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The stimulating papers by Ross and Numbers have dealt quite faithfully with Schwantes' book, and there is little I would add to their critiques. The implications for the classroom teacher, however, do raise questions with which I would like to deal at greater length than my colleagues did.

History is *choice,* the enlightened conscience the key. If choice is to mean anything, individuals, groups, and nations must perpetually exercise judgment in a range of meaningful opportunities. Otherwise, there is nothing but a cosmic puppet show. History is mildly didactic, occasionally entertaining, often rather discouraging. It considers the ways in which men and nations react to situations. To the extent that these reactions are fixed in advance by determinism, choice (and therefore personal responsibility) must be the central issue.

If there were one concept a historian should learn from history, it would be that of multiple causation. This concept would not in any way exclude the divine from history; but it would recognize that complexity is the rule in any historical process, and that God works through rational or natural processes. Did God not so work, choice would be a terrifying matter of trying to cope with unpredictable and arbitrary forces. In our secularized age, the religious element is downgraded in explaining historical phenomena. To restore the religious element as a monocausal explanation, excluding the other factors in the interest of promoting "Adventist" history, would be an equal distortion. Pat, one-shot answers, even a "quest for liberty," when dealing with the complexities of human beings and their motives, must be suspect.

The Christian teacher will "know" by faith that behind it all is indeed the Divine Ruler; but no matter how earnestly he wishes to uphold the Good Cause, he will not force on others intuitions or insights beyond what the data will bear. He should restore for his students the imbalance in perspective consequent to this secularized age, suggesting the relationship of human history to the great drama of the controversy, but tentatively when he does not know, and humbly as he realizes his limitations in understanding the purposes of God. He will avoid caricature and exaggeration lest the disillusioned student may discard the entire concept later. This is substantially what professional historians were driven to do in the past century when repudiating the theologized assertions of their predecessors.

Schwantes on "Providence and Freedom" (chapter three), as I read him,

seems to insist on two extreme positions only — a biblical view that requires the rejection "of any [nonbiblical] causal determinism as undermining personal responsibility" and also the rejection of purposeless history, history "completely undetermined." But then he goes on to claim divine supervision to be "as pervasive as the air," though "admittedly discreet" so as not to thwart man's freedom (p. 32). We are back to will-enfeebling causal determinism again, divine this time. Unless some of the nuances of his reasoning escape me, Schwantes has said that the discreet (invisible) divine control leaves the historical actor the responsibility (and guilt feelings) for a choice that in reality he could not have made, inasmuch as he was under this "discreet" control.

Nothing, says Schwantes, can just happen; there is no place for Christian fortuity. We are back to E. H. Carr's "joker in the pack of cards" — the procedure by which, when puzzled, we simply foreclose argument by playing Providence as the joker.[1] For all the sweep of Schwantes' rhetoric, we are no further in resolving the problem of human will in history than we were before he wrote his book.

Must we be forced, then, to choose between absolute determinism and no determinism? Can there be intermediate ground, including *real* chance? No, says Schwantes. "Chance" is not a Christian option (pp. 33, 35).

Is there a place in our sinful society and damaged natural environment for man to be affected by what would "naturally" just happen, without specific intervention? The rain falls on the just and the unjust; the defective tower at Siloam kills impartially those passing beneath it, regardless of their virtue. Under the terms by which the great controversy is fought, obviously divine interposition must be frequently withheld. In a sin-cursed world good things happen to bad people and vice versa — nature takes its course. How much better institutional affairs would go (and closed doors be opened) if Schwantes were correct that there is no such thing as chance!

God appears to leave much to our decisions, deplorable as many of them prove to be. If we believe in free will, what alternative do we have? The question of determinism may be in the same category as the nature of the Trinity, inexplicable in our present knowledge. It may be wisdom to leave such matters for the New Earth and meanwhile exercise one's capacity to live with ambiguity. Yet the question of human will — freedom of choice, and attendant responsibility — *is* basic to salvation. If it *must* be assumed that Providence so closely guides that the outcome of each war, election, or vote in a committee is determined, then freedom and responsibility for human beings become myth.

However, I do support Ross's view that Schwantes should be commended for trying this discouraging task. History and social studies majors and minors at Pacific Union College are required to take a seminar that is concerned with problems of causation. Whatever the faults of the book in question, it is indeed the best we have, and it is required as one of the texts for the course. In the class discussions, however, the book is not treated as though it were verbally inspired. We will continue to use it, *faute de mieux,* while waiting for someone around the circle to come up with a better one.

To consider further the problems of teaching, I find myself sharing Numbers' distrust of "Christian" history classes. We have an almost irresistible urge to work out details beyond the data. Tens of thousands of unread pages (written by those who do so) gather dust in libraries. (Historians who persist in this kind of adventurism cease therewith to be historians, whatever else they may become.) In the sense that both Numbers and I understand Ross's appeal for "sufficiently unique, i.e., Christian" history, "Christian" history could be to history as astrology is to astronomy.

The Adventist historian suffers from an identity problem. As a professional, he likes to see himself as a social scientist (or committed to a scientific method, in any case). The Adventist constituency tends to see him functioning as a sort of confidential secretary to Prophecy, explaining the past and foretelling the future. (Which of us has not been asked to endorse a twenty-page document clarifying the role of Henry VIII, the atom bomb, and the future movements of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet — all from the Old Testament prophets?) Not willing to be either quantified or like Nostradamus, the history teacher may feel painted into a corner.[2]

The Adventist history teacher feels that there is indeed a providential element in history, but his troubles come when he tries to demonstrate. How many "providences" per class period would be necessary to qualify him as a providentialist historian in good standing? He is on fairly safe ground discussing Martin Luther as a demonstration of Providence in history. But should he also try to fit in the election of Warren G. Harding, the fall of Nikita Krushchev, and the eleven battles on the Isonzo? What if, in addition to Martin Luther, he tries to work in Martin Luther King? Those who attempt this kind of history teaching have more courage than perspicacity.

Most Adventist teachers have made their own adjustment to these problems, but some, in vexation over commonly used but rarely examined clichés, go to the other extreme and simply ignore the whole question of divine intervention.

Ross almost seems to suggest two kinds of history — one presumably a

parochial variety for the Adventist classroom to justify charging tuition in a church-related college, the other for "outsiders." Assuredly when we teach or write for those not of our communion, we have an obligation to distinguish carefully between theological supposition (correct or incorrect but unprovable) and "history" in the professional sense. I would go further. To be honest, in an Adventist classroom as well, one should always make it quite clear what he is doing and should caution: "Here I leave history and enter speculation and intuition — which I personally think reasonable explanation of our problem, in the light of the Scriptures and the writings of Ellen White, but which is not verifiable historical fact." Some would see such a teacher as recreant to his responsibilities. He should pronounce a prophetic what's-what for any historical situation, and that should be that! He should impose answers, not ask questions. That would be, however, the worst of cop-outs. In my mind, that type of teaching tosses history out quite blithely and eliminates any need for investigation or analysis.

Perhaps I do not sufficiently share Ross's foreboding about the disappearance of history as a teaching field. Having had in my time to teach political science, geography, and sociology, I am inclined to think history will adjust to the interdisciplinary pressures and possibly even be the better for it. In any case, it hardly seems that the discipline would gain from an attempt to "denominationalize" it by tacking on "theological predilections."[3]

The Christian teacher should not employ shaky material that may lead to credibility gaps later. As Gary Land has so well said: "Christianity is a historical religion, basing its evidence to a large degree on historical events. It offers an interpretation of human nature and a morality by which to judge human actions. It denies the idea of progress, stating instead that man's decline will be ended only by Christ's Second Coming. In this light, it seems, the Christian historian can have a unique perspective unavailable to the nonchristian."[4]

There is no necessity for "Christian" physics, Spanish, or mathematics. There *is* a difference between the Christian and nonchristian educational institution, but the difference is not necessarily, even primarily, in some special body of indoctrination. To argue that it is would be comparable to the argument that only in compulsory worship or religion classes can the Christian campus be distinguished from its secular competitor. If this be so, we might as well fold up the church college at once. The structured, indoctrinating, formal approaches may confirm some inert students in their previous pattern, but these approaches will have less effect when the student leaves and "faces life."

The real difference is in the influence of and association with teachers *and* with fellow students in class and out of class, in all the campus situations. Like all his colleagues, the Christian history teacher has a witness and an influence in class, but far more outside the class — his commitment, his life-style, the concerns he has, and the questions he asks. The student who does not take advantage of his opportunity to circulate on the relatively small Christian college campus has missed much of what, presumably, he came for.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1 Edward Hallett Carr, *What Is History?* (New York: Vintage 1961), p. 95.

2 Some of the problems of working within set presuppositions can be illustrated by examining the ups, downs, and convolutions of Soviet historiography in the past half century. This is not to suggest any similarity either in degree of surveillance or in essential truth, but only that a discipline which has its own standards of performance but must also operate with some externally imposed assumptions, tends to suffer a certain schizophrenia.

3 Gary Land, History from an Adventist perspective, SPECTRUM (Summer 1970), p. 83.

4 Land, p. 83.