

SPECTRUM

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2

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SPECTRUM

CONTENTS

ALLAN W. ANDERSON	5	Reason and Revelation in Genesis 1-3
JOHN DAVID GRIFFITH	13	A Portfolio (photographs)

CHRISTIANITY AND PUBLIC POLICY:

REO M. CHRISTENSON	23	The Church and Public Policy
GARY M. ROSS	29	Christian Aspects of Diplomacy
FREDERICK G. HOYT	43	The Dehumanizing Effects of War
MARTIN D. TURNER	55	Project Whitecoat

POETRY:

C. A. OLIPHANT	4	What Will Be Remembered after April?
MAX GORDON PHILLIPS	54	In Michigan in Appletime

AN ADVENTIST LAW SCHOOL?

JOHN JERRY WILEY	71	No!
RICHARD B. LEWIS	79	Quantity or Quality?

REVIEWS:

GARY LAND	81	History from an Adventist Perspective
ERIC ANDERSON	85	Recent Christian Religious Wars
BENTON M. STIDD	87	How Is Earth History Revealed?
	92	Recent Books by Adventist Publishers
	93	Letters
	95	Notes on Contributors

What Will Be Remembered after April?

C. A. OLIPHANT

4

What will be remembered after April's tenderness
And May the month of chrysanthemums is past,
When ardorless December lays a white caress
Of snow upon the earth, and that last,
That final day allotted man gathers gloom?
Will man lay him down in gray death's shade
A broken clod uncomprehending doom,
Defeated in the end and made afraid,
Know nothing but to curse his lot
With his last expiring breath,
And the Creatures of the future, questioning what
Man was, be able only to say, "He had something to do with death"?
Or will the splendid music of the race
Throb into memory and man go singing to his fate?
Will some noble phrase then lend him grace
To walk unbowed through oblivion's gate
And eternity record of the common clod:
"He was but a little less than God."

Reason and Revelation in Genesis 1-3

5

ALLAN W. ANDERSON

This essay has grown out of a continuing concern for the health of present-day education. Our classrooms are still afflicted with the disease of Cartesianism: it remains the general belief that teaching and learning properly begin with the question of thought rather than with existence — that is, of what is the case. The notion persists that there are infinite conceptual possibilities open to reason. Thus one is encouraged never to make up his mind about anything, since he is always appropriating conceptually the possible.

Yet the case is quite other for Everyman. He has a finite number of days in which to work out his salvation with fear and trembling. The sophistry of understanding seeking faith instead of faith seeking understanding inverts the natural order (Romans 1:18-20).

Revelation is a datum from which one must begin, and so the adequate teacher does not devote himself to an endless exercise in trying to convince the student of what is the case. Unless the student has already consented to that, education as such cannot begin. The teacher ought not try to coerce or seduce the student into the truth. Rather he must simply witness to it.

Any competent thinker must apprehend that existence has certain basic structures. This fundamental insight disposes him to *believe* that the world is essentially a cosmos and not a chaos; and from this he infers that the world is an intelligible order — with the reservation that his finite mind is unable to grasp this order in every respect. Intellect, when not forced to serve a perverse will and appetite, cannot let him down in this primary affirmation. Intellect is coerced by truth. Unless corrupted by other faculties, intellect must receive what is the case, namely, what exists. On this account,

given normal intelligence, and all other factors being equal, if one still cannot receive truth it is because he *will* not. Thus Christianity has always asserted that sin lies first in the will and only consequentially in the understanding.

The religious thinker working within the Western tradition must ask whether the belief that the world is an intelligible order conforms to biblical thought. The answer to this is found clearly, simply, yet profoundly in Genesis, appropriately in the first three chapters of the first of the books entitled the Books of Moses.

The generic traits of existence are three, and these are expressed in polar structure: (1) the infinite and finite, (2) the eternal and temporal, (3) freedom and necessity. It is helpful to follow this scriptural account in the order in which it unfolds, and this will require that the infinite and finite be taken up first.

6

I

The story of Creation in Genesis one is distinguished, among other things, for presenting creation in her radiance. The overwhelming emphasis is on form. The bounds of every creature "after its kind" are set. The story is a hymn to divinely ordered limit, not, as some have thought, a paean to progress. A serial progression there is, from the first creature called into being, namely, light, to the acme of creation, man. But the order is essentially qualitative, not quantitative. There is no endless proliferation and diffusion. Creation is marked clearly by a beginning and a term, an origin and a consummation. The series of creatures called into being begins with light, the simple and maximally diffuse, and concludes with man, the representatively comprehensive and maximally combined.

Since no creature has constituted itself primordially, everything is bound to express its dependent nature: even procreatively, each creature produces "after his kind." The radical point here has nothing to do with arguments against secular biological theory. It is concerned in something far more fundamental, namely, the "nature" of the creature as such. Thus Saint Paul speaks of God who calls things which are not yet in existence as though they already were (Romans 4:17). The creature bounded by the Boundless, created from nothing, has no self-sufficient being from itself nor any in the divine essence, for God was under no necessity whatever to create. Creation is simply a free act of God's will and not a work of his nature. Since creation has undergone passage from not-being into being, it cannot be coeternal with God. The ontological limits of the creature are given to it in advance by power infinitely and qualitatively other than the creature's own. This re-

quires the creature to occupy a station in the hierarchy of creation — a position which it is powerless to alter in the slightest degree, for it has no resources by which to constitute itself, as such, in being.

Where, then, does Genesis one locate *man* in the order of creation? Like every other creature, man is bounded on the one hand by his origin, his beginning, and on the other by his consummation, his proper end. He is essentially distinguished from other creatures in that only he is created directly in the image of God. He is functionally distinguished from them as their divinely commissioned ruler (verse 28). Though created as the consummation of the finite order, he remains bounded by the Boundless. Made in the image of God, man has the formal condition of freedom, the faculty of choice; and the content of that image is man's participation by grace in the divine life (2 Peter 1:4); yet neither of these gifts can assimilate him to the divine essence. He is placed between two orders, the divine and the creaturely, with a vocational responsibility toward both. Archetypally he is a cosmic sacrifice, the one whose role is to mediate the created order toward God and the divine energies toward the creature. Christianity holds that this divine-human office has been historically accomplished in the life of Christ Jesus and has been given a definite statement in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

That man so stationed in the world has nonetheless no power primordial-ly to constitute himself in the world does not give him license to conclude that reason has no adequate role to play in this recognition. On the contrary, the comprehensive and magnificent structure of the vision in Genesis one is precisely the point from which reason must make her adequate journey as the handmaiden who accompanies faith.

We must first believe, so that we may come to understand — since in duly ordering priorities among activities of the spiritual life faith outranks understanding. But in man, faith is never constitutionally independent of the understanding. How could it be otherwise when in the first and great commandment we are commanded to love the Lord our God with all our *mind* (Mark 12:30)?

Clearly, then, Scripture teaches unequivocally that the world is a cosmos, not a chaos, and further commands us to believe it — that is, to consent to it as the case, without a conclusive demonstration of that, both in advance and in every respect. If one will make such a radical act of trust, of belief, he will come to understand his station in the world and will not be at a loss to answer God's first question to man: "Adam, where art thou?" He will know.

II

It is one thing to discover the truth of Genesis one but quite another to accept it. Already, pressing forward relentlessly, comes now the second act in the cosmic drama. Genesis two confronts man with the question: Will you abide in the Abiding?

Genesis two brings into the foreground man's relation to the next basic structure of existence, namely, that of the eternal and the temporal. Whereas Genesis one locates man in Power and covers him with the Almighty, the succeeding story of Creation situates man within Law and shows him subject to the divine Sovereignty. God is called in this chapter the *Lord* God. The cosmic structural splendor and benevolent amplitude of the first chapter are much in the background in this one. Death is spoken of for the first time. Emphasis on station is replaced by concern for quality of passage; and, with that shift in scene, world yields the stage to soul and cosmos to psyche.

Genesis two has nothing in it of the aesthetic optimism so characteristic of the first chapter, where the goodness of things refers to their fitness within an organic whole. Yet in both chapters, man's task is commanded and clearly described. A careful reading of them should dispel for all time the naive notion that some passively paradisaical utopia constituted man's primordial environment. From the beginning, man has been made for activity — for ruling, filling, and subduing the earth (1:28) and for guarding and cultivating the Garden (2:15).

Three primary events in chapter two point up directly man's *inwardness*: (1) the Lord God's prohibition (verse 17), (2) man's naming every living creature (verse 19), and (3) the making of woman from a rib taken out of man (verses 21-22).

1. *The prohibition.* This is the Creation story's central event for grounding an adequate grasp of the human condition. It interrupts radically the immediacy of the communion between God and man and actualizes instantly for man the infinite qualitative distance between the Creator and creature, the Sovereign and subject. The occasion for human despair, for *angst*, is fully present. But an occasion for dysfunction does not coerce it; and precisely on that account classical theology has always insisted that man ought not to have disobeyed the divine prohibition.

How shall we explain man's sinful response to the divinely created occasion for that sin? We do so by recognizing that the *possibility* of evil is the condition upon which finite good must freely actualize itself, within the limits of finite freedom. The possibility of evil is implicit in the divine

prohibition, and this possibility lies in the nothing, the negative principle in created being. This principle must itself be negated consciously, *on the instant* it is consciously encountered, or right action will not be actualized at all. There is no need for reason to prove or explain the possibility of evil, since it is a principle, not a conclusion.

Contemporary theology (Tillich, for example) has misguidedly attempted to explain the possibility of evil by claiming that there is a point in which Creation and the Fall coincide — thus making actualized creation and estranged existence identical. No interpretation could be more disastrous for an understanding of the relation between grace and free will. Revelation and not reason must help us here. Creation and the Fall are not coincident. Rather, the coincidence is between grace and human freedom (Philippians 2:13). Neither determines the other. They cooperate in a union of two wills, the divine and the human. There is only one adequate human embodiment of this mystery — the sacramental life of loving prayer in which one abides always in God's love and God abides in him, so that in this respect, as God is, so are we in this world (1 John 4:16-17).

What could be more conspicuous by its absence from Genesis two than any mention whatever of man's prayerful response in trust to that prohibition? Precisely at this point man should have come of age. Clearly, he did not because he would not. And Genesis three is not far off.

2. *Man's naming every living creature.* This event follows immediately upon the prohibition. God brought the creatures to man "and whatever the man called every living creature, that was its name" (verse 19). The power of intellect to abstract adequately the essence of another creature is clearly implied here. There is no following statement to the effect that man misnamed any, some, or all of those God brought to him. Ancient man understood that a name signifies its bearer's nature or essential power. Both the activity and the mystery of language are set forth in this text.

Language offers man the possibility of comprehending the Law of his own station in Creation. Man's language not only marks out space humanly but halts the mindless transition from past to present, and from present to future. The name of a thing abides. It cannot be reduced to the temporal trajectory and numberless accidents of a thing's career. Language discloses the signature of the Abiding both within and without all those things which are forever coming to be and passing away.

Man undertakes the task of naming creatures. He does so prior to the Fall. This reveals a responsible human consciousness already active *prior* to the Fall. Contemporary theologians, philosophers, and psychoanalysts

who interpret the Fall honorifically as the necessary prelude to free man from the prison of dreaming innocence seem not to have attended closely to the text nor to have considered the moral significance of language.

3. *The making of woman from the rib of man.* The creation of man is not complete until woman is brought forth. The other creatures, though named by man, are necessary but not sufficient for the functional objectification of himself. Without woman man would have remained a prisoner within his own subjectivity.

The gift of language and the bisexual structure of man bring his consciousness to functional maturity. The academically popular alternative to this interpretation presupposes that man's consciousness could not mature without his first asserting his finite freedom over against his Creator, that is, man required willingly to disorder his relation to God and the cosmos or remain forever in an arrested development.

On the contrary, it is clear that God himself undertook to initiate and bear first that psychological distance necessary between any two or more beings if they are to realize either friendship or estrangement. Otherwise, how shall we account for (1) the Creator's initiating the prohibition followed by (2) his solicitude in observing that it is not good for man to be alone and (3) his undertaking next to find and then make a companion for the one who is now alone? In each instance the initiative is God's. The psychological distance remains — as it must, if man is to go on growing as a person — but it is brought to functional use as the necessary condition for actualizing communion between friends or estrangement between aliens. There is no basis whatever in the story to support the notion that man had deliberately to make himself a stranger in the world in order to achieve a greater good.

When woman is presented to him, man experiences the company of his own kind, and the first rudiment of human sociality. At this point the developing cosmic social structure includes (1) God, (2) man as completed, and (3) other finite creatures. However, full social intercourse has not yet been actualized. Company has been established. Society, as the ordered reciprocal activity between at least three persons, has still to be presented.

III

Genesis three begins with an astonishing event. Man is directly addressed by his creaturely environment through the initiative of the serpent — itself a wild, not a domestic, creature. The creature speaks first, and to woman. There is nothing inherently wrong with the serpent's first addressing hu-

mankind. It is one of the essential features of the world that things address man in their own way. But man is responsible for answering things correctly, that is, in full awareness of his vocational dignity and his own creaturely limit. The drama of the social and personal encounter between man as a whole and his environment introduces the religious significance of the third structure of existence, freedom and necessity.

The stable relation between God the Unchanging (James 1:17) and the creature as mutable (2 Corinthians 3:18) is presented unequivocally in the story of the Fall of man. Finite freedom is actualized as a strict unity of possibility and necessity. It consists in the capacity to choose freely and to imagine a possibility for itself and others. Such an imagined possibility may or may not conform to the inner necessity of the human creature itself. Human imagination, if so disordered by the will, can disregard the essential creaturely limit in human being or vocation or both.

The woman falls through choosing to actualize sheer fantasy (Genesis 3:6). Like every creature, she is suspended between the inner necessity of her nature and the lure of appetite. As human she conjures with imagination a possibility made plausible by belief in the serpent's declaration of God's alleged deception and vulnerability. She has to choose between two conflicting beliefs; either she believes God obediently or the serpent opportunistically.

This introduces what for our time is a staggering and unwelcome thought: there are just some things that in the practical order ought not to be known. What are they? Whatever things are inimical to right action at the time, such as the actualized consequences of a wrong action which ought not to be taken. Finitude cannot have it both ways in the same place, at the same time, with the same person, in the same way, toward the same end.

The woman chooses to actualize her fantasy rather than, for the love and sake of God, to hold obediently to her necessary creaturely limit. There remains always one potentiality that we should never actualize — no, not to all eternity. This is another unwelcome thought for our time during which so many are bent on the notion that man is a bundle of potentialities driving toward their actualization. It is fatally overlooked that there is a potentiality in us that must be negated rather than realized.

What is the movement required of the human creature when tempted to nihilate freely the divine imperative? It is a double movement, a double negation which consists in our refusal to refuse the divine will. This double movement would be unnecessary had we primordially the power to create

the good by divine fiat. Mysteriously, however, we possess the initiative for withdrawing into the nothing from which we were called into being. We must not give ourselves airs that exercising that initiative frustrates the will of God, as Creator. Yet it does indeed frustrate our conscious communion with God and so destroys our realizing our divine-human destiny.

This freely willed failure to attend singlemindedly to the divine imperative, this refusal to "wait upon God," actualizes the nothing by corrupting from the human side the relationship between creature and Creator. The demonic suffering which this entails causes us to recognize evil not only as a privation but also as positive. "Something" which is no-thing then erodes the otherwise glorious passage of being. Maritain puts this well in commenting on John 15:5, "'For without me, you can do nothing;' which is to say, 'Without me you can make that thing which is nothing.'"

12

Sartre says that man's freedom consists in his power to say No. Unfortunately Sartre does not go on to say that man is under primordial obligation to say, by grace, No to his own No. This is the double negation available to the human creature by which he obeys the necessary limit within himself and becomes established in the freedom of the children of God.

When one not only "sees" this changeless relation between the Unchanging and the mutable but also consents to it as the case eternally (1 Peter 1:25), he will, like Job, repent. He will begin modestly to make his return to the beginning of beginnings; and will not vainly take flight into the endless vagaries of thought which when ungrounded on right belief soon loses the very intelligibility by which the human mind is graced.

Only such a penitent comes finally to be at home in the world. On the instant he confesses his belief and renounces all pretensions to supersede his Creator, behold, he is granted the vision of an intelligible world in which he finds his place, his passage, and his consummation.

a portfolio


JOHN DAVID GRIFFITH

We can never have enough of nature. We must be refreshed by the sight of inexhaustible vigor . . . the wilderness with its living and decaying trees, the thunder cloud, and the rain which lasts three weeks and produces freshets. We need to witness our own limits transgressed, and some life pasturing freely where we never wander.

HENRY DAVID THOREAU

**A lonely clearing
a little field of corn by the streamside
a roof under spared trees**

ROBINSON JEFFERS



Few come to the woods to see
how the pine lives and grows
and spires, lifting its
evergreen arms to the light
to see its perfect success


HENRY DAVID THOREAU



**... rocky strength and permanence
combined with beauty of plants
frail and fine and evanescent; water
descending in thunder, and the same
water gliding through meadows
and groves in gentlest beauty**

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In this fresh evening
each blade and leaf looks
as if it had been dipped
in an icy liquid greenness

HENRY DAVID THOREAU



A PORTFOLIO BY JOHN DAVID GRIFFITH

The Church and Public Policy

REO M. CHRISTENSON

23

What should be the attitude of the church — and of the Christian — toward the great problems of our time? The problems of racial conflict, poverty, environmental pollution, crime, war, underdeveloped countries, population control, etc.? Should the church member take an active interest in public policies that seek to ameliorate economic and social conditions detrimental to human welfare and dignity? Or is his responsibility fully met when he has helped bring Christ to the world and when he manifests love toward those he meets each day? Does the imminence of Christ's return suggest that active concern with public policy is inappropriate to a Christian whose priorities are in proper order?

Most members of the church would probably endorse the latter position. They regard the world as inevitably headed on a downward course, believe that anything that distracts attention from spreading the gospel is a snare of Satan, and are convinced that the path the church has followed is the only path consistent with the true faith. Perhaps they are correct — but then again perhaps they are not.

Any assumption that the church should direct its attention only to the spiritual health of mankind immediately confronts the fact that the church *has* concerned itself with men's physical condition since its inception. For decades the church has sponsored programs that minister to men's material needs. Nor can it be said that the church has done this solely because such a ministry provides an opening wedge for more effective evangelism — since the church has also supported legislation that restricts the sale of alcoholic beverages and curbs cigarette advertising, and it applauds members of the church who are prominently engaged in supporting such legislation.

When the church carries forward educational efforts warning against

destructive health habits, it can be argued that this creates goodwill and a milieu more favorable to its spiritual efforts. But when it backs legislative measures having the same objective, this justification applies no more than if the church advocated legislation against racial discrimination, against poverty amidst affluence, and against pollution. Are not these evils much more destructive than bad health habits? Thus it cannot be logically argued that increased concern for legislation promoting men's physical, mental, or emotional welfare is incompatible with accepted church practices.

The position herein taken is that Christian principles should be applied in every phase and on all planes of human experience — that the Christian's obligation has a broader sweep than is usually associated with it by most church members.

I

What principles do I have in mind? Four, primarily.

The *first* is implicitly rather than explicitly identified with the Christian faith: the principle that sufficient individual freedom should be guaranteed by government to enable men to pursue their legitimate spiritual and secular interests. This principle has long been associated with the concept of the dignity and importance of the individual — a concept to which Christianity has made a major contribution.

The *second* is that in a world in which the rich, the aggressive, and the clever have a disproportionate share of life's benefits, the welfare of the poor, the despised, and the downtrodden deserves special consideration. The writings of the latter Old Testament prophets as well as the example of Christ eloquently attest to the biblical nature of this attitude.

The *third* is that, since God has equal regard for all men, regardless of race or color, we should be likewise in our private and collective lives. The life of Christ and the preaching of Paul amply vindicate the Christian character of this principle.

Finally, war is a morally repugnant and an ineffective means of settling national conflicts.

The thesis being advanced rests largely on the following propositions. If we want to sustain democratic freedom for ourselves, we should seek to sustain it for others. If the individual Christian should be especially solicitous of the unfortunate, public policy should do likewise. If racial discrimination is wrong in our private and church affairs, it should be opposed in public affairs. Finally, if it is desirable for the individual Christian to relieve human distress, it is even more appropriate for him to prevent such distress.

Specifically, it is a more intelligent act of lovingkindness to help a jobless man find a job, or obtain job training so he can support his family, than to bring him food baskets. (The latter have their place, of course.) The former act not only helps supply the man's physical needs but also enables him to maintain the dignity and self-respect that charity does not and cannot provide. Again, if it is desirable for the individual Christian to act in this more enlightened fashion, it is equally appropriate for public policy to promote full employment, with the enthusiastic support and encouragement of practicing Christians. "Do unto others" is a wise basis for public policy as well as for private behavior. Last, war simply cannot be squared with the Sermon on the Mount.

Is there a persuasive reason why the Christian should not attempt to apply Christian principles to every activity in which he participates, to give them the widest possible reach? Unless the answer, incredibly, is negative, the Christian would seem to bear the responsibility not only for acting on Christian tenets in his private life but also of acting on them in his role as citizen. And this means that he should seek to determine what policies best incorporate those tenets and which candidates for public office are most likely to support them.

II

Is it all rather hopeless, since a general deterioration of individual and collective behavior lies prophetically before us? Certainly there are ample grounds for pessimism concerning the future of our society and our world. Yet it is entirely possible that the situation that has existed during the last century will persist for a considerable time — that is, conditions will improve in some respects and worsen in others.

It can hardly be denied that public morality has made some progress in the past hundred years — in the treatment of the mentally deranged, in improved prison conditions, in protective legislation for the Negro, in public health and other services for the poor, in the treatment of conscientious objectors, in the replacement of the spoils system with civil service, and in numerous other ways.

At the same time, few Christians would deny that Western civilization has seriously retrogressed in terms of the prevalence of religious faith, in the perversion of the faith which remains, in the moral nihilism and chaos which abounds, and in the general decay of private morals. In the most fundamental sense, Western man's spiritual well-being seems to be declining, but amidst the decline men have somehow managed to adopt more

humane policies in certain areas. There is no compelling reason to believe that this paradox will not continue for years to come. In any case, it is the Christian's responsibility to help his fellow men in every possible way, whatever the prospects for success may be.

Will the church member's interests and energies be diverted from more pressing matters — the salvation of souls — to less pressing matters, such as the reduction of personal indignities and physical suffering? This is not a danger that can be cavalierly dismissed. In fact, it can be cogently argued that the modern churches have grievously erred in directing their attention almost exclusively to social work and social legislation while ignoring the emphasis on individual salvation that unquestionably is central to New Testament teaching. Even so, there is a position on the continuum somewhere between total absorption in social legislation and total indifference to it which most adequately meets Christian premises.

It is not being argued that the church should redirect its major efforts toward political, economic, and social reforms; that would be a grave mistake. But the church could make clear that it endorses certain general principles without endorsing specific political means for implementing those principles.

That is, the church could make clear its staunch support of legislation intelligently designed to reduce racial discrimination — but without approving a particular approach or a particular bill. It could make clear its sympathy for legislative efforts to help the poor and the unfortunate — without taking a stand on the various concrete alternatives for achieving that end. It could make clear its approval of public policy that enlarges or bulwarks individual freedom without trying to identify the precise balance that should be struck between freedom and order. (Exceptions might be necessary where religious freedom was directly at stake.)

If this seems to restrict the church to a role of bloodless, platitudinous philosophizing, it is only because the church is not qualified to follow another course, nor could it do so without jeopardizing its capacity to play its role on the world scene. Is the church really qualified to say whether the poor should be helped by continuation of the Job Corps rather than by the program of the National Alliance of Businessmen or by using the federal government as an "employer of last resort"? Is the church qualified to prescribe the precise legislation needed to support Negro voting rights and school desegregation? Or to specify the kind of legislation that would best ensure adequate health care for lower income groups? Or to advise whether foreign aid should be bilateral or through the United Nations — or how

much aid less developed countries are capable of wisely absorbing? Can it knowledgeably declare what legislative priorities the nation should establish in meeting its many urgent needs?

No, the church has no expertise to offer in these matters. These questions involve highly technical and complex matters that cannot be resolved by Christian goodwill, intuition, or an examination of the Scriptures. The church could become embroiled in endless controversies of a divisive nature if it sought to take stands on particular bills. But enunciation of certain broad general principles would be divisive only insofar as some people resist a deepening awareness of the full implications of the Christian faith.

If this awareness leads to resentment, let us recall that Christ did not hesitate to set forth views which angered those with a limited or a distorted view of God's will. Most of the readers of SPECTRUM probably wish the church had taken a more forthright position on racial discrimination — in public, private, and church life — before secular and Negro criticism forced it belatedly to recognize the unchristian character of such discrimination. We cannot comfortably assume that we will not face avoidable and embarrassing crises in the future over other matters which a clear-sighted projection of the Christian faith might help us avoid.

III

The job of the church is to carry on the work it has been doing, and to do it with all vigor and dispatch — while also proclaiming its support for the political realization of Christian principles that are clearly applicable to public policy. But the church should leave up to the *individual* the job of applying those principles to specific issues.

True, the individual member lacks expertise, also. True, he may judge unwisely. But to decide is to take risks, and the possibility of error is a hazard of existence for Christians as well as nonchristians. Surely it is better for the Christian to act and occasionally err in his efforts to help his fellowmen through appropriate public policy than to ignore this plane altogether. Neither the climate of the times nor the fullness of the Christian vision permits us the privilege of confining our constructive efforts exclusively to church and private spheres of action.

On the other hand, if the church were to appear to be placing God's sanction on a specific policy which later proved ill-advised, the church could be subjected to damaging criticism. People expect individuals to err; they are less tolerant of church error.

If the church, then, helps provide its members with a broader Christian

perspective and sensitizes their consciences to their need to help their fellowmen on as many fronts as possible, it will have played its part adequately.

But will this distract laymen and the ministry from their major goal — saving souls? I do not believe so. The ministry's hands are already full — and I am not suggesting any appreciable diversion of their efforts or those of the active laity. But as every pastor sorrowfully knows, most church members are not active in the church and are not likely to become so in the future. The church may remonstrate, supplicate, threaten, coax, and cajole as it will, but most church members will only stir uneasily in their seats and continue their passivity.

If these persons were to apply some small part of their unused energies in cooperating with others in relieving the unfortunate, furthering racial harmony, and promoting greater equality of opportunity, they would have taken a step forward. And if the ministry were more alert to the correlation between certain broad public endeavors and established Christian values, this would represent no insignificant increase in their enlightenment. As a consequence, the tone of their message would be subtly altered in such a way as to produce a more Christian orientation toward public policy by the laity.

Meanwhile, the church would not leave itself open to criticism that it and its members are largely indifferent to many of the great questions that agitate our age.

Christian Aspects of Diplomacy:

SOME CONCEPTUAL GUIDELINES

29

GARY M. ROSS

America's role abroad puzzles the most astute observers. This paper, therefore, offers some suggestions for evaluating diplomatic conduct. Taken collectively the suggestions are *conceptual*, in the sense that stress is put on the intellectual assumptions that underlie policy decisions, and *prescriptive*, in the sense that I shall make some judgments and advance a point of view.

That the suggestions should have these characteristics is itself instructive. Fundamentalist Protestants are doctrinaire and nonspeculative. Their "truth," residing literally in depositories such as the Bible, is already extant, awaiting discovery but not formulation. Aside from its role in exegesis, mental effort rather than enriching the truth either does it positive violence or does not affect it one way or the other. As a student once wrote, "To Christians truth is both absolute and knowable. It is an unchanging goal held before all men of the past, present, and future. The duty of the religious person, then, is to reach this truth, and once he has it in his grasp, to close his eyes, grit his teeth, and hang on for dear life." But I hold that there are counterarguments that support the realm of thought, even if their elaboration would take us afield from the point of this paper.

Likewise, I throw off the mask of impartiality and disclose a viewpoint because driven to do so by the very nature of Christian education and of history itself. Here a digression cannot be avoided. Despite popular belief, Christian education is not experienced at its best when one takes a course in religion, attends a devotional, or meets a friendly teacher. Rather, Chris-

tian education, in its essence, is a classroom phenomenon consisting of the metamorphosis that occurs across the board when subject matter is ably handled by Christian teachers. The "mold of God in every department" is Ellen G. White's way of describing it.¹

This metamorphosis results from a *learning process* through which students must eventually pass, and through which they will more readily pass when the teacher models it. The *process* by which fragmented, compartmentalized learning evolves into integrated knowledge consists of (1) becoming judgmental, not relativist; (2) becoming judgmental on the basis of theory which relates to, or is at least compatible with, one's general philosophy of life. The men of the Enlightenment prescribed for a defective society on the basis of a world view that was mechanistic, Newtonian, and holistic. In like manner, Christian education truly results when a student, after the model of his teacher, fashions judgments about an academic discipline by reference to a world view we normally call the Judeo-Christian heritage.

If self-disclosure is an integral part of Christian education, it is an inevitable feature of the historical profession. The historian's familiar claim to scientific accuracy is muted by the undeniable and now widely acknowledged reality that subject and object belong to the same category, that human beings who are complex and variable are studied by other human beings who are equally complex and variable, not by independent observers from another species. This problem of self-consciousness is no small one: it transforms history into a nearly biographical reflection of the historian himself, his point of view, and the environment in which he lives and writes. "Before you study the history," wrote Edward H. Carr, "study the historian. . . . Before you study the historian, study his historical and social environment."²

Because of its inescapable subjectivity, history is not a science even if it strives for scientific exactitude, raises quasi-scientific questions about man and his environment, and allows itself to be influenced by scientific hypotheses such as that of natural evolution. Impartiality is not attained by mere election to be impartial; that is hardly a valid option, the true choice being between conscious self-disclosure and unconscious self-disclosure.

The perspective here, then, is conceptual and prescriptive, and it is both of these things for compelling, if not unavoidable, reasons. I shall now define some Christian precepts that might be made the basis of deduction, and then identify the attributes of diplomacy that are deducible therefrom.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF CHRISTIANITY

Christianity, considered in the broad, nonsectarian sense, contributes two things to the interpretation of our subject. In the first place, as Ernest Lefever shows, it offers a precise *form* which interpretive work should adopt.³ That is, biblical religion is expressed in the distinct grammatical moods that are familiar to us in everyday usage. If we say, "It is imperative for you to attend class this morning," we are saying in effect, "You had better attend class" or "You ought to attend class." In the same way, the Bible refers repeatedly to the imperative "thou-shalt" or to the *ought*, as when it deals with the duties imposed on man by a merciful yet particular God.

31

The declarative mood also appears in biblical and everyday use. Were we to say, "You should not attend class this morning because you are exhausted from a night on the town," we would be implying that what ought to be stems from an understanding of what is and not from mere desirability. Similarly, biblical religion declares who God is, what man is, and what God has done for man; and on the basis of such givenness it determines what is possible and what ought to be. In illustrating this realism Charles Burton Marshall notes the apostle Paul's reference to himself as childlike for having identified with a movement, earlier in life, that sought to establish an earthly kingdom fully reflective of God's will, without due regard for the contingencies that are given features of historical experience and life.⁴

Apart from inviting precision of thought through the use of, and careful distinction between, the imperative and declarative moods, Christianity presents, as a second major contribution to our subject, the *content* of the Bible which deals with the nature of man and God. Because most systematic philosophies in the Western tradition have begun with assumptions about man, it is not unusual to formulate our interpretation in the same way. As we do so, our notions about man might come from a variety of sources besides historical experience itself. John Herz takes his from Freudian psychology and other scientific discoveries of the late nineteenth century;⁵ Edward M. Bennett derives his from the classical image of man;⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau's picture seems to be rooted in the intensive secularity of our time.⁷ It is to the Bible, the theological sourcebook of the Christian, that I shall turn for a portrayal of man that is both distinct and useful.

The biblical picture contrasts radically with the estimate of man as actually or potentially rational that predominated among writers of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and so decisively affected American thought.⁸ Instead, it is conservative, pessimistic, and complex. Man

emerges from the biblical page as irrational, depraved, and corruptible. In the terms of the Old Testament, his "heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked."⁹ In the New Testament, where the apostle Paul's realism expresses such deep pathos, we are told, "The good that I would I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I do. . . . I find [it to be] a law, that, when I would do good, evil is present with me."¹⁰ Elsewhere we are informed that "all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God."¹¹ John the apostle laments that "men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil."¹²

Paraphrasing the biblical notions about men, Blaise Pascal wrote that "man is neither angel nor beast and his misery is that he who would act the angel acts the brute." In a better known statement, Pascal said, "Man would fain be great and sees that he is little; would fain be happy and sees that he is miserable; would fain be perfect and sees that he is full of imperfections."¹³ Recent scholars have drawn the same conclusion. Man's tendency to disobey God, Lefever tells us, "is not imposed from without by a cruel destiny or by society, but springs from within — from human pride, inordinate self-regard and the inclination to pursue self-interest at the expense of the interests and rights of other men."¹⁴ In Norman Graebner's view, "The Judeo-Christian ethic . . . has never taught men how to create a perfect world, but [only] how to live in one that maddeningly insists on being imperfect."¹⁵ Morgenthau dismally concedes that "there is no escape from the evil of power, regardless of what one does. Whenever we act with reference to our fellow men, we must sin, and we must still sin when we refuse to act; for the refusal to be involved in the evil of action carries with it the breach of the obligation against the guilt in which the actor and the bystander, the oppressor and the oppressed, the murderer and his victim are inextricably enmeshed."¹⁶

Because free and unpredictable, the will of man precludes knowledge from becoming automatic virtue, but it also offers a partial exit from gloom. Human volition is the good that man possesses. Were he entirely corrupt in contrast to an exalted God, man could not freely choose his ultimate destination; yet the Bible clearly allows him that freedom. In a resolute denial of individual predestination John, the disciple of Jesus, depicts God as tendering salvation to "whosoever believeth in him."¹⁷ Peter describes God as "not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance."¹⁸ Paul and Timothy assume that God would "have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth."¹⁹

Continuing this exposition of the good in man, John Bennett reminds us

that man is created in the image of God and susceptible to redemption through Christ.²⁰ By admonishing man to love God wholly and to treat other men as brothers, the Bible assumes that man is capable of such behavior, or else it would violate its own axiom (mentioned earlier) of determining the *ought* in the light of the *is*. In short, man is complex because morally ambiguous. As Kenneth Thompson has written, "[He] indeed is his own most vexing problem, — for he is both good and evil, rational and compulsive, generous and grasping, compassionate and cruel, human and divine."²¹

A seminal aspect of the Christian religion is its picture of God. God is ruler of the universe, so that in comparison to his power, nations need not delude themselves about *their* greatness. As the prophet Isaiah put it, "The nations are like a drop from the bucket, and are accounted as the dust on the scales. . . . It is he who sits above the circle of the earth, and its inhabitants are like grasshoppers."²² Being universal ruler and Lord of history, God holds in his hands the ultimate destiny of men and nations. Even if some of his other attributes elude finite comprehension, the scriptural God is not vague or ill-defined. He is a revealed Being who acted in history through Christ for the redemption of the world. In sum, we have in the Scriptures a God-figure who is definitely in control and far from wholly inscrutable.

The precise form of Christian discourse and the substantial amount of biblical data about God and man provide a foundation for interpreting American diplomacy. We shall now, by a process of deduction, bridge our notions about Christianity and our conceptualization of American diplomacy.²³

THE ATTRIBUTES OF STATESMANSHIP

The form of discourse just described enjoins statesmen to distinguish between the *is* and the *ought* and to relate the latter explicitly to the former. Without precluding thought about ends that are merely desirable or logical, statesmen eschew the absolute imperative when it comes to decision-making, and favor the practical or derivative imperative. Going a step further, they establish as their first concern, prior to all else, the givenness of life, or what we might call reality. Rather than arrange the world to suit their policies, panaceas, and palliatives, they bring policy into conformity with world realities. They reject the tendency of intellectuals to think in *a priori* terms (i.e., in terms of theory rather than experience). Like students of medicine who know that research is related to human problems, statesmen do not separate experimentation from the actual bedside of practice. In

large degree, they are pragmatic, existential, and oriented toward the *is*.²⁴

Because statesmen are keen observers of international realities and of the changing distributions of power and influence among nations, they are seldom amateurs, and scarcely aloof, ivory-tower philosophers. Like Harold Nicolson, the great British diplomat, and George F. Kennan, his American counterpart, statesmen are career men, practitioners well seasoned by exposure to all the realities of international behavior. With Senator J. William Fulbright, the astute critic of American foreign conduct at the present time, statesmen hold that "we must dare to think about 'unthinkable things,' because when things become 'unthinkable,' thinking stops and action becomes mindless." And with Fulbright they concur that "if we are to disabuse ourselves of old myths, and to act wisely and creatively upon the new realities of our time, we must think and talk about our problems with perfect freedom."²⁵

When attentive to reality, statesmen encounter something logically necessitated by that content of Christianity which deals with man's nature. Because in that formulation man is mainly although not entirely corrupt and egotistic, and invariably tainted by original sin, his interaction with other men eludes rational behavior more often than it exemplifies it. Competition, lust for power, and endemic conflict are the norm, not the exception. This being true, power is decisive if anything is decisive, although one man's power is relative to, or curtailed by, that of his adversary. To extend this analysis to nations I cite as a second characteristic of statesmen their concentration on means or achievability, by which I refer both to the fact of *power* and to the fact of *limited* power. Statesmen recognize the relevance but also the limitation of power.

Certainly the scholars have not overlooked such facts. Herbert Butterfield wrote that "the hardest strokes of heaven fall in history upon those who imagine they can control things in a sovereign manner, as though they were kings of the earth, playing Providence not only for themselves but for the far future — reading out into the future with the wrong kind of far-sightedness."²⁶ After reviewing the Truman Doctrine in 1951, Morgenthau warned Americans "to distinguish between what is desirable and what is possible" and between "what is desirable and what is essential."²⁷ Adlai Stevenson stated the point lucidly in a passage that bears quotation despite its length:

One of our hardest tasks — if we hope to conduct a successful foreign policy — is to learn a new habit of thought, a new attitude toward the problems of life itself. Fortitude, sobriety and patience as a prescription for combating intolerable evil are

cold porridge to Americans who yesterday tamed a continent and tipped the scales decisively in two world wars. Americans have always assumed, subconsciously, that all problems can be solved; that every story has a happy ending; that the application of enough energy and good will can make everything come out right. In view of our history, this assumption is natural enough. . . . So when we encounter a problem in foreign policy we naturally assume that it can be solved pretty quick, with enough drive, determination and red corpuscles. "The difficult we do immediately, the impossible takes a little longer." Just pour in enough man power, money and bulldozers, and we can lick it. If one diplomat can't come up with the answer, fire him and hire another — or better yet, hire ten. And if that doesn't solve it, some Americans conclude that there can only be one explanation: treason. . . . Impatience, arrogance and our faith in quick solutions [are problems of education and character for us]. As long as this habit of mind persists — and it is fundamentally an unchristian attitude, ignoring the pervasiveness of evil and loaded with arrogance and pride — we shall never be able to face our problems realistically. Our first job, it seems to me, is to school ourselves in cold-eyed humility; to recognize that our wisdom is imperfect and that our capabilities are limited.²⁸

Our third characteristic emerges logically from the fact of limited power. Statesmen define their diplomatic objectives accordingly. Notwithstanding their ability to conceive ends that are unlimited, they defer all but the fraction of a nation's aims which squares with the strength-in-being and the potential strength of the state. As Marshall puts it, "Nothing comes more easily or does less good than the engaging pastime of thinking up bold and imaginative schemes for improvement in disregard of the means for realizing them."²⁹ In Walter Lippmann's view, "Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes . . . it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs."³⁰

The end which statesmen serve is the nation. This "national interest," comprising the security of the nation and the welfare of its inhabitants, is tangible, concrete, limited, and achievable. To clarify further, I might note its position on the vertical scale of diplomatic objectives often resorted to. Subnational interests may operate, as when state autonomy belied the sovereignty of the nation under the Articles of Confederation. More commonly, supranational interests endear themselves to the diplomat, interests variously described as intangible, nebulous, unlimited, lofty, grandiose, transcendent, messianic, utopian, and idealistic. The flavor of such objectives was embodied in Woodrow Wilson's commitment to democratize the world (i.e., render it safe for democracy), in John Foster Dulles' pledge to liberate suppressed peoples behind the iron curtain in Eastern Europe, in Lyndon Johnson's preoccupation in Southeast Asia with such abstractions as law and order, Christianity, and democracy, and in Richard Nixon's pledge, made at Colorado Springs in June 1969, to create "a just world

order that will bring an end to war." For these Americans, and for many more, diplomacy served an ideology, not the nation. Its essence lay in the minds of men, rather than in any geographic, military, economic, or political entity. Looking beyond nations to individuals, this diplomatic outlook accented the common interest of mankind in peace, freedom, justice, self-government, and other such abstractions.³¹

So commonplace are such abstractions in the twentieth century that they obscure the fundamental modesty of the earlier American record, a record of substantial accomplishment and minimal failure. In 1821 the Greeks in the Turkish Empire precipitated a liberal-national revolution which eventuated in their independence. Americans rallied to their defense, invited our government to intervene, and got a lecture from Secretary of State John Quincy Adams which warrants extensive quotation, being one of the most memorable statements on foreign policy ever uttered in our history:

America . . . has abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when the conflict has been for principles to which she clings, as to the last vital drop that visits the heart. She has seen that probably for centuries to come, all the contests of that Aceldama, the European world, will be contests of inveterate power and emerging right. Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. . . . She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom.³²

President Fillmore received the same demand and gave the same reply during the Hungarian revolution of the 1840s as did Secretary of State William Seward during the Polish revolution of 1863. When the Cubans rebelled against Spain in 1895, President Cleveland refused to anchor American policy to sympathy and freedom. When his successor, McKinley, deviated from this pattern of modesty in the War of 1898, Senator Charles Sumner sought in vain to revive it:

Where is the statesmanship of all this [he asked]? If it is not an established rule of statecraft that a statesman should never impose any sacrifices on his people for anything but their own interests, then it is useless to study political philosophy any more, for this is the alphabet of it. . . . It belongs to [a statesman's] education to warn him that a policy of adventure and of gratuitous enterprise would be sure to entail embarrassments of some kind. . . . Prudence demands that we look ahead to see what we are about to do, and that we gauge the means at our disposal, if we do not want to bring calamity on ourselves and our children.³³

On a horizontal spectrum, the political standard of thought, or the national interest, lies alongside such competing standards as legality and morality. In 1939, Russia's attack on Finland confronted France and England with two issues, one legal and the other political. Was the attack a legal violation of the League of Nations Covenant? Did it, by altering the balance of power, represent political encroachment on the security of France and England? The episode's legal violation of the Covenant could not be disputed, but its influence on Franco-British security, at least arguably, was subordinate to the threat which contemporary Germany posed to that security. Nevertheless, France and England allowed the fact of legal infraction to determine their political response. They enjoined the League to expel the Soviet Union and probably would have aided Finland against Russia had not Sweden refused to allow passage of Western troops en route to Finland. In this instance, law enjoyed higher priority in the determination of policy than did the national interest in political safety, for such a war would have seen France and England dangerously — because simultaneously — pitted against Germany and the Soviet Union.³⁴

Ten years later another event showed how the balance could be tipped in favor of morality. The completion of Mao Tse-tung's conquest of China by 1949, and the resultant exile of Chiang Kai-shek to Formosa, posed two questions, one moral and the other political. Did the *de facto* Chinese government, and its turbulent ascent to power, accord with the moral principles of the Western world? Was it a political threat to the world balance of power? Although few could dispute the immoral or at least amoral nature of the Chinese government, the political significance of that government was, again, arguable. Nevertheless, Western governments determined diplomatic policy on the basis of moral rather than political considerations. There began (and has continued to date) a concerted diplomatic rebuff which antagonized the Chinese government, verified its ideological assumptions about capitalist hostility, and probably hardened, ominously for the future, its unwillingness to conciliate with the West.³⁵

George Kennan tells us that diplomatic episodes often combine our alternatives to the political or national interest. Finding a close association of legal and moral considerations, he suggests:

Whoever says there is a law must of course be indignant against the law-breaker and feel a moral superiority to him. And when such indignation spills over into military contest, it knows no bounds short of the reduction of the law-breaker to the point of complete submissiveness — namely, unconditional surrender. It is a curious thing, but it is true, that the [legalistic-moralistic] approach to world affairs, rooted as it unquestionably is in a desire to do away with war and violence, makes violence

more enduring, more terrible, and more destructive to political stability than did the older motives of national interest.³⁶

38

This analysis is borne out by an episode that occurred in 1914. In August of that year, England went to war against Germany, right after the latter pushed into Belgium, whose neutrality Britain was pledged to guarantee. In justifying her action, England had two options, one political and the other legalistic-moralistic. The political justification, which was the one announced by Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, held that Britain aimed to prevent the control of the Low Countries by a hostile power because such control threatened her security. What mattered was the hostile intentions of Germany, not the violation of Belgium's neutrality per se. Had the violator been a nation other than Germany, without proven hostility, England, he believed, might not have intervened. The Foreign Secretary did *not* say, but might have said, that England acted militarily on account of Germany's *illegal* violation of Belgium's neutrality and *immoral* suppression of the Belgian people.

The point, then, of the third characteristic of statesmanship, is that motives or principles other than the national interest subvert the political sphere, whereas one ought to emancipate the field of international politics and reinstate its autonomy.³⁷ But where is the Christianity of all of this? Does the Bible justify defense of the national interest, as it justifies the other attributes of statesmen? The answer returns us to the major purpose of this paper, which is to demonstrate the utility of Christianity in a conceptualization of diplomacy.

First, the national interest, because it is fundamentally moral, aligns itself with the moral tone of Christianity. Advocating its priority over abstract moral and legal principles appears to imply that viable foreign policy lacks moral content altogether, and that Christianity is being brought to the defense of a position it resolutely denies, namely, a position which concentrates on power and force and even makes them its very hallmark. In reality, however, we are far from Machiavellian cynics concerned only with unrestrained power conflict, for morality abounds in the concept of national interest, defying either/or simplicity. When this precept refers to the safety of a nation, it is moral if one regards — as one must regard — the taking of life as immoral. Moreover, "safety of the nation" includes not only the citizenry, but also the moral values and ideals which a nation embodies. Nor should we overlook the fact that national interest implies recognition and appreciation of its operation on other nations, an attitude

tantamount to Christian altruism. Likewise, the avoidance of self-righteousness and extravagance in diplomacy closely parallels the Christian ideal of humility.

39 Although it is usually true that policy serves either the nation or the nation's ideology, sometimes it serves both, in which case national interest and moral principle converge. The Marshall Plan aided hungry and war-wracked people who had stood up against Germany, but it also bolstered Western Europe against the Communist takeover that potentially menaced our national interest. Likewise, England's "support" of the Jewish demand for a national homeland after World War I owed itself both to humanitarian sensitivities for an oppressed people and to the practical reality of French encroachment on England's Middle Eastern interests. Thus Robert Osgood writes that "the interdependence of universal ideals and national self-interest is simply a reflection of the fact that man has a moral sense as well as an ego and that both parts demand satisfaction. Consequently, nations act with the greatest consistency and stability when their actions are based upon a balance of egoism and idealism."³⁸ Felix Gilbert concurs: "The basic issue of the American attitude toward foreign policy [is] the tension between Idealism and Realism. Settled by men who looked for gain and by men who sought freedom, born into independence in a century of enlightened thinking and of power politics, America has wavered in her foreign policy between Idealism and Realism, and her great historical moments have occurred when both were combined."³⁹

The national interest is Christian because moral, but especially because biblical. It is a logical outgrowth of the biblical portrayal of man. Being a party to power struggle despite his own limitations or because of them, man concentrates, as we have seen, on the achievability of his ends and on the viable fraction of the ends he conceives.

But the national interest is equally compatible with Christianity's picture of God. A clearly defined deity like the God-figure cannot be brought to our side and posited as the basis for unlimited means, as is so often the case with those who advocate objectives other than the national interest. Were God vague and ill-defined, John Bennett argues, "it would not be too difficult to convince ourselves that a provident Almighty was on our side. An unrevealed God can be made over in one's own image. But God revealed in Christ, who acted in Christ for the redemption of the whole world, who wills the welfare of each nation as part of the world that he loves, who transcends all nations in a way that he keeps all their ideals and achievements and ideologies under judgment — God so understood is the

ultimate perspective from which we should view our own nation among the nations."⁴⁰

Just as God, the defined Being discourages extravagant behavior in the belief that he is on our side, so also God, the ruler of the universe, reminds nations that they are finite. In contrast to his omnipotence, nations are mere drops in a bucket, dust on the scales, weaklings like grasshoppers. They are amiss and a spectacle before the world except as modesty governs what they do.

To conclude, this interpretation of American diplomacy is conceptual, prescriptive, and Christian. It is the last because (1) from Christianity as expressed in biblical language we derive the importance of reality or the givenness of life; (2) from the content of Christianity about man we deduce our stress on limited means; and (3) from its content about man, but especially about God, we find our concomitant emphasis on limited ends.

40 This approach to diplomacy, which for simplicity may be called the realist's approach,⁴¹ describes and admonishes in a manner identical to a statement made by Senator Fulbright: "The inconstancy of American foreign policy is not an accident but an expression of two distinct sides of the American character. Both are characterized by a kind of moralism, but one is the morality of decent instincts tempered by the knowledge of human imperfection and the other is the morality of absolute self-assurance fired by the crusading spirit. . . . We are not God's chosen saviour of mankind but only one of mankind's more successful and fortunate branches, endowed by our Creator with about the same capacity for good and evil, no more or less, than the rest of humanity."⁴²

Such modesty, I submit, is the quintessence of viable diplomacy, of statesmanship, and of the Christian ethos.

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- 14 LEFEVER, p. 19.
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- 16 MORGENTHAU, pp. 201-202.
- 17 John 3:16.
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- 19 1 Timothy 2:4.
- 20 JOHN C. BENNETT, *Foreign Policy in Christian Perspective: Twentieth Century Approaches and Problems* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1966), p. 41. See also Genesis 1:26.
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- 22 Isaiah 40:15, 22. Revised Standard Version.
- 23 Some clarification will be helpful at this point. First, I chose to dichotomize Christian and diplomatic notions thus far in the paper rather than to deduce behavioral guidelines from each religious idea as enumerated. My reason is that the three statesmanlike qualities to be described in the ensuing portion of the paper are not only deducible from Christianity but also logically related one to another, a harmony I thought it wise to preserve. Second, I do not hold that foreign policies compliant with these statesmanlike qualities will be successful foreign policies, only that their chance for success will be greater because of such compliance. Third, the phrase "process of deduction" should not imply a sequence which necessarily occurred in my own experience. As far as I am concerned, Christianity and diplomacy have probably been related reciprocally rather than sequentially. Fourth, it is not proposed here that the student should concern himself with a diplomat's moral or Christian commitment, but only that Christianity should undergird the criteria used in judging actual diplomatic behavior. Unfortunately, the religiosity and moral uprightness of a diplomat is no assurance that he will pursue a realistic course of action.
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The Dehumanizing Effects of War

43

FREDERICK G. HOYT

I

As historians study the fragmentary record of man's experience on this petty planet, one of man's most characteristic activities appears to be warfare — actual fighting, preparations for future fighting, the study of previous fighting to improve on performance, and writing about fighting as a literary form, for "War makes rattling good history," according to Thomas Hardy, "but Peace is poor reading."¹

It is difficult to discover any significant span of time when mankind has been totally at peace; and if such a period were designated, one would suspect that the historical record was faulty, or that it was but a lull between battles. Thus the Commonwealth of Venice used to have this inscription in its armory: "Happy is that city which in time of peace thinks of war."

History is commonly marked off by wars and battles: 331, 168, 1066, 1755, 1812, 1941, etc. And the heroes of the past who are remembered after the masses of humanity are totally forgotten are preponderantly military: Alexander, Julius Caesar, Hannibal, Charlemagne, Joan of Arc, Napoleon, Wellington, Nelson, Washington, Jackson, and Eisenhower, to name but a few.

One might therefore reasonably conclude that war is a natural condition of mankind rather than an abnormality, and that peace is little more than a hiatus between wars for recuperative purposes. "To everything there is a season," Solomon informs us: "a time of war and a time of peace" (Ecclesiastes 3:1, 8).

Where did war originate? It is clearly not of human origin. We read in

Revelation 12:7 that "there was war in heaven: Michael and his angels fought against the dragon; and the dragon fought and his angels."

Thus the first recorded historical event for the universe cryptically indicates the initiation of warfare. We are not informed about strategy and tactics, the forces deployed, specific engagements, the duration of the war, its precise locale, the weaponry and logistics systems, the names of any but the supreme commanders, or any dates connected with the war.

Genesis fourteen apparently contains the first formal comments on war in human history. Herein are contained elements that have become extremely familiar to mankind during the thousands of years since that event: nations, rulers, alliances, rebellions, battles, looting, physical destruction, slaughter, prisoners of war, and hostages. We could then leave this bit of history without further consideration if one additional element were not present in the account: Melchizedek, king of Salem and "priest of the most high God" blessed Abram for his military activities and assured him that God had given him the victory.

And the most remote specific event in the future about which we have significant detail is the culmination of this war in a stupendous campaign by the military geniuses of all history against the City of God. Apparently Satan will conduct his campaign as an ancient siege operation against the New Jerusalem without benefit of any modern weapons such as rockets or even aircraft, whereas God will utilize a nuclear device — "fire . . . out of heaven" (Revelation 20:7-9). The defeat of the attackers will not be followed by peace negotiations, war crimes trials, or attempts at rehabilitation, but by their complete annihilation.

Thus history as we can conceive it is a continuum extending from war initiated in heaven to the final war on this earth. Between these two points there stretches finite time of which a small segment is allotted for individual use. Our conduct during this personal time span, then, determines on which side we will be in the climactic battle of the universe. And one of the critical factors that will determine our eternal destiny is our relationship to that most typical of universal phenomena, war.

Men's minds have long been troubled by the institution of war. Moralists have often denounced it as an unqualified evil; statesmen have deplored it when they have not been forced to pronounce it salutary or essential to preserve independence, honor, freedom, and peace.

Contrary to Benjamin Franklin's aphorism that "there never was a good war, or a bad peace," the home-front American patriot has usually found war good. It furnishes patriotic excitement and instant virtue, the vicarious

joy of battle without risk, together with profitable jobs and generous contracts, all under the cover of national "defense." For a people to whom violence is an essential ingredient in popular entertainment, war fills a deep-felt national need in which conduct usually unacceptable in civilized society is blessed with the benediction of patriotic virtue.

To the participant, war's allure is compounded of romance, glamour, a break with monotonous routine, a relaxation of personal conduct codes, and the omnipresent possibility of instant promotion to folk-hero status. The average citizen possesses a primitive folk wisdom which intuitively informs him that John Hampden spoke correctly, as reported by Macaulay, in declaring "that the essence of war is violence, and that moderation in war is imbecility."² Thus he seldom troubles himself with questions of morality in war or of making warfare more humane.

45

II

From a study of history, statesmen commonly assume that the capacity of a state to protect its interests and defend its existence is contingent on its ability to employ military force effectively. Thus no state incapable of waging effective war can expect other states to heed its wishes or even acknowledge its right to survive. In the bargaining process of diplomacy, prestige is all-important and is usually synonymous with a reputation for power, so that diplomacy is thus essentially potential war. Or conversely it could be said that war is a business of seeking political objectives by military coercion rather than by negotiation. Either way, the ability to employ arms effectively is typically a decisive element in international affairs.

Thus the pursuit of power can readily become an end in itself for a state, rather than a means to other, perhaps higher, ends, because other ends are meaningless if a nation lacks the power of self-preservation. Military preparedness can easily develop into an obsession when a state concludes that it can best preserve its independence by expanding its military power and that it can most readily guarantee its own security by depriving others of theirs. In this manner any war can be justified as one of defense.

This convincing semantic exercise thus performs the admirable function of automatically and almost effortlessly absolving the individual citizen with an activated conscience from the necessity of evaluating any of his country's wars according to ethical criteria, since any war can readily be interpreted as a war of defense. Couple this phenomenon with the paranoiac secrecy of governments relative to the background for and conduct of any

military action, and it would require a morbidly sensitive conscience for a citizen to insist on the necessity for personal evaluation of his country's wars.

National security depends fundamentally on power, and power is impotent unless it is capable of being translated into terms of armed might. From this truism springs the obsession of all states with armaments, which may in turn generate a conviction that armaments ensure peace. Chairman Mao Tse-tung has provided us with a succinct observation on this point with a memory verse from his little red book: "Every Communist must grasp the truth, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'"

But "peace through strength" is as delusive as "peace through weakness." Weakness invites attack, whereas strength tempts its misuse and commonly generates counterstrength which an enemy may employ. "Force and fraud," Thomas Hobbes has explained, "are in war the two cardinal virtues."³ The tragedy of mankind is that nations often begin with weapons in arsenals to preserve peace and end with weapons on battlefields to win wars. From this tragic dilemma man has as yet found no escape.

When international tensions become intolerable because of an accelerating arms race, someone usually proposes a timely "preventive" war against the enemy, together with elaborate and logical justification for such action. Goading the enemy into an attack so that public opinion can be rallied to the defense of the fatherland may also be urged. Thus Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson made this entry in his diary on November 25, 1941: "The question is how we should manoeuvre them [Japan] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." This stratagem of Roosevelt and Stimson certainly ranks as one of the most monumental miscalculations in all history, comparable only, perhaps, to that of Belshazzar. But obviously they understood clearly the highly moralistic nature of the American people.

In contrast to the limited actions of the past, the twentieth century has seen wars of annihilation and demands for unconditional surrender become routine. In its extreme form this may involve the virtual extermination of a people; however, genocide is difficult to practice on a sufficiently large scale to alter the demographic bases of national power. Thus the humorless, deadly serious, efficient, methodical, disciplined Germans succeeded in eliminating only some eight million Jews and Slavs. The technological improvements created by American genius offer great promise for sharply heightened efficiency in the future.

Any seasoned battlefield commander recognizes the occasional value of skillfully executed atrocities in terrorizing enemy soldiers and civilians.

Thus we read in Joshua that after Israel had utterly destroyed Jericho — including men, women, children, and even animals — Joshua's "fame was noised throughout all the country" (Joshua 6:27). Today such tactics must be carefully regulated to prevent their escaping from control and also to prevent their dissemination to the general public through the news media (which thrives on sensationalism and thus eagerly seeks out such dramatic news), since the average citizen is too far removed from the actualities of warfare to evaluate such incidents properly.

Atrocities committed by the enemy are so essential in any war effort that they must be manufactured when the enemy is uncooperative. Their chief value is to imbue both soldiers and civilians with a firm belief in the consummate wickedness of the enemy and hence the moral necessity of annihilating him.

But diplomatic alignments are apt to shift so rapidly that experts in psychological warfare must be prepared to convert international saints into sinners, and vice versa, on short notice by having in storage an adequate supply of unused atrocity stories or by being able to transfer guilt for previously publicized atrocities from one side to the other. In this important facet of modern war the United States is currently cooperating beautifully with actual and potential enemies by generously supplying detailed atrocity stories against its own military personnel so that intelligence agents are no longer necessary in this area.

III

In the Christian, war often creates acute anguish of spirit stemming from an inner conflict. His religion teaches love and brotherhood among all men, but in war he finds a stimulant to action, an escape from tedium and guilt, an easy opportunity for publicly honored self-sacrifice, and a means by which he may exercise repressed tendencies toward violence through what Nietzsche has called "murder with a good conscience." Through participation in war, man discovers for his frustrations, tensions, and aggressions modes of release or expression which are not only socially sanctioned but equated with the highest levels of morality and selflessness in all civilizations.

Moreover, the Christian is understandably perplexed when he attempts to evaluate his nation's role in international affairs by applying his personal ethical standards to its conduct. Although he may be conversant with *The Prince*,⁴ a perceptive Christian citizen might well become confused

about the functional moral standards of his nation as contrasted with its proclaimed Christian ideals. If he has been convinced of national righteousness from reading historical accounts of crusades for justice or instances of international messianism or from having heard his country's history correctly interpreted by teachers, from kindergarten through college, it may well be a traumatic experience for him to be forced ultimately to accept the fact that Christian nations do not always deal with each other according to that system of ethical values to which he subscribes. But it would not be surprising if he could not accept as valid for his nation the maxim that often for safety and survival governments must employ "immoral" or "Machiavellian" policies inconsistent with the personal Christian ethic.

Recognizing the dilemma into which a conscientious citizen is thus placed, the wise statesman will often recall the advice of the perspicacious Florentine that a Prince (i.e., a government) must always appear to be virtuous regardless of his actions, and this not for any reasons of conscience but for pragmatic reasons of politics. Such an objective is made more readily attainable by the invoking of national security to justify closing military and diplomatic record groups to historians. Likewise the current fashion of not declaring wars makes it possible largely to ignore certain unpleasant international developments by labeling them "police actions," a phrase that strikes a sympathetic law-and-order chord in the soul of the Christian patriot.

Even an observer only casually acquainted with Seventh-day Adventists would almost certainly conclude that a people possessing such finely tuned moral sensibilities would be acutely sensitive to the tremendous moral implications in the domain of war and its varied ramifications. Such an observer would surely assume that a person who makes countless moral decisions daily — concerning his clothes, food and drink, reading, recreation, and thinking — would be deeply moved by the moral problems of war in modern society; and also that when he had discovered moral lapses in the conduct of his government, he and his church would be among the very first to cry out in public protest.

But such a neutral observer would doubtless be shocked to find that a church which has freighted the minutiae of life with moral significance is timid and virtually dumb before one of the greatest moral dilemmas of all history. The rationale behind such a posture is indeed difficult to delineate even for those who may have an intimate acquaintance with the Adventist church. But at least a tentative attempt must be made.

IV

49 One reflex institutional response to any questioning would surely be that the silence of the church is justified because it has been warned to stay out of politics (a term that would be defined, if a definition were attempted at all, within the context of partisan American political action of the last century). The only justification for violating this rule of political non-involvement would be the appearance of a national or local issue containing a significant moral element relevant to the church, traditionally limited to either Sunday legislation or alcohol, which would set in motion elaborate machinery to influence the political processes of this nation on all levels. But once having defined those areas with significant moral content for a previous generation, the church has been unable to modify its definition despite cataclysmic changes in national and international affairs.

Doubtless there is also present the very real fear of being charged with institutional hypocrisy or of falling victim to the embarrassing Jonah predicament. Having preached for more than a century that war would steadily increase in frequency and horror before the end of the world, as one of the sure signs of the imminence of this event, the church can hardly adopt a position of attempting to counter this development while feeling convicted that any such activity is futile, unless this were to be construed as constituting assistance to the "peace and safety" cry. If the nations of the world were to heed our warning of its imminent end, forsake their evil ways, and turn to God as Nineveh did, how would we react to being made false prophets, as was Jonah, by God's granting the planet a reprieve? We pray for peace to finish the work that our parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents failed to do. But how sincere in the sight of God is this prayer of an increasingly affluent subculture acutely conscious of status and social mobility upward from low class origins, and obviously luxuriating in what it terms, with what almost seems pride, the "Laodicean" condition?

With our eyes focused backward and our sensibilities strangely dulled, we talk as though wars were being fought as in the War Between the States, or at most World War I. Our concept of fundamental issues created by modern war is still limited to that of the soldier with a rifle and a bayonet (facing, it might be added, a similar soldier from the other side on quite even terms and according to fairly rigid codes of conduct). Hence we commonly talk as if modern war had created no moral problems not faced by Sergeant York, or even David: that is, one man facing another on a field of battle with weapons designed to kill, or at least intimidate, his individual enemy.

We give little indication of sensing the staggering range of moral involvement in modern, total, scientific warfare: the guilt and moral responsibility of the citizen who unprotestingly pays taxes and buys bonds to support the war machine; the citizen who profitably labors, without personal risk, in "defense" industries; the industrialist who amasses personal wealth and provides well-paid jobs for other church members in industries dependent for survival, directly or indirectly, on the demands of war; or the scientist who works for the government in developing the machinery of warfare while becoming wealthy and a respected member of the community and the church, even holding church office. (How brainwashed has one to be to tolerate any longer the scientist's cliché that he is freed from guilt as a searcher for pure truth, when in actuality he is a technologist serving the military machine as directly as any man with a gun, and with immensely more devastating effect and moral guilt?)

Another complicating factor in the church is the acceptance of an ill-defined concept, commonly denominated "the hand of God in history." Believing that God controls the affairs of nations, the Adventist is reluctant to speak or to act relative to national and international affairs for fear that he may inadvertently place himself in opposition to God's program; and he refuses to participate in the political process actively and reveal his insight concerning God's plan for his nation, because this would constitute forbidden political action.

He has had the specifics of this concept revealed but fleetingly in modern history—such as a single battle in the Civil War which was affected because the United States had failed to take a firm moral position on a social evil of national and even international import. (There seems to be no record that the church ever revealed this insight to President Lincoln or any other member of the government so that corrective action might have been taken to avoid similar divine punishment in the future.) Apparently no Adventist feels so certain that he possesses the formula by which he can readily and infallibly determine the side of right in war that he is willing to speak out publicly; at least he fails to aid his government with such intelligence, although he may speak dogmatically on these matters to small groups such as classes.

Although nationalism would doubtless impel the American Adventist to conclude that God's side has always been that of the United States, an even moderately observant person might be troubled in seeking answers to certain hard specific questions (such as those related to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the atom bombing of civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the fire bombing

of major Japanese cities, the saturation bombing of such German civilian and cultural centers as Dresden, the development of chemical and biological warfare, etc.) even if ready answers were discoverable for the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, and the gamut of genocidal Indian wars, and if Vietnam were to be ignored simply as nonwar.

Is the Seventh-day Adventist dilemma relative to war compounded unbearably by his acceptance of both the Old and the New Testaments as binding on him today? Thus he is forced to reconcile the warfare of Israel as directed by God (with its genocide, reprisals, extermination of prisoners, etc.) into his total concept of God, along with the Sermon on the Mount, since both originated with the same person of the Godhead. To be specific, he must be able to read that long tale of slaughter in Joshua ten which concludes with these words: "So Joshua smote all the country; . . . he left none remaining, but utterly destroyed all that breathed, as the Lord God of Israel commanded," together with these words from the Sermon on the Mount: "Blessed are the merciful; for they shall obtain mercy" (Matthew 5:7), and "Love your enemies" (Matthew 5:44) — and be able to integrate all of it into his personal philosophy with relevance to his life and that of his nation today. Is the task so formidable that he finds it impossible to face realistically?

V

With this limited background, what can be said specifically concerning the dehumanizing effects of war on Seventh-day Adventists?

First, we must constantly keep in mind that we are dealing with men, fallen men, not with saints or angels, and with such men living in the world as it is today. We must meet man where he is. Thus we must not talk as if we were utopians or millenarians. This is still Adam's world. Adventists have consistently rejected the theory of progress; so the world is not getting better in any significant sector, but worse, any condition or development otherwise being an illusion or strictly temporary.

One of the most serious consequences of any war would not be killing, even in atrocities, or supporting in various ways the act of killing by others, but the genesis and growth of a doubt that we are acting according to God's will for us as a nation and the failure to communicate this conviction to a level where it might stimulate a significant response. Since the Christian accepts the existence of but two masters whom he may serve, the obvious traumatic impact of this dilemma is clear: if he is not serving God, then he must be serving the Devil. If the latter is correct, then his duty and his

church's duty are obvious and impelling: immediately to speak out loud, clear, and with persistence in order to inform the nation of the path of justice and righteousness that should be pursued. Any attempt to keep his insights private — or to share them in a limited way with his congregation or students — would be not only a grave sin but also a gross betrayal of the essence of the democratic process and a serious abuse of the basic freedoms of speech and the press.

Equally serious in its effect on the individual would be any gnawing suspicion that he had shirked his responsibility and obligations as a man and a citizen in relation to war. That is, the devastating impact on the integrity of his personality could hardly be overestimated if he began to wonder if the boy up the street had died for his sins and in his place — or had even been seriously wounded — while the citizen enriched himself, advanced his professional position, or lived in comfort in avoiding military service.

Also profoundly disturbing to a healthy personality would be the harbored suspicion that Machiavelli was indeed right — that there is no applicability of the Decalogue to actions of states and their leaders, that they are in fact above this law which pertains only to individuals, whereas states are subject to an entirely different code. Although the average draftee may not be equipped mentally to handle the complexities of why he should be a noncombatant and thus should be instructed simply to repeat the sixth commandment, even a cursory reading of the Old Testament makes it evident that killing by state action — either in warfare or in the execution of criminals — was not intended to fall under the prohibitions of the Decalogue. If this were not true, then we have been fearfully remiss as a church for more than one hundred years in not crying out constantly against the United States for committing mass murder and desecrating the Decalogue while claiming to be a Christian nation.

Equally serious to the institutional integrity of the church and its members would be the haunting doubt as to whether we had been consistent or not in our stand on war. Could we, for example, have both enlarged our witness and made a significantly better world by a firm, uncompromising position such as Quakers would take?

Might we profitably modify Briand's famous statement to Lloyd George during World War I: "War is much too serious a thing to be left to military men; it should be the concern of the church"? Has war been the concern of this church as it should have been? Or have we shamefully avoided a duty and thereby missed immeasurable opportunities?

The bell that tolls for the victims of war still tolls for each of us, whether

we stop our ears or rationalize it all away as of no concern to us or our church. And Donne might have added—the tolling will reverberate throughout all eternity.⁵

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In Michigan in Appletime

MAX GORDON PHILLIPS

Had we but known
there was so little time
in Michigan in appletime

we would have tried
to taste forever there
the sunrise of her cider raw ;

yet as it was,
brim-spilling as it was,
a cup too full of time for us

to care about
its meaning, we in fact
would simply laugh and drink until

the cider was
forever drunk or spilled
upon the multi-colored leaves

that fell for us
alone once only there
in Michigan in appletime.

Project Whitecoat

MARTIN D. TURNER

55

I

First Tuesday, a National Broadcasting Company television special program shown on February 4, 1969, dealt with the topic of Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW). After showing the effects of a number of the agents on animals, the program turned to an interview with a young man who was identified as a Seventh-day Adventist and a participant in a volunteer program of the United States Army known as PROJECT WHITECOAT. In this project, experiments with BW agents are performed on the volunteers. This knowledge came as a shock to many who are proud of the contributions the Seventh-day Adventist church has made in medicine and health care.

Although February 4 was the first time many people had heard of the church's connection with CBW research, it was not the first time this had been mentioned in the public media, nor has it proved to be the last. The November 1967 *New Republic* carried an article that made such a connection. Similar references appeared in a book on the subject published in 1968¹ at an international conference on CBW in London in February of that year,² and in the second of two articles on the subject in *Science* magazine.³ On July 8, 1969, the Columbia Broadcasting System television program *Sixty Minutes* featured CBW, and again an Adventist serviceman was shown in connection with this effort. It was stated that the 180 men like him at Fort Detrick, Maryland, the army's headquarters for research and development of biological warfare, undergo voluntary tests in which they are infected with diseases and then sent to the hospital for study.

These presentations, if they are factual, raise a number of serious questions about the moral posture of the Seventh-day Adventist church with respect not only to biological warfare but also to military service in general.

Before we look at these questions, however, it would be instructive to review briefly the history and present position of the United States government on the development and use of chemical and biological weapons.

II

During World War I various kinds of gas were used freely by both the Allies and Germany. In all, 1.3 million casualties, including 91,000 deaths, were attributed to gas warfare.⁴ After the war, the Geneva Convention of 1925 banned the first use of chemical and biological weapons. Although the United States helped to draft the treaty and signed it at Geneva, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, after a closed-door debate, refused to ratify it. By mid-1968 sixty nations, including Communist China and the Soviet Union, had ratified the treaty.⁵

56

Although the United States had used gas in World War I, by the start of World War II still no significant effort had been made in this country to develop biological (germ) weapons. In 1942, however, a National Academy of Sciences study committee concluded that such weapons were feasible, and a year later Camp Detrick was opened under strictest secrecy. There was some initial interdepartmental fighting between the Office of the United States Army Surgeon General and the Chemical Warfare Service, which had done most of the work with gas. The surgeon general took the position that only the defensive aspects should be studied, but the chemical corps generals argued successfully that the offensive and defensive aspects cannot be separated, and they were given the responsibility for the entire program.

For several years opposition to the program by the United States Army Medical Corps was so strong that they refused to station a medical team at Fort Detrick.⁶ By 1952, however, the breach had healed sufficiently for such a unit to be stationed there permanently. The first use of Seventh-day Adventist volunteers began in this unit in 1954. In 1956 the unit was reorganized on a permanent and independent basis and named the United States Army Medical Unit, Fort Detrick. The name was changed again in 1969 to the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).

Project Whitecoat is the code name for the human volunteer group within this unit, a group made up almost exclusively of Seventh-day Adventists. Recruitment is done only among Adventists in training at Fort Sam Houston; but for legal reasons, others cannot be excluded if they find out about the project, are qualified, and request entrance. Project Whitecoat is the only program at Fort Detrick that involves experiments on humans.

Partly as a result of the use of gas in World War I and the subsequent ban on its use by the Geneva Protocol, considerable public feeling rose against the development and use of chemical and biological weapons. To counter this sentiment and "educate" the public on the subject, the army hired a team of publicity experts to direct a large-scale public relations campaign called Operation Blue Skies. The program, begun in 1959, primarily promoted the idea that CBW was "humane." The response was largely favorable, but some were not convinced.

Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier, a Democrat from Wisconsin, concerned by a series of newspaper and magazine articles published in connection with Operation Blue Skies, began a drive to have the administration reaffirm as official policy a statement made in a 1943 speech by President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the United States would not use chemical or biological weapons first. On September 3, 1959, Congressman Kastenmeier introduced a resolution to this effect on the floor of the House of Representatives and warned in a speech that the army was seeking a change in this policy.⁷ Both the Departments of Defense and State actively opposed the adoption of the resolution, and it was defeated. There the matter remained, officially at least, for almost ten years.

On November 25, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon announced that the United States would not be the first to use lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons, and it would "renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons and all other methods of biological warfare." He also said that he would resubmit the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for ratification.⁸

The announcement was greeted with approval in many quarters, but some persons pointed out that it signaled no change in the present use of tear and nausea gases and defoliants in Vietnam. In addition, the Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of lethal and "all other gases," is interpreted by the United States as not applying to nonlethal gases, defoliants, or food-destroying herbicides, in spite of the fact that two thirds of the signatory nations, including Britain, France, and the USSR, have officially interpreted the ban to include them.⁹ It is feared, therefore, that if the United States ratifies the treaty with these reservations the effect will be to weaken rather than strengthen the Protocol.

The renunciation of biological weapons seems all-inclusive at first glance, but it should be noted that the option for research on "defensive measures" was left open and that all CBW work is officially referred to as defensive in that it acts as a deterrent. But perhaps more important, Pentagon officials revealed after the November 25 speech that biological toxins (the poisonous

but nonliving, nonreproducing by-products of living bacteria) had been re-defined as chemical rather than biological weapons.

Until recently the definition of biological warfare included the "employment of living organisms, toxic biological products, and plant growth regulators to produce death or casualties in man, animals, or plants; or defense against such actions."¹⁰ Militarily, toxins are much more useful as a weapon than live bacteria, because there is no danger of their setting off epidemics that could react on the user. They would not cause the "massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences" the president cited as drawbacks to the use of germ weapons.

The announcement was beneficial, because it did clear up the ambiguity of United States policy regarding the first use of CBW. It by no means settled the controversy over CBW, however, because it made almost no difference in the present use or development of these weapons. The day of the president's speech, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said that it would cause "no major impact on the basic research in defense systems and safety" supposedly being done at Fort Detrick, and Colonel Lucien Winegar, deputy commanding officer of the post, said that "it would be 'fair to assume' that Detrick will continue to produce dangerous organisms that could be used offensively, since any defense against biological weapons involves the production of harmful agents that are potentially available to an enemy."¹¹

III

Although the debate over CBW has become more audible within the past year, actually it has been going on for some time. A number of professional and scientific groups have studied the matter, among them the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Union of Concerned Scientists, and the Pugwash Study Group. These groups have also sponsored numerous conferences and symposiums, one of which met in London in February 1968, sponsored by the J. D. Bernal Peace Library. An important question about Project Whitecoat, one that was mentioned repeatedly by the participants in that conference, is the difference between offensive and defensive research. The army justifies its CBW work on the basis that defense against such weapons is needed. A look at how the money is spent, however, raises doubts about this motive.

In 1964, of the total \$115 million budget for CBW, \$102.8 million was spent for offensive work. The remaining \$12.2 million went into what could be more readily called defensive measures, such as detection, protection

systems, and immunizations.¹² There are good reasons to believe, however, that even these apparently beneficial types of research are not as innocent as they appear at first. The most obvious reason is found in an army manual on CBW, which states candidly that "CB defense is a prerequisite to attack capability."¹³

Theodor Rosebury, a microbiologist who served as director of research at Fort Detrick during World War II, says of his experience: "At Detrick a certain delicacy concentrated most of the physicians into principally or primarily defensive operations; the modifiers *principally* or *primarily* are needed because military operations can never be exclusively defensive."¹⁴

Another well-known microbiologist, Ivan Målek, has pointed out why the development of such weapons is usually justified on the grounds that they are defensive in nature: "One of the characteristic features of biological weapons is that it is difficult to distinguish work done purely for defensive ends from that which is mainly offensive. Furthermore, if defense is to be effective and prepared in time it must be based on knowledge that can easily be transferred to offensive uses. That is why military establishments working on the development of these weapons do it mostly under the label of defense."¹⁵

Science magazine, in one of a series of two articles on the subject, in January 1967 noted that much of the BW work

inescapably has a special character, an inverted quality like that of medicine turned inside out. It consists in part, for example, of efforts to breed into pathogenic organisms precisely the characteristics — such as resistance to antibiotics — that medical researchers would like to see eradicated. In the context of biological warfare even lifesaving techniques such as immunization take on a strange aspect: immunity among one's own population and troops is a prerequisite to the initiation of disease by our own forces, as well as a precaution against the initiation of others. Some diseases are currently excluded from active consideration as BW agents simply because no vaccines against them have yet been developed.¹⁶

In a paper presented at the 1968 London conference, Elinor Langer made this comment: "With few exceptions, such as development of detection and protective equipment, little CBW research can be accurately described as defensive. . . . Because of the nature of chemical and biological weapons, research even in seemingly 'pure' areas, such as the development of vaccines, has at least equal implications for offensive and defensive use."¹⁷

The difficulties of using vaccination as a means of defense against a BW attack led the Pugwash Study Group to conclude that, in spite of the fact that vaccines are available for most of the major BW agents, a general immunization program will probably never be effective as a prophylactic

measure.¹⁸ Apparently these same difficulties have led the Pentagon to put most of its effort into the offensive area of development. As we have seen, however, there is still a need for some "defensive" knowledge, because, as Malek points out, "in the case of intended microbiological attack it is possible to prepare one's own personnel, for instance, by vaccination against selected microorganisms, so that they would not be seriously endangered when entering the infected area."¹⁹

IV

60 In October 1954 then Surgeon General George Armstrong sent a letter to Theodore R. Flaiz, secretary of the General Conference Medical Department, in which he noted that Lieutenant Colonel W. D. Tigertt, commanding officer of the medical unit at Fort Detrick, had been invited "to present to representatives of the Seventh-day Adventist Conference a request for their assistance in the conduct of a study of the highest importance to our nation's health. Only through the use of volunteers can the necessary information be obtained."

A reply by Doctor Flaiz dated the following day stated that he had just received the letter and heard the presentation by Colonel Tigertt. He went on to say:

We feel that if anyone should recognize a debt of loyalty and service for the many courtesies and considerations received from the Department of Defense, we, as Adventists, are in a position to feel a debt of gratitude for these kind considerations.

The type of voluntary service which is being offered to our boys in this research problem offers an excellent opportunity for these young men to render a service which will be of value not only to military medicine but to public health generally. I believe I speak not only the sentiments of our administrative group in this office, but also of our Adventist young men in the services, in observing that it should be regarded as a privilege to be identified with this significant advanced step in clinical research.

Since that time about 1,500 men have served in this unit. In a paper presented to the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States in November 1954, General Armstrong made the following statement in relation to the aims of this project: "The Army Medical Service, with its requirement for operation anywhere in the world, must maintain a continuing interest in all of the communicable diseases. Obviously, should such diseases ever again become problems in this country, the information deriving from these studies would be directly applicable to the overall national health."²⁰ It is of note that biological warfare is not mentioned.

By 1963, however, after Operation Blue Skies had publicized CBW, a

number of charges were made about the use of volunteers for such work. In an article in *Military Medicine* Colonel Tigertt acknowledged that volunteers were being used for experimentation, but he defended the practice as being necessary for defense. He said it should not be surprising that deliberate infection was being induced in human subjects for BW research and added:

61 What is surprising is that many physicians have refused to deal with the problem. They explain their apathy by stating that ethics prohibit their participation in any endeavor, the derivatives of which might be used to produce suffering or cause loss of life. Yet our profession admits that to be prepared to deal with such a threat we must have an understanding of the methodology. This writer once heard a solemn proposal to provide a medical education for certain men, but to deny them the Hippocratic Oath so that they might participate in the study of biological weapons, thereby obtaining the necessary medical information but keeping the medical profession free from blemish. Such attitudes, whether fully developed or not, cannot be ignored because they seriously hamper efforts to get appropriate investigations under way.²¹

In response to the February 4 NBC television program, the March 20, 1969, issue of the *Review and Herald* carried an explanation of the beginning of Seventh-day Adventist participation in the project:

The United States Government decided that as soon as a definitive treatment could be developed for a disease, the findings would be given wide publicity in medical journals around the world. This publicity would effectively remove that particular disease from the potential arsenal of biological warfare. At the same time, it would also spread medical knowledge on treatment worldwide, so that those presently afflicted by that particular disease could be helped. . . .

Adventist medical servicemen were known to be highly motivated for humanitarian service. Thus the Seventh-day Adventist Church was approached to ascertain whether this would be considered something an Adventist serviceman might be able to volunteer for. After thorough study, the Medical Department of the General Conference and the General Conference Committee agreed that this was humanitarian service of the highest type, and that any Adventist serviceman might feel free to volunteer.²²

As we have already seen, it is not certain that the existence of an effective treatment or vaccine for a disease is sufficient to ensure its removal "from the potential arsenal of biological warfare." In fact, such treatment must exist for the disease to be included in that arsenal.

After this article appeared, I wrote to the National Service Organization at the General Conference and asked for additional information about Project Whitecoat. The reply from Clark Smith, director of the organization, included the letters from which I have quoted. But as for more detailed information, he said, "I do not know what official statements I could get from the Army concerning this project inasmuch as it is classified and therefore all statements would have to be cleared before release."

Concerned by the apparent contradiction between "wide publicity" and classified research, I wrote again asking for clarification. The reply did an about-face, however, and said that according to Colonel Dan Crozier, the commanding officer of the project, all clerical and secretarial work connected with Whitecoat was done by Adventist men, "so that there is nothing secretive about the entire project." The fact that all Whitecoat volunteers must have a security clearance at the "secret" level was not mentioned.

A number of questions about the project had been raised, and by August 1969 a committee had been set up by the General Conference to conduct another "thorough investigation" of Project Whitecoat. The investigation consisted of a visit to Fort Detrick by an eight-man subcommittee for an interview with Colonel Crozier and his staff. When I asked if any information other than that given by the army was to be considered, it was pointed out that the committee members were very busy men and that, although such information might be "interesting," it was not considered important to their work. The visit to Fort Detrick took place on September 11.

The following day Winton H. Beaven, then president of Columbia Union College and a member of the investigating committee, wrote a letter to the presidents of the other Adventist colleges and universities in North America in which he said:

I can report to you categorically that Project White Coat is a completely volunteer unit, that no classified projects are carried on in Project White Coat, that it has no relationship to either chemical or biological warfare directly or indirectly. . . .

It appears that because the biological and chemical warfare unit is located at Fort Detrick, Project White Coat has been tarred with the same brush. As a matter of fact, Project White Coat is a completely open unit — anyone can enter the post any time he wants to and see anything he wants to. There is nothing hidden and there never has been. However, the area which deals with chemical and biological warfare is within a stockade and completely enclosed, but it has no relationship whatsoever with Project White Coat.

The official report of the study committee was not quite so emphatic. It did acknowledge that the official mission of the unit is to conduct "studies related to medical defensive aspects of biological warfare and to develop appropriate biological protective measures, diagnostic procedures, and therapeutic methods," but went on to emphasize that the results of the research "are freely available to the public; the material is not classified information." In a subsequent letter, Clark Smith, who acted as secretary of the committee, went even farther, saying that the policy of free publication had been in effect from the inception of the project: "From the beginning of the work which is represented by USAMRIID in 1953 to the present time,

the work of this project has been freely published in the professional journals of the world.”

This sounds somewhat strange, however, when compared with the testimony of some previous participants. A former researcher at Fort Detrick, who asked not to be identified, and who is now dean of the medical school at a well-known university, said in a recent interview that when he was at Detrick, from 1954 to 1956, much of the work done with the volunteers (predominantly Seventh-day Adventists, but the program was not yet officially designated Project Whitecoat) was classified. He recalled one experiment in which volunteers were taken out into the desert for tests of nerve gas. The objective was to find out if the results of tests in laboratory aerosol chambers were similar to those in actual open-air situations. He went on to say that the experiments were successful and that from the results they were able to determine the concentration of gas necessary to cause death under actual use conditions.

A former volunteer of my acquaintance who was in the project in the late fifties said he was under strict security regulations at the time in connection with his work on tularemia and there are some things he participated in that he cannot disclose because they are still classified. Another person with whom I have talked said he went for an interview but decided not to volunteer for the project. After the interview he was told explicitly not to mention to anyone that such a project even existed.

Classification policies have become more lenient in recent years and more information is now being published in an effort to break down public opposition to CBW. The November 27, 1969, issue of the *Review and Herald* carried an interview with Clark Smith in which he reported the findings of the Project Whitecoat study committee.²³ He said: “After the first program in 1953-1954 the present unit was established in 1956 and since that time more than 160 articles and reports have been published in the standard journals of the medical profession.”

He neglected to state, however, that the 160 total includes all the articles from the entire medical unit at Fort Detrick. Only 23 of the 160 articles deal specifically with Project Whitecoat volunteers. During the first twelve years of the project only 5 published articles reported on studies involving 255 volunteers. During the twelve years 1,200 men participated in the project. From 1966 through September 1969, 18 articles were published about 440 volunteers, giving a total of 695 volunteers mentioned in the published literature since 1956.

In a private interview on November 17, 1969, Colonel Crozier indicated

that between 1956 and September 1969, 623 men had participated in one project, 225 participated in two, 40 in three, 3 in four, 2 in five, 1 in six, and 374 men did not take part in any studies. This gives a total of 1,221 man-projects, leaving 526 unaccounted for in the literature. Colonel Crozier stated that only two experiments did not successfully meet their objectives. These were cases where the volunteers were accidentally infected with a disease other than the one being studied. He also acknowledged that there had been a recent series of classified studies that involved 73 volunteers. He said that "most of these studies were done in the fall of 1965, one in January 1966, and the last ones in June 1966." He emphasized that these were the only experiments that had been classified since he became commander in 1961, but admitted that before that time more of the work done by the unit was classified.

Another item of interest to come out of the interview with Colonel Crozier was not mentioned in the *Review* article. The medical unit furnishes the offensive research laboratory with vaccines developed through experiments on Whitecoat volunteers. Colonel Crozier acknowledged that these vaccines were indispensable to the work of the researchers in the offensive area and that they would have to develop the vaccines themselves if the medical service did not. He saw no ethical problem, however, and explained that "we are engaged only in the study of infectious diseases and we can't help what use others may make of our work. I have no problem at all reconciling my work here with medical ethics, none at all."

We asked if there was any interaction between the professional staff of USAMRIID and those in the offensive area. He replied that "USAMRIID is completely separate from the Biological Research Laboratory here that does the offensive work. Of course our people cooperate and researchers exchange technical information since they are working on the same bacteria. But although they cooperate at a working level, the two units are completely separate organizationally." The *Review* was more emphatic:

The fact that these two research programs are situated on the same Army post, Fort Detrick, has led many people to unwarranted conclusions as to their connection. About the only connection is a piece of experimental equipment costing in excess of a million dollars. . . . Perhaps once a year permission is requested by USAMRIID for the use of this equipment. To illustrate the difference between the two programs, though, the USAMRIID offices and laboratories are open to visitors with a purpose. The research program in what could be called the offensive area in biological warfare, on the other hand, is highly classified and enclosed in a separate section of the post with a high fence guarded at all times. No one enters that section of the post without a classification allowing access to the secret work carried on there.

But Colonel Crozier, when asked, revealed that "up until two months ago we had two labs, Virology and Animal Assessment, inside the fence. Actually, much of the work done behind the fence is not classified, and there is some of the offensive type of work that is done outside the fence." He explained that the laboratories were no longer behind the fence because they had been moved into a new building.

The *Review* declined to publish a letter that called attention to these errors and omissions, since "very few, if any, *Review* readers have sufficient information to be able to discuss the question intelligently."

In addition to talking to Colonel Crozier, I have corresponded with Congressman Richard McCarthy, who has been instrumental in bringing CBW into the open in Congress and in the public press. He is also the author of a book on the subject.²⁴

At a conference on CBW in December he stated that he was convinced by his investigation that Project Whitecoat was being used for offensive rather than defensive purposes. "The whole thrust of it in its essential conception was a deterrent one, an offensive one, that we threaten to use a disease on somebody else if they use it on us. Now what they have done of a defensive nature is minimal, and they even admit it themselves. We don't have any measures to inoculate the American people against this kind of germ warfare."

His testimony on this point is corroborated by Colonel Crozier. He acknowledged that no preparations were being made for civilian defense and that "the Department of Civil Defense has never recognized biological warfare as a serious threat to this country." Congressman McCarthy said further, "My knowledge of [Project Whitecoat], and I base that on the statements made by very responsible people, is that it is offensive, not defensive, and that the Seventh-day Adventists are being duped."

V

The most critical questions that must be asked about Project Whitecoat are those about the morality of contributing to a morally dubious cause. If one accepts the proposition that one is morally responsible not only for the immediate result of his actions, but also for the net long-term results, it becomes clear that the moral aspects of participation in CBW research are really little different from the ethical problems surrounding the role of medical personnel in warfare in general.²⁵

The Hippocratic Oath says: "I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but never with a view to injury and wrong-

doing. Neither will I administer poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I suggest such a course."²⁶

The Oath of Geneva, formulated and adopted by the World Medical Association in 1948, states that "even under threat I will not use my medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity."²⁷

The Code of Ethics in Wartime of the World Medical Association is more specific, stating that "it is deemed unethical for doctors to weaken the physical and mental strength of a human being without therapeutic justification and to employ scientific knowledge to imperil health or destroy life."²⁸

Obviously, these codes have direct bearing on biological warfare research. Their application to the combat situation is not quite so clear, but there can be little doubt that the role of medical personnel in war is a critical one. Official military doctrine, stated in Army Field Manual FM 8-10, *Medical Service Theatre of Operations*, makes the mission of medical troops abundantly clear:

The primary duty of medical troops as of all other troops, is to contribute their utmost to the success of the command of which the medical service is a part [p. 195].

The mission of the medical service in a theatre of operations is to contribute to the success of the military effort [p. 20].

The objective of all hospitalization is to return a maximum number of casualties to full duty within a minimum period [p. 32].

Significantly, saving life and easing suffering are nowhere mentioned as being part of the mission of the medical service.

Traditional medical ethics are concerned primarily with the doctor's responsibility to his patient as a single individual. In the military situation, however, this approach obscures the larger context and the aims of the organization in which the individual interaction takes place.

[Doctors] withdraw and wait while their fighting friends drop toxic gas or napalm, after which they may help the victims who survive. To a physician trained to prevent suffering, such a role may appear irrational, but it is sanctioned by medical ethics, through its apparent humanitarian function. But the wider situation has been well described by Dr. Howard Levy as "Kill, Kill. Cure, Cure," and this is the situation which the doctor's presence supports. A doctor may need to do this kind of thing, but he cannot shelter behind his humanitarian role. He is always an accomplice to the wider act and it is his relation to this which he must consider.²⁹

VI

On August 2, 1864, the General Conference Committee sent a letter to Austin Blair, governor of Michigan, in which is set forth the position of the church on military service. The letter stated that Adventists take the Bible

as their guide and "are unanimous in their views that its teachings are contrary to the spirit and practice of war." It was emphasized further that the Ten Commandments were regarded as especially important, and it was noted that "the fourth of these commandments requires cessation from labor on the seventh day of the week, the sixth prohibits the taking of life, neither of which, in our view, could be observed while doing military duty. Our practice has uniformly been consistent with these principles. Hence our people have not felt free to enlist into the service."³⁰

A year later the 1865 General Conference session passed a resolution which stated that Adventists "acknowledge the justice of rendering tribute, custom, honor, and reverence to the civil power, as enjoined in the New Testament. While we thus cheerfully render to Caesar the things which the Scriptures show to be his, we are compelled to decline all participation in acts of war and bloodshed, as being inconsistent with the duties enjoined upon us by our divine Master toward our enemies and toward all mankind."³¹

Even during World War I, with its nationalistic excesses, official statements by the church did not say specifically that Adventists were willing to serve in the army. No doubt many did, but a 1917 statement reaffirmed the 1865 declaration and requested that "we be required to serve our country only in such a capacity as will not violate our conscientious obedience to the law of God as contained in the Decalogue, interpreted in the teachings of Christ, and exemplified in His life."³²

But by 1934 official policy had become more specific. In May of that year, the General Conference Committee approved a "document of instruction to the youth" which allowed that since "warfare is unavoidable in maintaining civil government in a world of sin," we should not condemn those who take part in it, but that those who refrain from "taking *combatant* part in the destruction of human life" (italics mine) will be a "greater influence for the cause of righteousness."

The statement goes on to enumerate some of the activities that noncombatants will perform: "They will help to feed and clothe the Army; assist in caring for the sick and wounded; help to bury the dead; aid in the transportation of men, food, clothing, etc. . . . They will help to fortify positions and otherwise protect human life. They will carry the wounded back from the front. The noncombatant . . . simply and conscientiously and courageously objects to taking human life, *so far as his participation is concerned*" (italics mine).³³

A two-page definition of noncombatancy given in a statement authorized

in 1940 makes it plain that "noncombatancy is not pacifism." It "is not conscientious objection to war service," and therefore the "Christian non-combatant will not refuse to participate in the military establishment."³⁴

68 The early statements also refer to the position of the church as being "noncombatant," but there is some doubt that the term had the same meaning in 1864 as is assigned to it today. It should be remembered that at that time there was no such separate category within the army as there is today. Additional evidence that the terms *noncombatant* and *pacifist* were used interchangeably in 1864 comes from a letter of introduction to the governor of Illinois written by a local official for two church leaders who wished to make known the church's position on war. The letter informed the governor that "there is in this part of our state a number of church organizations of the Seventh-day Adventists, who are as truly noncombatants as the Society of Friends."³⁵ Neither does the present definition appear to be particularly "contrary to the spirit and practice of war" as long as someone else does the actual killing.

Current church literature still quotes the 1865 statement, apparently oblivious to the contradiction between it and the present position. It would seem that the best method of resolving the inconsistency would be to re-revise the definition of noncombatancy to conform to the original usage, and to initiate in the churches an active program of education that emphasizes "the duties enjoined upon us by our divine Master toward our enemies and toward all mankind," and that makes it clear why these are inconsistent with "all participation in acts of war and bloodshed." Whether this is done or not, it should be clear that we can no longer have it both ways. A narrowly defined morality that claims to object to "the spirit and practice of war" but that does not believe in "conscientious objection to war service" will no longer suffice.

The position that biological warfare research is "humanitarian service of the highest type" is an unfortunate example of the fruits of such moral nearsightedness. An important and meaningful first step in the process of change would be for the church to renounce publicly its support of Project Whitecoat and to make its influence felt on the side of those who are working for a redirection of the CBW effort toward genuinely humanitarian ends.

A conscience that is sensitive to the dangers of coffee and wedding rings, but fails to be concerned with the moral implications of participation in biological warfare research, and in war itself, must seem paradoxical to a great many thinking people. A recent magazine article that dealt specifically with the Adventist involvement in Project Whitecoat concluded:

"The guardians of the Adventist Church . . . are content with a morality of form without substance, one in which the arts of disease can be presented as the healing arts, and in which germ warfare can be embraced in pious obedience to a divine injunction against death."³⁶

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Discussion: AN ADVENTIST LAW SCHOOL?

No!

JOHN JERRY WILEY

71

An article by Richard Hammill has given SPECTRUM readers arguments favoring the establishment of a Seventh-day Adventist law school. Briefly summarized Hammill's arguments were:

1. We need a school of law that will prepare a large number of Adventist lawyers and judges to practice in thousands of communities throughout the United States.
2. We need a school of law to help our church clarify its thinking on the place of law in the fabric of society and in the theology we preach.
3. We need a school of law to serve as an additional means of helping us realize the importance of a continuing search for truth.
4. We need a school of law in which lawyers come to recognize that the function of all laws is to produce justice for human beings.
5. We need a school of law that will help impress not only the lawyers among us, but the whole church, that God values persons who are deeply concerned that they themselves do justice.¹

I wish to give counterarguments and to offer additional insight into assumptions that Professor Hammill makes in his article.²

I

1. The process of becoming a judge is not directly related to law school education, except that judges are usually lawyers. Thus Hammill's argument raises the central issue of whether or not the church needs a school of law to prepare large numbers of Seventh-day Adventist lawyers. For the most part, the statement rests on the observation that Adventist lawyers are

needed "primarily to give status to the church in thousands of cities and towns across the United States." Is status the issue? If it were, would status come to the church more fully through Adventist attorneys who were educated in schools across the country than through the establishment of an Adventist professional school (probably understaffed and underfinanced) in Michigan, California, or elsewhere?

Experience with professional education has given the church some indication that when a school is established as "the school" (medicine, for example), the graduates have a strong tendency to settle in nearby geographic areas rather than "in thousands of cities and towns across the United States." This human inertia might very well be reinforced in law practice, since each state has its own test for admission, generally a bar examination. Unlike medicine, law does not offer general reciprocity between states. Passing the difficult New York examination does not mean that a lawyer will be admitted to practice in California; he will have to satisfy residence requirements and take the local examination in that state.

It is interesting that a Seventh-day Adventist educator uses as his major argument the idea that status is one of the primary goals of graduate education. My understanding of Seventh-day Adventist theology is (man's evaluation of "status" notwithstanding) that God values *every* human being — not for position or education, but for character.

II

2. If the Adventist church needs help in clarifying its thinking on the "place of law in the fabric of society and in the theology we preach," would not the impact on the church at large be greater if that clarification were made primarily at the secondary and undergraduate level at a felicitous time in the student's life? What Hammill reveals is an internal problem in Adventist education that could be solved more directly, perhaps, by adding legal scholars to the faculties of existing schools and colleges.

3. As I have already suggested, I believe the church would meet the need of utilizing lawyers as "an additional means of helping us realize the importance of a continuing search for truth" by adding law-educated men and women to the faculties of existing Adventist colleges.

4. Hammill says that "we need a school of law in which lawyers come to recognize that the function of all laws is to produce justice for human beings." His assumption here seems to be that somehow law schools are not educating their students to this function of law. This may have been the case in some schools a generation or more ago, but it is no longer true in

most well respected law schools of the United States. By this I do not mean that "well respected" should beg the question. Scores of law schools in the nation place primary importance on scrutinizing the law. The majority of schools engage in continual criticism of the law — whether it be statutory law, case law, administrative decision, administrative regulation, or the acts of individuals in official capacities. Many law schools today examine the moral, ethical, economic, social, and even religious significance of the law, and students' summers are often spent in projects of reform such as those sponsored by Ralph Nader.

5. If, as Hammill says, "we need a school of law that will help impress not only the lawyers among us, but the whole church, that God values persons who are deeply concerned that they themselves do justice," this is a most serious indictment of the Seventh-day Adventist educational system (elementary, secondary, and collegiate level). He seems to say that in spite of the system developed thus far, only a law school can rescue the church, for the Adventist colleges are not teaching justice now. In his fervor to develop arguments for establishing a law school, perhaps Hammill overstated a need. In any case, no single intellectual discipline can carry the entire church educational system on its shoulders, and what he may be saying is that all of Seventh-day Adventist graduate and undergraduate education is failing to teach justice.

III

The benefits suggested may be illusory; but even if Hammill is correct in his assumptions about the benefits that would flow to the church through the establishment of a law school, his analysis fails to assess the burdens. Likewise, it fails to establish alternative means of educating more Seventh-day Adventist lawyers.

Law is a good profession for Seventh-day Adventists to enter. Nothing in legal education is detrimental to the beliefs and objectives of the church. Adventist attorneys can help the church in more than the usual area of concern — religious liberty — i.e., such areas as estate planning, contracts, family law, business organization, real estate, trial practice, philosophy, and religion. The growth of law as a profession in the church would create a larger body of educated, knowledgeable, community-oriented church members who would be able to support the church through their leadership and through their financial contributions.

If one assumes, for the sake of discussion, that the church would be better served by encouraging more of its youth to enter the legal profession,

then the issue might be framed as whether the need for Seventh-day Adventist lawyers can best be met by a church-owned law school or whether existing law schools can be utilized without defeating the objective of creating a church-oriented group of attorneys. I suggest that we must consider the following questions at the threshold:

1. *Are substantial numbers of qualified Seventh-day Adventist college students interested in entering the legal profession?*

The only published figures, those prepared by the Association of Seventh-day Adventist Lawyers in 1967, show fifty Seventh-day Adventist college students "interested" in entering the field of law. My instinct tells me that this is a low figure as an indication of interest and that the existence of a Seventh-day Adventist law school would no doubt increase interest in the legal profession.

A more vital but unanswered question is: how many *qualified* students can be interested in law as a career? The pool of students who are academic standouts is limited in the Seventh-day Adventist church, and a first-rate law school would undoubtedly dilute that pool for other graduate and professional disciplines.

2. *Could a Seventh-day Adventist law school compete in quality with existing schools? If not, would such an inability be significant?*

Law schools are accredited by three primary accrediting bodies: (1) the state in which they are located; (2) the American Bar Association; and (3) the Association of American Law Schools. The most stringent requirements are those of the Association of American Law Schools, which grants accreditation to approximately 115 law schools in this country. The American Bar Association grants accreditation to nearly 150 schools.

Some factors related to costs in accredited law schools are as follows:

Library. The largest law library in the country, Harvard's, has approximately 1,200,000 titles. The average number of titles in the law libraries of fully accredited law schools is approximately 85,000. (Note that these are *titles*, not volumes.) The smallest law libraries in even partially accredited law schools (American Bar Association accreditation only) have approximately 25,000 titles. Under the standards of the Association of American Law Schools, \$40,000 must be spent each year on book purchases.

Faculty. Are there enough teaching-oriented Seventh-day Adventist lawyers (with preeminent academic records) to staff a law school?

The teaching load of professors in fully accredited law schools is four to

six hours per week; the level of class preparation by law professors is significantly higher than is customary among undergraduate liberal arts professors. A student generally takes 88 to 90 semester hours in a three-year period. Thus, a minimum faculty, offering virtually no electives, would be eight full-time professors.

The average salary of the law professors in American Bar Association accredited schools in 1968-69 (including all ranks from lecturer to professor) was \$17,000 per year for a nine-month year, with thirty weeks of teaching. The average starting salary was approximately \$11,000 per year, and the salaries for full professors ranged to \$40,000 per year. The law school that ranked twenty-fifth in the nation in median faculty compensation had an average salary in excess of \$20,000 per year. Those figures have risen significantly during the past year.

Physical Plant. Obviously the question of physical plant opens a tremendous area of discussion of what is necessary. One private law school, which has made a deliberate choice to remain small (400 total enrollment), has built a modest facility costing \$3,400,000. This houses twenty-five faculty members, the dean, two associate deans, supporting staff, classrooms, and library space for 200,000 volumes.

Operating Costs. In no private educational institution, whether church-related or broad-based, can tuition alone satisfy the need for operating income. In fact, somewhere between 40 percent and 75 percent of the operating costs of private professional schools comes from other sources. Traditionally, the church has been the private source that underwrites the costs not absorbed by tuition. My understanding of the economic position of the church leads me to believe that the Adventist church has reached the breaking point in support of education.

3. *How important is it to keep law students in a protective religious environment through their law school experience?*

A Seventh-day Adventist lawyer is essentially a Christian who uses the available institutions of society to protect individual rights and redress wrongs. It seems questionable whether the best way to arrive at an imaginative, aggressive, competent lawyer is to place him in an isolated culture. This additional cloistering, it would seem, might well weaken rather than strengthen him.

4. *Are other schools available where qualified students can pursue a course of study in law without compromise of church and personal principles?*

Seventh-day Adventists may attend in good conscience the following fully accredited law schools:

Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Loyola University, Los Angeles, California
University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California
American University, Washington, D. C.
Willamette University, Salem, Oregon
Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
University of Santa Clara, Santa Clara, California
University of California, Berkeley, California
University of California, Hastings School of Law, San Francisco, California
University of California, Los Angeles, California
Stanford University, Palo Alto, California
University of Texas, Austin, Texas

76

The church should consider whether the need for additional Seventh-day Adventist lawyers can be met by legal education in existing law schools supplemented by church programs such as the following: (a) encouraging attendance at those law schools willing to respect Adventist principles; (b) establishing scholarship and loan assistance programs for qualified students financially unable to attend law school; (c) adding courses in Adventist liberal arts colleges to explore the place of law in society and religion; (d) holding church-sponsored seminars in specialized courses for Adventist attorneys.

5. *Is the church ready to accept a discipline dedicated to questioning and probing the reasons behind every rule, be that rule legislative, executive, administrative, philosophical, or religious?*

I ask this question without answering. It is a question that all Adventists may well ponder personally.

IV

1. Seventh-day Adventist attorneys educated in the law schools of this country could bring a diversity of experience and a breadth of outlook to the church greater than that of a group of attorneys educated in a Seventh-day Adventist law school.

2. Formation and operation of a law school, which would be a tremendous undertaking for the Seventh-day Adventist church, in terms of both personnel and financing, should not be undertaken if Adventist lawyers can be educated in other ways.

3. A Seventh-day Adventist attorney educated in a secular law school ought to be church-oriented because of his earlier undergraduate education

and church and family background. Specialized courses and seminars sponsored by the church can be utilized for continuation purposes.

On balance it seems that the burdens of a Seventh-day Adventist law school would far outweigh its benefits, especially since most of the benefits that would be derived by a church-sponsored law school can be derived in other ways.

As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said in an address at Boston University: "When you get the dragon out of his cave onto the plain and into the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal."³

Justice Holmes' dragon was the law, that creature that has been ominous and foreboding to the layman. The lawyer has been his keeper, and he has hardly fared better. I sincerely hope that we can get the dragon out of his cave and onto the plain and into the daylight. We should see that a law school's strengths cannot outweigh its weaknesses. Then we can tame legal education for the benefit of the church.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

- 1 Richard Hammill, *The Church Does Need a Law School*, *Spectrum* 1, 5-11 (summer 1969).
- 2 Portions of this article were sent in 1968 to selected Seventh-day Adventist educators and administrators in a memorandum signed jointly by attorneys Warren L. Johns and Robert M. Peterson and by me. I acknowledge reliance on certain portions of that memorandum, but accept full responsibility for substantial changes here.
- 3 Oliver W. Holmes, *The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes* (selected, compiled, and edited by Max Lerner. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company 1943).

Quantity or Quality?

RICHARD B. LEWIS

78

The financial implications of founding a Seventh-day Adventist law school are of towering importance in view of the current crisis. Since tuition furnishes only a fraction of the funds needed to provide classroom and office space, library, administrative and teaching personnel, and the usual "overhead" facilities for a new school, additional burdens would have to be borne by the church and donors whose contributions might better be used to solve existing problems.

Granted that these considerations could be overlooked with equanimity if a law school were *really* needed — consider the following propositions relative to the supposed needs:

1. Presumably Adventist medicine is different from general medicine. Presumably Adventist theology is different from general theology. In these two departments the question is not whether the Seventh-day Adventist church should furnish professional schools, but whether in either or both professional schools the training given is indeed Adventist.

2. Presumably Adventist natural science is different from general natural science, especially in the life science departments. Presumably Adventist behavioral science is different from general behavioral science. In these two disciplines the question is not whether the church should furnish graduate and professional programs but whether at this point in time there are scholars capable of staffing the departments. "Capable of staffing" has deep implications: a biology-geology research scholar who has been a ten-year member of a fifty-year-old, fifty-man research institute in creationism (instead of what we now have) which has developed a truly Seventh-day Adventist body of knowledge sufficient to mark the "difference" we so glibly

refer to; a behavioral science scholar who has done sufficient original research to assert a truly Seventh-day Adventist philosophy of psychology, sociology, and anthropology in place of the thinly veneered article we now boast — in short, one who has made the synthesis between current academic viewpoints and Seventh-day Adventist Christian viewpoints.

3. It remains to be shown that an Adventist-trained lawyer would necessarily be a better attorney (a more *Adventist* attorney?) than one trained in an established law school. Has it, in fact, been shown that a genuine Adventist history teacher needs doctoral training in a special Adventist graduate-professional* school in place of an established graduate-professional school? or the same for art, music, English, et cetera? No religion is taught in the "established" schools, true. But at the graduate-professional level in the Adventist institutions are the "religion" courses taught to satisfy a convention? Does a graduate-professional student need to be wet-nursed in this respect?

4. Wouldn't the energies of the church better be directed toward improving undergraduate education in terms of the following?

- a. More administrators who are educators.
- b. More department heads who are interested in good teaching more than in empire building.
- c. More teachers who know what has been going on in higher education in the past ten years.
- d. More administrators and teachers who know what Adventist education is supposed to be, who have the courage to achieve distinction in Adventist education, who have the initiative to achieve excellence before being forced to advance by "worldly" accrediting agencies.
- e. More than the present few open minds.

No aspersion is here aimed at any individual persons — certainly not at those few accomplished teachers who fail only because there has been no tradition within the church educational system toward the development of their specialties, not at those whose limitations have been determined by the subculture which nurtured them.

5. Seventh-day Adventist undergraduate education has been plagued by overextension, duplication of effort, and false standards based on quantity rather than quality. As a result, efficiency, innovation, and excellence have been in short supply, in strange incongruity with the expense, effort, and dedication lavished on the project by many generous-hearted people.

6. What the colleges need is a demand, within the organization, for educated young people who have the "power to think and to do," who are

"thinkers, and not mere reflectors of other men's thoughts." Such a demand would challenge more of our best students to attend Adventist colleges and to seek employment within the denomination.

I submit that these issues must be debated and some solid conclusions reached before the founding of a school of law; before the continuance, beyond the level required for staffing the academies, of some graduate-professional programs now authorized. Let us beware of vested interests!

NOTE

* This hyphenated terminology is a concession to a nonsensical tradition. The distinction between "graduate" school and "professional" school is unrealistic, outdated, hypocritical, and snooty. Graduate schools are professional schools. Those who attend them have professional objectives in mind; their curriculums are as professionally oriented as those of the avowed professional schools, and their entrance requirements are equally non-liberal arts. The refusal of "graduate" schools to accept credits from "professional" schools is usually arbitrary and groundless. On the undergraduate level, liberal arts still live, but not on the graduate level.

REVIEWS

History from an Adventist Perspective

GARY LAND

1844: RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENTS

By Jerome B. Clark

Nashville, Tennessee: Southern Publishing Association 1968 volume 1,
396 pp; volume 2, 368 pp; volume 3, 240 pp each \$7.95 per set
\$21.95

81

In these volumes the author, a professor of history at Southern Missionary College (Tennessee), attempts to portray the great religious, social, and intellectual activity of the age that produced the Millerite movement. Although for many years Seventh-day Adventist ministers have attested to their belief that much of this activity constituted a battle by Satan to defeat the cause of truth, one looks to the professional historian for a full understanding of the historical context of the 1844 movement. Such a work could contribute to a clearer view of the origins of the Seventh-day Adventist church. Unfortunately, Clark falls rather short of success.

Based almost entirely on secondary sources, his work leads one to expect that it will be a synthesis of previous historical scholarship. However, in nearly every case Clark draws on his sources for facts rather than for historical interpretation. Seldom does he consider how these historians have explained the existence and meaning of the movements he treats.

This fact suggests the central flaw in these volumes. Aside from pointing out that these activities have a common focal point in the year 1844, the author fails to construct an interpretative framework by which to draw together such diverse movements as Millerism, social welfare, abolitionism, and the peace crusade. Sometimes he even loses sight of 1844. For instance, in his discussion of higher criticism, within the space of fourteen pages he ranges from the second century to 1954. Significantly, in that particular chapter he does not even mention two tremendously important works on the life of Christ (those by Ernst Renan and David Straus) that fall within his period of emphasis.

Content with a chronological summary of events, Clark offers little explanation of why they took place. His comment on several abolitionists is typical: "Interestingly enough, they were as deeply involved in the temperance, peace, and women's rights movements as in antislavery. This was a characteristic of many antislavery reformers" (1, p. 66). Instead of merely noting the characteristic, the historian should seek to determine why these men were involved in such a wide spectrum of reform.

But Clark, although tracing the impact of antislavery on such centers of evangelicalism as Oberlin College, does not make use of the thesis that Western evangelical revivalism had an important role in the origins of antislavery¹ and reform in general.² Nor does he give attention to the idea that the reformers were a displaced social elite striving to assert the traditional values and social position of their class.³ By neglecting such approaches, he virtually ignores the social and economic background of the movements he studies, and thus he offers no reason why they arose around 1844.⁴

Furthermore, the author does not show how the idea of progress permeated these movements. Occasionally he draws from a historian who uses this concept (2, p. 321; 3, p. 36), but never does he develop it. I do not wish to suggest what Clark's thesis should have been, but the idea of progress might well have proved a fruitful, unifying theme for the material he presents. Use of it might have shown more clearly the fundamental difference between (a) the Millerites' basic assumption that the increasingly corrupt world could be saved only by the Second Coming and (b) the dominant world view that a perfect society could be achieved on this earth.

When Clark does venture into the realm of interpretation, he raises historiographical problems of immense dimensions. Like the ministers mentioned earlier, he invokes the hand of God or Satan to explain the existence of certain developments. He calls the Millerite movement "ordained of God" (1, p. 60) and attests to his belief that Miller will rise in the first resurrection (1, p. 64). Concerning early manifestations of the prophetic gift within Adventism, Clark writes that God tried to use William Foy as his "agent to carry prophetic messages, but he [Foy] had failed the trust" (1, p. 73).

Turning to spiritualism, the author states: "The monstrous lies perpetrated by spiritualism are the work of Satan himself. The archdeceiver comes to men in the guise of spirits, using his evil angels as his agents of deception, and teaches that there is no difference between evil and righteousness, and that there is no judgment of the wicked" (1, p. 371).

And, finally, on evolution: "This phenomenon of acceptance is inexplicable except in connection with prophetic movements. Evolution arose as the counterfeit to the Sabbath and the Bible truths just at the time of the rise of the Advent Movement. It was born at the same time because Satan feared the Advent Movement and did not want its truths to be taught. While the Sabbath, the sanctuary, and the Spirit of Prophecy were being developed as distinctive Seventh-day Adventist doctrines and teachings, the theory of evolution was arising to destroy these very truths in the minds of scientists, theologians, and laymen. The real and the counterfeit were developed at the same time" (3, p. 173).

Most professional historians would be uncomfortable with such historical writing, for during the past century they have sought to develop a historical method that is based on known quantities. Realizing that no one can fully understand causation, they nevertheless believe that interpretation must be tied to documentary evidence; otherwise historiography will once again sink into irresponsible speculation and superstition.

In the face of this attitude, what position should the Christian historian take?

Clark obviously holds that the historian is justified in using the supernatural to explain earthly events. But man has such an incomplete understanding of the relation-

ship of supernatural powers to earthly happenings that, apart from divine revelation, he can have no firm support for his ideas.

The Christian historian recognizes that the supernatural can and does have a role in human affairs, but that men's finite minds are incapable of determining the specific nature of that role. In humbleness, he realizes that his explanations are partial and that only in eternity can he hope to find answers to some of his burning questions. Furthermore, if the Christian historian expects to gain the attentive hearing of the historical profession, he cannot indulge in theological predilections. Such a hearing, I am afraid, will not be accorded Clark's work.

On the other hand, I do not necessarily mean that the Christian historian's work is no different from that of his nonchristian colleague. Christianity is a historical religion, basing its evidence to a large degree on historical events. It offers an interpretation of human nature and a morality by which to judge human actions. It denies the idea of progress, stating instead that mankind's decline will be ended only by Christ's Second Coming. In this light, it seems, the Christian historian can have a unique perspective unavailable to the nonchristian.

Ellen White writes: "Let the youth study these records, and see how the true prosperity of nations has been bound up with an acceptance of the divine principles. Let him study the history of the great reformatory movements, and see how often these principles, though despised and hated, their advocates brought to the dungeon and scaffold, have through these very sacrifices triumphed."⁵ This statement suggests that the peculiarity of a Christian historical perspective is characterized not by attributing causation to the supernatural but by one's interests and the questions one asks.

Clark follows this approach to some extent, for few but a Seventh-day Adventist historian would examine the years under consideration by placing the Millerite movement at their center. By doing so he reveals that a significant number of people did not accept the idea of progress. Moreover, while higher criticism and the evolutionary theory were breaking down Christian faith, he suggests, scientific advances provided improved means by which Christians could communicate the gospel to the world. But because he does not develop these ideas, Clark's contribution is limited.

Another problem Clark's method raises is that he often seems to write Adventist apologetics instead of history. Rather than criticizing Mormon and Spiritualist beliefs on the basis of a few Bible texts (1, pp. 125-126, 328-330), he might have examined the criticisms that their contemporaries made. This approach would have had the advantage of probing further into the ideas of the time while avoiding the implication that the book is a religious tract.

The chapter entitled "The Impact of Evolution on Religious Thought" reveals this problem most fully. For fourteen of the twenty-five pages Clark explains current creationist philosophy, following with a cursory outline of the development of evolutionary theory. In his zeal to explain creationism he forgets the purpose of his chapter, for he virtually neglects the controversy over evolution in the Christian churches. By so doing he misses an opportunity to make an important contribution to our understanding of this period. Out of his sympathy for their problems Clark might have examined the ideas of Agassiz and other Christians more closely, asking why they did not incorporate new scientific findings into a responsible, biblically oriented theory of creationism.

In addition to the problem of content, Clark's volumes leave much to be desired stylistically. Portions of his work reveal that Clark can write well; but there are many abrupt transitions, listings, quotations, and repetitive phrases. Occasionally Clark tries to cover too much material. His treatment of higher criticism degenerates into a nearly unreadable listing of names, with a sentence or two of description after each. One would expect this in a reference book, but good history is literature and has no place for such writing.

Although generally accurate, Clark is also sometimes liable to error. He identifies the first Negroes sold at Jamestown as slaves (2, p. 15), whereas the evidence indicates that they were equivalent to indentured servants. He implies that the term *fundamentalist* existed in the 1830s and 1840s (1, p. 260), whereas historians generally date the word from 1909. Within the space of two pages he gives two different figures for the number of blind people in the world at present (2, pp. 289-290). And his chapter on nativism might be more accurately titled anti-Catholicism, for in emphasizing its religious aspect he gives little attention to the remaining complex of ideas and emotions that made up the nativist movement. However, he does make a careful distinction between antipapalism and anti-Catholicism (1, pp. 203-204).

These errors are minor, however, when compared with the problems of methodology and style which appear, in large part, to have resulted from a very hurried job of research and writing. Gordon Madgwick's introduction to volume one indicates that the author spent about a year and a half doing research and seven weeks writing the manuscript. Although Clark presents an impressive bibliography, he does not seem to have digested the ideas of the historians whose books he used. Had he spent more time thinking about his findings and more time writing and polishing his manuscript, he might well have produced something truly valuable to both Seventh-day Adventists and the historical profession.

As they stand, these volumes, bringing together a body of material otherwise not accessible to the nonhistorian, perform a limited service to the members of the Adventist church. But when regarded in the light of what might have been accomplished, they are disappointing. They reveal that Clark is a committed and sincere Christian; one wishes that he had held the standards of historical scholarship as high.

Clark has apparently already begun work on a new study entitled *The Temperance Movement in Great Britain and America*. We shall be interested to see if he grapples more successfully with the problems his recent work raises.

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Recent Christian Religious Wars

ERIC ANDERSON

UNHOLY SMOKE

By G. W. Target

Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans 1969 127 pp \$1.95

85

For an Irishman, George Target is curiously apolitical — even antipolitical. “I have very little interest in either a ‘United Ireland’ or the ‘Freedom of the Six Loyal Counties of Ulster’ ” (p. 9), he states early in his brief paperback on recent “troubles” in Northern Ireland. He feels that most politicians are “sick in the head for power or simply . . . wicked men on the make” (p. 10). So Target warns his readers not to expect any simple solutions in *Unholy Smoke*. Truth as complex as it really happens is what he promises. “So as it comes, then, as it happened and happens, sights, sounds, words, smells, agonies, people . . . *The People, Yes!*” (p. 20).

The allusion to Sandburg’s rambling, patchwork poem is appropriate, for Target also writes in a quilt style. He writes a few paragraphs in one direction, throws in a line of asterisks, and is off on a different tack. Like Sandburg’s, too, his rhetoric is excellent when it hits the mark, and a little embarrassing when occasionally it doesn’t.

Catholics in Ulster view themselves as an oppressed minority; and Protestant Seventh-day Adventist Target sees that they do have much to be unhappy about. There is the extensive gerrymandering of local election districts, a self-perpetuating “fiddle” because “Unionist Councils ‘usually allocate houses to Catholics’ only in ‘Catholic wards lest the voting pattern be upset’ ” (p. 37). This combination of vote and housing inequity, plus job discrimination, forms the basis of the civil rights protest in Northern Ireland.

On the other hand, Target says, many civil rights advocates have objectives beyond ending anti-Catholic discrimination. They are supposed at heart to desire an Ireland united under “Home Rule,” and this frightens many Orangemen, because to them it means “Rome Rule.”

(Two features of Northern Ireland’s system of law enforcement should also be mentioned for an understanding of the crisis. First is the Special Powers Act, about which Target quotes a Sheffield University professor: “ ‘British citizens in Ulster can be arrested without warrant, denied recourse to law, flogged, denied trial by jury, and if a British citizen so incarcerated without trial dies in prison, the Ulster government can refuse the right of inquest’ ” (p. 30). In addition, there are the B-Specials, an auxiliary police force that is all-Protestant and variously called a lawless mob or saviours of the community.)

Target begins his history of recent disturbances with the account of an unauthorized Londonderry protest march (October 5, 1968) which police vigorously broke up, sending a participating Labor MP to the hospital with injuries from a cop’s club. Afterward the Stormont government blamed the news media and outside agitators, and a blue-ribbon investigating commission found there may have been something of a police riot.

Perhaps the most shocking of the ensuing incidents described in *Unholy Smoke* is the Burntollet Bridge affair and related violence in January of last year. A small and peaceable civil rights march from Belfast to Londonderry suffered several attacks from Protestant vigilantes, culminating in a large ambush at Burntollet Bridge outside Londonderry. Defenseless men and women, reports Target, were attacked by mobs armed with stones, sticks, and even nail-studded clubs. Police were ineffective, to say the least, in halting the violence.

Indicative of official attitude is the answer given to an interviewer as to whether assailants were armed. "There were no arms out there that I could see," said the man in charge of an Orange Hall where many of the counter-demonstrators met. "As a justice of the peace I could not put up with that. Plenty of sticks and cudgels, yes, but arms — certainly not" (p. 56).

After Burntollet, the situation in Northern Ireland deteriorated even further. Serious rioting broke out on several occasions in Londonderry and Belfast, featuring sabotage reminiscent of the outlawed Irish Republican Army, Protestant arson, sniping, and police gassing of mobs. Eventually, British troops intervened in cities by then divided by elaborate physical barricades.

But as Target said at the start, this is not a political book. The author views the conflict more in terms of people and morality than in terms of economics and government.

The hatred and the warfare, he says, are not basically the result of outdated laws, unfair hiring practices, or police brutality. He sees the underlying cause of Ulster's woes as the consequence of an abdication of moral responsibility by the churches — Protestant and Catholic.

Northern Ireland teetered on the crumbling edge of Civil War, but the parish magazines were facing the future with editorials and hearts held high, secure in the times of choir practice, content to know that it was "hoped to have the Templemore Avenue Brass Band — which has won many brass band competitions — accompany Evening Service," and there is "an easy method of separating a yolk from a white for the preparation of a *really* fluffy spongecake" (p. 121).

Now apart from the lies, the evasions, the "covering of truth with words," and hardly bothering at all about who "started" it, the greatest wickedness, the depth of evil, the wound in the side of Christ, piercing His heart, is that Roman Catholics and Protestants alike were all prepared to finish it by killing each other . . . that Christians hated Christians (p. 117).

Target charges that the churches failed to teach Jesus and him crucified, and that this, more than anything else, has caused the unholy smoke rising over burned-out homes in Ulster. Such a theory gives the non-Irish reader no discomfort — unless, perhaps, he compares the unhappy dearth of sermons on the evil of hating "papists" in Ireland with the number of sermons delivered in Mississippi (or Chicago) on the evil of hating "niggers."

At any rate, Target sees the whole crisis as a humiliation to Christians everywhere. Or as a British soldier put it to him: "You can stick the bloody job. . . . Sooner be back getting shot at with the bloody wogs down in Aden. . . . At least you don't expect nothing much better from *them*" (p. 105).

With such rather convincing accusations against the churches, *Unholy Smoke* has run its short course. Despite its quasipolemic style, the book provides valuable perspective on the most recent of Christian religious wars.

How Is Earth History Revealed?

BENTON M. STIDD

87

CREATION — ACCIDENT OR DESIGN?

By Harold G. Coffin (with chapters by Ernest S. Booth, Harold W. Clark, Robert H. Brown, Ariel A. Roth, and Edward E. White)

Washington, D. C.: Review and Herald Publishing Association 1969

512 pp illustrations \$7.95

Occasionally a book is of sufficient importance and complexity to merit discussion by more than one reviewer. The editors think that this is such a book.

A recent excellent review of Coffin's book in this journal presented an analysis of its contributions through the eyes of a biologist. I wish to give an appraisal from the viewpoint of one in earth history, particularly paleobotany.

Coffin's reliance on and generous use of the published works of Ellen G. White and the Bible as sources of truth allow him to deal frankly with issues in a way that is of particular value to Seventh-day Adventists. His attempt to base his theories on a short chronology in the tradition of most Adventist apologists becomes increasingly difficult in view of new data in fields the author represents. But there is no denying the absolutely fundamental position the short chronology holds in much Adventist thought; hence this topic is of extreme importance among Adventists, and increasingly so. It is this aspect of the volume on which I wish to focus attention.

Fundamental to the defense of a short chronology for the earth is the concept of a perfect world brought into existence in a week's time. The first section of the book is devoted to this topic and the underlying issue — how the Genesis story is to be regarded. "By faith we accept this story as a true and literal record that God has given us" leaves no doubt as to where the author stands. In the author's view, Moses, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, was protected from any of the scientific misconceptions of his time, so that in addition to setting forth basic theological truths of Creation, the account was intended as a concise and literal scientific statement. This reflects a particular view of inspiration and revelation common in the Adventist church and prevalent throughout the volume. It is admitted that at times use was made of the terminology and cosmological concepts of the time. But it is implied that Moses and the other Bible writers did not concur in these popular misconceptions. This position, however, may be as precarious as the Roman Catholic position on papal infallibility.

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When the Bible speaks of the creation of great whales, the author justifiably points out, this translation is too limited. The difficulty of including carnivorous animals in an original perfect creation may be one of the reasons why a better translation is desirable. That the term *sea monster* is an improvement is not obvious to me. Nevertheless, it points up one of the greatest problems facing one who believes that Creation occurred only 6,000 or 7,000 years ago: namely, the incredibly rapid rate of change in organisms necessary to produce carnivores, and the tremendous diversity of life forms extant today.

This problem is admitted at the end of chapter twenty-seven, which paradoxically goes to great lengths to show that only microevolution occurs. The argument boomerangs, however, for it proves too much. The evolutionist is chided on the one hand for believing in macroevolution in the absence of the necessary mechanisms, while on the other hand the creationist, when presented with a similar problem, finds it quite in order to suggest that other processes not now known were formerly active.

Flood geology¹ is discussed in the second chapter and in certain succeeding sections. The idea that the original creation was destroyed by the Noachian Flood of vast proportions and incomparable magnitude seems to be absolutely essential to a short earth chronology. Support for such an event is marshaled by pointing out those places in the geologic record where catastrophic action was responsible for rapid deposition. Such places do exist and are quite skillfully exploited in support of Flood geology. One example is the Carboniferous section in Nova Scotia, where Coffin has turned up some rather interesting observations in support of rapid deposition. However, this site and others in the New England states have long been noted for their unique record of rapid deposition but not transport of upright plant remains. Furthermore, a significant portion of the data on Nova Scotia that fails to fit with a transport model is not considered.

The situation is quite different in the Eastern Interior and Midcontinent basins where coal seams equivalent to those of Nova Scotia are traceable over thousands of square miles. The suggestion that the vegetation composing these coal seams was collected in great mats during the Flood and eventually dropped in place is not in accord with much of the evidence. For example, the small reproductive bodies (pollen and spores) produced by Carboniferous vegetation are also found in these sediments. Their distribution within these rocks, with consistent differences from level to level and from coal seam to coal seam, is precise enough to make stratigraphic correlation possible. This is strong evidence that the coal seams were produced by intact plant communities growing naturally on sites reasonably near the areas of deposition. If these coal seams were deposited one above another (at least fifty in the Illinois basin) in a few months' time by surging flood waters, it is inconceivable that there would be any order to the occurrence of such microscopic objects.

A recent palynological study shows that from Silurian through Devonian time, spores increased in diversity (number of genera) concomitant with the development of two distinct size classes.² This is in harmony with the concept of the gradual change of a land flora in the direction of heterospory. Again, for such an ordered sequence of such small objects to have been laid down in a few months' time by flood waters on a worldwide scale is difficult to imagine.

The author makes a major point of the lack of similarity between the herbaceous peats so widespread in cold northern regions today and the woody nature of most coals. He fails to point out in this regard that the climate of coal-forming habitats was most often demonstrably warm and moist. Although less widespread, in warm temperate and subtropical regions, peat deposits with much wood are known.

Finally, an autochthonous peat seam has been discovered which extends under the ocean off the coast of Florida for as far as one and three-quarter miles.³ Apparently the sea has been slowly transgressing over the land for the past four or five thousand years. Thus a model of sorts does exist in present-day environments for coal seam formation in the past.

Considerable attention is devoted to the question of the nature of the lateral appendages of the organ genus *Stigmaria*. Although this is an interesting morphological problem (the rootlets do have many leaflike characters, including an abscission zone at the base), there is no doubt that these appendages functioned as roots, and their almost universal occurrence in the underclays or sediments beneath the coal seams is not easy to account for on the basis of predominantly transported flood deposits.

The presence of limestone containing distinctive marine fossil assemblages characteristic of the different levels within the Carboniferous in the cyclothem sequences so characteristic of Carboniferous strata implies quiet water in offshore environments where fine sediments could accumulate. Thus the evidence from microfossils and macrofossils, together with sedimentary evidence, demands considerable lengths of time for the formation of Carboniferous strata. This kind of evidence also argues against the ecological zonation theory presented by Harold Clark in chapter sixteen.

It is inconceivable to me that during the initial stages of the Flood there would have been no forms of higher life (for example, Angiosperm seeds, twigs, leaves, etc.) swept into areas of deposition no matter how strongly the antediluvian world might have been zoned. This points out a constant dilemma faced by Flood geologists: the necessity of invoking violent catastrophe on the one hand (which shortens the time necessary for a given geologic structure to form), while on the other hand admitting that there are many examples where an integral part of the same structure calls for slow accumulation or development in quiet water. Sometimes it appears that even Flood geologists tone down the violent scenes recorded by inspired writings, or at least shift them around in time or space.

One of the major problems faced by Flood geologists is where to draw the lines between pre-flood and post-flood deposits. A rough outline is presented in chart form (p. 111) comparing geologic periods with presumed major events of the Flood. This is understandably a difficult task, since these boundaries are not evident in the geologic record.

It will be noted that several of the examples chosen as evidences of the Flood do not fit very well with the chart: for instance, the Miocene San Onofre breccia and the Cambrian Burgess shale. On the chart, Miocene is well up into the Flood-postflood transition section. Of more concern is the fact that, while the two formations in the San Onofre area indicative of rapid deposition are described, the Monterey shale, which does not conform to a catastrophic model but is interbedded with the first two at several levels (see Figure 8.2), is not characterized at all. This shale is composed dominantly of microscopic diatoms that are generally recognized as accumulating

slowly on sea bottoms. (The author suggests on page 61 that such deposits may have accumulated in preflood times.)

In the discussion of the delicately preserved Cambrian Burgess shale fauna, the author argues that a catastrophe such as the Flood would be required (pp. 69-70). Evidence on turbidity current deposits and submarine slides make such an argument difficult to defend. Moreover, the fact that the fossil-rich seam is not confined to a single level or living community suggests that the area was recolonized a number of times and that at least several generations of organisms are preserved.

If it were not for many consistent lines of evidence indicating relatively slow development of certain geologic structures — including, among others, organic reefs at many levels in the column and the floral and faunal successions in Tertiary deposits such as are described by Ritland⁴ — one might conceivably consider the entire geologic column as Flood deposited. If this could be done, one might (if numerous other lines of evidence are ignored) stay within the time limits that many Flood geologists are willing to accept. The vagueness with which preflood and postflood boundaries are indicated is evidence in itself of the vulnerability of the attempt. Even so, if one accepts the general outline presented in Figure 10.9 (p. 111), there are still tremendous difficulties that prevent fitting all the necessary events within the acceptable time limits.

A good account of radioactive time clocks is given in chapters twenty-five and twenty-six. However, I remain amazed at some of the summary statements designed to allay any fear of abandonment of the biblical time scale. For example:

In accord with the principle that "the book of nature and the written Word shed light upon each other," an understanding of radioisotope dating can assist one in avoiding unwarranted interpretation of inspired testimony, and a recognition of the insights given through prophetic ministry can assist one in identifying incorrect assumptions underlying the interpretation of radioisotope data. There is need for extensive research by adequately qualified geochemists who recognize the complementary testimony of the book of nature and the written Word. Areas in great need of such investigation are radioisotope dating of volcanic material, intrusive material, and marine deposits [pp. 294, 295].

One with a different point of view might think it entirely valid to modify the last two sentences thus: "There is need for extensive research by adequately qualified theologians who recognize the complementary testimony of the book of nature and the written word. Areas in great need of such investigation are the nature of inspiration, accommodation, theory, and hermeneutics."

The calibration of radiocarbon dates by means of bristlecone pine tree ring chronology (going back at least 7,000 years) is particularly damaging to traditional short-term time limits and did not receive the full treatment it deserves. The fact that bristlecone dates for the past 2,500 years compare closely with C_{14} dates is acknowledged. But the distressing fact that bristlecone and historical dates for the two earlier millennia seem clearly to indicate that C_{14} dates during this period are not too old but consistently too young is stated in a way that is not easily comprehended by the average reader (p. 307). Moreover, while considerable space is given to discussion of a peat bog that conceivably could fit into a model of postflood buildup of C_{14} , there

is almost no mention of the numerous bogs that indeed give an opposite pattern or conform with an approximately uniform rate of buildup.

Studies of the daily growth of certain Paleozoic horn corals indicate an amazing harmony between three independent lines of evidence (paleontologic, astronomic, and radiometric), indicating that in Paleozoic time the number of days per year was much greater and has progressively decreased through geologic time to the present 365. Such increasingly sophisticated chronometers make the concluding statement of chapter twenty-six ("Continuing investigation of radiocarbon dating may be expected to bring greater harmony between the information God has given to us through the written Word and that through the natural world") overly optimistic if not dead wrong. Perhaps it would be in order to study most carefully whether we correctly understand the information God has given us in the written word.

The resurgence in recent years of evidence favoring continental drift is one of the several significant topics not considered. The discovery of seafloor spreading — with progressively thicker and older accumulations of fossil organisms as one moves away from the midoceanic ridge, together with paleomagnetic reversals integrated with radiometric dates showing older dates with increasing distance from the rift zone — is difficult to harmonize with a short history of the earth.

Permian glaciation is considered in three sentences. Our skepticism toward Permian glaciation is at about the same stage at the present time as was our attitude toward Pleistocene glaciation in the days of G. M. Price.

My greatest concern is the impression the book will inevitably create in the minds of many readers. Problems for geologists and evolutionists are emphasized by prominent headings, whereas even the most damning problems to certain traditional fundamentalist points of view are rather obscurely mentioned in chapter summaries accompanied by statements indicating the need for further study. One is left with the impression that further investigation will produce evidence in favor of a short earth history.

It is commonly assumed that Coffin's positions are required if one is to defend the integrity of the Sabbath and preserve respect for the Bible and the value of the writings of Ellen White. But this is not necessarily true. Although it is beyond the scope of my review to go into this aspect of the subject, this aspect does represent an area of study that should be of fundamental concern to Adventists who are aware of the world they live in.

Last, I think the book is misnamed. Though it is not the fault of the author, the publisher's advertisements make broader claims for the book than are justified. The central issue with which the book deals is not so much whether Creation was by accident or design as it is a defense of a particular view of earth history derived, in turn, from a particular, literal interpretation of inspired writings to which all scientific evidence must conform. It is one thing to be a creationist — it is quite another to be a Flood geologist.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

- 1 Those who attribute nearly all of the earth's strata (p. 61) and many other geological phenomena to a single event, the Genesis Flood, are commonly referred to as "flood geologists."

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- 2 William G. Chaloner, Spores and Land Plant Evolution, *Review of Paleobotany and Palynology* 1, 83-93 (1967).
- 3 Spackman, and others, *Palaeontographica* 117, 135-152 (1966). [See also Daniel Habib, Walter Riegel, and William Spackman, Relationship of Spore and Pollen Assemblages in the Lower Kittanning Coal to Overlying Faunal Facies, *Journal of Paleontology* 40, 756-759 (1966).]
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LETTERS

Richard Rice's essay [Adventists and Welfare Work: A Comparative Study, winter 1970] is an informative contribution to the philosophy, programs, and people of Seventh-day Adventist social service. This comparative study of welfare activism in Chicago in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries concluded that Seventh-day Adventist welfare service was in the mainstream; it was typical in philosophy and technique with the contemporary welfare service in Chicago.

The essay refers to the "general welfare movement" of Chicago and to the "major welfare movements" of the era. John Kellogg was in step with the prominent welfare leaders of his time. But how representative of the religious-social reform in Chicago is the model of this study? I believe that [the author] assumes too much unity of both goals and practices among the Protestant activists. Distinctions and differences existed within a broad range of Protestant social thought.

The Seventh-day Adventist offensive in the city was fundamentally evangelistic in the essay. Like the Salvation Army, it hoped to rescue individuals; and like the thought of Joseph Cook of Boston, it did not directly challenge contemporary laissez-faire economics. Other Protestant welfare leaders, equally concerned but less defensive, believed that social and institutional, as well as individual, reform was necessary, even imperative. The Washington Gladdens responded to the urban issues, but more fundamentally to the problems of labor and the challenge of socialism. The William Blisses were critical to the extent of hostility, demanding a complete restructuring of society's institutions. Such leaders, radicals in their own time, spoke of crisis and capitalized on the social-industrial-urban unrest of the era.

Rice's essay neglected to account for the various shades in the spectrum of Protestantism's social concern — a spectrum from the YMCA to George Herron, from A. J. Behrends of New England to the Social Creed of the Federal Council of Churches to Herbert Casson's Labor Church — a spectrum including our contemporary labels of conservative, moderate, progressive, and radical. The model of Chicago is only a model of a specific kind of welfare work and [is] not indicative of the range of Protestant social criticism or the response of these Christianized progressives. And subsequent comparison of the Seventh-day Adventist social service with this limited model is hampered by this interpretative assumption.

I have used the phrases welfare movement, social activism, religious social reform, Protestant activities, and social concern interchangeably. The author cited the term welfare work. By whatever terminology, we are talking about the growing social outreach of Protestantism to the immediate material and spiritual needs of late nineteenth century society.

I believe the material [Rice has] researched and presented regarding Seventh-day Adventist community service in Chicago in this period is valuable and useful. It's a story that needs to be told.

FRANK ROBINSON
Columbia Union College

There will doubtless be a number of SPECTRUM readers who will gain much from Ramm's article [How Does Revelation Occur?, winter 1970] and the comments on it. This discussion, however, seems to me so opaque, so laden with sesquipedalian pedantic terminology worthy of an H. K. Christman, that I doubt the average nonspecialist in esoteric theology will benefit from two-fifths of the magazine.

I would like to see in SPECTRUM more discussions concerning the Spirit of prophecy and its relation to today's church. The two articles concerning Adventist city missions are a good beginning. Other areas of interest that could be explored are the teaching of agriculture in Adventist schools, the type of training given our physicians at our medical school, purposes and methods of operation of our medical institutions, and our overall philosophy of education. In some of these, the church seems to be following "afar off" from a literal observance of the testimony counsel. Those who hold that these nineteenth century writings have no modern application, however, will find nothing more timely than agricultural training and the educational methods advocated by Ellen White.

The demand by students today is for "relevance" in their curriculums. Relevance was called by another name, such as "education in practical lines," in another era, but the principle is as viable and pertinent today as it was then.

RICHARD RIMMER
Madison, Tennessee

Eric D. Syme's article [Concepts of Church and State, spring 1970] needs special approval for its commonsense view of religious liberty. An *absolute* state-religion separation is a *reductio ad absurdum* position, in view of [our acceptance of] Hill-Burton [funds], chaplains [in military service], etc. While we Seventh-day Adventists must maintain our religious stance, this does not mean we must be "doctrinaire," as Syme writes.

WILLIAM G. WIRTH
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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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