

Humanity and Apocalypse: Confronting the Holocaust

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5

*Wer bin ich? Einsames Fragen treibt mit mir Spott. . . .
Wer ich auch bin, Du kennst mich. Dein bin ich, o Gott.*

Who am I? Lonely inquiry is a cruel sport. . . .
Whoever I may be, Thou knowest me. Thine am I, O Lord.

D. BONHOEFFER, *Widerstand und Ergebung (Resistance and Surrender)*.

Self-definition is a lonely personal quest. Who am I? A rabbi, a teacher, brought into your midst to tell you what cannot be told, to remind you of what our age cannot ignore, but has suppressed. George Steiner, the brilliant Socratic gadfly of our times, has noted in *Language and Silence* that the Word was there at the beginning but not necessarily at the end. And he cites Karl Wolfskehl:

Und ob ihr tausend Worte habt: Das Wort, das Wort ist tot.

And if you have a thousand words, the Word, that Word is dead.

I also have no words to bring you into the darkness. I do not even have the silence which might accomplish this. There *are* those who could lead you into the innermost circle of the Inferno: Elie Wiesel . . . Eugene Heimler . . . Primo Levi . . . the witnesses; the survivors. And the word has not completely died. It lives with the poets. Theodor Adorno once said that no poems could be written after Auschwitz. Then came Paul Celan, arguably the greatest German poet of postwar times; and Adorno retracted that saying. Sylvia Plath sang the song of Lady Lazarus; and Nelly Sachs wept for the children. But Nelly Sachs lived in the twilight zone and died alone. And Paul Celan and Sylvia Plath rushed into death because it seemed brighter than life. Already Hoelderlin had noted:

Indessen duenkte mir oefters

*Besser zu schlafen, wie so ohne Genossen zu sein,
So zu barren, und was zu tun indes und zu sagen,
Weiss ich nicht und wozu Dichter in duerftiger Zeit.*

Better to sleep, than to be without comrades.
And I do not know how to wait, what to do and what to say
And why to be poet in a time of want.

6

Who wants to be a poet at a time like this? But we need them: they are today's prophets, remembrancers who give us our awareness of the night — and who may also let us know when dawn is breaking. We need also the remnants of language which have been preserved through them. Commenting on the Peasants' War, Friedrich Engels noted that "in a religious epoch, even revolutionary ideas have to be expressed in a religious rhetoric." In apocalyptic times, religious ideas have to be communicated in that anguished stammering which is all that remains when the darkness closes in. And at that time, our religious differences almost disappear. We are united in terms of *whatever remains* of our humaneness, and through our glimpses of the Infinite entering the finite. And so we will now join together and share our perplexities, our anguish, and the small spark of hope left to us. We will attempt to confront the Holocaust.

I

The organizers of this Congress set a specific task for our endeavors with which we can commence. The initial prospectus contained the following paragraph:

The humanizing of man in an apocalyptic world: The civilized world with which this century began has become the apocalyptic world with which it moves towards its end. Item: the Holocaust! The historical circumstances which made it possible for this impossibility to happen have at least in part to do with the history of the religions of the Western world. The problem of the role of religion in the humanizing of man cannot ignore the inhumanity of modern times.

Much of this is accepted by all of us here at this Congress. We recognize the twentieth century as the Age of Brutality. Hindsight enables us to note a steady progression into darkness commencing most clearly in the trenches of World War I. It was von Falkenhaym and Haig who first used the concept of the body count in modern warfare, who saw the trenches as blood pumps, and who played the numbers game. Vietnam is only the last remake of that movie. But there are enough histories and historians who can, and do, chart the course of the unfolding evil before us. The origins of totali-

tarianism are clear to us. And I trust that we have not forgotten that the Nazi state pioneered in our time a number of innovations which are directly related to the Holocaust: *It was the first openly criminal state in which inhuman acts were applauded and made the norm; and it managed to win over the minds of its citizens.* We hear much today of those who spoke out at the very beginning and at the very end. The time has not yet come that we can forget the reverberating silence that sent millions to their death.

Let us take a frank look at the suppositions underlying the statement that the Holocaust "has at least in part to do with the history of the religions of the Western world." Let us discuss Christianity here. I know all about the Judeo-Christian heritage which is Western Civilization. I like it. And I accept full responsibility for the evils of our society, as I have accepted its blessings. Almost three thousand years ago, Judaism taught the doctrine of communal responsibility, and to this day our penitential prayers on the Day of Atonement take us into the recognition that the sins of our society are our own sins.

7
But while the act of evil links aggressor and victim in a fratricidal pattern, the distinction between them endures. *In the beginning*, Cain held Abel responsible for being a victim. *In our own time*, here in America, the black community is castigated for having been brutalized by a system which promised equality but proved to be flawed in its color vision. *And yesterday*, as Jews entered the death camps, there were those who criticized them for not fighting against machine guns with their bare hands, or who indicated, really, that the "Jews had brought it on themselves"! Surely, the brutality of our time does not only consist of napalm and bombs: it is found in words and thoughts.

As to Christianity's involvement with the Holocaust: perhaps it were better for a Christian to state this than for a Jew. Yet I remember long afternoons in an East Hampton garden spent in the company of Paul Johannes Tillich; and much of what I say and teach comes from him. Wilhelm Pauck at Union Theological Seminary taught me to appreciate Martin Luther — I still feel that "Concerning the Jews and Their Lies" was more than a pamphlet written by Luther in a moment of weakness. And if I link Luther with the German madness and see a relationship to the Holocaust, I do so because I want to understand Christianity through its great men whose failings reflect the failings of Christianity. We cannot judge on the basis of weak men who claimed to be God's representatives but surrendered to dictators. We can judge attitudes that recur again and again within the faith.

Leo Baeck's classic essay on Christianity as the romantic faith underscores

the emotionalism that blurs the sharp ethic of the Christian call for social justice. This romanticism was endemic in fascism as well. Carl Schmitt, a lover of Streicher and Hitler (now back in business in West Germany), defined political romanticism as “subjectivated occasionalism” in which everything can become romanticized and nothing matters. In 1919 he admitted that “the core of political romanticism is that the romantic . . . wants to be productive without becoming active . . . without [assuming] responsibility.” Religious romanticism faces the same dangers; and a concordat between religion and the state unites common emotions within both structures which evade ethical controls and find their own existence sufficient self-justification. Fascist actions were often condemned by Christianity; but they were carried out by professing Christians and by those who felt their Christianity to be a subservient but substantive part of the state that commanded its individual members to act in this inhuman fashion.

Religion’s task of humanizing man is curtailed when secular and religious authority become intertwined. Perhaps that is one lesson for the history of religion rising out of our exploration of the Holocaust. I fear that it is not the only lesson. Religion on its own can also misdirect human emotions and separate man from fellowman. It can stress human guilt — in an effort to promote repentance — to the point where everyone is totally guilty and where guilt therefore ceases to have meaning. It can stress the Divine to the point where the human is lost. It can accept the Holocaust as part of God’s plan — but only by substituting human vision for the Divine. Christianity has made all of these mistakes; and Judaism has made most of them.

II

The loftiest vision of Christianity is that of the Cross. Non-Christians can only view it with the deepest respect, and marvel at the self-sacrifice, at the devotion and service to fellowman kindled among those whose spirits are truly at Calvary. And yet there is a danger in that vision. One Jew was crucified on that hill. Six million Jews died in the gas chambers of Europe. There are those who would say that Auschwitz and Golgotha are the same. They are not the same. They can never be the same. Six million sacrifices as a vicarious atonement? It is blasphemy to think so.

It is even wrong to put these deaths into a framework where one begins to think of six million martyrs testifying of their faith to the world. They were not martyrs. They were victims. Their skins became lampshades, their fat became soap, their golden dentures became loot, and their prayers were not heard. Their death was tragedy, not testimony. They died as human be-

ings and nothing more. Their murderers survived, less than human, still part of our contemporary society.

Christianity can only come to terms with Auschwitz under the sign of the Cross. Is man still redeemable after this ultimate collapse of his humanity? Does Golgotha still illuminate the human situation? Juergen Moltmann's most recent book addresses itself to this problem:

In the New Testament the question "Who is man?" points towards the one man, Jesus of Nazareth [deserted by God and man] . . . concerning whom it is stated *Ecce Homo!* But at the same time God's answer is given: "I will be with you!" . . . Faith unites the recognition of God and self-recognition within the recognition of the Christ. The Crucified One is the "mirror," says Calvin, in whom we recognize God and ourselves. For in his cross there is revealed, together with the misery of human forsakenness, the love of God which accepts man in his state of misery.¹

9

The Christian theologian Simon states that "by holding the mirror of Auschwitz before Golgotha we remove the veil of unreality from the latter; by contrasting Golgotha with Auschwitz we bring the latter into a wider morality and give spiritual meaning to the meaningless."²

Gruenewald's altarpiece of the tortured face and mangled body comes to replace Raphael's serene vision of the crucified Jew. It may well be that the contemporary Christian gains a deeper understanding of his God by pouring the full measure of human suffering now known to man into that moment of history which was Golgotha. But if there were aspects of Auschwitz at Golgotha, the non-Christian will still challenge the notion that Golgotha gives morality and meaning to Auschwitz. For Moltmann, *Ecce Homo* and *Ecce Deus* are *one word* written upon the Cross at Golgotha. Those standing outside that mystery who look at Auschwitz can only say *Ecce Homo*. (Perhaps, as Klasemann noted last night, we come also to *homo absurditus* alongside of *Deus absconditus*.)

The Christian sees the suffering of one person at Golgotha and finds it encompassing all human suffering, including Auschwitz. In the core of the suffering upon the Cross he discovers the love which will assuage all pain. Man is both impotent and heroic, the protagonist of a tragedy resolved *outside* the arena of its performance. For the Jew, the process is reversed. He starts with the six million victims of Auschwitz, and moves from there to the single man who must confront his own Auschwitz. In the words of Rabbi Ignaz Maybaum:

The Cross, as the poetic symbol of suffering, hides the truth. Auschwitz . . . is the truth mankind must face. The Irish who perished in their great famine perished in their Auschwitz. The young boys who died in 1914 in the mud of Paaschensele died

in their Auschwitz. The soldiers who died at the Somme and at Verdun . . . the soldiers, airmen, and sailors of the second world war, the Russian prisoners who were starved to death in Germany, the Russian peasants who were destroyed like useless cattle by Stalin, the men, women, and children who died in the air raids, the victims of Hiroshima and of the air raid on Dresden, they all died in their Auschwitz; they died because what happened was a monstrosity [and not a poetic tragedy].⁸

Auschwitz can never be Golgotha. Golgotha is the attempt to bring man through the limits of human weakness into the confrontation with God. Auschwitz demands that man must confront his own monstrosity and take full responsibility for it. Those who ask, "Why was God silent?" are influenced by a tradition challenged by the Jew — who still wants to know: "Why was man silent?"

10

It is passing strange that, at the moment of asserting human culpability for the monstrosities of life, Judaism also asserts its hope that man can survive and regain his humanity. Every human being is a new hope, an individuality in which aspects of the Divine are revealed. He cannot be defined: *individuum est ineffabile*. Man is made in God's image; as the Talmud interprets this, the Divine imprint does not create men like identical coins; each is unique, each is in God's image.

A reconciliation between Judaism and Christianity can take place at this point; the discovery of man leads to the awareness of God, just as the awareness of God must lead the Christian to the awareness of man. And the mystery of individuality leads to respect between differing faiths. Differences remain. There is an ancillary insight here for those of us who teach comparative religion courses: one must learn to listen to nuances. Confronting Auschwitz, one could select Jewish and Christian statements which would give the impression that there is absolute agreement between these religions as they confront the ultimates of human suffering. We are *not* agreed. But we respect each other's grief and walk our own way. At the end of time, the roads converge and become one.

III

Meanwhile, how shall we live with each other in the shadow of Auschwitz? *Can* we confront the past and present monstrosities out of the resources of our religious traditions? Or are these to be abandoned? Can we still talk of the resources of our democratic traditions? Or is this to be abandoned? Are we still brothers?

In the realm of human relationships, the problem of theodicy becomes the quest for the *Mitmensch*, the fellow human being. Some years ago a public letter was published in which a Jew addressed a fellow human be-

ing on the problems of life after Auschwitz. The author of this letter was Guenther Anders. He entitled it *We Sons of Eichmann* and addressed it to Klaus Eichmann, the son of Adolf. The text evidences a deep concern for a young man living under the shadow of the past. It deals with our generation in our monstrous time.

Anders emphasizes the horror of Auschwitz which has made itself at home in all areas of our apocalyptic age. He summarizes the specific *monstrosity* of Auschwitz:

What is monstrous?

1. That there was an institutional and factory-like extermination of human beings: of millions.

2. That there were leaders and assistants for these actions, namely — *slavish* Eichmanns (men who accepted these tasks like any others and excused themselves on the basis of commands and loyalty); *dishonorable* Eichmanns (men who fought to obtain these posts); *stubborn* Eichmanns (ready to surrender all of their humanity in order to enjoy total power); *greedy* Eichmanns (men who did the monstrous precisely *because* it was unbearable to them — and they had no other way of proving to themselves that nothing could shake them); *cowardly* Eichmanns (men who were delighted for once to do the infamous with a good conscience, that is, as not just something no longer prohibited, but as something which was commanded).

3. That millions were brought and kept within a condition in which they did not know of this. And they did not know of it, because they did not want to know of it; and they did not want to know of this, because they were not supposed to know of this — that is, millions of *passive* Eichmanns.

11

Once more, Auschwitz is here used as a mirror. It is not Golgotha which is reflected, but our own home and that of our neighbor. Anders is aware of this: he recalls the immediate past to avert the immediate future.

One of the causes of Auschwitz was — technology. Anders cries out that “our world, despite the fact that we discovered it and built it, has become so enormous that it has ceased to be ‘our’ world in a psychologically verifiable sense. It has become ‘too much’ for us” (p. 22). Our actions now have effects which are beyond our awareness. This conflict between man and his technology has been noted earlier; the concept of alienation has been assimilated into modern life. Yet Anders sees a new dimension here, a growing darkness. In the last century, man suffered from lack of knowledge; in our time, man suffers from too much knowledge, from intentionally produced false knowledge. And if our intellect is insufficient or misdirected, this also applies to our feelings. All of us know this. The death of an infant moves us; the death of six million people simply stuns our senses.

We are Eichmann’s sons, removed from the consequence of our actions, inheritors of a dark past, actors in new monstrosities which poison the continents and destroy our immediate neighbors. We are also victims. While

we distinguish between those who killed and those who were killed, we recognize that the monstrosities which were perpetrated in those days have etched themselves into the structure of our corporate existence. The fine edge of our sensibilities has been worn away by the monstrosities of our age. The six o'clock news is the most brutal program on television — and we do not even turn it off. Each day, murder and destruction flicker across the screen as part of our home life. Is it any wonder that we have learned to live comfortably with the knowledge of the death of the six million? We can keep a body count of our own, right in the privacy of our living room.

Which came first? Did the new monstrosities wipe out our knowledge of Auschwitz? Or was it our inadequacy of dealing with the Holocaust which gave the new monstrosities, the Belsens of today, their place within our society? The encapsulated traumas of our childhood must be confronted at some stage of our growing-up period. How else can we become more humane? Our various religious disciplines may be of help at this point — confession is a way of self-confrontation. Nor can history be ignored: the passive, greedy, cowardly Eichmanns who staffed the camps are still among us — where they have not been replaced by new recruits. Which machine are they serving, and how many of us serve the same establishment?

The complexities of modern existence make it difficult to discover the answers. Yet there are moments in every life when we break out of the structure, when we are no longer controlled but, suddenly, are in control. And then we can be human beings. We can be humane. We can reach out toward our fellowman. And our shared suffering and our shame can be a bridge and can cease to be a barrier. Auschwitz — remembered within the community of human fellowship — can then become a question addressed to God. Then. But not until then.

IV

Meanwhile, how shall we bring our exploration of the Holocaust to a conclusion? When Dante left the Inferno, he once more looked up at the stars. And I am a witness for the Jewish tradition which will not end a prophetic reading on a note of despair, but will continue in the text until words of hope have been expressed. We may query the initial announcement of this Congress which noted that “nothing seems so irrelevant in the modern world as religion.” The presence in our midst of Dorothee Solle and others is a welcome reminder of the relevance of religion in our time. In Europe, we find a biblical concern with human needs in the “theology of revolution” which combines Moltmann’s theology of hope with radical

change. As one definition would have it: “[The theology of revolution means that] the qualitative new future of God has united with those who are now oppressed, set aside, and persecuted; that, therefore, this future does not begin on top, at the peak of ‘progressive society,’ but at the bottom, with its victims.”⁴ And our exploration of myth and symbols assures us that not only theology but also the sanctuary is open to the struggle for the rehumanization of man.

13

Jews do not often “do” theology — we have no word for it in the Hebrew language. But our experience of the Holocaust, our rediscovery of the land of Israel, and our involvement in the open society have led to a verbalization of our religious thinking. The outer structure of it parallels Christian thought; and I am pleased rather than embarrassed that I can thus pay tribute to my old teacher Paul Tillich and my new friend Heinrich Ott. (Mind you, reconciling these two becomes a problem.) Sometimes, this involvement brings rabbis beyond the boundary as they move through death-of-God theology into the Dionysian fields of Brown and Kean. Even then, Jewish thought finds itself stimulated by its rebels and will not let them go — whether their names be Elisha ben Abuya, Spinoza, Freud, Marx, or Bloch.

Our neighbors teach us. But the foundation of our thinking is still the Bible and the rabbinic interpretation, a *shalshelet ha-kabbalah* (a chain of transmission) which has lived through all the generations of Jewish life and speaks through us in testimony of the encounter with God. The Jew has lived with the problem of theodicy since Abraham pleaded for the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah: “Should not the Judge of all the earth do what is just?” The Book of Job expresses it most clearly — but I am afraid that Job has been grossly misused in our time. It is a work utilized to achieve instant recall of all dimensions of the problem: human suffering, the distant God, and the encounter. Its misuse has created the illusion that one has controlled the situation because one can discuss it! Even Job’s friends had more sense; they waited for seven days and seven nights. Those who entered the inner circle of hell can find themselves expressed in this book. But while all of us are survivors, we are more inheritors; we are the next generation. Our book is the Book of Ezekiel. More than constantly reliving the anguish, we have to relieve the pain, we have to bind up the wounds, we have to start again. We have seen new life. Our function and our self-understanding rise out of a prophetic text which is unmistakably priestly and pastoral. These are the functions that we query in religion. The prophet, after the Churban (Destruction) of 586 B.C., could see them in life. Can we?

The Second Churban took place in the year A.D. 70. At that time the rabbis began to stress a new aspect of God whose suffering, involved presence — the Shekinah — went into exile with the people. The dialogue between man and God continued — the personal God of the Bible and the questioning figures of the Abrahams and Jobs of rabbinic times. It has changed little in modern times. The modern Jewish thinkers who have expressed themselves most clearly on the subject of Auschwitz are those who have remained within the rabbinic tradition and who formulate the experience of the last two thousand years within the pattern of rabbinic logic: Emil Fackenheim and Leo Baeck.

Leo Baeck is already considered one of the classic Jewish teachers of modern times. He died in 1956, and his hundredth anniversary will be observed next year. His importance to a theology of the Holocaust rests not only in his teachings but in his life. His last major work, *This People Israel*, was partly written in the concentration camp. Within the innermost circle of hell, he remained a teacher; and he taught the human dimension where God is encountered. What is man? And where is God? Man is defined in the interrelationship with fellowman, with the *Mitmensch*; and God is encountered at that point.

Different traditions within contemporary religion use the concept of the *Mitmensch*. Baeck drew its modern formulation out of the teachings of Hermann Cohen, the founder of the neo-Kantian Marburg school, who was also the great teacher of Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig. The outer structure of Baeck's teachings was thus related to the language of Kant and his successors. In some ways, this has proved a barrier to his thoughts — we all know colleagues who empty their shelves every five years in order to remain fully contemporary! Kant! (Dare I even mention Hegel's influence on Fackenheim?)

Our inheritance from Leo Baeck does contain a stress upon duty and an ethical rigorism — but this is derived from the rabbis of the first century and not from German idealism. Out of the concentration camp there came a teaching concerning man whose inner tensions bring him to the knowledge of God. Man encounters the mystery — and it brings him to the ethical commandment. Man acts in an ethical manner — and finds himself before the mystery. The near and the far God are part of the polarities of existence. It was Buber and not Baeck who tried to explain some aspects of the Holocaust by stressing the far God, the God who has hidden his face for a moment. But when Martin Buber asked himself, "Can one still call to God after Auschwitz?" he shared Baeck's answer: "Do we stand overcome be-

fore the hidden face of God? . . . No, rather even now we contend, we too, with God, even with Him. . . . We await his voice, whether it come out of the storm or out of a stillness; . . . we shall recognize again our cruel and merciful Lord.”⁵ God is far and will be near. He is near, and he will be distant. But in the darkness, and after the darkness, he can be found within the area of human interrelationships, in the I-and-Thou encounter, in the actualities of social existence.

Heinrich Ott notes that God is found within *Mitmenschlichkeit*:

It is in this sphere that the question of God must be articulated and worked out for theology. It is here that the concept “God” must be explained and defended. It is here that one thing must be shown: within the human stance, within the interrelationship between men, i.e.: in the *Mitmenschlichkeit* there is a noticeable, understandable and meaningful, and expressible difference when God is accounted to be a reality. That which is named “God” must here make its appearance. And it is here that we must be responsible for God to man.⁶

15

Theology works together with philosophy. A common language is discovered, and one can then discuss God as a Process, or a limited God. (Hans Jones’ Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality always almost convinces me.) There is excitement in listening to Cobb and Altizer weigh the immediate future against the apocalyptic (pantheism versus panchristism). But Leo Baeck teaches the God of the rabbis: “God is the place of the world, but the world is not His place;” that is the distant God. But God is also the near God, the personal God. The constant experience in the realm of human interrelationship is a testimony that cannot be ignored.

Nor would I have you ignore the Jew who has walked through the darkness and still reaches out toward his fellowman in love and hope. As Emil Fackenheim has noted, he has learned a special lesson at Auschwitz: his right to survive. It is not a new statement. Hobbes, Spinoza, and Freud have all stressed the universal and ineradicable tendency of human beings to preserve themselves, to think of themselves first and foremost.⁷ But there is a different sound in Fackenheim’s statement:

Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler posthumous victories. They are commanded to survive as Jews, lest the Jewish people perish. . . . Jewish life is more sacred than Jewish death. . . . The Voice of Auschwitz commands the religious Jew after Auschwitz to continue to wrestle with his God in however revolutionary ways; and it forbids the secularist Jew (who has already, and on other grounds, lost Him) to use Auschwitz as an additional weapon wherewith to deny Him. . . . The Voice of Auschwitz commands Jews not to go mad. It commands them to accept their singled-out condition, face up to its contradictions and endure them. . . . The Jew after Auschwitz is a witness to endurance . . . “mir zeinen do”: we are here, exist, survive, endure, witnesses to God and man even if abandoned by God and man.”⁸

Here is an often quoted, authentic Jewish response to Auschwitz. It has been criticized as inadequate, as replacing the Voice from Sinai with a demonic voice. This is not Fackenheim's point. He affirms the Jew's role as a witness *even* when he is far from God and man. Ultimately, a witness speaks to someone and is a spokesman for someone. The demonic exists in the world, in the *Mitmensch*. (Blake's vision of the demonic is pure innocence.) It obscures the reality of God: it is not God. The affirmation of the task points toward the Divine even where the word falters and is inadequate. Theologians use mythic language here in an effort to enlarge human understanding. Paul Schutz tells the parable of the lost father; Emil Fackenheim uses the open thought-structure of midrash; Hans Jonas weaves a Platonic myth in which God suffers at every Auschwitz rising out of the Divine self-limitation which permits human freedom.

"Elu v'elu divre elohim chayim" — these and our other attempts are the words of the living God, human attempts to walk through the darkness. They are part of human freedom — even when they fail to understand God's freedom to reveal himself and to conceal himself, to present himself in the *Mitmensch* and wait to be found, to be encountered. "Eh'yeh asher Eh'yet" — God is He-Who-Is, existence ever renewing itself, God encountered where he will be encountered. Where man comes to say "thou," he moves into the dimension "where this word is not valid simply for a specific individual but valid for the whole horizon of existence." With the Book of Daniel, we move through messianic hope to eschatological hope: "Go thou thy way till the end be" (Daniel 12:13). In the darkness of the way, we must all learn from each other, aware that we work within our limitations but must move beyond them.

And so we return to the poets.

"Mir zeinen do" — we are here.

Let us close with a story told by Elie Wiesel. There was a madman who burst into a synagogue in eastern Europe, in Nazi territory. The Jews were assembled for prayer in the synagogue; and he screamed at them: "Shhh. Not so loud. God will hear you. Then he will know that there are still Jews left in Europe!" But on another occasion, years later, Elie had a different ending: "They continued to pray. Each day, the shammas commenced the service by striking upon the pulpit and exclaiming: "Gott, mir zeinen do.' When he was the last one, he still cried out: 'God, I am still here!'"

And we are still here.

All of us.

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- 4 *Internationale Dialog Zeitschrift*, p. 13 (1971).
- 5 Martin Buber, *At the Turning* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Young 1952), p. 62.
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- 7 See R. S. Peters, "Reason, Morality, and Religion," *The Swarthmore Lecture* (1972).
- 8 Emil Fackenheim, *God's Presence in History* (New York University Press 1970).