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'THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO'

While in Europe in May of this year, I was shocked, like millions of others, by the news of the wanton defacement of Michelangelo's magnificent *Pieta* by a madman. Shortly afterward, the following editorial appeared in the *International Herald Tribune* (published with *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*) in reaction to this act of senseless vandalism.

What triggered in the mind of Laszlo Toth those mad moments in St. Peter's Basilica may never be known. But a work that has been revered by many generations of men for its artistry as well as its moving subject, one that has lived beyond millions of human lives, while war and revolutions swirled around it, has been perhaps irreparably, certainly pointlessly, damaged by one man.

It is almost too easy to draw morals from this assault upon the Pieta, upon the young Michelangelo's concept of Christ in Mary's arms. There is turmoil in the world, and other works of art, clothed in the implication of man's finest aspirations, are being packed away in Hue before the shells fall. Men, women, and children have been killed in Ireland, because, among other differences, there is disagreement over just how the central figures in the Pieta shall be honored on earth. Others have died in the Middle East for, among more mundane reasons, conflicts between a theology that rejects Christ and one that makes him a precursor of Mohammed. And religion, or the denial of it, has entered into the many deaths of Bangladesh and those of Indochina.

If the damage to Michelangelo's masterpiece had been a true parable, it might have come more fittingly while the Thirty Years' War ate out the heart of Europe. while Napoleon was marching, or while millions tore at one another across the world in those two terrible wars of this century. For those were truly the days Christ prophesied, "in which they shall say, blessed are the barren, and the wombs that never bear."

The world is still caught in that perennial dilemma revealed in the dialogue between Jesus and Pilate. When Christ said that He had come into the world to bear witness to the truth, the proconsul answered: "What is truth?" and gave Him in whom he could find no fault at all to be crucified. The innocent still die, and suffer, because one man's truth is another's lie. There are Pontius Pilates in office who condone or promote such deaths, and mobs to call out for them.

But it is better to cling to the hope that rests in the symbols of a better world than to smash them with hammers or bombs. It is better to believe in a truth, and live one's belief, than to fight and die against someone else's truth. And if this is not the final answer --- since the other person's belief may be less tolerant - his resort to force may leave no alternative to counterforce. Still, the exploration of the means of intercommunication among many truths alone may save humanity. For man now can destroy himself utterly, as he is already destroying the environment which gives him life. And while forgiveness may be granted by some power beyond mankind for what is done in ignorance, can man forgive himself and his fellow man "for they know not what they do"?

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MOLLEURUS COUPERUS

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Theological Aspects of the Seventh-day Sabbath

V. NORSKOV OLSEN

[The occasion for the presentation of this paper represents a historical waymark for Loma Linda University and an honor for the author. Doctor Olsen was chosen by the University Lecture Committee (from nominations originating in the schools of the university) as the person to give the first DIS-TINGUISHED FACULTY LECTURE. This distinction was initiated for the following purposes: "to honor individual teachers for creative and relevant scholarship; to provide a means for teachers to encourage each other in the enjoyment of study and investigation and in the satisfaction of fostering student incentive for the full development of individual powers; to give opportunity for discourse among members of diverse disciplines toward the end of enlarging common understandings and of discerning the congruence of all knowledge." EDITOR.]

To give the setting for this presentation,¹ let me first define the terminology.

During the pre-Reformation era, Sunday was kept as a holy day, like the other feast days of the church, but *not as a Sabbath*. The Puritans in England are the first who attached to Sunday all that was theologically embedded in the Sabbath — which is something the Continental Reformers never did. To avoid confusion with the Puritan Sunday-Sabbath, therefore, I use the term *seventh-day Sabbath*.

Thelogically, the keeping of *a rest day* and the keeping of *the Sabbath* are two very different things. The keeping of the Sabbath has far-reaching theological implications which form the doctrine of the Sabbath. It is these theological aspects and their correlations (five in number) that I shall consider.

When I refer to the Sabbath as a constitutive norm, I mean a doctrine

which is so pertinent that other doctrines are not truly established unless they are erected within the theological framework of the former, which thus functions as the constitution.

When I speak of the Sabbath as a *corrective norm*, I mean a doctrine which at all times is a tuning fork, by which one can ascertain whether or not the other doctrines are in tune both on the spiritual and on the pragmatic levels.

THE CORRECT GOD-CONCEPT

When Nietzsche declared that "God is dead," he said only what would become commonplace for a considerable part of the human race in this century. There is the fierce, dogmatic atheism of world communism. There is the quieter, less sensational, intellectual conviction that nothing exists beyond a natural order explicable and discoverable by science. This is, by now, the normal outlook in most of the educated West. Within the churches, the confession "I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth" has been undermined by liberal theology. In other words, the influence of Darwin and the evolutionary theory have destroyed faith in God as the Creator.

A classic example in this respect is the book *Honest to God*, written by John A. T. Robinson, the Anglican bishop of Woolwich, England.² Within a few hours of publication, the first printing was sold out. In about a year the book passed through ten editions; half a million copies were sold; and ten translations in all the major languages of Europe were on the market. Doctor Robinson's statements harmonize with the antitheistic spirit of our age as he advocates a "Christianity" that dispenses with all thought of a personal, transcendent deity. The bishop has told the world just what our generation wants to hear: "Glory to man in the highest; for man is the master of all things."

The Seventh-day Adventist church has correctly emphasized that the theology of the Sabbath restores the right God-concept: a transcendent God who is absolute, personal, and holy; the Creator and Sustainer of the universe. Further, a person's God-concept expresses more clearly than anything else his theology and has a direct bearing on his view and interpretation of the Bible. As to views of the Bible, the spectrum is large. Here, I am concerned with two aspects: (1) the *orthodoxy*, often leading to creedalism, the end result of which is ice-cold confessionalism, dead formalism, and self-righteous ghettoism; (2) *rationalism*, the intellectual approach most often leading to humanism and liberalism. Christianity is a historical religion. The God of this historical religion is Yahweh, or the I AM. It is tempting at first glance to think that reference to God as the I AM is reference to God's changeless being. The ancient Greeks, who struggled philosophically with the problem of the changing and the changeless, would have favored such a view. But in Israel's faith and in the Christian faith, the Hebrew words Yahweh and I am have a dynamic meaning: he causes to be. The emphasis is on divine activity — not passive, eternal being. God discloses himself in his acts: Creation; the Flood; the call of Abraham; the Exodus; Sinai; Saul, David, Solomon; the Exile; the Return; the Incarnation, the Crucifixion, the Resurrection, and the Ascension of Christ; Pentecost; the Second Coming.

God who acts — I like to define him as "the acting God" — says to man: "If you wish to know how the I AM acts, go to the Bible, and the Spirit who is moving will make the acting God real to you." Redemption is based on some specific historical acts that occurred within historical time and that God made part and parcel of the plan of salvation. Biblical theology is anchored in these acts. But for liberalism, rationalism, and subjective existentialism there is a common denominator: the Scriptures are approached with preconceived philosophical ideas and/or a subjective religious experience, which now becomes the judge of the Bible, making the redemptive acts in history a "stumbling block" — which, as in Paul's time, men always seek to remove in one way or another.

The weekly Sabbath is a reminder that God acts in history, and he sanctifies time and events taking place within history. In the study of comparative religions we find that what was new "in the teaching of Judaism was that the idea of holiness was shifted from space to time, from the realm of nature to the realm of history, from things to events."³ Notice that the shift of emphasis is to time, history, and events. Accordingly, God sanctifies specific events taking place within historical time.

Here, I cannot enter into a discussion of this aspect. All I can do is to challenge the scientist and the philosopher by saying that the answers to the deep scientific and philosophical problems of being, space, and time can best be met by the God-concept embedded theologically in the Sabbath doctrine. The Sabbath teaches us that "there is a realm of time where the goal is not to have but to be, not to own but to give, not to control but to share, not to subdue but to be in accord."⁴ The God-concept of the Sabbath answers the question: From where did man come and when? Also it is able to answer the question: Why is man here?

THE ADVENT OF CHRIST

When the pioneers of this church chose the name Seventh-day Adventist, they were convinced that the name itself would convey the significance of two very pertinent doctrines for the latter days. In that conviction they were correct. In God's providence the two doctrines were reviewed together, for the Second Advent of Christ is theologically embedded in the Sabbath doctrine.

In the Old Testament the Sabbath is closely linked to the world to come. Accordingly, the full theological impact of the Sabbath truth will give that dimension from which we can face and answer not only the question "from where?" but also the question of the final God-intended destiny of man. The Sabbath as a sign of the latter became so much a part of Jewish religion that, in the thoughts of the rabbis, the Sabbath is the essence of the world to come; or, to express the relationship in another way, the world to come is all-Sabbath. Although early Christian writers and the Reformers of the sixteenth century disregarded the Sabbath as a day, they nevertheless spoke about the eschatological truth expressed in the Sabbath doctrine.

Theologians very often make their contributions by calling attention to the significance of a neglected aspect of a certain doctrine — for which one must be thankful. However, having done that, very often they make that neglected point the center of their theological system. Here is a pitfall, for fragmented theology always leads to a distortion of the biblical truth. I believe that the eschatological aspect of the Sabbath could and should become a constitutive and corrective norm in the midst of the conflicting eschatological concepts of modern theology. To explain:

Futuristic eschatology is the belief that all principal eschatological events are yet in the future.

Symbolic eschatology is the view of Tillich and Niebuhr, for whom the Second Coming is not an event on a heavenly timetable, but a symbol, a reminder, and a promise that happiness is transhistorical.

Realized eschatology is the theory that the kingdom of God, the Second Advent, and the Resurrection are fulfilled in a personal encounter with Christ — the new birth and a new society resulting.

Time would fail me if I should deal with the latest eschatological concept expressed by the German theologians Pannenberg and Moltmann. All that needs to be said is that their "theology of hope" was sketched out by the Jewish Marxist, Ernst Bloch, who wrote his work *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* between 1939 and 1949 during his exile in America from Nazi Germany.

The General Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Uppsala in

1968 was permeated by this new eschatology. The most definitive statement of joint Protestant-orthodox authorship, issued at Uppsala, took stock of "a new world of exciting prospects" in which "the new technological possibilities turn what were dreams into realities." Through almost every paragraph of a closely reasoned document on world economic and social development ran the idea of "change," "radical transformation," "revolution," and "drastic innovation." The key concept was a plea for death to the old order as a prelude for the new.

The theme of the meeting in Uppsala was expressed in the most beautiful eschatological words of the Bible: "Behold, I make all things new." But this promise was going to be fulfilled as understood by the new theology of hope just referred to.

Inaugurated eschatology, which comes closest to the eschatology of the Sabbath, embraces the most vital aspects of biblical eschatology. Inaugurated eschatology can be explained by the D day and V day of World War II. The First Advent is the D day. The decisive battle was won, and this was consequential for life here and now. The Second Advent is V day; the consequences of the victory will then be fully realized. This form of eschatology moves in an ellipse which has two foci, the First Advent and the Second Advent.

Let us imagine that the religious liberty secretary has the eleven o'clock Sabbath service. In the first part of the sermon he states that the end is near and Christ is even at the door. (For that, one must be happy, for only the Advent can solve the world problems.) The proof of the end, he says, is the sign that religious liberty is on the way out. Part two of the sermon is an exhortation to circulate the magazine *Liberty* and write letters to congressmen so that laws curtailing religious liberty may not be enacted. By doing as the speaker advises, the members are actually holding back the signs which must precede Christ's coming, which alone in turn can solve the problems of the world.

Here is an anomaly. Yet the preacher is theologically sound. On account of the First Advent of Christ there is a realized eschatology with social implications here and now. The principles of the kingdom of God must be demonstrated here and now. The fourth commandment states the social implications when it says that the Sabbath is not for those only who have entered the kingdom of God, but for their son, daughter, servant, stranger, and even the cattle within the gates.

Let me bring together the two main points dealt with so far: the Sabbath as the expression of (a) a true God-concept and (b) true eschatology. At the time of the Reformation the sovereignty of the transcendental God was stressed to the degree that all the Reformers believed in predestination. Rationalism followed, and God was pushed further back into the universe in the theology of the deist, whose God had left man and the universe to be ruled by inherited laws and man's own reason.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, reason had failed in the realm of religion. Schleiermacher turned the tide by emphasizing that our feelings are the seat of our God-consciousness. The immanence of God was now stressed; this God-concept pressed to its extreme led to pantheism as taught in the nineteenth century. The doctrine of the immanence of God laid the early foundation for religious existentialism. For man it meant the subjective experience with God in the I-Thou relationship, and the eschatological hope of the Resurrection was fulfilled here and now in the new birth. For society it meant world progress, for God is in society, and the eschatological hope of a new world was to be brought about by a God who is now immanent in the social structure. In other words, to deny the progress of man and society is to deny one's God-concept and one's faith in the immanence of God. Further, this concept of God was in full harmony with the scientific theory of evolution.

Now it becomes clear that there is a close relationship between the Godconcept and eschatology, and now it is clear why the true God-concept and eschatology should be reviewed together. Both are expressed in the Sabbath doctrine; therefore, the Sabbath doctrine should be a constitutive and corrective norm of eschatology.

JUSTIFICATION AND SANCTIFICATION

The Sabbath, as related to man's personal salvation, should be a sign of justification and sanctification. One can speak thus about the Sabbath "within." When the Sabbath has been considered as a sign of the central spiritual realities of man's salvation, it has often led to two opposite and dangerous positions: *legalism* and *antinomianism*, which allegorized the actual day.

The Jews at the time of Christ observed the Sabbath day scrupulously, but the Sabbath became a stumbling block for their spiritual advancement. The Talmud has page after page of minute Sabbath regulations. For example, "He who has a toothache may not rinse his teeth with vinegar and spit it out again, for this would be to apply a medicine; but he may wash them with vinegar and then swallow it, as this is but taking food." Regulations are given for dressing on Sabbath morning so as to be sure not to wear anything — such as pins or necklaces — which might tempt one to some form of labor by the removal of anything. Women are forbidden to look in a mirror on the Sabbath, because they might discover a white hair and try to pull it out, which would be a grievous sin.⁵

In the early history of the Christian Church some Christians went to the opposite extreme. In the second century, antinomianism was strongly expressed by some theologians; and with the entrance of Sunday into the church it is significant that some of the first statements against the Sabbath and in favor of Sunday are from these men.

The church fathers and the reformers spiritualized the Sabbath by making it a symbol of the spiritual rest in Christ to a degree that the day as such was allegorized away. Thus, when the Sabbath as a day was done away with, the church lost the Sabbath as a fence or hedge within which some basic doctrinal truths were realistically symbolized. When the spiritual truths imbedded in the Sabbath are divorced from the realities of the day itself, they die. Therefore the essential spiritual truths represented by the Sabbath cannot be divorced from the day itself.

However, the early fathers and the reformers were correct in the view that the Sabbath is a sign of the spiritual rest from sin through forgiveness by faith in Jesus Christ. Here Christ is in the Sabbath; and this testifies to the spirituality of the law, a spirituality which seeks to realize the kingdom of God in what is called sanctification, thus confirming the immutability of the law as an ethical standard.

The correct understanding of the Sabbath "within" should be the constitutive and corrective norm in a theological and existential consideration of the relationship between grace and law.

THE SIGN OF THE COVENANT PEOPLE

The dilemma of the doctrine of the rest day at the time of the Reformation is seen in three different concepts. *First*, there are the reformers with a rather ethical and social attitude toward the use of Sunday: worship is encouraged on that day, but work and activities of pleasure are not denied; Sunday is chosen because it is the most convenient day, but any of the other days in the week would be acceptable. *Next*, there is a mystical concept of the Sabbath, which advocates that the Sabbath as a day is done away with, but mystically or spiritually fulfilled in Christ and the lives of the believers. *Finally*, there is the Puritan observance of Sunday as the biblical Sabbath. It is this last which is important to a consideration of the Sabbath as a sign between God and his covenant people.

There developed among the Puritans a covenant theology that has its

roots in the theology of Calvin. It teaches that the plan of redemption is administered in a covenant relationship with God and man, originally made with Adam and Abraham. There is only one plan of redemption. Likewise, there is only one covenant. A unity between the Old Testament and the New and between the old Israel and the new is thus shown, and the immutability of the moral law in man's covenant relationship with God is emphasized. As this covenant-concept developed, the theological significance of the Sabbath emerged. One of the greatest authorities on English Puritanism accordingly states that the doctrine of the Sabbath "represents a bit of English originality and is the first and perhaps the only important English contribution to the development of Reformed theology in the first century of its history."⁸

The paradox of Puritan Sabbatarianism in its earliest phase was pointed out by those who could not implant all that is biblically attached to the Sabbath as the seventh day of the week into Sunday as the first day of the week. In this paradox, early in the seventeenth century, seventh-day Sabbath-keepers originated within the English-speaking world. In America they were found among the Baptists in Rhode Island in the middle of the seventeenth century. However, their concept of the millennium fell within Jewish apocalypticism, a belief in an earthly utopia. It was in the nineteenth century that the Sabbath created a world movement when correct eschatology was first united with the Sabbath.

Puritanism has been characterized by its moral and ethical consciousness and strict discipline, but at the same time it has been accused of legalism. However, there is a legitimate legalism on the practical --- shall we say administrative? — level when the people of God realize that in their vocations and institutions they are in a covenant relationship with God. Since the Sabbath is the sign of the covenant, the community of the covenant people must administratively enforce the letter of the law, hoping that each person who is in its community voluntarily may also have the spirit. Even if the son, the daughter, the servant, the stranger may not have the spirit of the law, God's commandments are still a hedge and a tutor. This was the strength of Puritanism in the early history of the English-speaking people. The tragedy of present-day society is, of course, that the hedge has been broken down and the tutor is gone; this is the source of the moral deterioration among the English-speaking people. Only the constant preaching of divine justice can give true meaning to human justice. If this preaching ceases, human justice will collapse, for its only justification lies in the existence of a divine standard.

Puritanism has shaped the quality of human life and society in the English-speaking world to a degree and in a manner not approached by any other form of religious expression. The spirit of the Puritan religious genius is found in their covenant-concept, which in turn renewed the theological significance of the Sabbath.

The Sabbath as the sign of the covenant leads to a demonstration of the principles of the kingdom of God within the community of the covenant people. The Sabbath is a foretaste of the eternal Sabbath, but the whole law should be demonstrated in the work days of the week and also be a foretaste of heaven. The endowment and the support of institutions for that purpose are found, therefore, within Puritanism. The covenant-concept taught the Puritan that his "property" really belonged to God and was lent to him by God to be used in God's service. And the Sabbath as a sign of the covenant teaches the same.

I said earlier that the Sabbath teaches us that there is a realm of time when the goal is not to have but to be, not to own but to give, not to control but to share. The institutional aspects of the Seventh-day Adventist church endeavors — an integral part of the church from its earliest days — are built on a theological foundation embedded in the covenant-concept of the Sabbath and rooted in true Puritanism. The Holy Spirit guided the pioneers in formulating "present truth" but at the same time guided them in the establishment and operation of institutions as part of that "present truth." These institutions were founded on a theological basis and nourished on the same. The theology of the Sabbath and these institutions belong together as a sign of the covenant relationship between God and the remnant church.

CHURCH AND STATE

The history of the Sunday-Sabbath issue pinpoints the truth of the New Testament concept of a free church in a free state, even though from the negative point of view. (I use the expression "a free church in a free state" because I think this expression best conveys the ideal New Testament concept of church-state relationships. Also, it is a positive expression, for it points out that the church is not just free *from* something but free *for the purpose* of something. The latter, of course, is the important point.)

In *The Great Controversy* Ellen White points out that through the centuries the church councils and civil legislation "pressed down" the Sabbath "while the Sunday was correspondingly exalted."⁷ This fact has never been spelled out in Adventist literature. Therefore, I will attempt briefly to do so, taking a bird's-eye view of the church-state Christianization of Sunday in the light of the prophetic time period of 1260 days, interpreted to cover the historical period from 533-38 to 1793-98.

The decree issued by Emperor Justinian in 533 is well known in Adventist circles, dealing as it does with the "subjecting and uniting" of all clergy under the bishop of Rome. However, I have never found in any Adventist literature the answer given by the pope when he received this decree. His reply is equally significant. Accepting the decree in the most literal sense, the pope answered: "Preserving the reverence due to the Roman See, you have subjected all things unto her and reduced all churches to that unity which dwelleth in her alone, to whom the Lord, through the Prince of the Apostles, did delegate all power."⁸ If one wishes to make Adventist prophetic preaching relevant to modern religious trends, one should notice that present-day Roman Catholic ecumenism was expressed back in 533: "reduced all churches to that unity which dwelleth in her alone."

The more significant result of Justinian's decree regarding papal supremacy is seen in its relation to the Code of Justinian and to canon or ecclesiastical law. The philosophy undergirding the 1260 years is found here, and it could be utilized in Adventist prophetic preaching. Justinian codified the Roman laws and incorporated into this new codification doctrinal decisions made by the early church councils. Justinian withdrew from the West, and the bishop of Rome became the custodian of the Justinian laws by which the barbarian nations of Europe now were Christianized, and the unity of Europe as the *corpus Christianum* was established. From then on, popes and bishops were more lawyers than theologians, and civil and ecclesiastical laws were fused.

In subjecting the church to the state, the Protestant Reformers remained within this *corpus Christianum*. When Zwingli and Luther killed the Anabaptists, and when Calvin, with the consent of the other reformers, executed Servetus, who held antitrinitarian views, they all functioned in the strength of the law of Justinian, which declared that rebaptizers and antitrinitarians were liable to capital punishment.

In Europe there was no "free church in a free state." The church was not free, but neither was the state free. The men of the French Revolution realized that the state must be freed from ecclesiastical laws. The revolutionary government in its constitution of the year of 1793 states in article seven the same principle expressed in the First Amendment of the American Constitution. It is significant that 1260 years after Justinian made the bishop of Rome the head of all Christendom, and the latter thus became the custodian of Roman law (which included ecclesiastical laws), France made null that whole judicial system and established the free exercise of religion.

With this illumination of the 1260 years, let me turn again to church-state Christianization of Sunday.

In 1961 the British government appointed a committee of eight parliamentarians whose task it was to ascertain whether or not there should be any Sunday laws in today's Britain. If so, on what principles should they be based? The committee began its study with the Sunday Fairs Law of 1448, the earliest Sunday law still on Great Britain's statute books. Undergirding this law and revisions that followed, the committee found, were two strongly religious motivations: (1) to encourage "church attendance and religious conformity . . . by prohibiting secular activities and restricting employment" and (2) to prohibit "entertainments and amusements [that] profaned the Lord's Day."⁹ The committee agreed that Sunday legislation founded on purely religious motives should be repealed. The report of the committee has been debated in the House of Commons and attempts have been made to amend the present Sunday law, but all have failed.

The picture of the church-state Christianization of Sunday in Great Britain is as follows.

About the year 600, the Celtic, or western, population of Britain adhered to an ancient form of Christianity, which included a certain Sabbathkeeping of the seventh day. The pagan Anglo-Saxons lived in eastern Britain, and the pope sent the monk Augustine to Christianize them. One of Britain's greatest authorities on the medieval church tells about the meeting between the representatives of the Celtic Christians and Augustine. Among the reasons why they could not unite he mentions the following: "The Celts held their own councils and enacted their own laws, independent of Rome. The Celts used a Latin Bible unlike the Vulgate, and kept Saturday as a day of rest."¹⁰

In 664 at the famous Synod of Whitby the English king submitted to Rome. In 697 a Sunday law was enacted, and thereupon one followed after another. There are at least twenty instances of either civil or canon law relating to Sunday before 1448, when the law was enacted on which the present-day English Sunday law is based. Although it is now recognized that all these laws were given for religious reasons, the British government is not ready to amend them. I think this is a most interesting chapter.

The next question that should be asked is: How is British development related to the Continent? This is a no less exciting story, which I will make short. The English Sunday law of 1448 is closely related in content to a Continental law of the thirteenth century, and that one can be traced back to the legislation of Charlemagne, who after being crowned by the pope in A.D. 800 reinforced old and enacted new civil and canon laws in order to Christianize Europe. But the Sunday law of Charlemagne can be traced back to the Council of Orleans in 538, five years after Justinian's decree regarding the bishop of Rome.

Only once has the ideal New Testament concept of church-state relationship — a free church in a free state — been realized, namely, in the United States of America. However, God's remnant church is universal; it lives within all types of governments. In most countries any type of government can change overnight. Because the church has to relate itself to these governments, it is necessary that there be a universal acid test in the churchstate relationship. The universality of this test is even much more important because the church correctly bases the relationship on a theological foundation. The constitutive and corrective norm in the giving and receiving relationship of the church with society is the freedom for the Sabbath doctrine. With the Sabbath as the norm, the theologian and the church administrator will have to find God's way in any given practical situation.

As America is becoming a more and more complex society and in this process may change the principle of a free church in a free state, the church will face new problems in its relationship with society. On the road from the principle of a free church in a free state to the final denial of the freedom to observe the Sabbath, as the Adventists believe will be the end result, is a transitional period when the church may find itself in the situation it has experienced in other countries. It may be well to remember that in the Adventist world church (with three-fourths of its membership living and prospering under complex social conditions during its whole history) the Sabbath was always the acid test in any relationship with society. As long as the Sabbath norm, in God's providence, is workable or kept free for greater witness, there is a giving and receiving relationship with society. However, the church must constantly heed the warning by Mrs. White "that men will employ every policy to make less prominent the difference between the faith of Seventh-day Adventists and those who observe the first day of the week. In this controversy the whole world will be engaged, and the time is short. This is no time to haul down our colors."11

The controversy in which the Sabbath is the central issue will be climaxed when the principle of a free church in a free state is lost by the final denial of the freedom of the Sabbath. Here is a situation where the giving and receiving relationship cannot operate, because the constitutive norm for that relationship has disappeared. In some countries the Adventist church has already had such an experience.

CONCLUSION

If justice is done to the message contained in the Sabbath doctrine, the worldwide Sabbath-Sunday controversy will be centered, I expect, in a fivefold issue and not merely in the issue of Sunday laws. These issues are:

1. The right God-concept with its correlation of correct biblical hermeneutics.

2. A true eschatology centered in the events of the First and Second Advents of Christ.

3. The Sabbath within: the true understanding and experimental knowledge of justification and sanctification, of grace and law.

4. The doctrine of stewardship and the social implications expressed in the Sabbath as the sign of God's covenant with his people.

5. The Sabbath as the constitutive norm for deciding where the demarcation line is to be found for the covenant people in its giving and receiving relationship with society. (The Sabbath can also be said to be the measuring rod in the case of doubt as to how far to go in the relationship with society.)

More than a hundred years ago Abraham Lincoln said in a message to Congress at a time of great national crisis: "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must arise with the occasion. . . . We must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country. We cannot escape history. We will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down in honor or dishonor to the latest generation. We, even we here, hold the power and bear the responsibility."¹²

In most universities of today, all fields of education reflect the attempt to make a religion out of agnostic secular humanism or to change dynamic historical Christianity into religious humanism. My topic here has a most practical bearing on the very foundation of Adventistic educational philosophy.

The theology of the Sabbath makes Seventh-day Adventism distinct. I believe that unwavering faithfulness to that distinctiveness will be respected as long as the acting God has a work to do in and through his covenant people. More than that, it is in that distinctiveness that the Adventist church has its greatness. The world needs just that which is found in this distinctiveness. In many circles, even in those of governments (not only in one nation but in many), this distinctiveness is recognized and sought. That opportunity must be met, while at the same time the greatest efforts should be made to strengthen the spiritual life of the theological distinctiveness.

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The Captain Lays Down the Law

GODFREY T. ANDERSON

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The sights and sounds and smells of Buzzards' Bay provided the backdrop for the childhood of Joseph Bates. From the moment of his birth near New Bedford in 1792, he was surrounded by influences that inexorably led him to choose the life of a seaman. It was said of New Bedford in those days that one-third of the population was away at sea, another third had just returned, and another third was getting ready to ship out. New Bedford, or that portion across the Acushnet River that was set apart as Fairhaven in 1812, was to be Joseph's home for over sixty-five years.

Along with his love for the sea, he carried within himself a strong bent for reform in virtually all the areas in which it manifested itself in antebellum New England. Also in early middle age he began to take religion very seriously. As he grew older he exhibited what today would be regarded as almost a fanatical devotion to moral and religious reform movements.

The full extent and degree of Captain Bates's religious and reform convictions are apparent in his account of his final voyage on the brig *Empress*. The ship's Registry in the Melville Whaling Museum in New Bedford carries the following facts regarding the *Empress*: It was built at Rochester in 1824; Joseph Bates, Jr., was given as the Master. It had a single deck, two masts, and a square stern. It was registered as a brig of 125 tons. After the final voyage of Joseph Bates, his brother Franklin became the Master. The following year the brig was sold at St. Catherine's. When the brig was only three years old, Captain Bates took her for his last voyage as Master, and a unique trip it proved to be.

On August 9, 1827, the *Empress* left the picturesque harbor of New Bedford for east coast ports of South America. She carried an assorted

cargo and a new crew recruited from Boston, all of whom, with the exception of one, were strangers to the ship's captain. As the pilot left the *Empress*, a strong breeze blew them out onto the turbulent ocean for the long voyage to the south. The night had already set in as they took their departure from Gay Head light. At this time the captain called all of the crew aft on the quarterdeck for some instructions regarding the voyage.

When the men had gathered about, a set of rules and regulations to govern their voyage was outlined for them by the captain. Perhaps never before nor since has such a set of rules been outlined to a group of hardy, rough, seagoing men. In general, conditions on merchant ships in this period were harsh at best and often brutal and brutalizing.¹ Liquor played a heavy part in the degradation of the crews, and contributed to the shocking conditions which were the rule rather than the exception.

First, said the captain in his orientation lecture to them, the members of the crew were to use the full name in addressing each other. "Here's the name of William Jones; now let it be remembered while we are performing this voyage that we all call his name William. Here is John Robinson; call him John. Here is James Stubbs; call him James. We shall not allow any Bills, or Jacks, or Jims, to be called here." In this way he went down the list of all the names and requested them to address one another in a respectful manner, and to call themselves by their proper names.

The second rule that he announced was that there was to be no swearing during the voyage. At this, one of the crewmen named William Dunn said, "I have always had that privilege, sir." "Well," said the captain, "you cannot have it here," and he quoted the third commandment to show the wickedness of profanity. William Dunn spoke up again and said, "I can't help it, sir!" Then he pointed out that when he was called up in the night to reef topsails in bad weather, and things didn't go just right, he would swear before he would think of what he was saying. The captain said, however, that he would discipline him properly if he forgot this rule, and Dunn gave the meek rejoinder, "I will try, sir."

A third unique rule laid down by the captain as land faded from sight was that there would be no washing or mending of clothes on Sunday. The captain said, "I have a good assortment of books and papers which you may have access to every Sunday. I shall also endeavor to instruct you, that we may keep that day holy unto the Lord." They were to have every Saturday afternoon free to wash and mend their clothes. At sea and in harbor he would expect them to appear every Sunday morning in clean clothes. Furthermore, there would be no shore leaves on Sundays. Seaman Dunn was again moved to speak out. "That's the sailor's privilege. I have always had the liberty of going ashore Sundays." The captain was adamant, however, and said that Dunn and all the crew must live up to this rule also. Then he endeavored to show them how wrong it was to violate "God's holy day," and how much better they would enjoy themselves in reading and improving their minds than in joining in all the wickedness that sailors were in the habit of indulging in when in foreign ports on Sunday.

Finally the captain said, "Another thing I want to tell you is, that we have no liquor, or intoxicating drinks on board." He did have a bottle of brandy, and one of gin in the medicine chest. These he would administer when he thought members of the crew had need of their medicinal properties. "This is all the liquor we have on board," he said with finality, "and all that I intend shall be on board during our voyage." He strictly forbade their bringing any liquor aboard when they were ashore in foreign ports.

At the close of all this, the captain knelt down and commended his ship and his men to God, "whose tender mercies are over all the works of his hands, to protect and guide us on our way over the ocean to our destined port." The following morning, all but the man at the helm were invited to the cabin, to join in morning prayer, where they were told that this would be the practice morning and evening. All were urged to join in these sessions. On Sundays when the weather was suitable, worship was held on the quarterdeck, otherwise in the cabin, where there was generally a reading from selected sermons and from the Bible. There was some grumbling about being deprived of shore leave on Sunday, but the captain later reported that "we enjoyed peace and quietness, while they [sailors on other ships] were rioting in folly and drunkenness."

After a passage of forty-seven days, the *Empress* arrived at Paraiba (Joao Pessao) on the east coast of South America. Then the vessel continued on to St. Salvador (Bahia) and St. Catherine's. Most of the time Bates, on his little reform ship, traded along the stretch of modern Brazil as far south as Rio Grande, near the modern Uruguay boundary. He experienced much adventure and traded with a degree of peril from privateers and pirates emanating from Brazil's neighbor to the south. The chief cargoes which Bates dealt in were dry hides, rice, coffee, and farina. This latter seems to have been in great demand at this time, and Bates was impressed with its nutritious qualities.

After trading for several months up and down the coasts of South America, and after numerous high adventures, the *Empress* returned again to New York and New Bedford. Apparently the crew made a reasonably good adjustment to the stringent regulations laid down by the captain at the outset of the voyage — all except William Dunn, who had to be reprimanded once or twice during the voyage for drinking while he was on shore leave.

On arrival in New York, the crew, with a single exception, chose to remain on board to discharge the cargo. They chose also to continue with the ship until they arrived in New Bedford, where the *Empress* was to be fitted out for another voyage. She arrived in New Bedford about the twentieth of June, 1828, almost a year after having sailed under the austere regulations decreed by the captain. Some of the men inquired about going on another voyage, but Captain Bates had decided this would be his last. His younger brother, Franklin, took over as Master of the "temperance brig" *Empress* for its next voyage. The conditions on board were much as they had been on the previous voyage.

A very revealing document, showing the inner religious struggle of Captain Joseph Bates at this time, is his log book, which is in the Old Dartmouth Historical Society library on Johnnycake Hill in New Bedford, Massachusetts. This "log book" is much more than a ship's log. It reveals the introspective reflections of a man who is very deeply concerned about questions of religion and his own spiritual condition in the light of what he now believes to be the reality of a Christian experience. This log book, handwritten by Captain Joseph Bates and over a hundred pages in length, gives an insight into the strong feelings on religion which he was experiencing at this precise time.

Typical of the comments was his entry of September 28, 1827 (Sunday): "I know not what the Lord is preparing me for, or why I have such conflicts in my mind.... But I feel sometimes such a spirit within me for fear I shall be led to commit some dreadful sin for which I know I must suffer."

Captain Bates was somewhat of a pioneer in promoting the temperance ship idea. He felt heavily burdened to improve the moral tone on shipboard, for the young seamen especially. Regarding the concept of a temperance ship, the *Sailor's Magazine and Naval Journal*, published by the American Seaman's Friends Society, reported that forty ships sailed from New Bedford in 1830 "with supplies of distilled liquor for medicinal use only" and then reported the following year that seventy-five similarly equipped vessels sailed from New Bedford a year later. As a part of the reform wave of this period which touched all facets of existence, there was a great deal of concern expressed over the welfare of seamen, and most seamen who were acquainted with ship life seemed to agree that hard liquor was the most serious problem they had to deal with in connection with the seagoing men of the period.

Following his final temperance ship project, Joseph Bates devoted his energies successively to a variety of reform movements in the 1830s and onward, including manual training projects for young people, and an attempt at raising mulberry trees for silk cultivation. Then he gave himself completely, and his modest fortune which was considered in 1840 to be a "competency," to advance the Millerite movement. The failure . . . of the Millerites and various subsequent groups in predicting the imminent apocalypse did not deter Joseph Bates, but he clung to these ideas and proclaimed them for the rest of his days. Until his death in 1872 he gave himself over to the work of itinerant preacher. He rests far from the sea in Monterey, Michigan, at the side of "Prudy," his faithful companion of over fifty years.

NOTE

1 "Seafaring [in this period] at best, was a rough, dangerous calling, and sometimes rendered unbearable by the brutality of master or mate." S. E. Morison, *Maritime History of Massachusetts* (Boston 1961), p. 259.

Need for Organizational Change in the Adventist Church

WILFRED M. HILLOCK

Since the conditions of the world and the composition of the Seventh-day Adventist church, both, are changing rapidly, the church must be willing to address itself to the question of adaptation. The geometric advance in the rate of change presents a challenge to all of today's institutions. To the extent that an organization learns to adapt to rapid change, it will influence the events of the future. Conversely, those social institutions that adapt slowly, or fail to change at all, lose relevance to the course of events.

Primary factors in adaptability are the organizational structure of authority and the responsibility relationships that can encourage or discourage innovation. The dynamic nature of the world demands that an organization examine itself to ensure that it is structured so as to be responsive to change. An enterprise should not be static. New techniques become available; social, political, and economic settings change, both internally and externally. Thus, realignment may be essential if the organization is to accommodate itself to the pace of its times.¹

The pioneer leaders of the church repeatedly called for a new look at organization, giving as a reason the continuing growth in church membership and institutions.² Should we do less today?

The present organizational system of the Adventist church (developed between 1900 and 1903)³ was designed for circumstances different from those in which the church now finds itself. Numerically and geographically the church was small: the total world membership was 76,000, there were 1,500 workers, the total overseas budget was \$150,000, and in all there were 58 institutions. Comparably, 1970 figures are: 2,052,000 members, 66,000 workers, a mission budget of \$27.2 million, and 910 institutions.

Total annual expenditures have grown from \$662,000 to \$211.2 million — an increase of 320 times.⁴

The rate of change at the beginning of the century was significantly slower. The brainpower available to solve church problems was concentrated largely in the formal structure itself. Most of the important decisions pertained to local conference matters. Although suited for turn-of-thecentury problems, the structure adopted seventy years ago is not adequately responsive to the membership of today and does not adapt readily to changing conditions. The plan developed then, basically a good one, should not necessarily be discarded. But timely modification is needed in the interests of overall efficiency and of providing members the means of significantly influencing decisions.

WHERE IS THE AUTHORITY?

Theoretically, authority within the Seventh-day Adventist church rises from the membership through the local church organization. The local church elects delegates to a conference constituency session, which in turn elects local conference officers. The reasoning is that authority originates with the body of members, and the elected officers are responsible to the body of members.⁵

This basis of authority in the church is somewhat similar to that of nearly all large American business corporations. At the corporate stockholders' meeting, the shareholders elect management officers. In many cases, however, corporate management's control of selection procedures leaves virtually no alternatives available to stockholders. In situations where members or stockholders have little voice, authority can be said to perpetuate itself.

This procedure does not work badly for business corporations, because competition is an "invisible hand" that guides, and because profits measure efficiency and effectiveness. Inefficient or unresponsive management will ultimately be replaced.⁶ Unfortunately, no comparable forces are at work in the church to ensure constant attention to the church's ultimate goals and to search for economical methods of achieving them. When a significant choice must be made, the most effective route may have little to recommend it if it is not popular at the management level. Is there anything that pushes the church administration toward innovative solutions?

Another explanation for church authority is provided by what management students call "acceptance theory." This theory suggests that authority originates with membership acceptance of the direction given by leadership. Those who participate are those who grant authority.⁷ This may come close to an explanation of the nature of authority in the Seventh-day Adventist church. To the extent that members participate in the program of the church, there is acceptance of the authority of the church administration. Membership participation being somewhat less than ideal, one must conclude that acceptance is reduced, and thus there is valid reason to seek organizational change.

Undoubtedly, the constituency session in which church representatives elect local conference officers has an influence on decision-making within the church. But at present this influence is not large. There are two reasons that it is diminished: (1) the officers elected by the constituency are not the primary policy-making or decision-making body of the church; and (2) the few hours devoted to a constituency meeting do not allow for the development of viable alternatives to the proposed officers or plans — or even an intelligent understanding of the problems of conference administration. The delegate who seeks orderly progress has no effective choice but to accept the suggestions of the leaders who have prepared their case. To do otherwise would be to make an uninformed decision or at best (if the delegates are informed) to disrupt the proceedings by proposing alternatives.

Because of these impediments to the intelligent exercise of the authority of members, significant influence on decisions is denied church members, who theoretically are the source of church authority. This is particularly unfortunate in a church that subscribes to the principle that a few men should not control the whole church, and that every person in the church should unite in planning.⁸

On the other hand, the circumstances that an elected church leader finds in his office are not always those he would choose. Many times he is a captive of the organizational structure. A union conference president, for example, might desire to allow participation in the choice of local conference officers at a constituency session, but to do so would be to invite disorder. Within the present organizational pattern, he is left with virtually no alternative but to retain control of the selection procedures. If he approached a local conference constituency session without positive recommendations for local conference officers, he would be classified as an unwise or incompetent administrator. Thus he has very little choice about an authority so broad as virtually to exclude effective participation by the church members, because of the time limits involved and the selection procedures that have become traditional.

The present authority structure in the church calls for decisions to be made by committees at all levels. These committees are usually made up of persons in effect selected by the president, or chairman, of the committee, since the president's support is all-important in the choice of all conference employees. In most cases, therefore, opposition to the chairman's views is unlikely. If unexpected opposition should arise, it would need to be highly organized in order to be successful. And that is even less likely, since the members of the conference committee, to a great extent, are replaced at the pleasure of the committee chairman.

Thus, the system concentrates authority in a few persons. I am not advocating that a committee chairman should not have a voice in selecting the committee members. I am saying that a method must be developed by which the committee, including the chairman, is directly responsible to the church body. The church does not subscribe to a self-perpetuating hierarchy. If one accepts the fact that at present the decision-making influence of church members is severely limited, then the question that arises is: Where does authority actually lie within the church?

Careful observation will reinforce the conclusion that in North America the power to influence decisions is now largely concentrated at the middle levels of church administration — that is, the union conference officers. The course of action that the church takes is largely dictated by (a) ability to influence the election of subordinates, (b) opportunity to select those who choose the church's top leaders, and (c) control over the flow of funds.

Local conference presidents are recommended to the constituency by union conference officers. Union conference officers also appoint the delegates to the General Conference session. The flow of funds is through the union conferences.

Thus the union conference officers, the middle-level administrators, are the principal decision-makers within the church in North America. Toplevel administrators find themselves severely limited by the need for support both in election and in revenue. Decisions on the overall educational problems of the North American Division, for example, depend on those middle-level administrators who have control over higher education funds. Continent-wide solutions cannot be effected until, and unless, the necessary funds are made available by the union conferences.

Many years ago the concept was stated that "the message which Seventhday Adventists are giving is a world-wide message: and the General Conference Committee has the oversight of the work the world over."⁹ In practice, however, the role of the General Conference officers is advisory in the North American Division, not that of program planning.

At a time when the church is confronted by a global challenge, the need

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for global planning is imperative. Planners of a worldwide program should devote their energies to informing themselves and planning for the needs; should be accountable directly to the church members for that planning; and should be able to draw extensively on input from many sources.

Does this concept mean return to "kingly power" within the church? It is not proposed as such. Kings receive their authority by inherited right or by self-perpetuation. Kingly power does not exist when leaders are answerable directly to the members. Officers at all levels who become responsible to members then become amenable to the ideas of the members to whom they are accountable.

PRINCIPLES FOR CHURCH ORGANIZATION

For any individual to suppose that an organization will necessarily be improved by following his personal recommendations for organizational structure is a mistake. The best structure will result from extensive input of fertile ideas from many people, examination of those ideas based on sound principles, and selection of those concepts that will contribute to increased organizational efficiency in responsiveness to the needs of progress. The following statements are offered in that setting and spirit.

1. WIDE PARTICIPATION

Behavioral scientists generally accept that one of the primary means of securing participation in *achieving objectives* is to begin with participation in *decision-making*.¹⁰ This is also a biblical principle: "Where no counsel is, the people fall; but in the multitude of counsellors there is safety" (Proverbs 11:14). One who assists in defining goals and developing programs can be expected to contribute to the activities called for by plans that he has helped develop, for people work hard when they have a stake in the outcome of a program.

Adventists (leaders and members alike) have long believed that the task of the church cannot be accomplished by ministers alone. It follows, then, that decision-making should not be the private preserve of church administrators. "The labor, care, and responsibility of this great work does not rest alone upon a few preachers." "There are to be no kings . . . in any conference that is formed."¹¹

The driving force for change will come from concerned members of the church. The organizational plan that will best contribute to the accomplishment of the objectives of the church will be a plan which members participate in developing and by which they will have a continuing and significant

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decision-making influence. And they will know it, for people have a sense of whether or not they really have an influence.

An effort to create the impression that the people influence decisions, when in fact they do not, will not be a satisfactory substitute. Pseudodecision-making and pseudo-participation deceive no one. When administrators have already decided on a particular course, but attempt to convince members that the decision is theirs, the make-believe approaches hypocrisy.¹² The time has come when the church needs to draw on its reservoir of talent to meet the challenges of the world in which we live.

2. Administration by plan, not crisis

Although it cannot be said that the church as now structured does not respond at all to changing conditions nor that the church is unable to change, change is usually effected belatedly and as a result of irresistible pressure. A problem arises, pressures mount, a committee of leaders is appointed to study the problem, and a solution is eventually adopted.

Two approaches to the conduct of an enterprise are diametrically opposed. One is to await the appearance of problems, allow them to achieve major proportions, and then seek solutions. The preferred approach, however, is to develop a system that defines objectives and then plans in advance for the accomplishment of them. This method of operation depends on extensive and continuing efforts to foresee events and to provide for a number of alternative events. Specialists in the field of management generally agree that a purposeful, planned approach is better than a problem-solution approach. "Proper management rules out management by crisis and drives."¹³

The present pattern of authority relationships in the church hampers the effective use of this preferred approach. Overall plans cannot be developed until structural relationships and responsibility definitions are such that the church's central governing body is *authorized* to plan, and then is held accountable for achieving results. Decision-making by consensus of special interest groups lends itself to the crisis approach to problem-solving.

3. REALISTIC SPAN OF CONTROL

A basic element of church organization that deserves attention is the number of subordinates that are directly responsible to any one superior. There is no formula for the "perfect" number of subordinates to be responsible to one person, but there are guidelines for effectiveness. According to organization specialists, normally five to fifteen persons should report to one supervisor.¹⁴ A wide span of control (often with resulting diversity of responsibilities and ill-defined delegation of authority) necessitates infrequent contacts between superior and subordinate, heavy reliance on policy decisions, demand for extremely well prepared subordinates, and acceptance of a slow rate of change.

By accident or design, the church has adopted extremely wide spans of control. It is not unusual for thirty or more pastors, eight department secretaries, and five institution heads to be responsible to one conference president. In the union conferences, the situation is similar, with the substitution of local conference presidents for pastors, and larger numbers of persons in other categories. A small army reports to the General Conference president.

When the organizational foundations of the church were laid, Adventists were counseled to spread the work and share the responsibility.¹⁵ An improved organization can provide reasonable spans of control in keeping with the need for dynamic action and can recognize the limitations of administrators and the need to reach beyond "policy-type" solutions.

4. USE OF STAFF

When a business sets out to make a better automobile, the executives usually recognize the need to surround themselves with staff specialists whose responsibility is to give "expert" advice. These specialists do not make operational decisions; their task is to seek out alternatives that line executives do not have the time or knowhow to discover. Each staff specialist concentrates on one area of expertise, so that the enterprise will not miss new ideas or opportunities.

"The appearance of staffs is usually proportional to the size of the enterprise."¹⁶ An enterprise need not be very large, however, before it recognizes the necessity for specialized assistance on such matters as economic decisions, taxation, government relations, personnel policy, contracts, and legal matters. In general, however, it can be said that the staff concept as a standard organizational element is practically nonexistent in the administrative hierarchy of the Adventist church (with its present decision-making structure and broad spans of control).

This type of counsel should not be confused with departmental interest in a program or activity, of course. With programs and goals that are measurable in their direct impact on the church, department secretaries have functional authority. In contrast, a staff person is one whose responsibility is to give specialized advice, not to produce direct results. In this sense, here is an opportunity for the Lord to use men's minds.

The need for such counsel is self-evident. The church has grown to the place where a legal error has been known to cost large sums of money or

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force an organization into a venture that it would prefer not to participate in. It will be a major step forward when the church structure includes adequate use of staff persons who can advise the decision-makers.

SUMMARY

Wide participation, adequate planning, appropriate span of administrative control, and the use of staff expertise are some of the organizational techniques to which attention should be directed in the search for improvements that will make the Adventist church system more effective. The church has at its service many persons who are able to help determine the questions that should be answered in the process of restructuring.

I believe that the Adventist church should establish a study group to propose a plan for improving the decision-making structure. Such a group should be composed primarily (if not entirely) of persons without personal or political interest in the outcome of such a reorganization, for the historical pattern of the church has been one of resistance to organizational improvements: "There is everywhere someone to hold back, they have not valid reasons for so doing, still they hold back."¹⁷

Seeming support of the church leaders should not be interpreted as satisfaction with operational aspects of the church. Many church members and organizational personnel have a great deal of faith in the leaders at all levels and in general in the members. But at the same time they recognize that the present structure is not adequately responsive to members because it does not provide for significant participation.

Many responsible members would welcome the opportunity to be informed about choices for church leaders, to have leaders who will be responsible to the members, and to support those leaders who present realistic plans for accomplishment. These members are people who want to strengthen the church, not weaken it. Their intention is to build on the foundations laid in 1863, 1888, 1901, and 1913 in order to uphold the original purposes and plans adopted by the pioneers of the church.

Organizational change is now being considered by church leaders. These leaders must avoid tokenism in participation and tokenism in application of concepts or techniques that have been offered as solutions to some church problems. Not just any reshuffling of authority will accomplish what needs to be done. The fundamental problems need to be addressed. All elements of the church need to be involved. The Seventh-day Adventist church must become accustomed to frequent upgrading and must adapt to a society that is experiencing an ever-quickening pace of change. A church that is a worldwide church needs a worldwide approach to planning which results from an organization structured according to principles that are compatible with concepts drawn from the Bible, from the counsels of Ellen G. White, and from the best practices thus far learned by specialists in organizational management. Participation in goal-setting and programplanning should be provided for those whose active support is essential. The church has been counseled to seek improvements in the organizational system. "As we near the final crisis . . . we should be more systematic than heretofore."¹⁸

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An Exquisitely Personal Relationship:

PROPOSALS TOWARD THE COMPASSIONATE CARE OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AND THEIR FAMILIES

CATHERINE LYONS¹

33

Like any other exquisitely personal relationship, the compassionate care of the terminally ill and their families requires an asking of certain questions that are basically philosophical and religious in nature. In this case, we must ask: (1) What is human life? (2) What is human death, and when is it morally permissible to halt artificial prolongation of biological life signs? (3) What is the responsibility of the medical profession to the loved ones of the terminally ill?

I

Every science that has studied man or the societies that he forms has had to cope (willingly or by force) with the question, "What is human life, and how does it differ from all other forms of life?"

The fact that an adequate definition of human life has not been given by any one special field of thought should not be surprising. Most fields of inquiry (biology and medical science included) approach the subject of Man and human *being* from a special theoretical or practical bias and with a particular goal in mind. In their own ways, our various sciences have reduced man from the totality of his being to a collection of ever-so-many functional parts, systems, and modes of existence. What we have learned about man's physiological, psychological, emotional, and social needs and make-up, as a result of the fragmentation of the intricate wholeness that man is, has been helpful in our quest to understand the complexity of human life. But our knowledge thus far is not adequate to define human life in essence. At best, our efforts to date permit us to define man as being different from all other animals in terms, for example, of certain anatomical and physiological uniquenesses and the innate capacity for speech, reason, memory, and rationality.

The fact that we are unable to define human life adequately, however, gives not one of us legitimate excuse for having a lazy imagination concerning those integrals which fashion us as *human* beings. We are duty bound to see man as an intricate interweaving of body, mind, and spirit, and, in such a holistic view, to search for some understanding and appreciation of man's uniqueness.

We are all aware that biological being is preconditional to human existence. But perhaps we are less aware — or are at least less accepting — of the fact that biological being and human existence are not necessarily coterminous. Simply stated, one of the medical, biological, and indeed philosophical peculiarities of man is that the uniqueness upon which "being human" depends can terminate in advance of the body's total biological demise. Though one cannot say that our uniqueness is totally "other than bodily existence," it is certainly true that human life is recognizably (though perhaps indefinably) more than biological being and process.

An essential aspect of that which is clearly more than biological involves man in relationships with other human beings and the world — relationships, whether casual or intimate, into which he carries a remembrance of things past and a hope for the future. For Martin Buber, the Jewish theologian, the uniqueness of man is to be found in the act of relation or in the meeting of "I" and "Thou." In the words of Buber, man is "the creature capable of entering into living relation with the world and things, with both men as individuals and the many, and with the mystery of being which is dimly apparent through all this but infinitely transcends it."² In his affirmation that the essence of man can be directly known only in a "living relation," Buber neither has given answer to the question "What is human life?" nor has he defined the uniqueness of man. Rather, what he tells us about man is *where it is* that *what he is* is to be found.

To be in an exquisitely personal relationship with another person is to be at the beginning of a knowledge of man. It is to stand at the threshold of entering into an awareness of the uniqueness that is each one of us — a uniqueness which allows us to be alike in terms of a classifiable species, but which means in the words of Viktor Frankl "absolute *being different*, absolute otherness,"³ in terms of our personal being, the human existence that I know as an individual and that you know as an individual. Just as Buber did not define the uniqueness of man, but rather told us that the essence of man can be realized only in living relation, so Frankl does not give a definition of the uniqueness of the individual human being, but tells us that, as individual persons, we are personally different.

The individual differences which are the uniqueness of a terminally ill patient, and which that person shares with no one else, must be seen as of utmost importance by the members of the caring professions. As important as the effect that surgery, hemodialysis, or chemotherapy may have on a patient is the way in which one's illness, restricted life, and impending death affect this unique, never-to-be-repeated human being. Concerning this, Sir Robert Platt notes that "there is a side to human behavior in health and disease which is not a thing of the intellect, which is irrational and emotional but important. . . . Consider, for instance, how the patient's personal reaction to illness is so often what determines his future: how one diabetic becomes an invalid while another, scientifically indistinguishable, carries on a normal existence."4 In a similar vein, Joseph Fletcher writes: "The sufferer is not just a case of pneumonia or pyloric stenosis or peptic ulcer; the patient is a person, with feelings of hope or despair, of purpose or defeat, of loneliness or fraternity. The patient is not a problem; he is a person with a problem.''5

How often do we look on patients as problems to be overcome rather than as persons to be cared for? How often are we disgusted by the terminally ill patient who is unable to feed himself, or to manage his toilet needs, or to express his wants in understandable speech? In how many cases of these sorts have we reacted in careless and callous abandon, harshly demanding that a patient eat the food he neither likes nor wants, or reprimanding a stroke patient for garbling his words?

How often do we take time to be aware of, indeed to inquire about, the very real and very painful fears which are a natural human element of terminal illness, of death and dying? Do we recognize ill patients who would rather be dead than be invalids and dependent on others for the management of their daily and hourly needs? Do we care for persons with cancer who see their disease as dirty and ugly, who are ashamed of their illness, and who fear that their loved ones will no longer want to touch them or be near them? How much time do we spend in medical ministry to the young woman who has had a mastectomy and who considers herself less feminine, less of a woman, and who may unconsciously avoid any physical relationship in the future rather than bear the suffering of embarrassment?

What percentage of the time used in "taking care of a patient" is actually

spent in "compassionately caring for" the person? In comparison with the time spent in carrying out the routine medical care of patients, how much time is spent in "living relation" with them, seeking to understand their fears and personal sufferings — that is, their sufferings of mind and spirit — and what effect such fears and sufferings are having on the course of their illnesses and their lives?

To enter into compassionately caring for our patients is to be always personal in our actions. To be concerned with the human sufferings of mind and spirit is as intimately a part of quality medical care and "compassionately caring for" as is the act of gently replacing a catheter tube into the body of a confused patient. "Compassionately caring for" is, in essence, a personal relationship: a person caring for another person. It is my affirmation of the unique person that you as person-patient are to me.

Thus the medical ministry of compassionately caring for a terminally ill patient always requires two things. *First*, the members of the health care team must make sure that everything that may *reasonably* be done to promote human well-being either has been done or is being done. This will include all wise and reasonable efforts to effect a cure or to reverse the course of the illness, while keeping the patient as free of pain as possible and respecting his rights as a person. *Second*, our medical ministry requires a living relation in which we seek to recognize and appreciate in our patient the *absolute otherness* which is the meaning of his uniqueness as an individual human being. Such a relation places us under obligation to seek to understand how this person is personally different from every other patient.

To say that we do not have time to be in a living relation with our patients — to say that we do not have time to know our patients as persons — is, in effect, to acknowledge that we do not have time to give quality care. For quality medical care demands a person-centered treatment and maintenance program wherein the patient's personal needs and wants, strengths and weaknesses, shortcomings and fulfillments, spiritual stamina, courage, and fears are matters of concern to the nurses and physicians (and all other members of the health care team) as they seek to compassionately care for their patient, who, as a human being and a person, is, in essence, an intricately delicate interweaving of body, mind, and spirit.

Π

The fact that life and death are still defined largely in traditional terms of biological being and process is illustrated in our recent quest to redefine death. Whether one refers to work of the ad hoc committee of Harvard

Medical School and its definition of irreversible coma⁶ or to the "dying score"⁷ proposed by Vincent J. Collins, life and death continue to be defined primarily (if not entirely) in terms of certain physiological life signs, the presence of which denote life and the absence of which denote death. Biological death, strictly speaking, is purely clinical and by comparison quite precise. Human death, on the contrary, is always personal — involving the cessation of purposeful, responsible, relational life — and, as such, defies exact determination.

The compassionate care of the terminally ill and their families requires an understanding of human death as being infinitely more than the cessation of biological existence. The often-heard statement that "everything will be all right" is, to the dying person and his family, at best a lie and an insincerity offered by the living, who, paralyzed by the stark reality of death and human temporality, attempt to make easy an event which, because of our accustomed denial of it, is exceedingly difficult to accept. The anguish borne by the living after the loss of a loved one is piercingly stated by Gene Hackman in his role as the grown son in the motion picture *I Never Sang* for My Father: "Death ends a life, but it does not end a relationship which struggles on in the survivor's mind toward some resolution which it may never find."

On the other hand, death is hoped for, even joyfully anticipated, by some patients and their families because of the physically, mentally, spiritually, and financially debilitating effects of certain forms of medical treatment and maintenance. This fact (harshly true and perhaps shockingly difficult to accept) that a person may be exhausted and dehumanized to the point of longing for death, should not so much put us in question of the morality of the patient's desire to die as it should bring us to examine our motives and methods of medical care and treatment in prolonging the life of the terminally ill.

Buber's characterization of man as the one "capable of entering into living relation" is not only an informative statement about man, but is also an instructive statement which offers a goal-orientation as we seek to save and prolong life. The corollary of Buber's statement that "the essence of man can be directly known only in a living relation," is the affirmation that to remain a humanly healthy human being one must be able to maintain a living relation with his fellow human beings and the things around him.

If the saving of life and the prolongation of life are to be meaningful in a human sense, beyond the technical achievements of forestalling biological death and prolonging bodily existence, they must be done with some goal in

mind. And one might suggest that that goal, morally speaking, should be to return man to human functioning in his human environment of friends and nature. For us not to be intimately concerned with the effect that medical treatment has on a patient's ability and desire to enter into living relation is to stand in a scientific vacuum divorced from medical ministry, from that side of medical practice which is always personal, always concerned with man as a social being who needs human companionship, reinforcement, and interaction.

That it is neither the duty nor the right of a physician to stand in judgment of whether a person's life is worthy to be lived is a fact which always needs stressing. Leo Alexander, referring to certain medical atrocities committed during the Second World War, noted that "it became evident to all who investigated them that they had started from small beginnings . . . with the acceptance of the attitude . . . that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived."⁸ This statement should remind us to recognize the respect which must be paid to all human life, regardless of its present state or future or medical hopelessness. Such a statement, however, ought not to mislead us into a belief that biological life should be prolonged indefinitely at all costs.

It is difficult at times for the physician, schooled in the "death is the enemy" tradition of medical education and practice, to be confronted with the patient who in waning years calmly but resolutely states, "I am ready to die." So thoroughly frightened have we become of death that we are often shaken to the very depths of our being by the person who is ready in mind and spirit to die and who gallantly awaits the accord and accompaniment of the body on finite life's final journey.

Biological life is invaluable to the human being in that it is preconditional to one's being human. Whether or not, however, one may morally choose death over life is a sensitive issue, one of the most important questions confronting us in our medical ministry to the terminally ill. The patient who sees death as the prize of a life well lived, and who exhorts her physician to keep her comfortable but not to deny her of her journey into death, by the use of penicillin should she contract pneumonia, is a case in point. Here we are confronted with the question of whether one may choose to die of a quite common and easily treatable ailment before stroke, cancer, diabetes, or senility set in. In effect, we are being asked whether this person may choose to die as a relatively independent human being before she becomes a burden to her family and loved ones — or whether a home for the aged, incontinence, wheelchair, and bedsores must be preconditional to honoring her wish to die. This question is raised in particular because through the use of antibiotics we save, each day, thousands of chronically ill, aged persons into further physical and mental disability and the meanest of diseases. That many of these individuals fear their continued bedridden existence and their confused, restricted lives more than they fear death is a fact that we are all too slowly coming to admit and deal with as we consider their continued treatment programs.

Our medical ministry of compassionately caring for our patients, which requires that we do all we can to make available the best treatment programs possible, also requires that we be concerned to know what limits, if any, they would like to see set regarding the extent to which their biological life should be prolonged. For some people who have done a great deal of honest thinking about death, the wish to leave this life as independent, fully human beings in control of their faculties is honorable rather than immoral.

That life is valuable, and that some are willing to sustain all sorts of discomfort and restrictions in the hope of staying alive and returning home, is something that we are reminded of anew each day. Indeed, the courage and will-to-live with which terminally ill persons often meet the prognosis of death, often give one more than sufficient reason to try to buy for the patient's life one more month, one more week, or one more day, in the hope that remission will come and that at last the long-awaited "miracle" or miracle drug will be ours and his.

But what of the patient who has promised that he will be a "good patient" — that he will carry his burden of the load, taking the doctor's orders and obeying the requirements of the treatment regime — when the pain becomes too much, when his restricted existence makes him aware that his dreams will not come true, when his bed and his room become the perimeter of his physical world, and when he feels that he is losing control of himself — his biological processes and his mind?

What about this person who just last week wanted so fervently to live, and now wants to die? What about my responsibilities to him as a fellow human being, when his life becomes for him more of a nightmare than his fear of death? How does he affect me? Does he anger me? Should I reprimand him and scold him for what I perceive to be childish behavior? Am I disgusted and embarrassed by his fears and weeping? Do I all of a sudden think that there are others — stronger, braver, more cooperative than he who are more deserving of my time and my skills? When I leave his room now do I pull his door shut behind me when always before I left it open?

With regard to certain methods of artificial maintenance — chronic hemodialysis, for example --- there is already a growing element of positive concern supporting the freedom of the terminally ill person to elect death and withdraw from a treatment program which he feels is maintaining him at an unsatisfactory and inhuman level of existence, or which he feels is too costly — emotionally, spiritually, or in other ways — for him and his family to bear. Also, earlier in this discussion, a hint of support was given to the request of the elderly woman who wished to be kept comfortable in the event of pneumonia, but who asked not to be denied of knowing death as an independent being in full control of her mind. In such a case, the request seems to come from a human being who wants to confront death with peace and dignity and with a realization of a wholeness of self. We need to consider also what moral obligations we may have to allow death to come to the person who has suffered massive and irreversible damage to the higher levels of brain functioning which control reason and rationality, when we know that death in such an event would be the fulfillment either of a previously expressed desire of the patient or the present desire of the family.

At this point it should be noted that the support which is suggested for permitting death in the three examples given is in no way intended to imply that one is justified in treating as a casual matter a patient's request to withdraw from treatment or his desire to die. Any such approach would be a blatant denial of the fundamental purpose of promoting human well-being. Humanly speaking, life is much too precious to permit easy assumptions or conclusions about its continuance or demise.

Because confusion and inability to make concrete, lasting decisions often mar the mind and emotions of the seriously ill patient, our medical ministry requires a patient-centered, team approach which brings to the sufferer's bedside a caring group of nurses, physicians, psychiatrists, social workers, and chaplains who share the task of understanding the patient's overt and covert pleas. They must be concerned to know what, if any, social and family difficulties may have arisen to influence the patient's decision about further treatment. They need to know, for example, whether the patient has recently lost the emotional or spiritual support of someone whom he loves and needs, or is fearful of losing such support and encouragement in the near future, so that tonight's long, lonely hours and tomorrow's physical struggles and indignities are too painful and meaningless to face. A patient's stated or implied desire for death may overlie certain discourage

ments, frustrations, and fears that only the most compassionate and sensitive, listening persons will be able to perceive.

Human death and dying, whether anticipated or desired, always involve personal sufferings of mind and spirit on the part of the conscious dying individual and his loved ones. Dying as a thoroughly *personal process* involving all sorts of fears — chief among them the fear of deception and loneliness — is strikingly portrayed in Leo Tolstoy's short story, "The Death of Ivan Ilych": "What tormented Ivan Ilych most was the deception, the lie, which for some reason they all accepted, that he was not dying but was simply ill. . . Apart from this lying, or because of it, what most tormented Ivan Ilych was that no one pitied him as he wished to be pitied. At certain moments after prolonged suffering he wished most of all . . . to be petted and comforted."⁹

To be comforted by the living, to not be abandoned, to not be deceived only so slowly are we coming to recognize and cope with these very real, very painful needs of man in his dying. To bathe, to keep clean, to manage the toilet needs, to turn on his side or back — these are all required in the care that is owed to the dying person by the living as a part of our human covenant of love and respect; but these medical delicacies and difficulties are not the totality of our medical ministry of compassionately caring for this fellow human being.

All too slowly, but finally, we are coming to hear the dying patient when he says, in effect, "As important to me as your technical efficiency, your syringes, and your hospital regulations is my need not to be feared and rejected by the living because I am dying. More important to me than the platitudinous assurance that everything will be all right and that I have nothing to fear is my need to have with me in my dying days courageous and personable nurses and physicians, who though being at their wit's end of medical knowledge and skill, are willing to sit by my bed and to visit with me on the basis that we are all human, all mortal, all finite."

Our personal and medical ministry of "compassionately caring for" entails the acknowledgment in word and deed that the terminally ill, dying patient is a person. This holistic view, this recognition of man as body (that is, biological being and process), mind (meaning specifically the *cogito ergo sum* aspect of man's being) *and* spirit (that which is realized and expressed through — but is other than — bodily existence), gives content and outline to our responsibilities in dealing with the dying. Essentially, it requires of us an assurance and a promise that the dying person will not be violated in body by the use of futile life-prolonging procedures and techniques, or by the use of unwarranted and unwise medical intervention to forestall, frustrate, or reverse the dying process; that he will not be violated in mind by the use of drugs or surgical techniques which fall outside of the planned medical regime designed to keep the patient humanly comfortable; that he will not be violated in spirit by being treated in the abstract as a personless disease, illness, or condition; and that he will not be violated as a person, a fellow human, by being abandoned or deceived.

IV

In a recent *Life* magazine, Joan Barthel writes movingly and tenderly about her reactions to death and the dilemma of a friend's dying:

Even now, my headaches linger. So do the bad dreams, the regrets. . . . I know about the natural cycle, to everything there is a season, but I cannot bear to think of the end. I am afraid now because the inner resources I thought I had . . . seem so frail and feeble. I loved her, but if love were enough, wouldn't I have known better what to say to soothe and make her easy? Wouldn't I have known how to use more creatively those last precious hours I spent staring at magazines, pacing the hall, drinking coffee in the lounge? I believed in another life for her, but if faith were enough, wouldn't I now rejoice for her instead of lamenting all that is lost — the cruise she won't take, the book she won't finish, the climbing roses she won't see this June? Or is the fault only in the quality of my faith and hope, in my brand of love? I keep thinking I should have sung for her.¹⁰

Here is a friend reflecting on the death of a loved one: wondering what she could have done that she didn't do; wondering what she didn't do that she should have done; questioning her brand of love, her faith, her ability and strength to face death again — fearing that she also might die helpless and speechless as her friend died; wondering now if her thoughts are neurotic or normal; wondering if the questions she is asking are natural to such an event — and yet helpless to know whom to trust or to whom to turn.

The author of the article — like God-only-knows how many people who are facing the death of a loved one at this very moment — found herself, in those final days, very much estranged from, and abandoned by, the health care community into whose hands her friend had committed the last few months of her life. The doctors stopped coming; there was a different nurse on duty each day; and the accounting department's only concern was who was going to pay the bills. But medical ministry to the terminally ill requires that we be supportive of the intimate community of persons who have been the source of our patient's strength, courage, and loving. We must comfort the bereaved as well as the dying. Often during the period of anticipatory grief when the patient and the family are struggling with tears, fears, confusion, and anger, the health care team finds it less of a psychological and spiritual strain to stay away from the patient and his family than to draw near to them. Even when someone must enter the patient's room, to assist with a bedpan or to bring fresh water or medicines, the tasks are frequently done with an air of professional efficiency which (at least covertly, if not overtly) imparts to the family a feeling that they are either unimportant or in the way. Why does the fear of honest confrontation with questions about life and death drive one, time and time again, to abandon the human beings who at this very moment need emotional and spiritual support as they bravely attempt to keep company with their dying loved one?

How we react to the terminal illness and impending death of patients, and how well we are able to keep company with, and be supporting of, the grieving loved ones, largely mirrors how we have coped with death and the reality of human finiteness in our own personal lives through experiences of illness and death in the past. The extent to which we have successfully avoided coping with death (and the prospect of death) in our previous encounters with dying persons directly influences the extent and quality of our relation with a fellow human being who, today, is suffering through the dying and death of a loved one.

V

To the end that we might become a priesthood in medical ministry to man in his totality and in so doing further humanize the art and practice of medical care, I offer the following theses as proposals toward the compassionate care of the terminally ill and their families.

1. We must face the reality of death and dying, and seek to learn in that reality something more about the uniqueness of man and the meaning of human existence.

Persons involved in the practice of caring for the sick and injured should be encouraged to continue to do all that is *reasonably possible and advisable* to save and meaningfully prolong life, taking into consideration at all times the human rights of the person-patient involved. We should be aware, however, that if we are to humanize the art and science of medicine, we will need to understand and appreciate the possibility that death and dying may be processes out of which a wholeness of being and a rediscovery of self may occur in the sufferer, in those who love him, and in those who care for him. To this end, our personal and medical ministry to the terminally ill and their families requires that we try to see human death as a positive affirmation that man is knowingly temporal and finite and *precious*. The very fact that one will, in time, be no more makes him at this moment, and at every moment, utterly dear and utterly demanding of our most dedicated, skilled, comforting, and compassionate care for him in his dying — and in his desire to die — as well as in his living.

2. In all of our efforts to save and prolong life we must be concerned with the issues of quality and meaning in human existence as the patient sees them.

Though it is not our duty or place to stand in judgment of the quality or meaning of another person's life, we are duty bound — in the name of human decency and loving care — to be concerned with what our personpatient sees to be quality and meaning in his life: what he sees to be a meaningful life worthy to be lived.

This is to say that in our attempts to save and prolong life we must be careful that we do not take more away from man than we restore to him. For example, we must be concerned with what we have done to the diabetic's own sense of well-being and worth when we have removed his gangrenous legs. In effect, we must be concerned that under the rubric of rehabilitation we not "disabilitate" a person into a level of existence that he cannot tolerate — and that we are not justified to demand that he tolerate. One may recall in the film *Johnny Got His Gun* the frightful moment when Johnny, realizing that his arms and legs have been removed, cries to himself, "But what kind of man would do this to another human being?"

3. We are never justified in abandoning a patient because in our mind "the case has been lost."

Indeed, the attempt to save a person's life may have been unsuccessful; but so long as the patient lives, he is fully deserving and fully demanding of our visits, our time, and our company. This fellow human being must be fully the recipient of our compassionate companionship and care until his dying is complete.

4. When a person-patient states that he wants to die or to withdraw from a treatment program, we must seek to understand the underlying reasons for his request, the true meaning of it, while taking the utmost care lest we intimidate the person in the process.

It ought not be our primary concern to talk every patient out of such a request. Rather, in such a situation, our fundamental responsibility is to be intimately involved with the person in his decision-making process, recognizing his struggles of mind and spirit, and helping him to understand what other programs of treatment, if any, may be available. Our responsibility is to be fully in company with him, discussing what he sees to be a meaningless or worthless state of existence. It is to be in living relation with him as he copes with the thought that there may be a point in life — and that this may be it — when death would be more dignified and blessed than continued existence.

5. We must seek to release the hidden resources that are there to help our patient meet the challenge of his terminal illness.

In order to do this we must be concerned to know his strengths and weaknesses; his feelings of personal fulfillment and achievement. What have been his hobbies, his leisure time activities in the past? What has he wanted to do, to learn or to study, that the personal and professional responsibilities of his busy workaday life have never left him time to do? This task is one of the most difficult, and perhaps one of the most neglected responsibilities confronting those involved in the medical ministry of compassionately caring for the terminally ill. To this responsibility we must bring an awareness and an understanding of the "absolute otherness" of this person-patient that makes him entirely and personally different from every other person for whom we must care.

6. The health care team — as a caring community — must be present when needed to give physical, emotional, and spiritual support to the family and friends of the terminally ill patient.

Just as our medical ministry of compassionately caring for the terminally ill requires that we make available the best possible program of diagnosis, treatment, and maintenance, so too our medical ministry of compassionately caring for the loved ones of the terminally ill requires that we make available a program of supportive care which concerns itself with the physical, emotional, and spiritual needs of those who bravely — or perhaps not so bravely — attempt to bear the agony of companying with the one who is dying. Into this supportive care must be drawn the expertise and personal ministry of our social workers, psychiatrists, and clergy — as well as our nurses, physicians, and paramedical personnel. While it is true that not every grieving person wants the help of a psychiatrist or the consultation with a social worker, or the ministration of a pastor, it is imperative that such services be made available to all individuals who desire such help.

The foregoing discussion and proposals regarding the compassionate care of the terminally ill and their families spell out neither in entirety nor in detail the responsibilities which must be accepted and fulfilled. Regardless of all that is still left to be said, however, it is to be hoped that we share an

increasing understanding of how our medical ministry requires an exquisitely personal relationship in which we willingly stand in a living-loving relation with all who are in need of medical and comforting care.

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TIME FLOWERS

W. Earl Allen



Allegiance

JOE MESAR

It's an old excuse.

They used it after Auschwitz after the obscene stalls and the final ovens.

They used it after Andersonville after gaunt bodies collapsed in clawed-out tunnels.

They used it after the battle with the Amalekites after slaying utterly women and children, man and beast.

We were only following orders.

How Did Ellen White Choose and Use Historical Sources?

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION CHAPTER OF THE GREAT CONTROVERSY

RONALD GRAYBILL

In an article on Ellen White's literary indebtedness, William S. Peterson remarked that any literary scholar will testify "that 'source studies' are among the most treacherous tasks to undertake."¹ By now perhaps some SPECTRUM readers, considering such articles the most tedious as well, may be weary of the drawn-out debate over Ellen White's treatment of the Bible and the French Revolution, chapter fifteen in *The Great Controversy*.

But some interesting evidence has come to light which can hardly be overlooked. One objective of the 1911 revision of *The Great Controversy* was to identify historical sources in which material quoted in *The Great Controversy* could be found by those who wished to verify the quotations. An examination of correspondence and other documents dealing with this revision has turned up significant data with a direct bearing on Ellen White's use of the historical sources appearing in chapter fifteen.

For readers who have not followed the discussion from its beginning, I will review some major points. In the Autumn 1970 issue of SPECTRUM appeared an article entitled "A Textual and Historical Study of Ellen G. White's Account of the French Revolution," by Peterson, then associate professor of English at Andrews University.² This article offered an evaluation of historians quoted by Ellen White in chapter fifteen of *The Great Controversy*, and concluded that "she appeared not to have been familiar with any of the important work that had been done on the Revolution in the latter half of the century and that she relied instead on older historical

treatments that were strong on moral fervor and weak on factual evidence."³ The historians Peterson evaluated — Scott, Wylie, Gleig, Alison, and Thiers — were judged to possess "strong antipathies against Catholicism and democracy."⁴ They generally belonged, Peterson said, "to an earlier 'romantic' historical school whose work had been largely discredited by the time Mrs. White was revising *The Great Controversy* in 1885."⁵

Peterson asserted that Ellen White followed her sources very closely and "drew most of her material from only a few pages of each." This observation led him to wonder how one should interpret her statement that the scenes were based primarily on visions. Peterson said that "except for a few broad generalizations about the Albigenses, Mrs. White provided no connected historical narrative in 1884; this appeared only after she had been reading in [J. N.] Andrews' library, and then every fact, every observation, came from printed sources."⁶ Peterson went on to cite a number of instances where Ellen White allegedly misread or misused the sources from which she did quote. In a sentence, then, Peterson seemed to be saying that Ellen White's sources for her treatment of the French Revolution were not the visions she received, but bad historians whom she used badly.

Peterson's article was followed by a series of replies over the next year and in each case Peterson himself was given an opportunity to respond. It is not my purpose to challenge the work of others, nor to attempt to answer all the questions that have been raised, but rather to correct a few misapprehensions.

Ι

A study of the notes left by Clarence C. Crisler (Ellen White's secretary who did much of the searching for the sources of quotations for the 1911 revision of *The Great Controversy*) disclosed Crisler's torn-out pages of chapter fifteen of the 1888 edition. Of course the 1888 edition did not carry references to the authors quoted, but these torn-out pages had Crisler's handwritten notations in the margins giving *the sources* of the quotations. But the interesting thing is that in many places Crisler made a double reference — one to an original source where the quotation could be found, and another to a secondary source: Uriah Smith's *Thoughts on Daniel and Revelation.*⁷

If one takes an 1884 edition of Smith's classic work (or even a current edition) and compares his exposition of Daniel 11:36-39 with Ellen White's treatment of the French Revolution, one quickly discovers clear evidence that Mrs. White did not quote Scott, Gleig, Thiers, or Alison directly. She drew the quotations entirely from Uriah Smith's work.

In fact, Smith had used all these same quotations in the 1873 edition of *Thoughts on Daniel* — and he himself may have taken them from secondary sources.

If one compares *The Great Controversy*, pages 269-270 and 273-276, with the 1873 edition of *Thoughts on Daniel*, pages 314-325, or the 1884 edition of *Daniel and Revelation*, pages 270-279 (either of which Ellen White could have used in her 1888 revision), one discovers that she used nothing from Scott, Gleig, Thiers, or Alison that Smith did not have. Every time Smith deleted material, she deleted the same material, although occasionally she deleted more. She even used the quotations in exactly the same order on pages 275 and 276. There can be no doubt that she drew the historical quotations from Smith, not from the original works.

Why is this significant? First of all, it changes our understanding of the way in which Ellen White selected the historical quotations she used in this chapter on the French Revolution. The impression that she sat down in the J. N. Andrews library in Basel and pulled this book and that one off the shelf, rejecting those that didn't agree with her biases, is not accurate. She did not, in any real sense, "select" these historians. She simply took over the historical references used in Smith's exposition.

Knowing the source from which Ellen White actually worked also helps explain the supposed suppression and distortion of evidence. She is said, for example, not to have given a "fair and accurate account" of the behavior of the bishop of Paris. Scott's account of the incident tells how the bishop renounced his faith, but it appeared that Ellen White had omitted several sentences which indicated that the bishop was forced to renounce his faith, and that he did it in tears and regretted it afterward.⁸

Why did Ellen White leave out the sentences in question? Was she deliberately misleading her readers in order to paint the bishop in an unfavorable light? No. Uriah Smith left out exactly the same sentences; and since she was quoting from Smith, not from Scott, she too left them out. She might be charged with poor scholarship by those who want her to conform to the canons of historical research, but certainly we can no longer entertain the suspicion that she practiced deliberate deception.

On the question of the comedian Monort and his blasphemous remarks, the fact that Ellen White was quoting Smith and not Alison again helps to explain the difficulty. She attributed the remarks to "one of the priests of the new order,"⁹ and Peterson points out that "a cleric he was not, except perhaps in some extravagantly metaphorical sense."¹⁰ But Smith refers to this speaker as "the comedian Monvel [sic] . . . a priest of Illuminism."¹¹ We should doubtless admit that Ellen White's reference to a priest of the new order is liable to misinterpretation, but Smith's phrase clearly gave her her lead. The new order was illuminism, and Monort was an appropriate "priest." It is interesting that she followed the quotation about Monort with the scripture, "The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God."¹²

Π

While no inflexible rule can be established, the preparation of chapter fifteen illustrates an important point to remember in attempting source studies on *The Great Controversy:* the references placed in the book in 1911 refer to sources *where the quotations can be found*, not necessarily to the sources where Ellen White found them.

Thus, when Philippe Buchez and Pierre Roux's Collection of Parliamentary History is cited, Peterson says: "I can find no information about the English translation which Mrs. White evidently used."¹³ The English translation she probably used was Daniel and Revelation, 1884 edition, pages 276-277.

Where does this leave us with the historians? Peterson treated and discredited five of the nine sources Ellen White quoted in her chapter on the French Revolution: Scott, Gleig, Wylie, Thiers, and Alison. We now see that except for Wylie, Ellen White cannot really be said to have selected any of these writers directly. Rather, she was accepting Uriah Smith's choices and expositions.

There were several historians Peterson did not treat — Buchez and Roux, White, d'Aubigné, and de Felice — saying that her quotations from them were brief and primarily factual. Certainly all would agree that the material from de Felice falls in that category.¹⁴ Wood subsequently treated the case of White,¹⁵ and Peterson did not challenge his favorable evaluation although he implied that it was too brief.¹⁶ It has been shown above that the quotation from Buchez and Roux was copied from Uriah Smith.

This leaves us with two historians: Wylie and d'Aubigné. I have nothing to add to the dicussion of Wylie, but there are some more specific comments from Ellen White herself on d'Aubigné, in an article titled "Holiday Gifts":

For those who can procure it [d'Aubigné's *History of the Reformation*] will be both interesting and profitable. From this work we may gain some knowledge of what has been accomplished in the past in the great work of reform. We can see how God poured light into the minds of those who searched his word, how much the men ordained and sent forth by him were willing to suffer for the truth's sake, and how hard it is for the great mass of mankind to renounce their errors and to receive and obey the teachings of the Scriptures. During the winter evenings, when our children

were young, we read from this history with the deepest interest. We made it a practice to read instructive and interesting books, with the Bible, in the family circle, and our children were always happy as we thus entertained them.¹⁷

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- 3 Peterson, SPECTRUM (Autumn 1970), p. 63.
- 4 Peterson, SPECTRUM (Autumn 1970), p. 62.
- 5 The work of revision should not, of course, be limited to 1885.
- 6 Peterson, SPECTRUM (Autumn 1970), pp. 63-64.
- 7 Uriah Smith, Thoughts, Critical and Practical, on the Book of Daniel (Battle Creek, Michigan: Steam Press of the Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association 1873). Thoughts, Critical and Practical, on the Books of Daniel and Revelation (Battle Creek, Michigan: Review and Herald Publishing Association 1884). The Prophecies of Daniel and the Revelation (Mountain View, California: Pacific Press Publishing Association 1944).

William C. White stated to the General Conference Council on October 30, 1911, that "much of the research for historical statements used in the new (1888) European and American editions of *The Great Controversy* was done in Basel, where we had access to Elder Andrews' large library, and where the translators had access to the university libraries." (*Notes and Papers Concerning Ellen G. White and the Spirit of Prophecy,* fifth edition (Washington, D. C.: Ellen G. White Publications 1971), p. 127. This statement must be emended by the internal evidence provided by *The Great Controversy* itself. It is obvious that neither the translators nor Ellen White felt any need of using these sources to any extent for this particular chapter. Further research is under way on the composition of the remainder of the historical sections of *The Great Controversy*.

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The Status and Role of Women in the Adventist Church

LEONA G. RUNNING

I

Many women held high positions and made outstanding contributions in early Seventh-day Adventist history. Was this because they were qualified and valued as treasurers, Sabbath school conference secretaries, educators, and editors? Or was it because they could be paid less than men would be paid in those same positions?

One does not have access to records, if indeed they still exist anywhere. But experience would lead many persons to feel certain that women throughout the history of the church have generally been paid at a much lower rate than their male counterparts and that women have usually received few, if any, of whatever fringe benefits have been in vogue for males. Although women are willing to "sacrifice," they think that there should be equal opportunity for sacrifice! In this day of rising democratic awareness, women believe that the sacrificial role should not be forced on them and that the degree of sacrifice expected by the church should not be greater for them than for men.

A survey could develop some interesting and valuable information about the Adventist church: What is the proportion of women to men in the general church membership? How many employees are women? How many working women have working husbands (in or out of the church)? How many women are the sole supporters of dependent husbands, children, or parents? How many women are single, with no choice but earning a living?

In the summer of 1971 it was announced that a "third woman" had been elected to the General Conference Committee (the top-level decisionmaking body). Later one more woman was added — and more than a dozen extra men. What's there to cheer about with a ratio of 4 women to 275 men?

Before any male says (to himself if not aloud), "We always pick the best qualified — and practically all of them are men," let me point out that women have not been permitted opportunity to develop their potential and to gain experience that would qualify them to participate as committee and board members in equal numbers. Those qualified, in fact, are often ignored. I doubt that intelligent women want to be included merely for tokenism. What they really want is to have a voice in discussion and decision because they have a contribution to make and a worthwhile role to fill.¹

As for remuneration, the financial situation was greatly improved in 1967 when the basis of the wage scale was altered. But many inequities remain. A married woman teacher, for example, is paid less than the proper wages and benefits for her rank — because her husband is considered "head of the house." She does not get what a single woman of her educational achievement and experience gets. The married woman cannot leave retirement benefits to an invalid husband or dependent children. The current policy provides only for "widows and orphans," not mentioning "widowers" who might be in need. Although the church has come a long way in recognizing that in some circumstances a woman, married or not, is "head of the family," improvement still needs to be made. It is not true that women can live more cheaply than men. When single women do so out of necessity, it is at a lower standard of living.

Women who are secretaries and stenographers need also to be given serious consideration. In many cases they are kept on hourly rates so that they will not be eligible for the fringe benefits that salaried persons have. Some of them are not given the midyear cost-of-living raise. I am not referring to flighty girls or to those just out of high school or business college, but to mature, responsible, efficient women who have worked for years, in or out of church employment. Their plight illustrates further that women sometimes suffer insensitive and cruel treatment and are viewed by men as objects rather than as persons.

Committee W (on the Status of Women in the Academic Professions), was reactivated in 1970 after being dormant forty-two years. With the backing of the American Association of University Professors, the parent organization, it is moving into a strong campaign for the proper rank for part-time teaching women in higher education (the same as for part-time teaching men). As the other part of their work, part-time women teachers may have the care of their small children, rather than (as some men) research, government work, or moonlighting in a second institution.

Women's life-styles are changing. If a woman chooses to rear a family, this probably occupies no more than ten years of her productive career life. She needs to keep up with the progress of her profession during those years until the last child is in school, and she may need some refresher courses before stepping back into her profession, with a career of a good thirty years, or longer, still ahead of her. In Russia, whose society Americans tend to look down on, women have equal opportunities for education and professions. Over 70 percent of Russian physicians and 83 percent of dentists are women. About 31 percent of Russian engineers (including, admittedly, most of the street cleaners and road builders) are women — but also about a third of all judges, lawyers, and college teachers.

More and more, modern educators are expressing what Ellen White said long ago — that the first few years of a child's life are all-important in determining the child's health, personality, and character. Adventist women are not advocating that mothers work outside the home during these formative years, unless it is necessary because they are sole supporters of the children. But to say any longer that "woman's place is in the home"² for her whole lifetime is to hide one's head in the sand and refuse to recognize life as it is in the latter third of the twentieth century.

The women who by necessity or choice enter the labor market in competition with men need opportunity for preparation. Often this is not given, and women are discouraged from entering many lines of endeavor. One may look at the few women who have achieved good careers in Adventist employment and think they really have nothing to complain about. But if their full stories were known, it would be clear that women's goals of education and service are not achieved without struggle against unreasonable opposition far beyond what men encounter. Every woman who has been in church service for ten or twenty or more years could tell dozens of stories about discrimination on the basis of sex.

Π

Illumination is brought to the discussion of discrimination, in a different context, by F. L. Bland, who points out that theories of "superiority" are based on pretense, hoax, nonsense, and pseudoscience, and implies that these are at the foundation of "supremacy" ideas of practically any time or place or culture. His summation of the principles involved is direct and sobering:

The faith expressed by Paul that every nation is "made of one blood" is the foundation for a harmonious, compassionate society. On this battlefield science has long ago joined religion as an ally.... How free are we from the snobberies of caste and race? How free are we from the hypocrisies of a mythical superiority?...

We all stand condemned before God. Our politeness and our pretensions of culture without God only lead to moral and spiritual complacency. We begin to thank God as did the Pharisee that we are not "as other men are." [Jewish men pray a daily prayer, "Blessed be God, that hath not made me a woman"!] It is significant for us that Jesus condemned this lordship of class and race. The following is a clear-cut picture of His attitude:

"Christ came to demolish every wall of partition, to throw open every compartment of the temple courts, that every soul may have free access to God. His love is so broad, so deep, so full, that it penetrates everywhere. It lifts out of Satan's influence those who have been deluded by his deceptions, and places them within reach of the throne of God. . . . In Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, bond or free."³

Let us complete the quotation from a parallel text from Paul: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is *neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus*" (Galatians 3:38, RSV, italics mine).

Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm (New York) has often stated in public that she has suffered more discrimination as a woman than as a black. When Cleveland's Carl Stokes, first black mayor of an American city, was visited by a woman mayor (white) from another city, he invited her to the city council meeting just convening. She found herself to be the only woman present. Later, when she chided him about having no women on his council, Stokes said a little sheepishly, "We're tackling one minority at a time."

Dorothy L. Sayers was one of the first women students at Oxford University. Graduated with honors in 1915, she became a scholar and an author. In one of her two essays of some thirty years ago (now reprinted in paperback because they are so relevant), she mentions the matter of women's clothing and asks why men should preempt the comfortable (and modest) type of clothing, trousers, and then demand that women not wear anything similar.

Probably no man has ever troubled to imagine how strange his life would appear to himself if it were unrelentingly assessed in terms of his maleness; if everything he

The fact is that, for *Homo*, the garment is warm, convenient, and decent. But in the West (though not in Mohammedan countries or in China) *Vir* has made the trouser his prerogative, and has invested it and the skirt with a sexual significance for physiological reasons which are a little too plain for gentility to admit. . . . This . . . complicates the simple *Homo* issue of whether warmth, safety, and freedom of movement are desirable qualities in a garment for any creature with two legs. Naturally, under the circumstances, the trouser is *also* taken up into the whole *Femina* business of attraction, since *Vir* demands that a woman shall be *Femina* all the time, whether she is engaged in *Homo* activities or not. If, of course, *Vir* should take a fancy to the skirt, he will appropriate it without a scruple; he will wear the houppelande or the cassock if it suits him; he will stake out his claim to the kilt in Scotland or in Greece. . . .

wore, said, or did had to be justified by reference to female approval; if he were compelled to regard himself, day in [and] day out, not as a member of society, but merely ... as a virile member of society....

If, after a few centuries of this kind of treatment, the male was a little selfconscious, a little on the defensive, and a little bewildered about what was required of him, I should not blame him. If he traded a little upon his sex, I could forgive him. If he presented the world with a major social problem, I should scarcely be surprised. It would be more surprising if he retained any rag of sanity and self-respect.⁴

Men's unconscious assumptions and attitudes show more than they realize. For example, a college president made this statement: "I don't have any prejudice against women. In fact, I *prefer* to hire them for my faculty; *they cost less money.*" Women don't blame men for absorbing cultural attitudes without *conscious* evaluation of those attitudes. What is important now is whether men will give some conscious thought to what has long been accepted unthinkingly.

The fact is that all of us, men and women alike, have been conditioned to certain ideas in society and the church — all our lives. Our religious outlook has come to us filtered through male minds, from a Holy Book written by men with the prevailing cultural assumptions of millenniums of male domination of the world. We are accustomed to hymns with such lines as "strong men and maidens meek" and to selected biblical passages that portray women as they were regarded by predominating male cultures.

If we think about it, however, even in biblical times a few women broke through those barriers — Deborah, Hulda, Lydia, and others. Solomon praised the executive position of a woman in the home (Proverbs 31:10-21), which encompasses work with wool and flax, bringing foods from afar, overseeing her women workers, buying fields and planting vineyards, spinning and weaving fine cloth, and making garments.

But as Dorothy Sayers made clear, the modern home is quite different. So Adventist women, along with women in secular life, are beginning to see themselves more clearly in the light of today and to take a place — in the world, in the home, and, under God, in the church — that befits them as children of God even as men are. They are not in accord with those in the women's liberation movements who have extreme social views (such as doing away with marriage), but they may question why a woman should have to lose her name when she marries. Rather, why not add a name?

What women really want of the church is a Christian environment and an educational environment and a work environment that will enhance not only their own outlook on life but the outlook of those with whom they associate in work or in marriage. Among other things, they want the maximum of the marriage relationship. They want their husbands to think of them as partners, to enjoy loving and caring for the children as fathers of the household, rather than relegating child care to the category of "women's work." (How will a child fit in society if he has been a chore instead of a family member loved and tended by both parents?) Secular society is leading the way on many such points.

The Genesis One story culminates with the creation of both man and woman "in the image of God." As Kenneth L. Woodward states:

This is a radical affirmation of sexual equality, and a sharp contrast to the creation myths of the Hebrews' neighbors in the Near East....

The feminist point of view, then, offers an understanding of the story of Eden that is close to the ancient Hebrews' own view.... As happens in all cultures, the ideals the Hebrews expressed in their literature did not always govern their social practices. The Hebrew woman, like her Greek or Egyptian sister, suffered under double moral standards imposed by a patriarchal society....

There are those who believe that Jesus himself did or said nothing to liberate women. It all depends on the cultural bias one brings to the study of Scripture. "Jesus was a radical feminist," says Dr. Leonard Swidler, a Catholic theologian at Temple University. "It is an overwhelming tribute to men's intellectual myopia that they have not recognized this over the past two thousand years."

Jesus' attitude toward women becomes truly radical only when measured against the customs of his society. At the great Temple in Jerusalem, women were restricted to an outer court, five steps below the court for men. And on the streets, it was considered beneath the dignity of a rabbi to speak to a woman — even his own wife or daughter. The basis of the Hebrew woman's second-class status was plainly sexual.⁵

Ellen G. White made some enlightened statements as early as 1898 that have been well ignored.

Women who work in the cause of God should be given wages proportionate to the time they give to the work. God is a God of justice, and if the ministers receive a salary for their work, their wives, who devote themselves just as interestedly to the work as laborers together with God, should be paid in addition to the wages their husbands receive, notwithstanding that they may not ask this. As the devoted minister and his wife engage in the work, they should be paid wages proportionate to the wages of *two distinct workers*, that they may have means to use as they shall see fit in the cause of God. The Lord has put His Spirit upon them both. If the husband should die, and leave his wife, she is fitted to continue her work in the cause of God, and receive wages for the labor she performs.⁶

If a woman is appointed by the Lord to do a certain work, her work should be estimated according to its value. Some may think it good policy to allow persons to devote their time and labor to the work without compensation. But God does not sanction such arrangements. When self-denial is required because of a dearth of means, the burden is not to rest wholly upon a few persons. Let all unite in the sacrifice.

The Lord desires those entrusted with His goods to show kindness and liberality, not niggardliness. Let them not, in their zeal, try to exact every cent possible. God looks with contempt on such methods.⁷

These quotations are only a drop in the bucket, the total, of good and pertinent statements made by Ellen White. In trying here to make the men of the church aware of the thinking of the women of the church — and of the nation and the world — I thus draw attention to the fact that the principles about which people are concerned today are principles clearly set forth many years ago by this respected church leader. It is a pity that the Adventist church so often has to be driven by the law of the land to do the good, right, and fair thing (minimum wage levels, equal employment opportunities, etc.). Some day the government will probably force the church to give women across-the-board equality of remuneration and opportunities. For once let the church organization do the good and right thing before the government says it has to!

What about ordaining women as ministers? Churches are doing this increasingly. Ellen White and other prominent early women of the Adventist church surely deserved ordination and were qualified for it. Undoubtedly today there are women, both in North America and overseas, who deserve this recognition of God's call to work just as men are ministers, pastors, evangelists, and administrators. If women have heard God's call in this way and have the qualifications in talent, preparation, and temperament, why should anyone stand in their way? Women in other lands care for one or two churches exactly as a man would — preaching, conducting evangelistic meetings, and doing all the rest of the pastoral work — and yet are paid as stenographers!

Ш

Only a few of the many, many experiences of discrimination against women — whether by persons or policies — have been cited here. And not all of these experiences are in the past; many inequities that exist are governed by current policy. Men pay lip service to the inspired guidance of Ellen White, but conveniently they ignore the clear statements that deal with the principles that are basic to bringing about a change in the status of women in the church.

Women ask only to be treated as worthwhile *persons*. Their role? They want to use for God and humanity the talents given them, and to devote their energies to God's cause. Their status? They want equality as persons. Why should one attempt to define the "role," singular, of women any more than the "role," singular, of men? The issue is that of the infinitely varied wishes and capabilities of *human beings*.

The following statements suggest the direction which the Adventist church might consider:

1. Church leaders, in recognition of the fact that society is changing, should use their initiative and influence to broaden the educational, indoctrinational, and cultural systems of the church to permit preparation for the genuine partnership of men and women in all aspects of life.

2. Men of the church should seek to discover that women have individual talents to develop and use in God's work. Those men who are in positions of strength should work for the inclusion of women in every role for which individual women may be qualified or may become qualifed — including committee, faculty, and trustee structures, together with every professional and business relationship.

3. Church organizations and institutions should give across-the-board equal pay and equal fringe benefits for equivalent work, service, or professional performance, with reference only to years of experience and level of responsibility. Assistance for the benefit of children might be made by tuition rebates rather than by less equitable means.

4. All church agencies should give equal opportunities for women to prepare, advance, and compete for jobs that people wish to have because of their individual interests, talents, and preparation.

5. Administrators and leaders should insist on provision for women to represent women in whatever organizational bodies discuss women's interests and vote policies concerning women. Women should be on all committees — for the value of the viewpoints that women can add to the consideration of any topic.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

- 1 Today one cannot pick up a magazine or a newspaper without reading such headlines as: The feminine role is commemoration day topic (Johns Hopkins Journal, Spring 1971); Hobgoblins that hold down women, a Life review of July 2, 1971, by Carol E. Rinzler of a book by Elizabeth Janeway, Man's World, Woman's Place (William Morrow and Company); From Adam's rib to women's lib, an article by Kenneth L. Woodward (McCall's, June 1971); Set stage for new equal rights battle (the Equal Rights Amendment before Congress), by Sarah Booth Conroy, and The liberation of Betty Friedan, by Lyn Tornabene (both in Mc-Call's May 1971 issue); Women pressure Lansing for new equal pay law (The News-Palladium, Benton Harbor, Michigan, June 29, 1971); and a new regular column in Ladies' Home Journal entitled "The Working Woman," by Letty Cottin Pogrebin. This is a very broad spectrum of publications on this subject sampled in a brief period. Do not for a moment deceive yourselves into thinking that American Adventist women are not reading such articles (not to mention books) and thinking long thoughts. They are.
- 2 Bulletin of the Michigan Association of Women Deans and Counselors, June 1971, pp. 1-5, passim.
- 3 F. L. Bland, Of one blood, *Review and Herald* (July 8, 1971).

- 4 Dorothy L. Sayers, Are Women Human? (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 1971), pp. 38-42.
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Doctor Running's paper was originally undertaken at the request of the Biblical Research Committee (whose chairman is Dr. Gordon M. Hyde) of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists. EDITOR.

Comments

BETTY STIRLING, Loma Linda University

Doctor Running has summarized well the major charges expressed by the working women of the Adventist church and has made some pertinent recommendations to improve the situation in which many find themselves. Some of the points she raises concern major problems. Three of these particularly need to be emphasized: (1) the persistent discriminatory behavior toward women who work; (2) the ignoring of qualified women (often while filling jobs with less qualified men); and (3) the practice of having men decide policy pertaining to women — without women representatives participating in the decision-making.

Discriminatory behavior toward women employed in the church is slowly disappearing — frequently as a result of pressure from outside the church. Wage scales and promotion policies are being brought into line. But as Doctor Running says, much remains to be accomplished.

Ignoring qualified women in favor of men for certain positions is related, of course, to our social definitions of "men's work" and "women's work." Both men and women almost automatically classify certain jobs with a "he does" and certain others with a "she does." Those responsible for hiring and promoting will need to exert much conscious effort to eradicate this firmly held, though often unconscious, practice.

The practice of men's deciding questions about the working women of

the church without consulting women or making them part of the decisionmaking group is also a social custom. Men are the church's decision-makers on most things anyway. So why worry if they are making decisions about women? The alternative — having women alone decide policy for men is unthinkable, of course, and in the normal course of social events simply would not happen.

Doctor Running mentions also such matters as the reasons for the kind of clothing worn by men and women. These aspects and others (like the frequently mentioned generic use of "man," "men," "he," etc., to refer to both men and women) may illustrate how discrimination is built into the language or the everyday customs of society, but they are minor aspects that will gradually change as more important problems are settled.

In her recommendations Doctor Running expresses well what many of the working women of the church would like, especially the professional women. Whether or not the "temporarily" employed, or the nonworking church women are very much concerned is another question. The chances are that the support for an Adventist women's liberation movement is not yet widespread, among either the women or the men.

Because there is a question as to the support for change, I would like to raise some questions from another viewpoint. Doctor Running has made her plea on behalf of the concerned woman. Could we look also at the question of women's status and role in the Adventist church from the viewpoint of the church organization?

The basic question would then become: What would be the benefit to the church of stopping discrimination against women? It seems to me that the church would benefit in many ways. A wider pool of women from which to select, and women workers who are satisfied workers are but two of the advantages to the church. It is true that eliminating discrimination might initially cost more in wages and fringe benefits. But would these not ultimately balance out in greater efficiency and less turnover? We might ask the question this way: Can the church afford *not* to make use of its women to their full capacities?

There is a corollary to the question of advantages to the church of stopping discrimination against women: What would be the advantages to the church of stopping discrimination against men? This is not a facetious question. Just as some women have the talents and preparation for what is called "men's work," some men have the talents (though usually not the training) for what is called "women's work." Should not the church stop discrimination both ways? Why shouldn't men with relevant talents and interests be encouraged to take jobs as secretaries, nurses, teachers in lower grades, and other jobs they are really barred from now? Can the church afford *not* to make use of its men in their true abilities?

Obviously, if the church is to do something about the position of women (and men) in the church, there is a big educational job waiting. The church ought to study seriously how to educate young women to stop hiding their talents, how to educate young men to be willing to try jobs that are called "women's," how to educate the decision-makers of the church to choose a person on merit rather than sex, and (possibly most difficult) how to educate the rank and file of church members to accept the new situation of equality of opportunity and responsibility for men and women in the church.

EDNA MAYE LOVELESS, Loma Linda, California

There can be no quarrel with Doctor Running's statement that many injustices have been done to women, even within the circle of the Adventist church. I'm not sure, however, that women have been the special object of injustice. Those who fail to value women as people valuable to God and to his work may also be insensitive and critical of men, children, blacks, whites, the uneducated, or the educated — depending on which camp they are in. I think discrimination is typically *un-Christian* rather than male, or white, or black, or whatever.

That the injustices should be corrected is incontrovertible also. I think, however, that there is more than one way to attain equal opportunity to sacrifice. Instead of raising women's wages to the level of men's, might we be more in the spirit of sacrifice to lower men's wages to the level of women's? We might then be *starting* toward a bit of an equalizing spirit with the Seventh-day Adventist workers in the world field, some of whom have come home from mission appointments when their children reached college age because their total wages were less than the children's tuition would be. If we're attacking inequities, it may be that we should give our attention to the grosser ones first.

If women lack qualifications to serve where men are serving, Doctor Running suggests, it may be because they have not had equal opportunity. This may be true in some cases, but I think we should not overlook other reasons. Often women are not qualified because of the *choices* they have made. Many choose to marry and stay at home rather than complete their education. Some choose to accept the support of a man rather than pursue a career. After the childbearing and childrearing years, often they choose the freedom of movement that nonpursuit of a career provides. Some noncareer women choose to contribute to society and the church by using their skills and education in volunteer projects worthy of their time and talent.

On the other hand, some choose to be frivolous and are not deserving of position or recognition. Many women with inordinate interest in fashion, decorating, dining, and matchmaking for their offspring have damaged the image of the Seventh-day Adventist woman. If a man has such a woman for his wife, he may have difficulty (God forbid) discerning that there are capable and intelligent women working in his organization.

Although Doctor Running asserts rightly that women have not always had equal opportunities, we should not overlook the fact that there are some specific roles that women play best. Their opportunities may not be identical with men's, but women have roles no less important. The opportunities open to a woman seem to me to be extremely wide-range. A woman can pursue a career, singlemindedly. Or, if she chooses wisely, she can marry a man who is able to support her (so that her choice to work is optional) and who will not be threatened by her choice to pursue a career. She can choose to remain childless. Or she can choose the greatest of professions, motherhood. This is not to denigrate other occupations of either men or women. Persons who perform a service to mankind through their work are achieving personal dignity and underlining the dignity of work.

But if a woman pursues motherhood adequately (Doctor Running's estimates notwithstanding), she is likely to devote more than ten years of her life to it. Getting the last child in school does not terminate her duties, although some parallel activities may be possible then. It is true that some options must be bypassed if one pursues motherhood. But such conditions are not peculiar to this career. Many a surgeon at great personal loss may have stifled another career in the process. And the inequities of financial backing have probably operated more effectively than those of sex to bar hosts of potential professional people from a desired course. As Robert Frost says:

> Two roads diverged in a wood, and I — I took the one less traveled by, And that has made all the difference.

Any of our choices preclude a variety of other choices. It might be profitable to consider that making choices is as crucial as decrying injustice.

Ellen White's Authority and the Church

STANLEY G. STURGES

The term *cult* has been applied to the Seventh-day Adventist church. One of the reasons given has been that Adventists have an extrascriptural source of authority in the writings of Ellen G. White.¹ The official church position, however, has been that Mrs. White's books serve only to shed light on the Bible and that the Bible is the sole source of authority in doctrine.² The average Adventist finds his understanding of Mrs. White somewhere between these two positions.

The following quotation from a *Review and Herald* editorial favors the first rather than the second assertion:

While Seventh-day Adventists do not consider the writings of Ellen G. White to be a modern addition to the canon of Scripture, we do recognize in them the same quality and degree of inspiration as that of the Bible writers, and consider their teaching authority to be equal to that of the Bible — for Seventh-day Adventists. The difference between them and the canonical Scriptures lies in the fact that we do not consider them to be of "universal application" — that is, to other Christians.³

This statement accurately portrays the current conscious attitude of a few and the unconscious assumption of many. Thus, Mrs. White's writings, as they are quoted in church publications and from the pulpit, appear to be right on a par with the Bible. What makes the Adventist church even more susceptible to the criticism of extrascriptural authority is the common use of these writings in doctrinal study. Her counsel is considered to have the same impact of authority — not only in principle, but frequently in literal interpretation — as the Bible. Her counsel is taken as the ultimate word in Bible study.

This perspective boxes in Adventist theologians. Consider the minister

who wishes to study in depth any of the church beliefs. He may indeed look to the Bible as the basis, but the final decision on its interpretation rests with Mrs. White. As vigorously as this position is denied officially, it is assiduously followed in practice. Adventist physicians feel guilty because some of Mrs. White's counsel on the practice of medicine is not clinically feasible. Educators are ill at ease about following the explicit "pattern" outlined for the schools of her day. (This is not to say that her instructions were bad, but more to say that they are unnecessarily felt to be immutable and to be appropriate to all times and places.)

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Unfortunately, Mrs. White herself doesn't help today's church out of the dilemma. Her personal letters and direct testimonies to individuals and groups were frequently considered suitable for broader application, both by usage and by her own instruction. For instance, even though she disclaimed infallibility,⁴ she said that her testimonies were not her ideas but the Lord's; that slighting and rejecting them was slighting the Lord; that God's blessings would be withdrawn from those who didn't heed the testimonies; and that turning aside from God's counsel (her testimonies) was like rebelling against him just as Korah, Dathan, and Abiram did (and everyone knows what happened to them!).⁵ She further wrote that one of the last deceptions would be Satan's attempt to unsettle the confidence of God's remnant people in the true testimony.⁶ Her books have many such statements — and they are used liberally to maintain her position of authority.⁷ Such statements would cause a loyal Adventist to hesitate to make any expression that might seem contrary to her word. Her works are a kind of "party line," and the faithful are quick to attack "revisionists."

It is hard for present-day Adventists to understand that the needs of the early Adventist church had an influence on how Mrs. White expressed herself about authority and revelation. The "little flock" that emerged out of the 1844 disappointment needed a firm guiding hand. They weren't in need of mere suggestions and advice as a focus for debate; they were looking for answers from a voice of authority. Mrs. White filled this position. By her direct approach to problems, the church benefited and prospered. Later, however, her position of paramount authority became institutionalized and schematized — and it becomes more so with each passing day. This is a mistake.

Mrs. White often spoke of there being no "in-between" point; she was either of God or of the devil.⁸ The all-or-none approach, applicable as it

was in expressing pointed instructions to a doubting individual or group in her day is not necessary for our understanding of Mrs. White's inspiration and authority today. During the same time in history, the Mormons accepted a similar aura about Joseph Smith,⁹ and the Christian Scientists did the same for Mary Baker Eddy.¹⁰ At first glance it appears that these personalities also claimed infallibility (since they spoke as the voice of God). But what is misunderstood is what their followers at that time required. They demanded leaders who frequently asserted their role as messengers of God.

Apparently many of Mrs. White's letters and testimonies went unheeded. To reinforce what she had in mind, she reminded church members repeatedly that her counsel was not hers but God's and that the members had better listen. Does this make Mrs. White deceitful and unprincipled for having spoken and functioned in a manner responsive to her times? To the contrary, it was perfectly acceptable then. Yet, Adventists today seem to feel obliged to read literally her efforts to structure and guide the early church, and hence they find themselves in the either-or position she spoke about: Don't tamper with the testimonies or you'll find yourself under Satan's banner.¹¹ To relate to her in this fashion now is worse than being foolish — it is destructive and devisive. Making her into an inflexible authority without the possibility of error creates a serious credibility gap for the thinking Adventist.

It should be no surprise that one can be inspired by the writings of Mrs. White in spite of unresolved questions and even disagreement with some of the things she wrote. Belief that her leadership was a manifestation of the gift of prophecy is not dependent on her being infallibly right on *every* point. Nor, emphatically, is it based on the ability to demonstrate that all of her statements are self-consistent and true.

But some Adventists seem to have a veritable compulsion to prove this point. As a result, they eagerly seek confirmation that cancer is caused by germs, that tuberculosis and cancer are largely caused by meat-eating, and that the Earth is no more than 6,000 years old.¹² Maybe these assertions are true. But implicit in this approach is the postulate that since she had this important information before scientists discovered it, she can therefore be trusted as God's messenger. What happens, then, when tuberculosis and cancer occur among vegetarians? Does this destroy her authority?

Π

Mrs. White's place of authority in the church should be carefully thought through. The very idea of such study causes consternation, however, be-

cause it seems to imply doubt concerning her work and also because it could mean that some long-held positions might have to be revised. The foundations of the Christian faith as Adventists understand them are not going to collapse from examining the views set forth by Mrs. White. LeRoy E. Froom has effectively dispelled this concern by pointing out that Adventist beliefs emerged from many conservative sources antedating Mrs. White.¹³

Adventists must seek a different means of using the Ellen White writings in church publications and from the platform. To use one of her quotations to clinch an argument closes off debate and reflection. The point then becomes unassailable, often reflecting more the proponent's position than what Mrs. White had in mind. To keep repeating that she was guided by God (because all her writings are in harmony with the Bible) is an effort to make her infallible.

The "radical" might propose to do away with the past; he might say that the Adventist church no longer needs her messages. Few Adventists would consider this a wise course. Equally imprudent, though, would be the position of rejecting all change and labeling as apostasy any effort to clarify her position. Either approach places the value of her counsel out of reach.

Mrs. White has given the church the highest quality of perception of God and his goodness. Her writings are ultimate for Adventists in the sense that through reading her books one can catch a clearer, transforming vision of God and of the unique task he has assigned to the Adventist Movement. The Ellen White books don't require an uncritical literalism in order to serve this purpose. The crossfire of challenge and criticism will only clarify and strengthen her place in the church.

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REVIEWS

Pride or Prejudice?

WM. FREDERICK NORWOOD

JOHN HARVEY KELLOGG, M.D. By Richard W. Schwarz Nashville: Southern Publishing Association 1970 256 pp \$5.95

Richard W. Schwarz's study of the life and contributions of John Harvey Kellogg, an influential physician in the middle period of the development of the Seventh-day Adventist church, is unique in certain respects: (1) Heretofore the church has not opened its archives to history scholars for a thorough study of some aspects of its development. (2) A scholarly study of the life and work of a controversial character who was dismissed from membership in the Battle Creek, Michigan, Adventist congregation merits the attention of professional historians within and without the church.

In securing access to thirty years of correspondence between Doctor Kellogg and Ellen G. White from the trustees of the White Estate, Schwarz has lifted the veil that tends to shroud the mass of significant papers, correspondence, and memorabilia still waiting in various depositories for historical examination and evaluation. The sympathetic attitude of the White Estate trustees toward Schwarz, one hopes, is an indication of the quality of official attitude that will increasingly be manifested by responsible custodians.

When they made correspondence available to Schwarz, the White trustees knew that he was committed to writing a doctoral dissertation for the University of Michigan. They knew also that Schwarz had access to the Kellogg papers at Michigan State University, to various private collections, and to other primary and secondary sources. Furthermore, they must have known that he would not be writing as an Adventist apologist. Thus, the helpfulness of the White archivists achieves added dimension.

I do not mean to imply that no writers within the church's organizational structure have ever been given access to needed historical materials. Access must have been given to Loughborough, Olsen, Spalding, and a few others whose works were directed primarily to church members to strengthen their faith in the advent movement.¹ Such works are commendable as forms of biography, essay, or even history — but only if history is not thereby distorted. More recent writers, Nichol and Froom in particular, with their heavy sectarian emphasis, have been powerful apologists.² They opted to use history in defense of the faith.

It should be emphasized that Schwarz did not write as a defender either of Kellogg or of the church officials who engaged the doctor in tart debate, but as a competent historian. Knowing that no historian can be strictly objective, Schwarz expressed in the preface to his dissertation a fear that his Adventist background might lead him to treat with prejudice the antagonism that developed between Kellogg and the church officials. He concluded his statement by quoting the words of Kellogg himself, written in 1919 to his wife, Ella Eaton Kellogg: "It needs more than human wisdom to rightly balance up and estimate justly the motives and influences which enter into one's experience."³ Perhaps wisely, the hesitancies expressed in the preface of the dissertation are not repeated in the preface to the published book.

The book preface calls attention to the absence of documentation and suggests that readers interested in sources cited consult the dissertation. Gaining access to unpublished dissertations, except on microfilm, is not a simple matter. Through the kindness of a colleague who secured a photocopy at considerable expense, I was able to examine Schwarz's dissertation. The ten chapters and bibliography constitute a typescript of 504 pages, whereas the printed book, with twenty-one chapters and an index, fills 256 pages. Since it can be assumed that publishers not specifically serving a scholarly readership make the decision not to publish footnotes or references, this unfortunate omission should not be attributed to the author. Nevertheless, it is better that the book be published as it is than that it be accessible solely to the relatively few Adventist historians who might trace it to its cloistered shelf in the University of Michigan library.

When a book about a person as controversial as John Harvey Kellogg comes from a church-owned publisher (which is understandably committed to the support of its parent organization) certain questions arise. To what extent, if any, was the author pressed to denature an objective effort to treat personalities and episodes in factual fashion — especially if this objectivity would seem to soil the quasi-official view on institutions and persons? The dissertation does not play down the simple but strong religious influence in his early years which shaped Kellogg's lifelong dedication to healthful living. Neither does it give short shrift to the years of cooperation between the church and the doctor when Ellen White was his close friend and adviser. (With tears streaking his pinkish ninety-year-old cheeks he once said, "Ellen White was the best friend I ever had."⁴) It is obvious that Schwarz attempted to turn his dissertation into a readable biography flavored with just enough verbalisms of a subculture to put the church reader at ease.

I do not know what were the instructions of the publisher to Schwarz, and I have not made a thorough passage-by-passage comparison of the dissertation with the book. But nowhere did my reading arouse suspicion of undue pressure. In neither account does Schwarz sink to the level of the joyous muckrakers of the early twentieth century or resort to the distortion of journalistic flippancy found in two popuar works, *Cornflake Crusade* and *Some Nuts among the Berries*.⁵ The dissertation's 14,000-word treatment of the sequence of events related to Kellogg's conflict with the church is reduced to a chapter of some 7,000 words in the published book; the former is welldocumented and must be read by anyone who wishes to know the facts of this complex conflict of personalities. Here, if anywhere, the publisher's editorial board must have offered some firm counsel, for Schwarz could have dealt more severely with Kellogg in some of his egocentric postures, and likewise with the church officials in their periods of severe authoritarianism. Streamlining this published chapter, however, does no serious violence to the biography, but it does tend to rob the account of many interesting and significant facts. Schwarz's objectivity is similar in some respects to that of Horace B. Powell in *The* Original Has This Signature — W. K. Kellogg.⁶ Unfortunately, Powell's interesting volume (not written as a dissertation) also appeared without a bibliography and without documentation except what little can be derived from the text itself.

It is common knowledge that John Harvey and Will Keith, his younger brother, did not get along after their early health food ventures gained commercial significance. John Harvey tended to treat his brother as subject to his direction, as indeed Will was for the many years he was an employee of the Battle Creek Sanitarium. The doctor later attempted to claim exclusive use of the family name commercially, but a court of law denied him that monopoly. Each of the two Kelloggs was a genius in his own right, but their "rights" clashed at numerous crossroads. Their hostility finally simmered down to a cold war that lasted until the elder brother died in December 1943 at the age of ninety-one years. The tragedy is that the situation might have been otherwise during the last five years of their concurrent existence. Will Keith expressed deep regret that there had been no real reconciliation at their last meeting on October 3, 1942. On June 22, 1948, a member of Mr. Kellogg's staff read to him (he was blind) a letter that the doctor had dictated before his death. Conciliatory in tone, the letter revealed regret that circumstances had severed their interests and brotherly relationship; it noted that Will's better business judgment had saved him from a vast number of mistakes of the sort made by John Harvey; and it expressed an earnest desire to make amends for "any wrong or injustice of any sort" he had done to his brother and praised him for giving the name he bore "a place among the notable ones of our time." Regrettably, a member of the household of John Harvey decided that the physical and mental decline alluded to in the letter should not be revealed to Will Keith. Therefore, the letter was not delivered until years later. Will Kellogg, who usually sublimated his emotions, was deeply grieved when he realized he had been robbed of an opportunity for a more complete reconciliation. This episode, omitted by Schwarz, is treated fully by Powell.⁷

Schwarz has delineated other emotionally charged situations that occurred when it appeared that the contending groups within the church — leaders and sympathizers who were polarized over the Battle Creek situation — had reached a rapprochement. There were some public confessions and renouncements of hostility, but the smoldering embers of pride and prejudice soon flared into a hostility that went through cycles of alternate calm and eruption. The General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists had participated little if any in financing the Battle Creek Sanitarium, but the church as the parent organization clearly had a vested interest in the sanitarium.⁸ Hence, it entered into the final struggle for control that developed a few years after termination of the 1938 bankruptcy trusteeship. Litigation ended in compromise within months after Kellogg's death. The church received a reasonable share of the assets (\$550,000 in cash and three farms valued at \$75,000) and a court mandate to use it for sanitarium activities in the state of Michigan.

Readers of Schwarz's volume should remember Doctor Kellogg for his amazing breadth of interests, his professional associations and writings, his persevering industry, and his unrelenting determination. All of these qualities were vital to the success of the Battle Creek Sanitarium after he joined the staff. His dynamism overflowed into many of his related corporate creations — the Medical Missionary and Benevolent Association, the Race Betterment Foundation, the Race Betterment Conferences, the Sanitarium Food Company, the journal *Good Health*, the American Medical Missionary Board, and the American Medical Missionary College.

The American Medical Missionary College was unusual because of its integral relationship with the social welfare programs instituted by Kellogg in Chicago. In addition, as residents in the college settlement house in Chicago, the medical students had limited instructional privileges in a few hospitals of the city. This clinical outlet and the charity cases at the sanitarium in Battle Creek were thought to provide ample teaching cases. A few high-level endorsements of the college, probably wangled by Kellogg, seem to be the justification for Schwarz's praise of the quality of medical education at American Medical Missionary College compared with that in contemporary medical colleges. The author has exercised better historical judgment by noting, however, that when Kellogg in 1908 stated that "the outlook for our College is better than it ever has been before," the Illinois State Board of Health had already decided to drop the college from its list of approved schools. Unfortunately, Schwarz did not follow with the observations on the college made about a year later by Abraham Flexner, whose report on all medical schools in the country was sponsored and published by the Carnegie Foundation.⁹ This prime source does not appear in the bibliography of the dissertation. In my opinion, the American Medical Missionary College, in spite of certain commendable features, was always a marginal operation - in finances, in controlled hospital beds in Chicago, and in maintaining a stable, organized clinical faculty. Furthermore, the divided campus was no asset. Like many other weak schools, it could not survive the long overdue nationwide clean-up of medical education triggered by Flexner's exposé.

In his epilogue Schwarz has summarized the lasting contributions John Harvey Kellogg, a man who was indefatigable in his pursuit of a mission, made to the health habits of Americans. Schwarz has exhibited a similar diligence in bringing his very useful study to completion. His book has much meat for the social and church historian of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, many clergymen and physicians as well as the silent majority of church laymen will read the volume with growing appreciation. How timely it would be if the Adventist church, like Schwarz, would dispassionately view the Battle Creek epoch as history that needs to be told, but in some respects not repeated.

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The Witnessing of Wit

ROY BRANSON

SENSE AND NONSENSE IN RELIGION By Sten H. Stenson New York: Abingdon Press 1969 255 pp \$5.95

In Sense and Nonsense in Religion Stenson responds to the loss of faith dramatized by the death-of-God theology and to the conviction that "religious Jews and Christians" either must preserve their "rational integrity as members of twentieth-century technological culture by giving up their religion" or must preserve their "religion in a secular world by giving up their rational integrity" (p. 155). Stenson reacts to this contemporary dilemma with a defense of paradox made familiar by neo-orthodox theologians. Making paradoxical statements is the appropriate, "reasonable" way for the religious person to affirm simultaneously the empirical world of nature and the mysterious truths grasped through "metaphysical intuition" (p. 220). Karl Barth could have said the same thing.

Stenson's original contribution is discussing paradox in terms of humor. Not that he identifies religion with wit and punning — that would be adopting a sort of natural theology. But Stenson wants to show the appropriateness of religious language by comparing its logic with that of humor.

The most relevent characteristic of humor is its ambiguity. "There could be no puns or witticism if it were not for the fact that the same words, pictures, movements, and so forth can be intended and interpreted in several different ways at the same time" (p. 106). Religious language is characteristically ambiguous. It points at the same time to both immanent and transcendent reality. Stenson pursues specific parallels between religion and humor. Wit, he says, forces contrasting ideas together by pointing to an area of similarity. The logical or psychological incompatibilities exposed among the terms surprise listeners into laughter — or even anger. The shock we feel in recognizing the new truth revealed in wit is like the astonishment that comes to us in the moment of revelation or conversion in religious experience.

Less convincingly, in the collision of ideas Stenson also sees that wit forces a mirror of the conflicts wracking human beings. "Our phenomenological description of wit suggests that it too is an experience — similar in certain important respects to the agony and ecstasy of the 'twice born' soul — in which both creative and destructive forces, the divine and the demonic, vie in the soul of man for his eventual allegiance" (p. 119).

Finally — because wit takes men's familiar ideas, juxtaposes them, and creates a new reality — Stenson can describe wit as immanent and transcendent, and even assert "God is like wit in this respect." To experience a witticism, then, is to encounter a Moment of Truth (crisis theology, p. 115), to be fascinated and a little awed by a new reality (Otto, p. 123), to be drawn to the edge of a new world of absolute freedom (existentialism, pp. 118, 122), or to be apprehended by God (traditional theology, p. 117).

What wit is to conversion, puns are to the sacramental. Wit directs attention to the one point of convergence between two terms in order to shock us with how at other points these terms clash. Puns, on the other hand, emphasize how two dissimilar terms can be drawn together. "We have likened puns to the places where two or more lines of thought easily join each other with only a nervous clatter to mark the ambiguity where the lines intersect" (p. 109). Puns, then, while recognizing differences, can show the similarities between two orders of reality (for instance, the sacred and the profane). "In puns several different lines of thought go through the same sign at the same time, and if one of those lines of thought is religious in some heightened sense, then that pun — which might be any sort of object or event, and not a conventional sign — will be sacramental in that way" (p. 107). The Christian must have the "witty," sudden illumination of conversion, but he also needs the "gradual sacramental enrichment of religious 'punning'" (p. 157).

Stenson succeeds in demonstrating the paradoxical nature of humor and in showing its similarities to religious affirmations. But he pushes his two methods — phenomenology and linguistic analysis — too far. He identifies exxistentialism as a part of the phenomenological school, almost ignoring authors more often used in phenomenological studies of religion — Otto, Eliade, van der Leeuw. This restricted view of phenomenenology leads him to include chapters on Sartre and Heidegger that do not seem to be necessary to the central development of the book.

More disconcerting is his preoccupation with existentialism, which warps his analysis of humor, especially wit. Not satisfied to show the similarity between wit and conversion (which he accomplishes brilliantly by illustrating the element of suddenness and surprise in both), Stenson demands that wit reveal anguish, pathos, despair, the demonic, the abyss, even the tragic (pp. 111, 116, 118, 119). He talks of a witticism being a disaster or catastrophe leading us into a world of chaos. With incon-

gruity and conflict I can agree — but tragedy? Stenson's interest in existentialist categories leads him to turn humor inside out. If a comic statement is essentially tragic, what has happened to our language? Wit and humor reveal important aspects of human experience. They should not be forced to encompass all reality.

Wit is violent and painful. It deals with the conflicts and tensions of significant reality described by existential philosophers. Puns are gentle and tame; they reveal the similarities in life. Puns enrich our apprehensions and are therefore inherently sacramental. Yet Stenson relegates sacramentals, or "lesser blessings," to puns and preserves the more complex and important sacraments for wit (p. 149). His first analysis would make the comparison of wit with conversion and pun with sacraments more consistent. But having ascribed to wit the importance of the tragic and the serious, Stenson wrenches the logic of his own position, to keep such an important aspect of religious practice as sacraments within the scope of wit.

In spite of some excesses, Stenson's overall effort is a success. He stresses wit because he thinks it is a kind of paradoxical language that can make sense (meaning) out of the nonsense (logical self-contradictions) of religious affirmation. Contemporary man, including those who proclaim the death of God, must see that religious statements, like humorous ones, deal with two realities at once. Humor may surprise sometimes, but often it tells the truth. Can't religion be recognized as doing the same? Today's cultured despisers of religion may regard statements of faith as silly. But really, Stenson says, they are the pitifully obtuse folks who remain sober-faced at a party, who in the midst of laughter fail to see the point. Stenson makes his.

The Timely Man

JAMES W. WALTERS

APOLOGY FOR WONDER By Sam Keen New York: Harper and Row 1969 218 pp \$5.95

Sam Keen is a representative of the post-death-of-God theology, a theology that tries to make the Christian faith acceptable to modern man by appealing to phenomenology — an appeal that works toward the conception of God (or religion) by beginning with a study of universal phenomena pointing to a transcendent aspect of life.

Keen's basic a priori is theological: that common grace makes possible "trust in the context within which action must take place and confidence in the ability of the self to undertake appropriate action" (p. 203). This affirmation is not an explicit theme in the book, but it must be recognized in order for one to understand the perspective of Keen's analysis of human nature and life.

Wonder is the motif of this study. For the author, wonder is passive awareness of the beauty and wholeness of nature which is not subject to laboratory analysis. The wonderful, the holy, and the valuable are essentially one entity, not separate entities. The experience of wonder in one's life is prerequisite to "authentic humanness."

In his historical survey of wonder in human experience, Keen looks at the primal, the Greek, and the Judeo-Christian man. These three men (constituting the ''traditional man'') cannot be pitted against each other. There are differences, but there is also a unity in their common experience of the wonder-full cosmos. The squabble between Athens and Jerusalem is a family affair; traditional man saw the cosmos as a teleologically ordered system governed by a divine rationality comprehensible to the human mind.

Traditional man, *homo admirans*, stands in stark contrast to modern man, *homo faber*. *Homo admirans* lived in a cosmos already "partially informed by patterns of meaning and value;" *homo faber* lives in constant anxiety and chaos "which he alone must shape and make meaningful" (p. 80).

Keen traces the decline of reason that led man to a stance of total contingency. First, Hume and Kant showed that the mind *creates rather than discovers* order in nature. Sartre and fellow atheistic existentialists developed the full implications of this relativistic insight: life is "absurd;" existence is simply "to be there." To this "accident" of being, man responds in two opposite ways, says Keen — primarily in the Apollonian way, connoting a conservative, orderly society; and secondarily in the Dionysian way, implying a reckless, uninhibited outlook on life.

The Apollonian way is closely related to *homo faber*. Modern man reacts to contingency by incessantly *working* to create meaning. Man cannot accept his life as a good gift of God. Rather he must continually strive to become human, to have dignity. Man as *maker* turns his body and mind into tools and seeks thereby to hollow out a niche of meaning in the alien universe. Man seeks *meaning* by gaining controlling knowledge over his environment. He seeks *control* by imposing structure and law and scientific method. Keen holds that any philosophy of life (such as Marxism, scientism) that pictures the world as a totally closed system is a "sick" philosophy; it is "ideopathological." Such a closed system, he believes, leaves no room for wonder and hope and thus results in a despair which is neither healthy nor mature.

Conversely, the Dionysian way knows no limits, norms, or boundaries. Response to life is as accidental, free, and chaotic as life itself. Those who walk in the Dionysian way are such personalities as Altizer and Marcuse, and the followers of their type of philosophy — the drug culture and the hippie movement. The Dionysian consciousness of perpetual spontaneity is schizophrenic and equally as disastrous to human freedom as the Apollonian way, says Keen. Keen applauds the Dionysian recognition of the repressive nature of present-day Apollonian society. But he criticizes it for not being a "responsible" alternative. It does not set forth a workable social order in which day-to-day responsibilities can be carried out.

Keen's mediating solution is to take the best of both modern life-styles in what he defines as "polychrome existence." His motto is: "There is a time for everything under the sun." The "timely man," *homo tempestivus*, is the ideal man. He knows when to contemplate the wonderful, and when to discipline his life by work. Like the

dancer, he moves "gracefully" to the beat and rhythm of the music, for it is "impossible to create a casuistry of appropriate responses" (p. 198). The ethic advanced by Keen, in the end, seems similar to Richard Niebuhr's ethic of the responsible self.

My quarrel with Keen is not with his ethics nor with his theological presuppositions. The main objection I see to his thesis is his theological sellout to modern man — a sellout which need not be and against which his discussion of traditional man mitigates.

The idea of trust, which undergirds this book, Keen derives from theology, as is seen in the mention of God, gift, and grace in his excellent phenomenological study and in his "quasi-theological postscript." This is fine and good for the religious man — which Keen presumably is.

But trust is also the only viable option for the secular man, says Keen. Rather than ground the reasons for a viable trust in his whole phenomenological study of man (especially the "traditional" man he lauds), Keen essentially says that trust is the best route to take, because it alone leads to a mature, healthy view of life. Whereas in chapters two to four he contends for the traditional man's view of at least a partially rational universe over against the contingent world of modern man, in chapters five and six he seems to capitulate to the modern world view himself. That Keen no longer holds traditional man's world view as in any way applicable to modern man is seen in his fervent plea that at least modern man should hold on to trust, which he may root "in a positive doctrine of the absurd."

Keen admits that man's denial of the transcendent may be the best, after all, for now man has no separation between the sacred and the profane. Everything "sacred" is imminent and near. Modern man can celebrate (secular parallel for Christian "worship") in his "one-story, undifferentiated, contingent world." In letting go of his earlier contention for some universal norms in the history of society, Keen loses any ground for appeal to trust other than "it makes for a more healthy life view." This basis for trust merely begs the question of whether to accept a positive or a negative life view if one is trying to be *realistic* about life and not merely "mature." In sum, Keen has sold out to modern man's contingency but still pleads for "trust," although he has no phenomenological basis on which to do so.

Langdon Gilkey, one of the most respected names in American theology today, has written *Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language*,¹ which also attempts to confront modern man with Christianity through a phenomenological approach. Unlike Keen, however, he does not capitulate to modern man's limited and narrow world view. In fact, Gilkey questions whether modern man, in the final analysis, is significantly different from traditional man.

Underneath modern man's "coming of age" and technological superiority Gilkey sees man with his fellow humans of all ages experiencing a sense of the transcendent in the depths of his being. Modern man's experience of the ultimate void (contingency) presses him "toward an anchorage in a transcendent totality of being" where life assumes both intellectual and existential meaning (p. 335).

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1 Langdon Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1969).

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