "if we are to disabuse ourselves of old myths, and to act wisely and creatively upon the new realities of our time, we must think and talk about our problems with perfect freedom."<sup>25</sup>

When attentive to reality, statesmen encounter something logically necessitated by that content of Christianity which deals with man's nature. Because in that formulation man is mainly although not entirely corrupt and egotistic, and invariably tainted by original sin, his interaction with other men eludes rational behavior more often than it exemplifies it. Competition, lust for power, and endemic conflict are the norm, not the exception. This being true, power is decisive if anything is decisive, although one man's power is relative to, or curtailed by, that of his adversary. To extend this analysis to nations I cite as a second characteristic of statesmen their concentration on means or achievability, by which I refer both to the fact of *power* and to the fact of *limited* power. Statesmen recognize the relevance but also the limitation of power.

Certainly the scholars have not overlooked such facts. Herbert Butterfield wrote that "the hardest strokes of heaven fall in history upon those who imagine they can control things in a sovereign manner, as though they were kings of the earth, playing Providence not only for themselves but for the far future — reading out into the future with the wrong kind of farsightedness."<sup>26</sup> After reviewing the Truman Doctrine in 1951, Morgenthau warned Americans "to distinguish between what is desirable and what is possible" and between "what is desirable and what is essential."<sup>27</sup> Adlai Stevenson stated the point lucidly in a passage that bears quotation despite its length:

One of our hardest tasks — if we hope to conduct a successful foreign policy — is to learn a new habit of thought, a new attitude toward the problems of life itself. Fortitude, sobriety and patience as a prescription for combating intolerable evil are

cold porridge to Americans who yesterday tamed a continent and tipped the scales decisively in two world wars. Americans have always assumed, subconsciously, that all problems can be solved; that every story has a happy ending; that the application of enough energy and good will can make everything come out right. In view of our history, this assumption is natural enough. . . . So when we encounter a problem in foreign policy we naturally assume that it can be solved pretty quick, with enough drive, determination and red corpuscles. "The difficult we do immediately, the impossible takes a little longer." Just pour in enough man power, money and bulldozers, and we can lick it. If one diplomat can't come up with the answer, fire him and hire another — or better yet, hire ten. And if that doesn't solve it, some Americans conclude that there can only be one explanation: treason. . . . Impatience, arrogance and our faith in quick solutions [are problems of education and character for us]. As long as this habit of mind persists — and it is fundamentally an unchristian attitude, ignoring the pervasiveness of evil and loaded with arrogance and pride — we shall never be able to face our problems realistically. Our first job, it seems to me, is to school ourselves in cold-eyed humility; to recognize that our wisdom is imperfect and that our capabilities are limited.<sup>28</sup>

Our third characteristic emerges logically from the fact of limited power. Statesmen define their diplomatic objectives accordingly. Notwithstanding their ability to conceive ends that are unlimited, they defer all but the fraction of a nation's aims which squares with the strength-in-being and the potential strength of the state. As Marshall puts it, "Nothing comes more easily or does less good than the engaging pastime of thinking up bold and imaginative schemes for improvement in disregard of the means for realizing them."<sup>29</sup> In Walter Lippmann's view, "Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes . . . it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs."<sup>30</sup>

The end which statesmen serve is the nation. This "national interest," comprising the security of the nation and the welfare of its inhabitants, is tangible, concrete, limited, and achievable. To clarify further, I might note its position on the vertical scale of diplomatic objectives often resorted to. Subnational interests may operate, as when state autonomy belied the sovereignty of the nation under the Articles of Confederation. More commonly, supranational interests endear themselves to the diplomat, interests variously described as intangible, nebulous, unlimited, lofty, grandiose, transcendent, messianic, utopian, and idealistic. The flavor of such objectives was embodied in Woodrow Wilson's commitment to democratize the world (i.e., render it safe for democracy), in John Foster Dulles' pledge to liberate suppressed peoples behind the iron curtain in Eastern Europe, in Lyndon Johnson's preoccupation in Southeast Asia with such abstractions as law and order, Christianity, and democracy, and in Richard Nixon's pledge, made at Colorado Springs in June 1969, to create "a just world

order that will bring an end to war." For these Americans, and for many more, diplomacy served an ideology, not the nation. Its essence lay in the minds of men, rather than in any geographic, military, economic, or political entity. Looking beyond nations to individuals, this diplomatic outlook accented the common interest of mankind in peace, freedom, justice, self-government, and other such abstractions.<sup>31</sup>

So commonplace are such abstractions in the twentieth century that they obscure the fundamental modesty of the earlier American record, a record of substantial accomplishment and minimal failure. In 1821 the Greeks in the Turkish Empire precipitated a liberal-national revolution which eventuated in their independence. Americans rallied to their defense, invited our government to intervene, and got a lecture from Secretary of State John Quincy Adams which warrants extensive quotation, being one of the most memorable statements on foreign policy ever uttered in our history:

America . . . has abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when the conflict has been for principles to which she clings, as to the last vital drop that visits the heart. She has seen that probably for centuries to come, all the contests of that Acedama, the European world, will be contests of inveterate power and emerging right. Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. . . . She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom.<sup>32</sup>

President Fillmore received the same demand and gave the same reply during the Hungarian revolution of the 1840s as did Secretary of State William Seward during the Polish revolution of 1863. When the Cubans rebelled against Spain in 1895, President Cleveland refused to anchor American policy to sympathy and freedom. When his successor, McKinley, deviated from this pattern of modesty in the War of 1898, Senator Charles Sumner sought in vain to revive it:

Where is the statesmanship of all this [he asked]? If it is not an established rule of statecraft that a statesman should never impose any sacrifices on his people for anything but their own interests, then it is useless to study political philosophy any more, for this is the alphabet of it. . . . It belongs to [a statesman's] education to warn him that a policy of adventure and of gratuitous enterprise would be sure to entail embarrassments of some kind. . . . Prudence demands that we look ahead to see what we are about to do, and that we gauge the means at our disposal, if we do not want to bring calamity on ourselves and our children.<sup>33</sup>



On a horizontal spectrum, the political standard of thought, or the national interest, lies alongside such competing standards as legality and morality. In 1939, Russia's attack on Finland confronted France and England with two issues, one legal and the other political. Was the attack a legal violation of the League of Nations Covenant? Did it, by altering the balance of power, represent political encroachment on the security of France and England? The episode's legal violation of the Covenant could not be disputed, but its influence on Franco-British security, at least arguably, was subordinate to the threat which contemporary Germany posed to that security. Nevertheless, France and England allowed the fact of legal infraction to determine their political response. They enjoined the League to expel the Soviet Union and probably would have aided Finland against Russia had not Sweden refused to allow passage of Western troops en route to Finland. In this instance, law enjoyed higher priority in the determination of policy than did the national interest in political safety, for such a war would have seen France and England dangerously — because simultaneously — pitted against Germany and the Soviet Union.<sup>34</sup>

Ten years later another event showed how the balance could be tipped in favor of morality. The completion of Mao Tse-tung's conquest of China by 1949, and the resultant exile of Chiang Kai-shek to Formosa, posed two questions, one moral and the other political. Did the *de facto* Chinese government, and its turbulent ascent to power, accord with the moral principles of the Western world? Was it a political threat to the world balance of power? Although few could dispute the immoral or at least amoral nature of the Chinese government, the political significance of that government was, again, arguable. Nevertheless, Western governments determined diplomatic policy on the basis of moral rather than political considerations. There began (and has continued to date) a concerted diplomatic rebuff which antagonized the Chinese government, verified its ideological assumptions about capitalist hostility, and probably hardened, ominously for the future, its unwillingness to conciliate with the West.<sup>35</sup>

George Kennan tells us that diplomatic episodes often combine our alternatives to the political or national interest. Finding a close association of legal and moral considerations, he suggests:

Whoever says there is a law must of course be indignant against the law-breaker and feel a moral superiority to him. And when such indignation spills over into military contest, it knows no bounds short of the reduction of the law-breaker to the point of complete submissiveness — namely, unconditional surrender. It is a curious thing, but it is true, that the [legalistic-moralistic] approach to world affairs, rooted as it unquestionably is in a desire to do away with war and violence, makes violence

more enduring, more terrible, and more destructive to political stability than did the older motives of national interest.<sup>36</sup>

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This analysis is borne out by an episode that occurred in 1914. In August of that year, England went to war against Germany, right after the latter pushed into Belgium, whose neutrality Britain was pledged to guarantee. In justifying her action, England had two options, one political and the other legalistic-moralistic. The political justification, which was the one announced by Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, held that Britain aimed to prevent the control of the Low Countries by a hostile power because such control threatened her security. What mattered was the hostile intentions of Germany, not the violation of Belgium's neutrality *per se*. Had the violator been a nation other than Germany, without proven hostility, England, he believed, might not have intervened. The Foreign Secretary did *not* say, but might have said, that England acted militarily on account of Germany's *illegal* violation of Belgium's neutrality and *immoral* suppression of the Belgian people.

The point, then, of the third characteristic of statesmanship, is that motives or principles other than the national interest subvert the political sphere, whereas one ought to emancipate the field of international politics and reinstate its autonomy.<sup>37</sup> But where is the Christianity of all of this? Does the Bible justify defense of the national interest, as it justifies the other attributes of statesmen? The answer returns us to the major purpose of this paper, which is to demonstrate the utility of Christianity in a conceptualization of diplomacy.

First, the national interest, because it is fundamentally moral, aligns itself with the moral tone of Christianity. Advocating its priority over abstract moral and legal principles appears to imply that viable foreign policy lacks moral content altogether, and that Christianity is being brought to the defense of a position it resolutely denies, namely, a position which concentrates on power and force and even makes them its very hallmark. In reality, however, we are far from Machiavellian cynics concerned only with unrestrained power conflict, for morality abounds in the concept of national interest, defying either/or simplicity. When this precept refers to the safety of a nation, it is moral if one regards — as one must regard — the taking of life as immoral. Moreover, "safety of the nation" includes not only the citizenry, but also the moral values and ideals which a nation embodies. Nor should we overlook the fact that national interest implies recognition and appreciation of its operation on other nations, an attitude

tantamount to Christian altruism. Likewise, the avoidance of self-righteousness and extravagance in diplomacy closely parallels the Christian ideal of humility.

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Although it is usually true that policy serves either the nation or the nation's ideology, sometimes it serves both, in which case national interest and moral principle converge. The Marshall Plan aided hungry and war-racked people who had stood up against Germany, but it also bolstered Western Europe against the Communist takeover that potentially menaced our national interest. Likewise, England's "support" of the Jewish demand for a national homeland after World War I owed itself both to humanitarian sensitivities for an oppressed people and to the practical reality of French encroachment on England's Middle Eastern interests. Thus Robert Osgood writes that "the interdependence of universal ideals and national self-interest is simply a reflection of the fact that man has a moral sense as well as an ego and that both parts demand satisfaction. Consequently, nations act with the greatest consistency and stability when their actions are based upon a balance of egoism and idealism."<sup>38</sup> Felix Gilbert concurs: "The basic issue of the American attitude toward foreign policy [is] the tension between Idealism and Realism. Settled by men who looked for gain and by men who sought freedom, born into independence in a century of enlightened thinking and of power politics, America has wavered in her foreign policy between Idealism and Realism, and her great historical moments have occurred when both were combined."<sup>39</sup>

The national interest is Christian because moral, but especially because biblical. It is a logical outgrowth of the biblical portrayal of man. Being a party to power struggle despite his own limitations or because of them, man concentrates, as we have seen, on the achievability of his ends and on the viable fraction of the ends he conceives.

But the national interest is equally compatible with Christianity's picture of God. A clearly defined deity like the God-figure cannot be brought to our side and posited as the basis for unlimited means, as is so often the case with those who advocate objectives other than the national interest. Were God vague and ill-defined, John Bennett argues, "it would not be too difficult to convince ourselves that a provident Almighty was on our side. An unrevealed God can be made over in one's own image. But God revealed in Christ, who acted in Christ for the redemption of the whole world, who wills the welfare of each nation as part of the world that he loves, who transcends all nations in a way that he keeps all their ideals and achievements and ideologies under judgment — God so understood is the

ultimate perspective from which we should view our own nation among the nations."<sup>40</sup>

Just as God, the defined Being discourages extravagant behavior in the belief that he is on our side, so also God, the ruler of the universe, reminds nations that they are finite. In contrast to his omnipotence, nations are mere drops in a bucket, dust on the scales, weaklings like grasshoppers. They are amiss and a spectacle before the world except as modesty governs what they do.

To conclude, this interpretation of American diplomacy is conceptual, prescriptive, and Christian. It is the last because (1) from Christianity as expressed in biblical language we derive the importance of reality or the givenness of life; (2) from the content of Christianity about man we deduce our stress on limited means; and (3) from its content about man, but especially about God, we find our concomitant emphasis on limited ends.

This approach to diplomacy, which for simplicity may be called the realist's approach,<sup>41</sup> describes and admonishes in a manner identical to a statement made by Senator Fulbright: "The inconstancy of American foreign policy is not an accident but an expression of two distinct sides of the American character. Both are characterized by a kind of moralism, but one is the morality of decent instincts tempered by the knowledge of human imperfection and the other is the morality of absolute self-assurance fired by the crusading spirit. . . . We are not God's chosen saviour of mankind but only one of mankind's more successful and fortunate branches, endowed by our Creator with about the same capacity for good and evil, no more or less, than the rest of humanity."<sup>42</sup>

Such modesty, I submit, is the quintessence of viable diplomacy, of statesmanship, and of the Christian ethos.

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- 2 EDWARD HALLETT CARR, *What Is History?* first American edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1962), p. 54.
- 3 ERNEST LEFEVER, *Ethics and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Meridian Books 1957), pp. 17-21.
- 4 CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL, *The Limits of Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1968), p. 127.
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- 8 Of many relevant titles I cite only two: NORMAN A. GRAEBNER (editor), *Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press 1964) and DAVID W. MINAR, *Ideas and Politics: the American Experience* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press 1964).
- 9 Jeremiah 17:9.
- 10 Romans 7:19, 21.
- 11 Romans 3:23; 5:12.
- 12 John 3:19.
- 13 The question of human nature is discussed at length in Pascal's *Pensées*, as collected in *Oeuvres Complètes*, LOUIS LAFUMA, editor (New York: The Macmillan Company 1963), pp. 502-518. Pascal is quoted in MORGENTHAU, p. 202, and in KENNETH W. THOMPSON, *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: An American Approach to Foreign Policy* (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1960), p. 57.
- 14 LEFEVER, p. 19.
- 15 Quoted in BENNETT, p. 24.
- 16 MORGENTHAU, pp. 201-202.
- 17 John 3:16.
- 18 2 Peter 3:9.
- 19 1 Timothy 2:4.
- 20 JOHN C. BENNETT, *Foreign Policy in Christian Perspective: Twentieth Century Approaches and Problems* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1966), p. 41. See also Genesis 1:26.
- 21 KENNETH W. THOMPSON, *The Moral Issue in Statecraft* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press 1966), p. 64.
- 22 Isaiah 40:15, 22. Revised Standard Version.
- 23 Some clarification will be helpful at this point. First, I chose to dichotomize Christian and diplomatic notions thus far in the paper rather than to deduce behavioral guidelines from each religious idea as enumerated. My reason is that the three statesmanlike qualities to be described in the ensuing portion of the paper are not only deducible from Christianity but also logically related one to another, a harmony I thought it wise to preserve. Second, I do not hold that foreign policies compliant with these statesmanlike qualities will be successful foreign policies, only that their chance for success will be greater because of such compliance. Third, the phrase "process of deduction" should not imply a sequence which necessarily occurred in my own experience. As far as I am concerned, Christianity and diplomacy have probably been related reciprocally rather than sequentially. Fourth, it is not proposed here that the student should concern himself with a diplomat's moral or Christian commitment, but only that Christianity should undergird the criteria used in judging actual diplomatic behavior. Unfortunately, the religiosity and moral uprightness of a diplomat is no assurance that he will pursue a realistic course of action.
- 24 This, of course, is the thrust of MORGENTHAU and others of like mind. See his *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1962 edition). Situation ethics, particularly when defined as methodology, represents an application of such realism to fields other than diplomacy. See, for instance, JACK W. PROVONSHA, An Ethic of Responsibility, *Spectrum* 1, 5-13 (spring 1969).

- 25 J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, *Old Myths and New Realities and Other Commentaries* (New York: Random House 1964), p. 46.
- 26 Quoted in MARSHALL, p. 105.
- 27 MORGENTHAU, *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*, first edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1951), p. 117.
- 28 ADLAI STEVENSON, *Call to Greatness* (New York: Atheneum 1962), pp. 93-96.
- 29 MARSHALL, p. 12.
- 30 WALTER LIPPMANN, *U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company 1943), p. 7.
- 31 GRAEBNER, p. viii. Inevitably and peculiarly, these ostensibly "common" interests resemble America's own value system in a manner which MORGENTHAU in *Politics Among Nations* calls "nationalistic universalism" and defines as "the tendency of individual nations to endow their particular national systems of ethics with universal validity" (p. 253).
- 32 Quoted in GRAEBNER (editor), *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company 1961), pp. 7-8.
- 33 Quoted in GRAEBNER, *Ideas and Diplomacy*, p. 366.
- 34 MORGENTHAU, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 12.
- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 36 GEORGE F. KENNAN, *American Diplomacy: 1900-1950* (New York: New American Library 1951), p. 87. The application of this principle to British diplomacy in 1914 appears in MORGENTHAU, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 13-14.
- 37 *Ibid.* (MORGENTHAU), pp. 14-15.
- 38 ROBERT E. OSGOOD, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century* (University of Chicago Press 1953), p. 17.
- 39 FELIX GILBERT, *The Beginnings of American Foreign Policy: To the Farewell Address* (New York: Harper and Row 1961), p. 136.
- 40 BENNETT, pp. 36-37.
- 41 OSGOOD clarifies the diplomatic terminology by identifying "realists" and "utopians" in the realm of the *is*, and "egotists" and "idealists" in the realm of the *ought* (pp. 7-10).
- 42 FULBRIGHT, *The Arrogance of Power* (New York: Random House 1966), pp. 245-246.