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SPECTRUM

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WOODCUT . . . DIRK K. KOOPMANS

Liberal Arts—the Last Hurrah?

GODFREY T. ANDERSON¹

5

A celebrated singer was telling some friends the location of her Welsh castle. She said it was “twenty-three miles from everywhere, and very beautiful.” This is about as precise an idea as many have of liberal arts education — “twenty-three miles from everywhere, and very beautiful.”

The concepts which people hold, even college students, of the meaning and value of the liberal arts, are wondrous to contemplate. One day early in the school year at La Sierra College some years ago, I was leaving a chapel service and found myself walking behind two students. They were discussing the fields they planned to major in. One had his mind pretty well made up. The other said, “I think I’ll major in liberal arts.” The first one asked, “What’s that?” The other answered, “Well, I think it’s what you major in until you’ve made up your mind what you’re going to do in life.”

I

My title raises the question of the survival of the liberal arts. This is of concern to many today. A recent annual meeting of the Association of American Colleges had as its theme “The Liberal Arts — Dead or Transfigured?” To be realistic we would have to agree that in recent times liberal arts have actually been the victim of overkill. The question now is “Will there be, or should there be, a resurrection?”

Any attempt to make a case for the enduring validity of the liberal arts might well begin with John Stuart Mill’s classic statement: “Men are men before they are lawyers, or physicians, or merchants, or manufacturers, and if you make them capable and sensible men, they will make themselves capable and sensible lawyers or physicians.”²

To this we might add the observation of John Henry Newman that a lib-

eral education, if properly conceived and executed, should teach a man to "see things as they are, to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irrelevant. . . . He is at home in any society, he has common ground with every class; he knows when to speak and when to be silent. . . . He has the repose of a mind which lives in itself, while it lives in the world, and which has resources for its happiness at home when it cannot go abroad."³

From a leader in the highly competitive arena of big business we learn that those who are liberally educated "would not easily be misled by glib political promises because they had studied the rulers throughout history and become familiar with their tricks of persuasion — their platitudes and posturings, the adoption of pseudo-high moral levels, and the unfulfillable promises of demagogues. It is in the liberal arts college that men and women are being educated to understand people — not only our own people, but those of other countries and other civilizations."⁴

The plight of humane learning in our day can be best understood in the light of events in higher education in the decade of the 1960s. It was during these recent years that higher education wrote one of the darkest and most distressing pages in its history. On this point Sidney Hook has said: "It is not hard to predict that from the vantage point of the year 2000, if not earlier, the last decade in American education [the 1960s] will appear as the most bizarre in its history."⁵

Another academician has commented in a similar vein: "With the first [student] onslaught [the campus] fell into disorder. The teachers fell out with each other, the presidents and deans were thrown into confusion, the 'rightfulness' of the students' cause called forth much support, and those who denied it would not bring the university back to where it was. . . . Presidents, deans, professors, from conviction or cowardice, fell for obviously nonsensical arguments. No authorities under attack had ever gone so far in flattering and beslaving their insatiable antagonists and attempting to placate them."⁶

To compound the tragedy of these events on campuses across the nation was an erroneous attribution of the causes of this unrest. This led to hasty and often ill-conceived attempts to reform the curriculum and teaching methods. These no doubt needed some attention, but for better reasons than to quell student unrest. Such changes should be made for the sole purpose of improving the education of the young people, not for the sake of peace in our time on campus.

The recent report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, en-

titled *Reform on Campus*, indicates that, of the colleges included in the study, 66 percent of the students were very satisfied with the educational program and only 12 percent were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. The conclusion is drawn that the campus unrest was due to other things than the quality of the educational process. Thus the author reasoned that "whatever changes are needed should be undertaken for the sake of the students and for the sake of the society, not for the sake of peace on campus."⁷

7 About this time came the ill-advised rush to place students in charge of virtually everything on campus and to accept as valid the demagogic slogan of the early leaders of the revolt at Berkeley: *Don't trust anyone over thirty*. Students have concerns of vital importance at stake in the educational process, and without question they should be consulted on various aspects of the educational program. This should not lead, however, to selling short the value of experience, dedication, objectivity, and goodwill to an expediency designed primarily to keep the boat from rocking. Frederic W. Ness, the president of the Association of American Colleges, dealt in a recent speech with the larger question of broadened participation in university and college administration. He said that faculty participation in administration (and by implication student participation also) often only replaces one irrationality with another; and under these conditions, leadership becomes so diffused that it seems to be nonexistent. In a choice between benevolent despotism and participatory chaos, he was inclined to choose the former.⁸

There emerged also at this time certain magic words that seemed to nullify the historical concept that a university campus is a place where reason is appealed to as the final arbiter in solving problems. Among these magic words (in addition to "youth") were *innovate, involvement, relevant, minority, interdisciplinary*, and others; and if these were not given deference, one's Americanism and even one's Christianity became suspect.

One perceptive member of the university community, commenting on the unreasonable demands made of universities, wrote: "No one expects a gas station to cater to pedestrians, or churches to accommodate atheists, or a bar to make teetotalers feel at home. People go into one of these places precisely because they are in accord with its known purposes."⁹ But the university is expected to be open, relevant, involved, and responsive to all the latest notions and fads.

II

We should remind ourselves, before proceeding further, that "the word 'liberal' comes from the Latin *liber*, meaning 'free'; that the proper meaning

of the phrase 'liberal arts' is 'the arts becoming to a free man'; and that from earliest times these have included the sciences." (In the Middle Ages the liberal arts consisted of the *quadrivium* (geometry, astronomy, arithmetic, and music) and the *trivium* (grammar, logic, and rhetoric). The only point that needs emphasis here is that "the liberal arts are rooted in freedom, not privilege, and they are broad, not narrow, in educational scope."¹⁰

Inevitably the question arises, "Is an education in the liberal arts practical?" It would not be realistic or helpful to advocate a revival of the *trivium* and the *quadrivium* or even some of the recent modifications of these historical disciplines. Reincarnation may not be the proper word to describe what is needed, but it does suggest that the essence of what was meant by the liberal arts deserves to be retained, but in a manner and in a form that will make them attractive and demonstrably "practical" in our modern times.

The following views were expressed, not by an ivory tower denizen, as we would surmise, but rather by a resident of the marketplace, whom we would expect to be impatient with all things that are not relevant to his materialistic objectives: "We sometimes hear the assertion that a liberal education 'leads nowhere.' Far from leading nowhere, it leads everywhere — into every mode of living, into every gainful effort. Indispensable in industry and the professions is the mind trained to think, the eye trained to see truth and the conception broadened to seize upon the main idea — and hold it. We need minds at work which are capable of rising above the tangible things we do to earn our daily bread, capable of grasping the intangible principles and truths that keep us moving toward finer, broader lives."¹¹

A little girl wrote a letter to a bank president in Canada asking why she should go to college. The president of the University of Toronto wrote in reply:

People have said that training for a vocation is useful, but that liberal education is not useful. That is nonsense. . . .

Huck Finn lost interest in Moses when he found out that Moses was dead, because 'I don't take no stock in dead people.' Today many 'don't take no stock' in dead languages, or even in living languages apart from their own. Latin, French, and German are academic and useless; but English is practical and useful. Then teach English, they say. Don't teach literature — Shakespeare and Milton are useless. Don't teach grammar — gerunds and participles are only for the pedant. Just teach English!

But it is the student of useless languages and literature who can use his own language with precision and imagination. Useless algebra, history, philosophy, and physics produce useful powers and resilience. The usefulness of liberal education is to develop useful, independent citizens, and in this process the longest way round is often the shortest way home. Education should enable a person to earn a living and to live a life.¹²

During the French Revolution, when Lavoisier was executed, the young judge who presided at the trial said, "The Republic has no need for savants." When a half million dollars was given by an Englishman to found the Smithsonian Institution in 1844, the working classes living in squalor in England might have been benefited greatly by this money. The idea of short-term benefits might have deterred the donor from making this contribution that started the institution which has done so much good since that time. Relevance can easily become the greatest of shibboleths.¹³

The attack on the liberal arts, and I use the phrase advisedly, is not without its brighter side. When a man is about to be hanged, the saying goes, it concentrates the mind immensely. From their critics, colleges can learn what to renounce and what to recover, what to mend and what to reaffirm. Students of the humanities and social sciences will recognize the need to know more of the natural world in this exciting time when research is on the move and when 90 percent of all the scientists who ever lived, so we are told, are still living. Scientists will remember that probably 90 percent of all the great artists, composers, philosophers, moralists, and men of letters are now dead, and that a considerable art is involved in bringing them to life again.¹⁴

One purpose of the study of the liberal arts and their "heir and continuator," the humanities, is to develop in a person the capacity to survive change. One serendipity which the university might discover in the present crisis is to seek to do a few things well rather than to attempt to do many things that it ends up doing badly. Further, the colleges of arts and sciences might resist attempts to turn them into coaching schools for professional and graduate schools, at the expense of liberal education. Knowledgeable deans of professional and graduate schools are realizing that the greatest gift a college can send to them is a liberally educated young person.

If breadth of education is still considered to be an important objective, then the secondary school must begin to make its contribution in this direction. In too many cases, thousands of high school graduates have been turned out illiterate and unprepared to go on with their education. At the same time, of course, they have been exposed to classes in macrame, sensitivity training, and baton twirling. Educators of vision at the secondary level can assist vastly in providing a broad foundation of learning for the young. As for the colleges, they have turned out their own quota of illiterates, narrowly trained but not really educated.

It should not be overlooked that a liberal education can be found in professional schools and that illiberal education takes place in liberal arts colleges. Touching on this point, Ralph Barton Perry said: "It will not do,

therefore, to say that a professional school is necessarily illiberal because it teaches law or medicine; . . . or even because its students are already largely committed to the career. It is quite possible that a law school or medical school should be liberal, and so-called liberal arts college be illiberal.”¹⁵ In further developing this point, this writer commented:

Even manual labor partakes of liberality at the moment when a man chooses to work with his hands; or when it becomes a skilled craft requiring taste and invention; or when it is attended with a sense of cooperation and social utility. As the professional or vocational school may be liberal, so the so-called liberal arts college may be illiberal, and will be illiberal in so far as it is pervaded with a narrow sectarian bias, or employs methods of mass appeal, or reduces study to the level of drudgery and routine, or otherwise fails to awaken the independent mind and exercise the student in the art of reflective and imaginative choice.¹⁶

10

The more educators devote their time and energy to the basic problem of how to do a better job of educating young people, the more successful will they be in reaching their goals. One writer makes some valid points in an overstatement when he says: “Although many undergraduate colleges no longer act *in loco parentis*, for many of their students they still act *in loco uteri*. Like wombs, most colleges offer a warm and cozy setting where the organism can exist protected from outside influences until parturition sends him or her screaming into the world.” When this situation obtains, there is a comfortable relationship between college and student:

Students don’t upset the college; the college doesn’t upset the student. Students ride out the four-year gestation period in a comfortable womb, bathed by a continual flow of self-appreciation and self-gratification, nourished by the illusion of achievement resulting from a regular diet of grades and well insulated from disrupting outside influences. A kick now and then is no cause for concern. It simply indicates that the infant is alive and presumably well.¹⁷

A college of this type renders the least service to the student and to society. The writer offers the unorthodox suggestion that it may be the quality of its dropouts rather than the quality of its graduates that provides the more accurate index of the social contribution of a college.

III

Space limitations will not permit my dealing with all the magic words that have been used and misused on college campuses in recent years. The term *relevant*, however, is one that demands some consideration. No reasonable or responsible person wants education to be irrelevant.

The real question is — relevant to what? To what the student wants as he sits in the classroom, or to what he will discover he needs, years later, after he has gone out and probably cannot return? Is building a general intellectual capability irrelevant be-

cause it is not *exclusively* relevant to the current headlines and slogans? . . . In the sloppy language of today, opposition to any particular pattern of change is denounced as opposition to change, as such, and extravagant statements are made about the rigidity of the academic curriculum. Actually the opposite charge would have more substance: that American education, down through the years, has spent so much time getting on and off bandwagons [to attempt to be relevant] that it has had little time for anything else. . . . A look at the agony and progress of man over the centuries might suggest some value in the systematic development of the human mind and a continuing relevance of disciplined and informed thinking, in contrast to the kinds of visceral reactions, heady rhetoric, and grandiose visions which have spread so much blood and debris across the pages of history.¹⁸

The distinguished historian Henry Steele Commager has added this observation on relevance:

II

Just as colleges should resist the demand for more courses, they should resist the demand for "relevance," as undergraduates commonly understand that term. Almost the whole of our society and economy — and, alas, much of our educational enterprise — is engaged in a kind of conspiracy to persuade the young that nothing is really relevant unless it happened yesterday, and unless it can be reported in the newspaper and filmed by television. It is the business of these and other media to be relevant; it is not the business of the college or university to be relevant. The academy has other relevancies. It must be relevant to the past and to the future, to our own society and to very different societies. It must be as relevant to art and music and philosophy as it is to urban problems or race relations, confident that neither urban problems nor race relations can be understood except through philosophy and history.¹⁹

A case in point might be the enthusiasm of some students to rush to the ghetto to right the wrongs that exist there. But the courses most relevant to solving these problems might turn out to be dry, tedious studies in the basic sciences, accounting, or law. This is certainly not the relevance that people have in mind when they use the expression. "They want to *talk about* the ghetto, or do the studies that take them into the ghetto, satisfying their own emotional needs, but doing little for the ghetto."²⁰

All hail, then, to relevance. But let us not ignore the rest of the question. Are we seeking relevance to the latest fad, to instant, untested nostrums, to the morning news headlines? The relevance with which we should be concerned must be the larger issues of yesterday and of tomorrow as well as of today. The education we provide must be relevant to social injustice, to bigotry, to violence, to excellence as a way of life, and especially to the dignity and worth of men — all men everywhere.

There have been advanced several theses designed to explain the decline or demise of the liberal arts in our time. One of these sets forth the notion that the liberal arts have been eroded into "functional nothingness by the forces of recent history." Another is that our culture is now being ground between two revolutions, one not yet complete and the other just coming

to birth, thus demanding a wholesale revision of liberal education. "The conclusion is that patchwork tinkering with the so-called liberal curriculum will accomplish little if anything of significance and that only a fresh image of the processes of liberation in our contemporary context will restore a constructive vitality to our campuses. . . . As for the liberal arts themselves, if they ever really existed, they have died in the process of becoming professionalized disciplines."²¹

The second of these theses has much to recommend it. If we are caught today between two revolutions, one going and one coming, our world must then stand at the juncture of two ages — the end of the industrial revolution, and the materialistic values that it spawned, and the beginning of the postindustrial revolution that has brought on a crisis in values, in cultural directions, and in the psychology of men in a changing time. Our colleges and universities are still deeply embedded in an industrial era. This has left little room for a meaningful engagement of the passions, including the passion of moral fervor. It follows that "there is little point, consequently, in discussing a possible revitalization of the liberal arts through improved teaching or through what are usually called interdisciplinary revisions of the curriculum."²²

There are other magic words which in themselves have much to recommend them. *Innovation* is something that can improve our programs. It is easy to fall into the bondage of tradition or, in the case of teachers, of having notes all neatly worked out which would not be usable if things changed too much. The liberal arts, and within them especially history, should teach us to accept change, not only gracefully, but with enthusiasm and in good spirit.

To repeat, the charge that educators by and large resist change cannot be sustained. To use a tired cliché, it is not change but change for the sake of change that should be suspect. "The only questions are whether the direction and content of changes are sound, and what the rate and magnitude of change should be."²³ Winston Churchill once said, "When it is not necessary to change, it is necessary not to change." We should distrust the fetishness of novelty. We should not exaggerate the value of newness in either ideas or things. "It is much easier to be original than wise," said Will Durant, who has spent a lifetime tracing the rise and fall of civilizations.

Several gifted students at Carnegie Institute of Technology joined in writing some free verse which expressed their feelings and which tells us much about students and the learning process:

I am amorphous. I am nerve ends, ganglia, squeezed, compressed.
I must stiffen, toughen, yet stay flexible.
I want to be steel, I am afraid of becoming stone.
I drift into limbo,
Sucking in fact, while I long for truth.
As I turn over and over I seem to be shrinking — Or am I coiling for a leap?
And to where?

A little later came commencement time:

All at once I knew a little bit about why.
I was out from under the suffocating mass of knowledge;
there was a direction to go,
a way to do it, and I knew the way.
I did know, had learned.
There was the door, the handle to turn, the latch to lift —
And all those years I had been finding,
acquiring, filling my pockets with keys.
Already the doors are opening. Through how many shall I finally pass?²⁴

13

Many years before these lines appeared, one with almost no formal education wrote with insight and inspiration:

For ages education has had to do chiefly with the memory. This faculty has been taxed to the utmost, while the other mental powers have not been correspondingly developed. Students have spent their time laboriously crowding the mind with knowledge. . . . The mind thus burdened with that which it can not digest and assimilate is weakened; it becomes incapable of vigorous, self-reliant effort, and is content to depend on the judgment and perception of others. . . . The education that consists in the training of the memory, tending to discourage independent thought, has a moral bearing which is too little appreciated. As the student sacrifices the power to reason and judge for himself, he becomes incapable of discriminating between truth and error, and falls an easy prey to deception. He is easily led to follow tradition and custom.²⁵

Where shall we turn for help in finding a solution to our educational dilemma? If we assume that the liberal arts concept is worthy of surviving, and perhaps of reincarnation, what form might this take? Is a new synthesis the answer? Surely the liberal arts will not, and should not, survive "hidden away in a napkin, undefiled by the busy world."

IV

We might pose the question: *What would the world be like without liberal arts?* What kind of a society would it be if the liberal arts were done away with completely? The late Mark Van Doren, who wrote much on the subject, offered an answer: "It would be a society for one thing in which discourse did not go on, in which conversation had died, in which ideas had ceased to be exchanged, in which argument had stopped, in which there

was neither agreement nor disagreement. I suppose it would be a world of beasts.”²⁶

To those who accept the counsel made available through Ellen White, the following guidelines are clear and unequivocal:

If placed under the control of His spirit, the more thoroughly the intellect is cultivated, the more effectively it can be used in the service of God.²⁷

None should consent to be mere machines, run by another man's mind. God has given us ability, to think and to act. . . . Stand in your God-given personality. Be no other person's shadow. . . . The cultivated mind is the measure of the man.²⁸

Have you thoughts that you dare not express, that you may one day stand upon the summit of intellectual greatness? . . . There is nothing wrong in these aspirations. . . . You should be content with no mean attainments. Aim high, and spare no pains to reach the standard. Balanced by religious principle, you may climb to any height you please.²⁹

14

A much-quoted statement regarding Battle Creek College sets forth a principle pregnant with meaning for all who are engaged in the educational enterprise of the Adventist church today: “God designs that the College at Battle Creek shall reach a higher standard of intellectual and moral culture than any other institution of the kind in our land.”³⁰ In this statement, emphasis is placed on two things that should command our attention, namely, *intellectual culture* and *moral culture*. A leading secular spokesman for the liberal arts tradition in American education has affirmed that the liberal arts “are studies designed to develop to capacity the intellectual and spiritual powers of the individual.”³¹ The value of vocational and professional training is assumed, not ignored, in this emphasis on developing the intellectual and moral capabilities of man.

In any program of education that stresses intellectual and moral culture, there is inherent the need for inculcating excellence as a habit of character. “Aristotle says, ‘One learns to be a good flute-player by playing the flute. One also learns to be a poor flute-player by playing the flute.’ It all depends on the standards of excellence held up. To keep insisting upon quality and discouraging the second-rate, shoddy and mediocre in performance, is a drive which every teacher has to make.”³² The two objectives of intellectual and moral culture set forth by Ellen G. White, as well as by secular educators, are the valid goals of the Christian liberal arts college.

One educator who was concerned about the survival of Christian colleges set forth three basic conditions that he considered essential for their survival.

First: To be vital today, a college or university must be *adaptable without losing its integrity*. Both of these points are important. A university must be

willing to change; but at the same time it must not compromise its standards — it must not lower them to the point where it is no longer an institution of integrity. The decline from excellence to mediocrity to total intellectual and moral bankruptcy can be subtle and rapid, as one writer has expressed it in “Descent”:

No admission standards,
 No attendance policy.
 No requyred studies
 No Foriegn Language
 no english No histry
 no math, no Sceinse
 Noexams; (no greyds)
 No? oners nofalure's)
 N o buksno! lekchurs"
 nO ree din: No/ritein
 NO NUTTIN³³

15

Second: To be vital today, a college or university *must take an honest look* at its own values and then place its dollars where its values lie. This is extremely important for survival. To implement this point the faculty and the administration must be able to identify the values they jointly seek to promote, to have a clear understanding of the values they espouse, and to be firmly and unequivocally committed to these values.

Third: “*To be vital today, a college or university must care deeply about the person of the student if the student is expected to care deeply about his or her education.*”³⁴

In his story “The Keeper of the Light,” Henry Van Dyke tells of a lighthouse built at the mouth of the Saint Lawrence River to keep ships from meeting destruction on the rocks in the gulf. Originally, the lighthouse was committed to the care of a Frenchman, with the admonition that the light should never be allowed to go out or to fail to blink once every minute. For many years the man and his family kept the light, even when the machinery was inoperative and it was necessary to turn the wheel by hand all night long. At length the Frenchman and his wife died. Two of the daughters married and left the little island, and Nataline, the youngest daughter, took over the responsibility of running the light.

The little village two miles across the water had always been hostile to the presence of the lighthouse. The light interfered with their trapping and shooting of wild birds. Also it warned away ships that would have been wrecked on the rocks, spilling cargoes that would have washed ashore to enrich the villagers. During one year in particular, things had gone badly for the villagers, and they faced the prospect of starvation during the winter

because of crop failure and the inability to catch fish and seals. Their eyes then turned to the lighthouse with its supply of sperm oil for the light. Sperm oil was not tasty, but it would sustain life during the last hard weeks of winter.

A delegation approached Nataline and asked for the remaining oil to save the villagers. Tempted, but knowing that much depended on her keeping the light, she refused. Then they planned to break into the storehouse without her knowledge and steal the oil at night. Warned of this, she kept them off at gunpoint. When she was asked why she did not consider the lives of the villagers more important than the light, she replied that God had committed to her the duty of keeping the light, and she would not abdicate her responsibility for any persuasion.

The supply boat which would bring supplies for the light and also for the villagers was due at the end of April. Just before that time a fierce storm came down from the north. All night long Nataline cleared away the gathering ice and snow from the light and saw that it burned clearly through the darkness, blinking once each minute to guide nearby ships. In the morning as she came down from the tower, wearied to exhaustion, she saw the supply ship anchored in the harbor. Had her light not burned through the night, had she permitted the oil to be consumed when it was demanded by the fishermen, the ship would have foundered on the rocks, and much of the precious cargo would have been lost. In after years the lighthouse island came to be known as the Isle of the Wise Virgin.

Here is a fitting parable for our day. For seeming advantages that are only of short-term duration, many will barter away the long-range civilizing values of the liberal arts. Without these lasting values, disaster must follow, and the enduring benefits that are rooted in "intellectual and moral culture" will be lost to mankind.

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The Knowledge of Faith

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The experience of faith is a perennial source of fascination. Among the questions it has prompted are those concerning faith's origin, its primary resource, and its content. *First*, where does faith come from? Does it originate in an act of the human will, in an exercise of human freedom? Or is it the result of divine activity, such as the influence of the Holy Spirit? This gives rise to the further question as to who is ultimately responsible for faith, God or man. *Second*, how is faith related to the Word of God, the primary resource for the church's public proclamation as well as for the individual Christian's devotional life? *Third*, since Christian faith is synonymous with faith in Jesus Christ, how is the relationship between a human experience in the present and a historical person in the distant past to be understood? The history of Christian thought is replete with answers to these important questions, all of which reflect a concern for the nature of faith: the various interpretations of free will and predestination, the frequent discussions of inspiration and revelation, and the many explanations of how faith and history are related.

Other questions, no less significant than those dealing with faith's origin and content, arise with respect to the epistemological character of faith. It is these with which this article is specifically concerned. Is faith itself a way of knowing anything? If so, what is the nature of its knowledge? In particular, how is it related to knowledge that is based on reason? These questions are usually considered in terms of the relationship obtaining between faith and reason. Does faith come before reason, or reason before faith? Does someone believe because he understands, or does he understand because he believes?

The problem of answering these questions is complicated by the fact that both words, *faith* and *reason*, are used in several ways. If reason is under-

stood as inclusive of all of man's cognitive faculties, then obviously whatever is known with respect to faith is reasonable, or rational, in this broad sense. Within the boundaries of the problem of relating faith and reason, however, it is customary, and helpful, to equate reason with *understanding*. Understanding cannot be simply identified with any function of man's cognitive faculties, for it is possible to know something without understanding it. To know that an automobile runs, for example, is quite different from fully understanding its mechanical operation. What understanding entails is a clear perception of the various causes, or reasons, for something being the case. In a narrower sense, then, reason represents the capacity for giving reasons; to know something on the basis of reason means being able to give reasons for its being the case. What is reasonable is what is capable of rational explanation.

If by faith is meant all that is entertained in the form of religious beliefs, as distinct from the ethical or practical aspects of religious experience (cf. faith vs. works), then anything of a religious nature known on the basis of reason is obviously included within faith. However, faith is frequently distinguished from mere belief, as the difference between the mere entertainment of certain ideas and the commitment to the content of these ideas as determinative of one's entire existence. Faith is often more narrowly conceived as the exhibition of such commitment apart from, or in spite of the lack of, incontestable objective or scientific proof of that to which the commitment is made. What faith, in this case, believes is not completely understood by reason. Thus, there is a certain tension between faith in the narrower sense and reason conceived as understanding. The question at hand concerns the relation of these two factors within religious experience.

I

There have been two classic ways of formulating the relation between faith and reason. The first is that of Augustine. According to his famous formula, *Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis* (If you do not believe, you will not understand), faith is logically prior to understanding, and there is no understanding the content of faith apart from the perspective of faith itself. The Augustinian view regards the knowledge of faith as self-authenticating and as providing the basis for what reason may subsequently explore and expound. But there is no understanding apart from faith. Because of the disastrous effects of sin on man's rational faculties, human reason can know nothing of the divine unless inwardly moved by the Spirit of God. Only under this influence are the objects of faith known.

Thomas Aquinas was less pessimistic regarding the effects of sin on man's rational faculties. In his view, it is possible for human understanding, unaided by divine power, to attain a partial knowledge of God. Such knowledge, to be sure, is less than that of Christian doctrine, but it nevertheless provides a starting point which anticipates what is known in faith. Thus, Thomas saw a continuity between reason and faith. Although it requires the supplementary knowledge of faith, human understanding can take one well along the road to belief — in which case faith, the explicit knowledge of Christian doctrine, appears as the logical complement of, if not the logical conclusion to, what the unaided human reason can know. In the Augustinian view, of course, there is no such continuity. Reason can proceed from, but never by itself precede, faith.

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It is important to notice that both of these formulations regard faith as cognitive in nature. In other words, they assume that faith includes knowing something, that it represents the affirmation of something to be true. An exemplary expression of faith is the statement, "I believe that God exists." Such an affirmation entails knowing that something is the case, in this instance knowing that God exists. An expression of faith is thus an affirmation that something is known. The question of the relation between faith and reason may therefore be formulated as the question, What is the nature of the knowledge of faith, and how is it related to the knowledge of reason?

Generally speaking, there are two types of knowledge, mediate and immediate knowledge. To know something on the basis of mediate knowledge is to base one's knowledge on something else that is known. If A is known because B and C are known, then knowledge of A is knowledge mediated by B and C. In other words, B and C are reasons for A. Since reason means the ability to give reasons for, it is evident that the knowledge of reason (i.e., rational knowledge) can be nothing other than mediate knowledge and, conversely, that mediate knowledge is knowledge capable of rational justification.

If I am asked how I know B, in the case just mentioned, my answer may be that I know B because I know D, E, and F. Perhaps my reasons for knowing D are G, H, and J. This process cannot continue indefinitely, with my giving reasons for knowing one thing on the basis of my knowing other things, because of the fact that my knowledge is finite. Sooner or later I come to the point where I must say, "I know this to be true simply because it is true," or "I believe P because P." In this case, P is accepted as self-evident. It may provide a reason for believing something else, but it is its own reason for being believed; it is self-authenticating. Such knowledge is

immediate, since it is not mediated by anything other than itself. It is not known because. . . . It is simply known — period. The process of regressive justification constitutive of mediate knowledge cannot be infinite. There must be a starting point; something must be accepted as self-evidence — self-authenticating. Therefore, all mediate knowledge includes among its integral elements at least one immediately known, or self-authenticating element, on which it ultimately rests.

When these two types of knowledge, mediate and immediate, are correlated with the Augustinian and Thomistic formulations described above, the knowledge of faith appears in the Thomistic view to be mediate knowledge, since it is based on knowledge provided by reason. By contrast, in the Augustinian view the knowledge of faith is immediate, since it is prior to all rational justification. Now, which of these two interpretations of the knowledge of faith more accurately represents the lived experience of the believer? Is the knowledge of faith more appropriately understood as mediate or as immediate?

Many Christians accept an explanation like that of Thomas as an adequate account of their belief in God. In this view, the movement from unfaith to faith roughly parallels the procedure a scientist follows in conducting his investigations. Beginning with an impartial investigation of all the available evidence bearing on a subject, the scientist selects from various explanations the one which most completely accounts for all the facts and states it as his conclusion. Similarly, the believer begins by observing impartially and objectively all the available evidence for, say, the existence of God. His investigation leads him to conclude that there is no explanation for such phenomena as the order he finds in nature other than the existence of an all-powerful and all-knowing heavenly Father. He therefore bases his faith in God on the conclusion to which the exercise of his reason leads him. Thus, faith is the conclusion to which reason leads by way of a rational examination of the readily available evidence.

This interpretation of the knowledge of faith is supported by a well-known statement of Ellen White's: "God never asks us to believe, without giving sufficient evidence upon which to base our faith. His existence, His character, the truthfulness of His Word, are all established by testimony that appeals to our reason; and this testimony is abundant."¹ Accordingly, any objective examination of the abundant evidence should lead to the inevitable conclusion that God exists. In this sense, reason prepares the way for faith, which, in turn, is based upon the evidence that reason discovers.

An appealing analogy seems to lend further support to this interpreta-

tion. Coming to have faith, coming to believe in God, is frequently compared to falling in love. Obviously, no one falls in love without some very important reasons for doing so. If a prospective bridegroom could not provide a single reason for loving the girl he intends to marry, we would seriously doubt whether the marriage ought to take place. To the contrary, people in love are known for the lengths they can go to in extolling the beauty, intelligence, and other attributes of their beloved. They regard each endowment as a reason for being in love. Similarly, the believer is capable of producing numerous reasons for his belief in God: God shows his love in a thousand ways; it is written in the stars of the sky and in the way all the creatures of the forest find their needs supplied. In addition, there is the evidence provided in the inspired Word of God, and, above all, there is the evidence of Jesus Christ, the very Son of God.

In the light of this line of argument, the knowledge of faith appears to have the character of mediate knowledge. The believer comes to faith by reaching certain conclusions based on the evidence that his reason discloses. He gives reasons for his faith by appealing to something more basic than faith, on which faith itself rests.

II

This account of the knowledge of faith as logically dependent upon rational knowledge gives rise to several critical questions. In the first place, its acceptance of the scientific method as a general model for interpreting the transition from unbelief to faith seems to rest on a superficial understanding of the nature of evidence. Evidence never lies out there in the external world as cold, hard facts, indifferent to the observing eye. To be seen as evidence, the facts always depend on the assumption of a particular perspective. Evidence of any kind — legal, scientific, or religious — attains its status only by virtue of the assumption of a perspective appropriate to that evidence. To the untrained eye, for example, all the symptoms of a fatal disease may very well go unrecognized. It takes the informed perspective of a physician to see these symptoms as evidence for whatever the malady might be. The present issue is the nature of religious evidence. Whether there is sufficient evidence for the conclusions affirmed by faith, or not, whatever evidence there is will appear as such only to one who assumes an appropriate perspective. Thus, the assumption of the proper perspective is as essential to faith as drawing valid conclusions.

A close examination of the evidence appealed to as a basis for faith reveals that its status is identical to that of the conclusions which reason at-

tempts to draw from it. The presence of a supernatural intelligence at work in the universe, for example, will appear as problematic as the existence of God to the individual who questions the latter. The testimony of the Holy Scriptures will have persuasive power only to the one who regards them as divinely inspired. Again, the sending of his Son to die for the sins of the world will constitute evidence for the love of God only to those who already believe that God loves them. In short, what appears to be an appeal to objective evidence available to any impartial observer turns out to be an appeal to the contents of faith.² If this is true, then it must be the case that the process of finding reasons on which to base one's faith is really the function of faith justifying itself, rather than something else justifying faith. Consequently, every attempt to get behind faith to prior evidence for it will always find faith already present in the perception of that evidence.

The romantic analogy exhibits the same sort of characteristics. None of the reasons appealed to have any force apart from the conviction they are designed to support. If someone assures us that he loves his wife because she has such beautiful eyes, we can easily turn his statement around to the effect that he finds his wife's eyes beautiful because he loves her. The same is true of anything to which he might appeal as evidence on which to base his love. All the "reasons" for his love turn out to be just as much the results of love as causes of it. Indeed, the very act of his giving reasons or providing evidence for his love is an act of love itself, rather than the impartial observation of his wife's appearance and behavior. True love is anything but impartial, particularly in its quest for evidence. The dozens of reasons someone else has for loving his wife will almost certainly fall short of persuading me that I should love her. All the evidence he finds is *evidence for him*, not for me.

Similarly, all the evidence the believer may appeal to as supporting his faith in God is equally capable of being construed as the result of his belief. There is no "objective" evidence available to believer and unbeliever alike. The difference between the two is as much a difference in their ability to see the evidence as a difference in the conclusions they reach. When it comes to the evidence for faith, there is no such thing as an impartial observer, completely open to persuasion one way or the other. The ability to see the evidence as supportive of belief in God is as indicative of faith as is coming to the conclusion, on completing an examination of the evidence, that God exists.

But what about Ellen White's statement quoted above? How can it be understood except as endorsing the view that faith is a conclusion arrived at

by looking at evidence? The first thing to be noticed about these words is the chapter in which they appear — the twelfth of thirteen in *Steps to Christ*. It is apparent from its title that the book intends to account for how an individual comes to have faith, to describe the transition from unbelief to belief. It seems unlikely that the author would reserve until next to the last chapter an explanation of something on which the entire process depends. Moreover, both the title of the chapter, “What To Do with Doubt,” and its opening paragraph obviate the fact that the relation of faith and reason described there occurs within the experience of one who already believes in Christ. Thus, the quest for reasons on which to base faith evidently takes place within the experience of the believer; its character is that of an outgrowth from and an exercise of faith, rather than of an initial foundation for believing. According to its context, then, the basing of faith on evidence Ellen White describes is a means of overcoming doubts that arise within the experience of one who already has faith, not an account of the transition from unfaith to faith to begin with.

Another important thing about this statement that faith is based on sufficient evidence is the fact that it is qualified by these words in the same paragraph: “Yet God has never removed the possibility of doubt. Our faith must rest upon evidence, not demonstration.”³ This distinction between evidence and demonstration is made elsewhere by Ellen White,⁴ each time to the effect that a demand for the perfect knowledge of complete, or conclusive, evidence as requisite for faith will never be satisfied. Because faith is not “certainty of knowledge,”⁵ one who demands such evidence as a basis for belief will never come to faith. This means that there is always a gap (because of an inevitable limitation of evidence) between that for which reason can provide a basis and that which faith believes. The evidence never fully accounts for what is affirmed by faith. Faith always believes more than what reason can account for; what faith affirms always extends beyond the evidence which reason supplies. In other words, the totality of faith’s contents is never transparent to rational inquiry.

If the evidence on which faith rests is less than coercive, then whatever certainty the believer has in the truth of his affirmations must rest on something more convincing than reason alone. There are therefore two reasons for seeking some factor other than reason to account for the presence of faith: (*a*) the lack of conclusive rational evidence for what is affirmed by faith, and (*b*) the need to account for the assumption of the perspective wherein the evidence for faith is perceived as such.

A suggestion as to what this factor might be appears in the closing sen-

tence of the same paragraph: "Those who wish to doubt will have opportunity; while those who really desire to know the truth, will find plenty of evidence on which to rest their faith."⁶ Although faith, as synonymous with the believer's total religious experience, may be regarded as based on abundant evidence that appeals to reason, the ability to discern this evidence represents something more fundamental than reason — a desire to know the truth. Now, one cannot establish the existence of this desire on a basis of rational evidence, for it is this desire which accounts for there being any such evidence. It will not do to appeal to A as a basis for B, and then attempt to establish B as the basis of A. That on which the discernment of rational evidence for faith depends cannot itself be accounted for by an appeal to such evidence.

There is, therefore, something within the total experience of faith which accounts for there being any faith at all, something upon which all the other elements of faith ultimately rest and to which all its other characteristics may ultimately be traced. In other words, there is within faith an irreducible element, or incompressible core, which accounts for all the other elements in faith and is not itself accounted for by any of them. The question at present concerns the nature of this factor without which there could not in any sense be faith. At what level of experience is it located? and what are its distinguishing characteristics?

III

As inclusive of the total religious experience, faith may be more or less; it may increase or decrease, grow or die. But with respect to its irreducible element, faith is qualitative rather than quantitative; it is either present, or it is not; there is no in-between. To illustrate, there is obviously a vast difference between the faith of the apostle Paul at the height of his ministry and that of the thief on the cross. Paul's faith was greater, more mature, stronger, better informed, etc., than the faith of the latter. But there is something which the two had in common, a fundamental characteristic distinguishing both of them from someone who does not believe. The question is, what is the nature of this fundamental distinguishing characteristic common to all believers, this indispensable *terminus a quo* of the life of faith?⁷

If the nature of that upon which faith ultimately rests is sought on the level of the desire to believe mentioned by Ellen White, it appears as logically prior to the discernment of evidence by the exercise of reason. Accordingly, this absolutely fundamental element within faith may be initially described as prerational. The fact that faith's irreducible element is prera-

tional follows from the principle that what accounts for reason cannot itself be accounted for by reason. Thus, the irreducible element accounting for the existence of faith is never transparent to man's understanding. It forever remains a mystery. There is no rational explanation for the transition from unfaith to faith; it can only be described.⁸

A frequent objection to such an interpretation of the ultimate foundation of faith is that it evacuates faith of meaningful content, that it renders faith a blind leap in the dark, incomprehensible and irrational. Such a leap is obviously at odds with the notion that the knowledge of faith is open to the investigation of reason. But it does not necessarily follow from its being pre-rational that faith's irreducible element is also noncognitive, empty of content. Faith may indeed know something, even though its knowledge is not the result of rational inquiry. Just as sight is never merely seeing, but always seeing *something*, so faith is never merely believing, but always, believing *something*, and what is believed is in some sense known. Hence, faith is never a vacuous entity, empty of all cognitive content; it always involves knowing something. The question is, What is the nature of the knowledge of faith with respect to its irreducible element?

Clearly, the knowledge of faith's irreducible element cannot be mediate knowledge. Mediate knowledge is transparent to reason, which establishes its truth on the basis of other things known to be true. But what is known by faith's irreducible element is not transparent to reason; so it cannot consist of mediate knowledge. The only alternative is that what faith knows on its absolutely fundamental level has the character of immediate knowledge. It is not known because something else is known; it is simply known. In terms of its irreducible element, faith is self-authenticating; it is its own evidence for being believed.

The notion that nothing is known except on the basis of reasons other than itself, in other words, that all knowledge is mediate, is unacceptable. *First*, it is logically impossible, since an indefinite regression of justification is inconceivable, at least with respect to finite knowledge. *Second*, it ignores the evidence provided by the most basic human experiences. When I see red, for example, I know that I see red. My knowledge requires no other proof than the perception of the visual field bearing that color. My knowledge in this case is immediate; there are no "reasons" for it. Again, when I feel pain, I know that I feel pain. I need no further evidence or justification or reason to account for the knowledge beyond the sensation itself. Such knowledge is immediate; it is not known on the basis of something else being known; it is its own reason for being known; it is self-authenticating.

Similarly, that which is known by faith's irreducible element is apprehended immediately. It requires no reason other than itself for being believed and is therefore self-authenticating.⁹

It is characteristic of immediate knowledge not only that it is self-authenticating, but also that it conveys maximal conviction. Consider the same examples. No one is ever in doubt regarding the knowledge of his senses. To be sure, the conclusions drawn from sensory experience may not provide an accurate account of the external environment, but that is not the point. The fact is that one knows the content of his senses — regardless of the accuracy with which the external world corresponds to this content — immediately and with maximal conviction. When I am in pain, there is never the slightest doubt regarding my knowledge that I am in pain; I am completely convinced of it. Of course, I may not accurately locate the source of the pain or intelligently account for its cause (these are the functions of a physician), but there is no doubt in my mind that I am really in pain (I don't need the doctor to tell me it hurts!). Maximal conviction is characteristic of immediate knowledge.

By contrast, mediate knowledge is not characterized by this degree of conviction. Relative certainty is all that it is capable of producing. If I conclude A on the basis of evidence B, C, and D, I can never be absolutely certain that my reasoning process is infallible. Perhaps there is another conclusion, equally well accounted for by the same evidence, which has not occurred to me. Or perhaps A is fully accounted for by B and C, and my inclusion of D as evidence is mistaken. Or perhaps I have overlooked or been totally ignorant of another factor, the addition of which to B, C, and D would invalidate the conclusion A. Such are the perils of discursive reasoning, based as it is on mediate knowledge.¹⁰ Its conclusions admit of relative certainty only; it is incapable of apodicticity. The most that can ever be expected from any rational or scientific investigation is a high degree of probability.

Now, which is fundamentally characteristic of faith, relative or maximal conviction? When a worshiper confesses, "I believe in God the Father, Maker of heaven and earth," does he mean, "I believe in the probability that God created heaven and earth"? Or does his confession express more than a relative certainty concerning the truth of his affirmation? Does he regard the creatorship of God as highly plausible, or as so certain that he is willing to stake his very existence on his belief that it is true? If faith is anything other than the maximal conviction that what it affirms is true, it is impossible to account for that paragon of religious devotion, namely, the individual who is willing to die for what he believes. People do not lay down

their lives for mere probabilities or relative certainties. Faith consists of going beyond the expression of relative certainty to the affirmation that the contents of faith are absolutely certain — so that their denial is not only false but inconceivable. The believer does not regard the contents of his faith as representing merely one of several hypotheses he might entertain, albeit the most probable one. No, he regards the contents of his faith as so certain that it is impossible for him to conceive of their not being the case. The very essence of faith, then, is maximal conviction.

Now what is the source of this conviction? It cannot be rational evidence, for such evidence is capable of producing nothing more than relative certainty, and relative certainty is never sufficient to account for faith. As a case in point, consider the consummate formulations of man's rational knowledge of God — viz., the naturalistic proofs for God's existence. They are well known to be ineffective in producing faith. No one ever comes to have faith in God as a result of studying the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments for the existence of God. The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is not the God of the philosophers. Not only logically but practically speaking, faith is never accounted for on the basis of knowledge mediated by reason. If maximal conviction as to the truth of its contents is essential to faith, then reason's disclosure of evidence cannot be constitutive of faith, for the most that such a disclosure can produce is a high degree of probability. So if the certainty of the believer in the truth of his affirmations represents more than the entertaining of hypotheses, however high their probability, then his faith must have some basis other than the evidence that appeals to reason. In short, faith cannot consist of mediate knowledge, for all it can lead to is relative certainty. Since immediate knowledge alone conveys maximal conviction, the knowledge constitutive of faith must of necessity be immediate knowledge. Immediate knowledge is thus required by faith not simply because, like all knowledge, the latter must include at least one immediately known element. Because faith by its very essence consists of maximal conviction, which immediate knowledge alone conveys, such knowledge is not merely requisite to but itself constitutive of faith. In other words, faith is faith by virtue of what it immediately knows to be true.

Since the maximal conviction constitutive of faith is conveyed only by immediate knowledge, and since immediate knowledge is precisely the content of faith's irreducible element, then this irreducible element of faith is not merely requisite to but exclusively constitutive of faith. That is to say, it is the presence of this element — and nothing else — that guarantees the presence of faith. Whatever the other elements that participate in religious life,

none of them has the status of this one irreducible element. It accounts both for there being any faith at all and for faith being what it is. Since this element is not a matter of more or less, its presence alone guarantees the presence of saving faith. The addition of other elements may constitute a working out of salvation, or the carrying out of its implications to their logical conclusion, but a person is not thereby any more saved than he is by virtue of faith's one irreducible element. If salvation on its fundamental level is not a matter of more or less, but a matter of being saved or not being saved at all, then it is this irreducible element of faith — and nothing else — which in the final analysis provides the basis of salvation.

If faith consists of immediate knowledge yielding maximal conviction, and if this is provided by its irreducible element, then the addition of mediate knowledge to the contents of faith by means of rational inquiry, with its accompanying degree of relative certainty, is not constitutive of faith. By virtue of its irreducible element, there would still be faith, whether the process of rational investigation ever took place or not. Therefore, the existence of faith does not depend upon the ability to come to certain conclusions on the basis of a rational investigation of evidence. The quality of one's faith is not directly proportional to his ability to provide rational proofs for its contents. Unless this is so, we must place a low estimate on the quality of faith in the uneducated and the young, those unable and those not yet able to give a rational explanation of their belief — an untenable position, particularly in view of Jesus' description of children as paradigmatic of genuine faith.

IV

In conclusion, it appears that faith is indeed a way of knowing something, and that the knowledge exclusively constitutive of faith is prerational, immediate, and characterized by maximal conviction. On this basis it is possible to suggest an answer to the question as to how faith and reason are related. It is evident from this examination of the knowledge of faith that the Augustinian formulation of the relation between faith and reason is the more accurate representation of the lived character of the human experience of faith. That is to say, the relation of faith to reason is one of irreversible logical priority. This means that faith is what it is independent of reason, and that within the religious life it is always reason which derives from faith, and never vice versa.

It does not follow from the logical priority of faith to reason that faith necessarily exists apart from reason, that is, that faith must at some time be

totally unaccompanied by an ability to give a meaningful account of its content. The effect of the argument has been to establish the *logical* priority of faith to reason, not its temporal priority. Thus, it does not invalidate the notion that faith is always accompanied by some degree of understanding. The point is that this rational element is not constitutive of faith, that it is not what determines either the presence or the nature of faith. Instead, the role of reason is more properly understood as corroborating rather than constituting faith. But this does not at all depreciate the importance of reason in religious life. Certainly, neither the rational explication of the contents of faith nor the corroboration of the affirmations of faith by a rational examination of the evidence is irrelevant to religious experience. Reason may be as integral to the totality of religious experience as is faith, but it is not, logically speaking, its fundamental constituent. Faith alone provides this foundation, which is in the final analysis nothing other than faith itself.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 Ellen G. White, *Steps to Christ* (Washington, D. C.: Review and Herald Publishing Association 1908), p. 105.
- 2 In *Steps to Christ*, Ellen White emphasizes the role of personal experience in her discussion of the evidence for faith (p. 111). She identifies as the "highest evidence of the divine authorship of the Bible" the effect of its "vivifying power" upon one's own mind and heart (*Education* [Mountain View, California: Pacific Press Publishing Association 1926], p. 171). And again, in *Testimonies for the Church*, volume eight (Mountain View, California: Pacific Press Publishing Association 1928), she says that "the real evidence of a living God" lies in "the conviction that God has written in our hearts, illuminated and explained by His word. It is in the living power in His created works, seen by the eye which the Holy Spirit has enlightened" (p. 325).
It is her view, then, that the most convincing evidence for the validity of the contents of faith is the experience of faith itself. Obviously this evidence is not perceptible from some position neutral to faith and unfaith, but only from within the perspective of faith. Therefore, an appeal to this evidence is an appeal to faith itself, not to something independent of faith, and thus not to anything "objective" in the ordinary sense of the word.
- 3 White, *Steps to Christ*, p. 105; compare *Education*, p. 169.
- 4 White, *Education*, p. 169. See also White, *Selected Messages*, book one (Washington, D. C.: Review and Herald Publishing Association 1958), p. 28; and White, *Testimonies for the Church*, volume five, p. 69.
- 5 White, *Testimonies for the Church*, volume four, p. 28.
- 6 White, *Steps to Christ*, p. 105.
- 7 2 Peter 1:5-7 places faith at the head of a list of attributes which believers should be concerned to acquire.
- 8 In *The Desire of Ages* (Mountain View, California: Pacific Press Publishing Association 1940), the inscrutability of the origin of faith is attested to by Ellen

G. White's comments on John 3:1-17: "So with the work of the Holy Spirit upon the heart. It can no more be explained than can the movements of the wind" (p. 172). She continues, "It is impossible for finite minds to comprehend the work of redemption. Its mystery exceeds human knowledge" (p. 173).

- 9 The notion that the knowledge of faith exhibits the character of immediacy is corroborated by Ellen White in her description of Mary's inability to understand or explain her anointing of Jesus' feet: "The Holy Spirit had planned for her, and she had obeyed its promptings. Inspiration stoops to give no reason. An unseen presence, it speaks to mind and soul, and moves the heart to action. It is its own justification" (*The Desire of Ages*, p. 560); and in her description of the possibility of knowing God's will on the basis of the content of one's own impulses: "And if we consent, He will so identify Himself with our thoughts and aims, so blend our hearts and minds into conformity to His will, that when obeying Him we shall be but carrying out our own impulses" (*The Desire of Ages*, p. 668).
- 10 The history of science reflects the continual refinement of scientific theories resulting from the progressive accumulation of factual information. Because it can never be assumed that all the information pertaining to a certain natural phenomenon has been discovered, no scientific explanation of a state of affairs can be regarded as apodictic. Though absolute certainty is the goal of scientific investigation, its approach to this goal is always asymptotic.

Comment

JAMES J. LONDIS

Rice begins his article by defining *reason* as "understanding," and contrasting it with *knowledge*. "It is possible," he says, "to know something without understanding it." One can know an automobile runs without understanding *why* it runs. Understanding is a clear perception of the "causes" of the engine's running, the "reasons" it runs. To understand is to "know" in a particular way. "To know something on the basis of reason means being able to give reasons [causes] for its being the case. What is reasonable is what is capable of rational explanation."

I

It seems to me this definition of reason is much too narrow for theology and philosophy. It is the notion of reason often associated with science and its methods. That is why it fits Rice's example of an automobile so well. By

contrast, theology and philosophy, when dealing with metaphysical questions, are not seeking the many causes of one effect or group of effects (such as the running engine) but in a sense the *one cause of all effects*. This is the ontological question, the question of Being itself, and the notion of reason Rice is suggesting does not and cannot deal with this question.

One historical answer to the ontological question is the God of classical theism. If the "reasonable" is what is capable of rational explanation in the sense of "causes," then the theistic concept of God is not reasonable, since there are no causes for God in theism. I'm sure Rice would not want to affirm that.

It seems to me that the concept of reason most adequate to the concerns of theology and philosophy is the one which sees the rational as the "intelligible," the "structured," the "coherent." Therefore, while the God of theism cannot be rationally explained in the sense of causes, one can show that the concept of God is a rational one in the sense that it is intelligible and coherent with our best thinking about experience. Some thinkers see the ontological argument, for example, as an explication of the intelligibility of the theistic concept of God.

It is because Rice begins with this definition of reason that he is forced into a view of religious faith as "self-authenticating" knowledge. Rice claims that all knowledge, ultimately, rests on some self-authenticating experiences. They are the starting point for epistemology. The major difficulty with this position is that not all agree on which experiences are self-authenticating, particularly in religion. "Faith," he says, "provides the basis which reason may subsequently explore and expound." Does that mean that faith has *no* basis *in* reason? If so, what enables the Christian to recommend his faith to a Moslem who also appeals to self-authenticating experiences? Doesn't faith need critical support from reason? If it does not, what is the difference between faith and an arbitrary, private opinion? Can one be honest, for example, and believe a revelation that violates established truth in the natural sciences? Does one have any basis for believing a revelation that would command one to enslave other human beings? The notion that faith "authenticates" itself is viable only if one means by it that the revelation accepted by faith, proves, on critical reflection, to be intelligible and coherent in relation to the rest of our experience and knowledge. Reason does not originate the revelations that awaken faith, but reason has the sacred responsibility to veto any alleged revelation that is confused and nonsensical. Furthermore, the revelation should find increasing critical support as it is subjected to examination.

Rice recognizes that if faith is self-authenticating it must involve cognitive elements that are immediately known. Usually, "immediate" knowledge is based on "immediate" experience. All knowledge of reason is "mediate," he says, while the knowledge of faith is "immediate." He mentions the experience of seeing red as a paradigm of immediate knowledge based on immediate experience. If one sees red, he *knows* he sees red. "My knowledge requires no other proof than the perception of the visual field bearing that color. My knowledge in this case is immediate; there are no 'reasons' for it. Again, when I feel pain, I know that I feel pain. I need no further evidence or justification or reason to account for the knowledge beyond the sensation itself. Such knowledge is immediate."

This illustration hurts Rice more than it helps him. He is using the term "knowledge" to describe feeling-states and perceptual-states of his own body. What is really known? Can he claim to "know" anything more than the fact that he is having certain experiences? Does he *know* that there is a red object independent of his perception? People often hallucinate the color red when there is no object independent of them causing the experience.

The point is that the moment one asks about the significance of his experiences — that is, whether there is something "out there" or not — one can only find out by judgment and critical reflection. One *tests* the experience. Can he touch an object he *thinks* he sees, etc. He "knows" there is a red *object* only after reasoning about his experience. He knows he has a red "experience" immediately. Therefore, any knowledge about an *other* has to be mediate. This Rice is unwilling to grant. Yet faith is not knowledge about my feeling-states or perceptual-states; it is knowledge of an other. (I use the term "knowledge" in relation to faith only because Rice uses it that way.) Therefore, as I see it, even the knowledge Rice attributes to faith must be mediate. The only way one can get around this is to presuppose a unity between the subject and object that makes immediate knowledge possible. Suffice it to say that Rice's illustration does *not* make his point.

II

There is an advantage to a theory of immediate knowledge, if it is true. If immediate knowledge actually exists, then some of the things we claim to know we cannot be mistaken about. Mistakes are only possible when knowledge is mediate, when one has made judgments and inferences. If there are knowing situations that are immediate, error is ruled out *ab initio*. Proponents of such a view have the problem, however, of explaining how peo-

ple who make claims to immediate knowledge can contradict each other. Even those who claim that *faith* is a form of immediate knowledge contradict each other. On Rice's view, there is no way to settle the dispute. One has made an appeal to the final epistemological court.

Rice then points out — correctly I think — that the ability to discern the evidence for faith grows out of “a desire to know the truth.” He calls this desire “more fundamental than reason. . . . One cannot establish the existence of this desire on a basis of rational evidence, for it is this desire which accounts for there being any such evidence.” This account of the matter perplexes me. This is a version of the familiar question “Why should I be rational?” One cannot answer such a question by giving reasons, because it is the value of reasons that is being challenged. The only possible answer is to say that a man is irrational and (in some respects, at least) insane, if he does not see the intrinsic value of being reasonable.

It is true that rational arguments cannot create the desire to be rational, to see the evidence, to embrace the truth. But, not to desire these things is to commit oneself to irrationality and dogmatism. There are no other alternatives. It seems to me that a case can be made for claiming that the desire to be honest with the evidence is an outgrowth of a commitment to the truth made by the will — a moral decision. This may be prerational in one sense, but in another sense it is the zenith of rationality, because it is the fundamental condition for being reasonable. Does Rice want this *desire* to be faith? If so, then he is using the term “faith” equivocally. If “faith” precedes reason in the sense that one must desire the truth before he is able to see the evidence, that is one thing. But if faith precedes reason in the sense one must adopt a perspective of faith before he can see the evidence, that is another thing. Rice, it seems to me, tries to say both things and thus confuses the issues.

To go on — I agree that giving reasons for faith does not necessarily lead to faith. Faith is more than mental assent. It involves the commitment of the whole person. But it must be a commitment that the person finds rationally persuasive. If one cannot cite good reasons for believing, reasons that impress the nonbeliever as well as the believer, how can one demonstrate that his faith was not hastily and ignorantly born? The skeptic may not agree, but at least he can understand the intelligibility of the believer's faith. When Rice says that “faith justifies itself,” I am at a loss to understand what he means. Does he mean that the believer's thinking and experience can in *no way* demonstrate the rationality of faith to the nonbeliever?

I sense Rice's confusion in his romantic analogy. “Are my wife's eyes

beautiful because I love her or do I love her because they are beautiful? Are my reasons for loving her the cause or the result of love?" The latter seems to be Rice's position. As he sees it, "the dozens of reasons someone else has for loving his wife will almost certainly fall short of persuading me that I should love her." His evidence is only "evidence for him, not me." Besides the fact that a man's love for a woman involves elements that are not present in a man's love for God (such as sense-impressions, sexuality, etc.), this analogy confuses more than it clarifies. What the devoted husband has shown by giving reasons for his love is that his wife is *worth* loving, and even a man who does not love her can agree. Who would claim that he fell in love with a woman *first* and then sat down and tried to find reasons for what happened? Most of us, it seems to me, observe qualities in a person (or needs) that draw us out of ourselves to them. Our love commitment is made because we have reasons, not vice versa. (This is *not*, of course, agape love we speak about.)

God is to be loved and trusted because he is *worth* loving and because he is *trustworthy*. I can give good reasons why God deserves to be loved, even to nonbelievers. The issue is not whether my reasons would cause the skeptic to love God, but whether my reasons would show it makes sense for *me* to love God — makes sense even to the skeptic. Love in the absence of reasons that make sense to others is hardly distinguishable from infatuation.

This is not to say there is *no* difference in the ability of the believer and the unbeliever to see the evidence. I agree that there often is a difference. The difference can be explained, however, in relation to the implications of the Christian life for one who does see the evidence. Research in the behavioral sciences has shown that the self can avoid seeing a great deal of evidence when that evidence is inimical to its own interests. (I would *not* say, though, that *all* unbelievers are thereby intellectually dishonest.) What I do not accept is Rice's contention that there is no objective evidence available to both the believer and the unbeliever.

III

Finally, I want to comment on Rice's claim that relative certainty is not good enough in religious epistemology. Reason, he says, can produce no more than probability in knowledge and contrasts probability or relative certainty with "maximal conviction" (or, as in the original draft of his article, "absolute certainty"). "Would a man die for a probability?" he rhetorically asks. My answer is *yes*. What is tricky here is the word *certainty*, or the phrase *maximal conviction* (whatever that is). I am certain my wife

loves me, and I would stake my life on it. But I would not say that it is impossible for me to be wrong. There are very few claims I would make which I would argue *cannot* be wrong. When one sets out to doubt as much as he can, as the Cartesian methodology recommends, one realizes there is very little that is undeniably certain. My "certainty" about my wife is primarily a psychological state based on very good evidence. But the most I can claim for the evidence is that it yields a high degree of probability that I am right. Nevertheless, I am "certain" I am right.

I want to support Rice when he says that faith does not depend on the ability to come to certain conclusions on the basis of a rational investigation of the evidence. I am with him also when he says that the quality of one's faith is not directly proportional to his ability to provide rational proofs for its contents. If this were the case, he says, we would have to place a low estimate on the quality of faith in the uneducated and the young.

In one sense, this is undeniably true. But there is a sense in which an ignorant faith *is* of poorer quality than an educated one. And it is not elitist to say so. When a man believes in God because of his skirmish with death, God accepts that as a man's best, given his condition at the time. But if that same man prefers to remain in ignorance, fearing the consequences that critical investigation might have for his faith, that man is no longer a good Christian nor does he possess genuine faith. Genuine faith has confidence in the truth, enough confidence to put it to the test. "The best Christian is an intellectual Christian," Ellen White says. That applies to machinists and farmers and children as well as to theologians. Even children can think carefully about their faith; and when they do, their questions are frighteningly rational. Knowledge is a virtue. A faith that steers a wide circle around reason ultimately becomes presumption.

Nativity

BRENDA J. BUTKA

O clarity of moon
and cold precision
embedded in infinity
of throbbing deepest heaven

no lamppost set to guide
or illuminate the night
but stamp of solemn sovereignty
affixed to perpetrate
scattered sparks of singing
rumors of a shining king
tales of silver bells to ring
transparency of morning

Stewardship and Securities:

A STUDY OF ADVENTIST CORPORATE INVESTMENTS

THOMAS DYBDAHL and JERE W. CHAPMAN

39

The church has always held a unique position of religious and moral leadership in society. This special role becomes increasingly more important when frustrations and moral crises are dominant in the human experience. Perhaps more than ever before in recent history, the Christian community faces the challenge to provide guidance and instruction in those difficult areas that require moral-ethical judgments. Thus, in this period of rethinking those assumptions which used to guide us with remarkable certainty, the religious leaders face awesome, though not misplaced, responsibility.

A concern that has stirred the special interest of clergy and laity alike is that of responsible stewardship. The organized churches in America have investments in corporate securities estimated at \$20 billion. The General Conference of the Seventh-day Adventist church has holdings worth some \$75 million.¹ Thus, the question regarding the stewardship of church investment monies, certainly not moot, should prompt careful scrutiny of investment practices in the light of certain Christian-ethical principles.

I

What to do with these investments has always been a source of concern for the Adventist church. The church has been conscious that it has a particular obligation to develop noneconomic criteria for guiding its portfolio. This sense of obligation has grown from a belief that the financial structure of the church ought to be in accord with particular parochial and Christian standards. An example of existing noneconomic guidelines is the refusal of the General Conference to invest in tobacco, liquor, or meatpacking companies. As Robert E. Osborn, assistant treasurer of the General Conference and investments manager, puts it, the companies selected are those "whose

major products and services are compatible with church standards and values.”

The principle here is obvious: If the church invests in and profits from a company, the church has a moral responsibility for the way in which its money is made. But all of this brings one — after looking closely at the General Conference investments — to the rather disturbing observation that the church has not developed any noneconomic criteria in a number of broader areas of Christian concern. Its investments have not always supported those human and social needs to which the gospel of Jesus Christ gives priority.

Thus, through its investment policies, the church has become vulnerable to some valid criticism. Having refused to invest in certain companies because of possible compromise to aspects of the health teaching of the church, should not the financial leaders and policy formulators be sensitive to areas generating the more intense questions of morality and moral responsibility in the social realm?

WAR

The Christian recognizes that wars will grow worse and worse and will continue to the end of time.² As much as one may pray and work for world peace, it is false eschatology to believe that peace will be achieved. At the same time, the church believes that the gospel of Jesus Christ is a gospel of peace — which stands in opposition to war.

In America there is an increasing swing toward militarism. More and more money is being spent on weapons and defense. The Pentagon budget for 1971 was larger than the entire federal budget in 1957. “America has become a militaristic and aggressive nation. Militarism in America is in full bloom.”³

We cannot stop war, and it is futile to believe that we can. And as citizens of America, participating in its life, we cannot avoid contributing to the war effort. But investing in war is quite another matter. The church avoids investments in liquor, not because it can thereby end the use of liquor, but because the church opposes its use, and because the church does not believe that profiting at the expense of another is in harmony with the gospel. The church cannot escape all responsibility for war, but through its investments it can refuse to profit from war. Some of the Christian’s tax money may support war, but none of the church’s investment money need support war. It can refuse to invest funds in companies which are profiting from the manufacture of products that destroy both human life and natural resources.

Through investments in these companies (see tables), the church places itself in a position of complicity with their acts. Christians have a special obligation to question that complicity.

Some argue that it is impossible to find any large company that is not involved with the business of war. That is a false generalization. The January-February 1972 issue of *Economic Priorities Report* pointed out that of *For-*

TABLE 1. GENERAL CONFERENCE INVESTMENT HOLDINGS WITH FIRMS HAVING SIZABLE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTS — JUNE 30, 1971¹

TOTAL ² SHARES HELD	COMPANY	1971 ³	
		DOD RANK	MILITARY PRODUCTS PRODUCED ⁴
12,000	American Telephone and Telegraph	5	Nike Hercules missiles
16,000	General Electric	5	M-16 rifles, Phantom jets, weapons
5,000	North American Rockwell	13	Military transports, aircraft engines
14,000	General Motors	17	Howitzers, antipersonnel launchers
7,000	IBM	19	Bombing navigation, weapon systems
9,000	Honeywell	22	Major producer of antipersonnel items
13,400	IT&T	23	Sensors and military systems
12,500	Ford	24	Grenade launchers, missiles
15,000	Standard Oil, New Jersey (Exxon)	27	Gravel mine sensitivity studies
21,000	Olin	30	Ammunition, missile guidance systems
10,000	FMC	37	Guns, ordnance, rocket launchers
34,000	General Telephone and Electric	42	Missile and weapon systems
26,000	Texaco	44	Fuel for military transport vehicles
8,000	Control Data	64	Data process for ballistic missiles
10,000	City Investing	68	Missile and weapon components ⁵
12,000	Eastman Kodak	69	Operator of Holston Army Ammunitions
14,000	Atlantic Richfield	85	Producer of DOD petroleum products
7,000	International Harvester	90	Tanks; aircraft used in air warfare
4,000	American Airlines	94	Military transport use

1. Tables compiled by Jere Chapman.

2. Investment and Income Funds shares have been totaled where this is necessary. Source: General Conference Quarterly Reports issued for Investment and Income Funds.

3. Based on dollar volume of military prime contract awards in fiscal year 1971. Source: Department of Defense Comptroller, Directorate for Information Operations, October 29, 1971.

4. Source: Department of Defense, Office of the Comptroller, Directorate for Information Operations; Corporate Information Center, Office of Resource Studies, National Council of Churches.

5. Subsidiaries have produced artillery shells, fragmentation warheads, antipersonnel cluster bombs. Subsidiary (American Electric) gained brief attention by taking napalm prime contract from Dow Chemical.

TABLE 2. AMOUNT OF GENERAL CONFERENCE INVESTMENTS WITH FIRMS HAVING SIZABLE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTS — DECEMBER 31, 1972

COMPANY ¹	1972 ³ DOD RANK	GENCON ⁴ INVEST- MENTS
Gen Electric	4	\$ 1,238,875
American Telephone and Telegraph	6	1,160,500
IBM	20	2,814,000
IT&T	21	237,000
General Motors	23	1,622,500
Exxon	25	1,312,500
Ford	28	875,875
FMC	31	1,125,750
General Telephone and Electric	36	1,205,000
Texaco	48	1,425,000
DuPont ²	52	1,420,000
Olin	58	396,375
Eastman Kodak	62	1,928,875
Control Data	73	1,026,375
City Investing	79	291,250
TOTAL		\$18,079,875

1. See TABLE 1 for military products produced by the companies.
2. Producer of military explosives and powders.
3. Source: Department of Defense Comptroller, Directorate for Information Operations, October 6, 1972.
4. Market value of combined General Conference funds in these companies.

tune magazine's list of the 500 top U. S. corporations 110 had few or no military contracts (\$100,000 or less).⁴

Others take the view, since military contracts may make up only a small portion of a company's business, and since most of the resources are involved in manufacturing products useful to society, that the company cannot be condemned. Here, there are two points to consider: (a) If a thing is wrong, the percentage of its "wrongness" is irrelevant. Would we invest in a mutual fund that had "only" 2 percent of its money in a brewery? (b) Merely considering the percentage of business a company does with the military is

misleading. For example, in 1971, although AT&T did less than 6 percent of its business with the military, that represented over \$931 million in contracts. Compare that sum with the total of United Aircraft Corporation, which did over 37 percent of its business with the military, yet held contracts worth \$60 million less than AT&T. And what about the products? Although Department of Defense contracts represent only 2 percent of General Motors' business, GM makes Sheridan tanks, M-16 rifles, and M-109 howitzers, all of which are designed to kill human beings.⁵

INJUSTICE AND OPPRESSION

Just as war will continue to the end of time, racism, injustice, and oppression will continue and will grow worse — for their source is the selfish heart of man. And until men are transformed by the grace of Christ, they will continue to exploit their brothers. But this does not stop the Christian from calling oppression and exploitation sin and from living in opposition to them. The message of the gospel is a message of liberation for all men. While on earth, Christ identified himself with the poor and the oppressed, and he asks the Christian to do the same.

Many companies in the United States practice injustice and oppression in the way they treat employees, especially minority peoples. Part of a Christian stockholder's responsibility is to see that the companies he supports with his money are concerned about their employees — about equal opportunity, about putting minority people in leadership positions — and are seeking to eliminate structures that help bind and oppress men.

This question of justice relates especially to companies that do business in South Africa. The Union of South Africa is not the only country in the world with problems of racial justice. Nonetheless, South Africa is one of the few nations in which an official policy of white supremacy is in action. "We want to keep South Africa white . . . [and] 'keeping it white' can mean only one thing, namely white dominance, not 'leadership,' not 'guidance,' but 'control,' 'supremacy,'"⁶ This imposes inferior status on some of God's children solely on the basis of their color. Apartheid transposes what the Christian knows to be wrong into a right.

What about investments that support this system? Most corporations (and investors) argue (*a*) that only by "keeping the lines open" with South Africa can they hope to influence government policies and (*b*) that their companies are supporting a slow but steady improvement in the position of blacks and coloreds. This is the position taken by Polaroid Corporation after its study of the question.⁷ But certain facts speak otherwise.

American corporations reflect the apartheid system in their general practices. All facilities in the U. S. corporations' plants in South Africa have: (a) racially segregated (and not equal) facilities; (b) all the best jobs are reserved for whites, and no black man may ever supervise any white, no matter what his skills are; (c) the black trade unions, such as they are, are powerless; and (d) employment of men under the migratory labor system who may not live with their wives and families.

All of this is not surprising when one discovers that in a study conducted by the Charles St. Thomas group in 1969, only 10 percent of U. S. businessmen interviewed in South Africa felt that apartheid was wrong.⁸

Any investment in South Africa by a U. S. company involves the expenditure of considerable capital. When a company begins to profit from its investments, it ends up with a vested interest in the economic and political stability of the country where its plants operate. So, U. S. business interests become tied up with the interests of the minority which imposes its will on South Africa.

It is easy — and conscience-soothing — to believe that by being in South Africa, a business can help to influence and change government policies. No sacrifice is necessary. Just invest, rake in the profits, and the change will inevitably come. This ignores the real dynamics of the struggle in South Africa.

The basic fallacy in the argument of those who hold out any hope of political change through economic expansionism is that they fail to understand a single fact of history: In authoritarian societies economic forces are controlled by political forces, not the other way about.

It is naive to suppose that South Africa's white society would give up its power, its privileges and its present system of security for the sake of rapid economic expansion. The change-through-expansion argument should be seen for what it is — a rationalization to justify what is in the best economic interests of those who employ it. Hard-headed political analysis shows that it is almost certain to be a dangerous delusion.⁹

After a visit to South Africa last year, fifteen clergymen stated: "Even progressive action on the part of American companies will not bring the basic changes in society that we support because of our Christian commitment to freedom, justice, and self-determination."¹⁰

The Christian investor cannot end the evils of injustice or racism. But he can refuse to profit from them and the human suffering they cause. He can bear witness that whenever his prosperity rests on the misery of another person, he will raise his voice in protest and testify to another way — the way of brotherhood in Christ.

POLLUTION

In the beginning, God gave man dominion over the earth and responsibility for it.¹¹ Thus the Christian stands in opposition to anything which

tends to hurt or destroy the earth. "Concern for cleanliness and order, for the fragile balance of nature that man cannot tamper with or destroy with impunity, follows naturally from the Seventh-day Adventist understanding of life itself — its origin, present predicament, and destiny."¹²

Pollution is becoming an increasing problem as men continue to waste the earth. Some companies have taken important steps to combat this evil. Others who have been lax continue to pollute the environment at alarming rates. The Christian investor has a responsibility to make his concerns known to all companies he supports — and to be sure that they are complying with laws in these areas. He can encourage them to take positive additional steps to reduce the destruction of God's earth. Thus he can bear witness to a positive way of living now.

Inherent in the Adventist church's investment posture is the failure of the church thus far to take into account the nature of moral commitment. The dimensions of an ethically based theology should be broad enough to encompass horizons that touch on every phase of human existence — economics, politics, aesthetics, and other cultural reality.

The Judeo-Christian tradition can and ought to be expressed through various "secular" modalities. There are really no nonreligious categories. To the total Christian posture, there are no spheres that are outside one's concern. When one assumes the human dimensions based on the life of Jesus Christ, the secular and the spiritual merge. The Christian responds to the total world from his own unique experience.

The Seventh-day Adventist church should begin asserting itself in these larger dimensions of the religious and spiritual outlook by examining more carefully issues that have universal ethical implications and are not merely parochial to the Adventist church.

Traditionally the Adventist church has maintained a position, whenever possible, of a noncontroversial nature. The assumption seems to have been that official aloofness from social and political issues is in the best interests of the church. Continuing in this tradition of discretion, the church should give immediate and serious consideration to the question of what to do with those companies in its portfolio which will continue to create controversy and criticism because of their involvement in areas antithetical to Christian concerns.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

- 1 In addition to this, the Pacific Union Conference has approximately \$30 million in its own investment funds. Nearly \$4 million is invested in a General Conference international fund, which serves the overseas divisions.
- 2 Matthew 24:6, 7; Luke 21:9, 10.
- 3 David M. Shoup, The new American militarism, *Atlantic Monthly* 223:51, 56 (April 1969).
- 4 The *Economic Priorities Report* is published twice a month by the Council on Economic Priorities, 456 Greenwich Street, New York, New York 10013.
- 5 These statistics are taken from a pamphlet entitled *Church Investments, Technological Warfare and Military-Industrial Complex* (New York: Corporate Information Center 1972).
- 6 Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, the late prime minister of South Africa, made these remarks to the House of Assembly in January 1963.
- 7 Documents explaining the Polaroid viewpoint can be obtained without charge from the Polaroid Corporation, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139.
- 8 The statements are taken from a pamphlet entitled *Are Things Getting Better in South Africa?*, by Don Morton, a South African Methodist minister.
- 9 Colin Legum, American investments bolster racism, in *Southern Africa, a Time for Change* (New York: Friendship Press 1969).
- 10 *U. S. Investment in Southern Africa: A Focus for Church Concern and Action* (New York: Southern Africa Task Force, United Presbyterian church 1972).
- 11 Genesis 1:26-28.
- 12 Herbert E. Douglas, Adventist leadership in ecology (editorial), *Review and Herald* 149:14 (May 4, 1972).

Investment Practices of the General Conference

ROBERT E. OSBORN

47

Many years ago Ellen G. White wrote about the handling of money: "You need to learn the art of using your talents to the glory of Him who has lent them to you. This requires study, and prayer, and consecration. You should learn the science of handling money aright. Then you will not allow it to pass through your hands without producing anything for God."¹ In view of this counsel, it is appropriate to take a good, long look at the use of not only personal funds but also those belonging to the church.

Comments as to the propriety of church investment in this or that vehicle of investment, or of even investing at all, usually go as follows:

Do you mean to say that the Adventist church is playing the stock market?

Is it true that an institution has put its funds in a shopping center which is open on Sabbaths and that some of the shops sell things we would never buy for ourselves?

Why does the General Conference invest money that people give with the expectation that it is going directly into mission work?

Wasn't it terrible that the conference association lost its whole investment because a bad decision was made to invest in a project that it should never have gotten involved with at all?

The church should sell all its stocks and bonds and put the proceeds into mission work — where so much good can be done right now.

The vast sums held in reserve in the General Conference could be used to bring a lot of people into the church.

Misinformation and fallacious reasoning are obvious in these queries and statements, and it is certain that not everything can be answered to the complete satisfaction of the critics. However, the persons responsible for administering church financial affairs have an obligation to be certain that the

rationale for and approach to investing church funds are correct and logical and that what is done can stand on its merit.

I

Before discussing the specifics of the investment of church funds, I will give some brief background matter on investment philosophy, money markets, and financial objectives.

The word *investment* has different meanings for different groups of people — consumer investment, business or economic investment, and financial or securities investment. All of these vehicles are used at times by church investment personnel, and the effectiveness is determined somewhat by *how* these vehicles are utilized.

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Consumer investment refers to the purchase of durable goods by the consumer, with the expectation not only that these goods will be used but also that they may even increase in value over the years. Generally one thinks of this as individual investing, such as the purchase of home, automobile, or other large durable item; but the term has relevance for church organizations and institutions also.

Business or economic investment refers to the use of money to purchase business assets that will produce income or other results. This category would include the investment by a person or a company in productive assets of almost any kind designed to earn a profit — a lease on a building, the purchase of furniture and fixtures, the securing of an inventory of supplies and raw materials, etc. These are examples of business that church organizations and institutions are continually involved in, whether in a conference project, an industry at an educational institution, or a large manufacturing concern.

Financial or securities investment usually refers to the purchase of assets in the form of securities that will produce a profit for the investor, even though he does not have direct control of the assets and must rely on the management talent of others. No new productive assets are created as a result if the investment of the investor purchases existing securities from another owner. In exchange for money, the investor looks forward to future income and profit, and he hopes the security purchased will maintain its attractiveness for others when he desires or needs to part with it.

Defined for the purposes of this presentation, the term *investment* means the purchase of a security that upon an appropriate analysis offers safety of principal and a yield commensurate with the risks assumed. Through a rational process of investment analysis, the investor determines whether a

specific investment provides safety of principal, satisfactory yield (rate of return), and minimum risk. All of these, of course, are subject to personal and collective judgment.

Diversification. In the investment of a sum of money, the choice must be made between the *safety* of investment and the *profit* that may be earned. One must never be in the position of having all capital invested in one type of security. A balance should be carefully maintained between (a) secure investments that offer less in the form of future income and (b) those that are less secure but offer the opportunity of future gains in the form of income or capital gain. *Risk* must always be balanced with *reward*.

No investment vehicle, admittedly, is free from all risk; but spreading insures minimizing of risk. The pull toward greater reward and growth is countered by the pull toward greater security. Administrators responsible for investing church funds must attempt to strike a proper balance by the process of diversification. In essence, common stock investing must be balanced to some degree by fixed income (bond) investing. Too much capital should not be placed in one enterprise, business entity, or industry to the exclusion of others. Geographic diversification may also be considered at times.

SECURITIES MARKETS

Three basic forms of securities — bonds, preferred stocks, and common stocks — (plus convertibles) are used in investing, and the following is a rather simplified explanation of them. (U. S. governmental securities are not included in this discussion, but they also should be understood by investors.)

A *bond* is a long-term senior debt of the issuing corporation in the form of a note given to the bondholder who has lent his money to the bond-issuer. The corporation (debtor) promises to pay to the bondholder (creditor) the face value of the bond on a published maturity date usually at least five years away. A fixed rate of interest is also paid at stated times. Therefore, bonds are correctly called fixed income securities. Since bonds are debts, they are senior to all other securities issued by a corporation, and interest on bonds must be paid before any dividends are available for distribution to shareholders of preferred or common stocks. They are secured in various ways.

Bonds are rated as to quality, depending on the security involved; and the higher the quality, the lower the interest rate. Changes in the financial status of the bond-issuer (thus changes in the rating of the bonds) can affect bond

values materially. The safety of a bond is dependent on the ability of the issuing corporation to pay the interest when due and the principal at maturity.

Bond prices are affected directly by the general level and trend of interest rates. If the cost of borrowing money rises, bond prices decline; if interest rates ease, market prices of bonds firm up, thereby providing capital gain opportunities. Yields on most bonds tend to rise as maturity dates lengthen.

The advantage of owning bonds is that they provide a steady source of income and the preservation of capital.

Preferred stocks lie somewhere between bonds and common stocks. Some consider them as neither full debt nor full ownership. They represent limited equity; generally owners have no voting rights. They carry a fixed rate of dividend, but without maturity date or maturity value.

Convertibles, although they are not in the basic three forms of securities, are a most important group to be considered. There are convertible bonds, and there are convertible preferred stocks. They are hybrids in that they are neither complete debt nor complete ownership per se. Under certain stated conditions, convertible items may be converted into the common stock of a company; but until then they are not fully considered as equities, although they have the capacity to become such. They are an excellent investment vehicle when properly understood and carefully followed.

Common stocks (representing basic ownership of a company) are what the average person thinks of when he considers investing in securities. A stockholder buys a part of the ownership of the company — part of the plant, inventory, production, all its properties. Since common stocks represent ownership, they carry no fixed rates of return (dividends), and the amount and regularity of payment depend on the fortune of the company.

When a company first offers its stock for sale, a specific price is set on that stock. But once this stock has been sold to the public — once it is freely traded in the market — its price is determined by what the buyer is willing to pay and what the seller is willing to accept. The price of the stock fluctuates with supply and demand. This is so whether the stock is traded on a regular exchange or in the over-the-counter market, where prices are determined by private negotiation among dealers.

Holders of common stocks cannot be paid dividends until all interest is paid on bonds and until dividends are paid on preferred stocks. However, common stockholders are not limited in the possible rate of return, since they receive no fixed rate of return. If the company does well, the common stockholders may be paid dividends in excess of the return paid on bonds or

preferred stocks. Also, as the attractiveness of the company is enhanced, the share value may increase (giving a capital gain), or vice versa (giving a capital loss).

Investing in equities has long been considered a means of providing a hedge against inflation; theoretically, the value of stocks will increase as inflation develops or its rate increases. However, the market at times does not reflect any real reasons for fluctuation, since the tendency is for psychological factors to enter the picture. Over the long term, though, common stocks have indeed provided a good investment vehicle and must be considered by those having funds available to invest.

Investment Companies. Open-end investment companies (mutual funds) are not discussed in detail in this presentation, although they are an important vehicle used by millions of investors. Likewise, closed-end investment companies are omitted here.

BASIC INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES

The three common forms of investment discussed here can be rated in a simplified manner against three basic investment objectives — safety of principal, income, and growth of capital:

	<i>Safety</i>	<i>Income</i>	<i>Growth</i>
Bonds	most	very steady	usually none
Preferred stocks	good	steady	variable
Common stocks	least	variable	best

Investors who want safety of principal above all else should consider investing heavily in high-grade bonds and quality preferred stocks. Those who want high current income would also choose bonds and preferred stocks. If growth is the investment objective, carefully chosen common stocks would be indicated.

II

An organization the size of the Seventh-day Adventist church, handling the large sums of money entrusted to it, must have definite policies and procedures pertaining to investment philosophy and strategy. Because such policies and practices are related to the times, they must be subject to constant scrutiny, review, and revision. The policies currently in effect have been developed over many years by various administrations in the light of prevailing economic conditions and trends, and they have been considered and modified at the annual councils of the world church organization through the years.

Two articles by Wilfred M. Hillock, of Loma Linda University, appeared in issues of the *Review and Herald*, the church paper, in 1972. Hillock warned against "speculation" as contrasted with "investment." An editorial followed in a third issue.² Much of the material in these three presentations, which dealt with how a Christian should look at investing in the securities market, is applicable to church investment policies and practices. It provides background for understanding the sensible and rational approach to investment that might be appropriately engaged in by the church.

Because the General Conference is responsible for a large pool of capital, the controlling investment and securities committee decided in 1967 to retain professional investment counsel. (This took place at the time the "unitized funds" program, described later in this article, began operation.) Lionel D. Edie & Company, Inc., of New York City, was chosen to do the research, analysis, and selection of securities for the General Conference portfolio. Members of the investment section of the Treasurer's Office work very closely with Edie & Company and keep in communication by telephone and in-person conferences for detailed review of current and projected trends in the economic and money markets.

Various funds of the Seventh-day Adventist church are available for short-term and long-term investing, including working capital as defined by policy, certain reserve funds, pension funds, funds appropriated but not yet called for, etc. Since all but the pension funds must be available in fairly liquid form, the policy is that these funds be invested in banks, savings and loan associations, governmental obligations, high-grade commercial paper, corporate bonds, and equities (stocks). A high degree of safety, it is believed, is built into all of these investment vehicles.

The investable funds of a church organization come from two basic sources: (a) funds actually *owned* by the church and (b) funds held in *trustee* capacity, in either revocable or irrevocable form.

OWNED FUNDS

Investments of *owned funds* are limited by policy to the following:³

- Commercial banks.
- Savings banks.
- Savings and loan associations or building societies.
- Short-term obligations of the federal government.
- Federal agency issues.
- Commercial paper (rated "prime" or "A" only).
- Bankers' acceptances.

Church unitized funds.

Building sites for conference and church projects and church-owned employee housing (subject to availability of excess operating capital of a nontithe source).

All of the items except the last have a high degree of liquidity, which is essential in this area of owned funds; only a very limited amount of capital, if any, would be invested in the last item.

These policy provisions and restrictions are applicable to all entities of the church organization — the General Conference, division conferences, union conferences, local conferences, and institutions. Administrators and controlling committees and boards do not have express or tacit license to go beyond the foregoing forms of investment. By policy, only unitized funds of the church organization may invest owned funds in bonds and stocks.

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TRUSTEE FUNDS

An increasing number of deferred-giving vehicles are being used in church organizations and institutions, and this practice has resulted in a large increase in the assets for which the church organization is responsible. Since the corpus of these trusts many times is in the form of cash, definite stipulations have been included in the overall investment policy. Basically, funds held in *trustee capacity* are to be invested in the same investment media as owned funds are, with the following exceptions and limitations (and with additional types permitted) :

1. There is a 75 percent limitation on the investment of trustee funds in unitized funds.
2. The final item listed under the owned-funds policy is not allowed for trustee funds.
3. Provision is made that up to 25 percent of the total of trustee funds may be loaned to approved church projects under certain conditions.
4. Up to 50 percent of annuities and irrevocable trust agreements involving cash may be invested in first mortgages on real property under certain limitations. Included in this 50 percent is a special provision for investing in U. S. Post Office facilities.

UNITIZED FUNDS

In order to serve not only the General Conference proper and its organizations and institutions, but also to assist the worldwide component organizations, the General Conference has established special "unitized" funds which are operated in a manner similar to mutual funds. All unit-holders (conferences, unions, divisions, the General Conference, and church-owned

institutions) own a proportionate share of the unitized funds, on the basis of the amount invested; and unit-holders share in the investment income and capital appreciation.

The General Conference operates these funds to provide the organizations and institutions of the church with a place to invest funds. This is especially important, since church policy does not permit organizations and institutions to invest in bonds and stocks except as particular union conferences by choice operate unitized funds. (Only one union conference has chosen to do this.)

The two main unitized funds operated by the General Conference are (*a*) the Investment Fund and (*b*) the Income Fund. The Investment Fund is a balanced growth fund with moderate current income and reasonable growth as objectives. The Income Fund has a high current-income objective, with less emphasis on growth. Full disclosure is made to the unit-holders of all equity positions (preferred and common stocks) held by the funds, with indication given as to purchases and sales made during the quarter.

The Investment Fund did well in 1972, with a total performance of 14.17 percent for the year. This compared favorably with the mutual fund industry as a whole and with the well-known popular indices. The Income Fund did not do too well in 1972, as was the case with other similar funds, but it did pay out 6.24 percent in current income (which is in excess of the minimum yield objective of 6 percent per annum). (By Internal Revenue Service regulations, the Income Fund can be used for the investing of the corpus of life income agreements, and certain legal limitations relating thereto some-

CASH MANAGEMENT AND SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS

The investment section of the General Conference Treasurer's Office also has the responsibility for the overall cash management activities of the General Conference Office itself. This entails a daily review of the domestic bank balances of the General Conference, the corporation, the unitized funds, and the pension funds. Minimum operating balances are maintained in the various banks; and projections are continually reviewed and revised, so that funds not immediately needed can be placed in short-term investments (such as U. S. Treasury bills and prime quality commercial paper). This close attention to bank balances and to the investing of short-term funds results in a sizeable amount of earnings each year.

In order to have expeditious use of funds, the General Conference has arranged for union conferences to remit funds to the General Conference by

bank wire transfers; and this same procedure is used for the settlement of securities sales.

The use of the "float" (checks issued but not yet cleared at the bank) is also a source of interest income, since these funds are kept invested until the projected time of the arrival of the checks at the banks for payment.

III

Through the years, the General Conference administrators have given careful attention to the selection of companies in which the church will invest funds. Basically, investment is made only in companies whose major products and services are compatible with church standards and values. Obviously this practice eliminates investments in companies dealing in liquor, tobacco, entertainment, meatpacking, etc. Most investments are in companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange or in high-quality over-the-counter issues.

CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

Near the end of 1971 and on into early 1972, a great amount of interest developed in the matter of church investments and corporate responsibility. One of the first major articles in a national news magazine appeared in the September 20, 1971, issue of *U. S. News and World Report*.⁴ The Seventh-day Adventist church was represented in this article as a "prosperous denomination" and as "still aloof" toward corporate responsibility. Both of these interesting observations are not entirely inaccurate.

The Adventist church has never taken an official position in regard to restricting investments to those companies that are "socially responsible" in respect to fair employment, military contracting, pollution control, product safety, race relations, and similar policies. Some universities and religious bodies in recent years have taken a growing interest in these matters and appear to be exerting at least limited influence on the activities of some companies.

At the time of the annual shareholders' meetings in 1972 a great amount of publicity was given to the campaign of five of the major Protestant denominations for information and disclosure on the involvement of six corporations having major activities in racially separated South Africa. A report released earlier had indicated the amount invested by churches in military contractors, and the figures given were significant.

In 1972 Yale University decided to become active in corporate responsibility, and the 500-million-dollar Yale endowment stock portfolio is being

invested according to guidelines laid down in the 208-page treatise entitled *The Ethical Investor* jointly written by two Yale professors and a former Yale seminarian.⁵ This book has become almost a nationwide guide for universities as they have taken some steps in the direction of selecting companies that are more socially responsible than others.

A few mutual funds (including one by the giant Dreyfus group) invest only in companies that are "benefiting society," such as in the areas of equal and nondiscriminatory employment practices, occupational health and safety, product safety and purity, impact on the ecological environment, military contracting, etc. From the monetary and economic viewpoints, however, their performance has not been too satisfactory, and this fact has dampened the enthusiasm of potential private and institutional investors.

According to a report prepared and released under the auspices of the Ford Foundation, awareness of the social ramifications of business activities is growing among banks, mutual funds, insurance companies, foundations, universities, and churches. This report was prepared by Bevis Lonstreth and H. David Rosenbloom, two lawyers who served as consultants to the Ford Foundation during its examination of its own investment policy.⁶ The report particularly pointed out that some religious groups and insurance companies are devoting portions of their portfolios to socially oriented investments where economic factors are not controlling.

During the past few years the General Conference has involved itself in a limited way by the holding of certificates of deposit in United States banks that are minority-owned, minority-operated, and serving blacks and other racially oriented minorities.

The idea of a corporate social audit has captured the imagination of social critics, businessmen, consultants, and professional accountants alike. Such groups as the Council on Economic Priorities, the National Council of Churches' Corporate Information Center, and the student-led Committee for Corporate Responsibility have all had a try at auditing individual companies' social performance in the areas of minority hiring, defense contracting, or pollution. Even the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has appointed an eight-man committee to develop some guidelines and standards for measuring social performance, a task which, admittedly, will be difficult if not impossible.

The concept of a corporate social audit implemented by certain groups involves an attempt to determine how well a particular corporation is doing in meeting its social responsibilities. This concept has been studied very carefully by two professors at Harvard Business School, Raymond A. Bauer

and Dan H. Fenn, Jr., who coauthored a book entitled *The Corporate Social Audit*.⁷ Their findings indicate that during the time they were conducting their research (1971 and 1972) a notable change took place in the way companies assessed their social contributions. These writers contend that the community at large is not so much interested in the *results* of various social programs as in the answer to one key question: Is the company really trying?

A Seventh-day Adventist student in the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, Tom Dybdahl, wrote his master's thesis in 1972 on the subject of the investment policies of the churches that are members of the National Council of Churches. Subsequently he prepared a forthright and well-documented paper on the subject as it relates to the Adventist church. This paper was sent to the twenty-five members of the investment and securities committee of the General Conference and is under consideration by them.

One rather difficult aspect that has not yet been legally resolved has to do with the investment of trust funds. It has been a well-established rule that funds held for others must be invested by a trustee in a manner which will bring the maximum economic benefit to the trustor. Obviously, the introduction of other criteria complicates investment practices.

Just how far social and corporate responsibility will go is still very much a matter of conjecture. Most certainly the question should be followed rather closely on a continuing basis by religious, educational, and charitable organizations.

CORPORATE MANAGEMENT

At a seminar I attended in April 1972 in New York City, Roger Murray, the well-known Columbia University Business School professor, spent considerable time on the question of investors' attempting to influence management. He presented what he termed two creeds for discussion by the group.

Creed One. I am an investor in equity securities and seek to maximize my total return by picking stocks that outperform a random selection of issues. This is a difficult enough task so that I ought not dissipate my time, energy, and analytical skills trying to substitute my judgment for that of corporate managers in specific business decisions. I intend to hold a stock just as long as I think it will afford my portfolio a superior return. If I think management is making inferior decisions, my job is to liquidate my investment promptly, not to try to change those decisions. I must remember at all times that I am an investor, not an owner or a manager of the business.

Creed Two. When I become a stockholder, inevitably I become a part owner, and I cannot escape my responsibilities. In the first place, I believe corporate managements need to have informed and experienced stockholders who continually review their

performance. The system will not work well if self-perpetuating managements are accountable to no one. In the second place, moreover, I know that I cannot always see trouble ahead and get out of a stock position before the price is affected. This means that on occasion I will improve my performance by staying with a situation, acting as an owner, and bringing about change in a portfolio company. If I perform my critical function well, I can even hope to prevent some problems. In the process of acting like an owner, in any event, I shall improve my chances of obtaining an early warning signal of impending problems.

Thus far, the General Conference has followed Creed One, regardless of pressure at times from dissident shareholders who have solicited the church's proxies at annual corporation shareholder meetings. In rare instances, the church representatives have remained neutral in proxy battles, but as yet they have not resorted to an antimanagement stance.

A tremendous amount of time and effort must be expended just to service the rather large pools of capital entrusted to the church. Hence, the responsible persons have not felt it worth while to maintain an enlarged staff such as would be required to investigate carefully the issues involved in proxy fights and other disputable areas. The attitude of the General Conference has been to liquidate its position in any company when confidence in its management is lost.

CONCLUSION

The responsibility of properly investing church funds is most important to the progress of the worldwide Adventist program, and the General Conference investment section takes this responsibility most seriously. In late 1969 a series of seven articles on the general subject of financial procedures was written by the treasurer of the General Conference, Kenneth H. Emerson.⁸ These appeared in the *Review and Herald* first and were subsequently combined to form a booklet entitled *Financing a World Church*. Copies are available on request to the Treasurer's Office.

The conservative and progressive policies that the General Conference has tried to formulate through the years are always under review and refinement, as I have mentioned earlier. Also, attempt has been made to secure the best counsel available to guide in the selection of investments.

It is impossible to operate an investment program counter to the prevailing economic and market trends. But the intention is to have proper safeguards to cushion against severe declines when they occur. The expectation also is to participate at least moderately in rising markets. In other words, the objectives are to insure protection in down markets, some of the action in up markets, but prudence and caution in all markets!

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The Afternoon Half-Moon

PHILLIP WHIDDEN

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After spending my whole afternoon in the fortresslike
Orlando library (in warm wooden and cool air-conditioned comfort)
I strolled out to the street to wait for my ride.
I stood on the sidewalk reading a novel.
He appeared with a light touch of fingers on my arm.
“Buddy, could you spare me a dime?”
(My hand was in my pocket when he started.)
“I’m weak — I haven’t eaten for two days.”
(I was already fingering the round silver coins in my pocket.)
He looked at me from a face eclipsed by emaciation
And partially darkened by inferiority.
Craters of acne, too.
The coin I gave him was a quarter. I am a full fool
When it comes to beggars. Especially young ones.
The afternoon moon had been up for hours —
It tried to be benign about the transaction.
I tried to return to my novel, and supposed him gone.
He stuck his hand out toward my novel. I stared
And realized he wanted to shake my hand.
“My name is Andy.”
“My name is Phillip.” I almost stuttered.
A pause. Time rolled between us.
“Have a good life, Phillip,” in a quarter-moon voice.
A pause. More than time rolled.
“The same to you.” I did stutter.
He walked away, and I said, “That’s some line.”
The moon was not wounded to the core,
But the light space around it shivered.

REVIEWS

Social Impact by Proxy

WILFRED M. HILLOCK

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PEOPLE/PROFITS: THE ETHICS OF INVESTMENT

Edited by Charles W. Powers

New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs 1972 214 pp

\$2.95

Both the questions and the answers about the "now" issue of investor responsibility are in the infancy of development. The basic question addressed here is: To what extent does the right to vote a proxy obligate the investor to concern himself with the social impact of corporate activity? This question is one that should concern *all* investors. But it has been of particular concern to churches, foundations, and educational institutions because of the nature of their institutional objectives. Buy/Sell decisions — as well as response to, or initiation of, proxy issues — call for a fine tuning of the investor's conscience that must go beyond surface issues.

Concern about moral perspectives related to the evaluation of securities prompted the Council on Religion and International Affairs (CRIA) to organize a three-day seminar to discover and develop ethical guidelines for concerned investors. A condensation of the discussion and the three papers presented at the seminar are the text of *People/Profits*. A cross section of representatives from corporations, organized labor, churches, universities, foundations, and the financial community met to discuss the legitimacy of the stock portfolio as a means of affecting the forces that shape the quality of life.

The spectrum of inquiry in such a discussion ranges from the concept of social injury to the concept of affirmative duty to support a positive impact on society. Do we refrain from direct injury to others? Is it enough to seek out the minimum that morality calls for, or does duty call for the investor to support a positive program of social betterment? The more complex questions arise for the investor when he begins consideration of promoting an affirmative program.

The portfolio manager of the eleemosynary enterprise is encouraged to take a minimum position with regard to the production of dangerous products, pollution of the environment, and the practice of discrimination. His dilemma in considering these items is to decide to what extent the maximization of return on the portfolio takes precedence over his concern for the quality of life. If there is to be progress in social

issues, the evaluation of portfolio management must reach beyond financial data. One would hope to look forward to a social audit of the manager's stewardship in the future.

Is it possible to develop criteria for the selection of investments that include social considerations? Or must the investor rely on intuitive integrity? Some of the discussion participants suggest that there is no real dichotomy, but that in the latter case there are criteria even when they have not been articulated. In the main, efforts to develop criteria have been overlooked by those who encourage institutional investors to exercise their prerogatives in the corporations whose stock they own. Charles Powers recognizes this problem in his presentation, "Case Studies in Ethical Criteria" (chapter 4). He avoids the tendency to engage in a theoretical discussion, but settles for the development of what he calls ethical categories and their application to various types of institutions.

Influence on the improvement of corporate conduct is an especially complicated issue for the educational institution. A university is hard pressed to defend its position of academic neutrality, and at the same time to fulfill its obligation to select an investment portfolio that positively supports social betterment. To promote social activism over the objections of corporate officials when one is a potential recipient of the financial support of the corporation calls for a high degree of courage. The current financial crisis in higher education may cause managers of university investment portfolios to be especially reluctant to become involved in ethical investment questions.

How does one answer the challenges of social responsibility when dealing with the multinational corporation that must survive in the host countries? Do investors in South Africa support the apartheid policy by their presence? Is it possible to survive in a multitude of cultural environments and accept responsibility for social concerns? The case of a large oil company in Angola serves as a basis for discussion of the multinational problem. A major protestant organization charged the company with racism and the support of colonialism in Portuguese Africa. The gap between the corporate manager and the socially conscious investor is most evident in this case discussion. Management found the confrontation a hair-raising experience; investors appeared to agree that the company should have exercised more foresight in the selection of its host country.

It may have been implied, but not directly addressed, that a cause of the failure of business to respond to social challenge is that business activity has too often been viewed as an independent subsystem rather than as a part of the total social system. Adolph Berle points out that almost half of the world's manufacturing potential is in the control of five hundred United States corporations.¹ To leave this economic power entirely in the hands of a few managers who all too often have seen their basic goal in terms of profits is a risk that should not be taken. As the beneficiaries of corporate profits, investors will protect their existing degree of control by concerning themselves with individual rights, consumer welfare, the environment, and the quality of life.

Should there be more participation on the part of stockholders? Three choices (in order of preference) are offered the concerned investor: face-to-face talk with corporate executives, the proxy mechanism, and the sale of the stock in those cases where he cannot influence change.

People/Profits is a beginning in the development of both questions and answers as to the social impact of proxy holders. The questions are easier to discover than the answers. The discussion provides a number of alternative answers to each question proposed, but with very little consensus. Beginnings must be made on complex issues.

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Wake Up!

JAN PAULSEN

MISSION: POSSIBLE

By Gottfried Oosterwal

Nashville: Southern Publishing Association 1972 122 pp \$2.95

For a people who spend much on *mission* and who are at times almost in a frenzy to keep personnel rotating, it must surely surprise observers that so little on the subject of mission has been and is being written by the Adventist church. Whatever strategies in mission the church may have, they originate with boards of trustees — albeit “guided by the Spirit,” but as interpreted by trustees. Objective external assessment of the strategies or examination of mission objectives has not been encouraged. New suggestions may be considered judgments against patterns of the past. To query may raise the question of disloyalty. Yet, if one wishes to be open to the leading of the Holy Spirit, does not the Spirit most effectively break through when the church is provoked out of its tranquility?

Gottfried Oosterwal’s *Mission: Possible* may well be a breath of fresh air — stimulating the church to awaken and look anew at itself, its priorities, and its motives.

According to the author, “each chapter was written specifically for Seventh-day Adventists” (p. 13). Well, *almost all* were. It may have slipped his mind temporarily that chapter four was written specifically “for a discussion group of Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians” (p. 12). The book is primarily a collection of articles and lectures, most of them prepared for different audiences, except for chapters one and seven, which were written specifically for this book. These two chapters are similar in mood (in contrast to the varying accents of the other chapters, because of the differences of the groups addressed) and are complementary in the concerns they express.

Oosterwal's main message is succinctly brought out in these two chapters: (a) the church exists *only* to participate in mission; (b) each generation must discover *its* "present truth" to be reinterpreted by each culture; (c) biblically circumscribed, to be sure, the generation's present truth must be reinterpreted nevertheless — in order to be meaningful to the non-Christians that compose the staggering 80 percent of the world's population unprepared to accept relics of a past and very foreign tradition; (d) mission is *the work of the Holy Spirit*, a theme recurring throughout the book (pp. 18-19, 62); (e) self-centeredness is an ever-present danger that institutionalized Christianity faces; (f) the role of the laity, clearly one of the main concerns of the book, is enormous (p. 103).

A reviewer is prone to pick at numerous details. But, to be fair to the author, the critic should remind himself that there are indeed legitimate reasons for writing other than a learned monograph that speaks only to a few colleagues. In the main, Oosterwal is writing to the Seventh-day Adventist church general reader who makes his weekly "sacrifice" to mission — after which, with a sense of having done his part, he withdraws into his protective shell, to emerge again when the next "payment" is due (a practice not unlike a religious "protection racket" in which one buys oneself peace of mind and a sense of "supporting mission").

Oosterwal's aim is to push the church out of such complacency into the unlimited openness lying ahead. In this aim he succeeds well. But in so doing, he simplifies; possibly even overstates; short-cuts to make his points; omits details that a systematic treatment of the subject would demand. Consequently, he may fall short of taking the general reader into areas of discussion for which the reader is not prepared, and this avoidance may becloud that which is primary and urgent.

Mission: Possible is not (and undoubtedly is not intended to be) a systematic treatment of mission theology or mission strategy. Rather, the book is filled with questions that members of a half-asleep Christian community must ask themselves in order for them not to become castaways in God's scheme. In raising the questions and stirring the readers, Oosterwal reveals a singlemindedness which, although understandable in view of his overriding objectives, leaves one a bit unsettled and at times puzzled.

For example, in his openness toward other Christian communions in their witnessing task of lifting Christ up before men, Oosterwal seems to say that they are God's agencies to evangelize the world in this generation (pp. 32, 34, 39) and that the Seventh-day Adventist church should therefore cooperate with them in this "world-wide evangelistic thrust" (p. 39). Some of Oosterwal's readers may well hold that view with him. But is the Seventh-day Adventist church really prepared to accept it (regardless of whatever "public relations" statements some given occasion may call forth)?

Could it be that the overwhelming task ahead necessitates an adapted — although in saner moments not readily believable — mode of thinking? Do not church leaders spasmodically make such statements but find themselves afterward, on reflection, muttering and sputtering a number of "buts" which amount to backtracking so as to continue saying what indeed Oosterwal himself says, that "Seventh-day Adventists can never leave to others what God has entrusted to them" (p. 39). Or, "Seventh-day Adventists believe that their unique part in God's mission" is to prepare a people to

meet him (p. 34). Interpreted in practical terms, what this means to those to whom the church witnesses — and according to Oosterwal 90 percent of Adventist converts come from a Christian background (p. 33) — is thus: “What matters is not what other Christians have told you before, but what I tell you now. You have got to leave that other church and join us in order to be saved. But before you can do that, you have to adhere to the following list of things.” Only rarely does the more relaxed proselytism (if-you-feel-you-more-meaningfully-can-worship-God-with-us-then-come-and-join-us) enter into the relationship of Adventists with other Christians.

When Oosterwal discusses the expansion of the church, he wishes to say simply and clearly that Adventists have spread far the past few years — “working in 84 percent of all countries” (p. 43) — and that the most rapid growth is in non-Western areas. His use of statistics to establish this is not particularly helpful. He makes frequent use of percentages, but a percentage growth chart not attached to specific figures is almost meaningless (as in Figure 2, p. 46). And he demonstrates how one can juggle percentages (undoubtedly unwittingly; hence it would be unfair to say “manipulates”) to support one’s thesis, leaving the reader with an impression out of harmony with the facts.

Another “percentage” statement made is that the Adventist church “is now the most widespread single Protestant denomination, working in 84 percent of all countries” (p. 43), with the subsequent conclusion: “Such a rapid and far-reaching expansion has not had its equal since the early Christian church conquered the world. . . . Now that the gospel has reached the remotest ends of the world, we have truly entered the last days of this world’s history” (p. 43).

How helpful is it to observe that Adventists are “working in 84 percent of all countries”? So one person has been able to scramble into Dahomey and plant the church’s “flag” there, or a book evangelist is working in some sections of the capital where the educated people live. What does this say about the extent of Adventist work in that country? Naked or inadequately interpreted statistics often mislead and give the church that false sense of satisfaction and security which in other sections of his book Oosterwal so admirably combats. Geography (i.e., having “entered a country”), of all criteria, is the poorest means of assessing missionary expansion. Distribution of peoples and the sheer matter of communication (i.e., how much have they understood of what I am saying?) must be additional criteria in determining whether in fact one has “reached the remotest ends of the world.”

The percentage figures given on page 107 are also bewildering. When the Christian movement is a lay movement, expansion is rapid and spontaneous, according to Oosterwal. One may have no problem in accepting this as a principal thesis. However, when the author assesses the growth of the Seventh-day Adventist church in the light of this thesis, the image is distorted. (Again, percentages are used without attachment to specific figures.) Oosterwal maintains that from 1870 to 1900 the church was essentially a lay movement and that therefore expansion was rapid and spontaneous (432.54 percent increase in membership). Between 1900 and 1930 “the biblical concept of the laity became blurred” and a “sharp drop . . . in the missionary expansion of the church” resulted. Membership increased during that period “only 184.83 percent.” The next three decades (1930 to 1960) saw the church drop to what he hopes

is its "lowest point," with an increase in membership of 167.25 percent. The actual figures, however, are: 5,440 members in 1870; 75,767 in 1900 (432.54 percent increase?); 314,253 in 1930 (184.83 percent increase?); and 1,245,125 in 1960 (167.25 percent increase?).

Entirely apart from the fact that I am at a loss to explain how Oosterwal arrived at his percentage figures, a membership growth pattern established on percentages, going from a very small figure to the over two million today, has an extremely limited value. It took the Seventh-day Adventist church almost *a century* to reach half-a-million members; and yet the increase in membership during *one decade* (1950 to 1960) when, according to Oosterwal, the "lowest point" was reached was almost a half million. I would have thought that a fairly healthy growth in membership, but the naked figures for this decade do not tell all. By 1950 the church had regained balance after World War II and was ready for a delayed missionary thrust. As one looks at the three three-decade cycles (1870-1900, 1900-1930, and 1930-1960) with the author's "good," "not-so-good," and "bad" growth descriptions, one cannot quite escape the feeling that Oosterwal's whole laity vs. "set-apart" ministry thesis, as applied to the Seventh-day Adventist church, is a bit strained. Did such epochs, presupposing change in the consciousness of the people, ever exist in the Adventist church?

I find myself asking the same question with regard to what Oosterwal describes as the epoch of "church-centrism," which he sees as having now been replaced by a new epoch of "Christ-centrism" (p. 34). The pattern of expansion, followed by a period of consolidation and preparation for further expansion, is not, as one looks at the missionary movements of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, an unusual expansion rhythm. It may even be a necessary rhythm for the strength of a movement — a strength which is not measurable solely by figures of numerical expansion.

In a stimulating and provocative way, Oosterwal touches on areas relevant to missiology which churches and historical missionary societies have found disturbing and uncomfortable to consider: the pilgrim-nature of the church (p. 109); a nonecclesio-centric (or anti-?) approach to mission (pp. 20, 70); missionary existence as pro-existence ("the church . . . exists for the world") (p. 101); a declericalized missionary ministry (pp. 108-116); the church as a sign of *shalom* (pp. 70-71); and the work of mission as "the work of the Holy Spirit" (p. 18). The church must be alert in order to see the progress of the work of the Spirit and be ready to harvest when the Spirit gives the signal (pp. 62, 89). Does the Spirit work independently of the church members who are being asked to "keep their eyes open for the people whom the Spirit has prepared to join them" (p. 62)?

In his concerns, and in the way he accents them, Oosterwal repeatedly comes close to the thinking of his fellow Dutch missiologist and (I believe) former teacher, J. C. Hoekendijk. How far along Hoekendijk's path is Oosterwal prepared to walk? This we shall know only when he acquaints us with a further developed ecclesiology and a more detailed theology of the apostolate.

On the whole, *Mission: Possible* is not only a very readable book. It is also a much-needed elbow jab in the side of a church community for which the danger of losing its urgency is real.

American Religious Art

J. PAUL STAUFFER

THE HAND AND THE SPIRIT: RELIGIOUS ART IN AMERICA,
1700-1900
By Jane Dillenger and Joshua C. Taylor
University Art Museum, Berkeley, California 1972 192 pp \$10.00

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The Hand and the Spirit is the title of an exhibition of American religious painting and sculpture that was first shown last summer at the University Art Museum in Berkeley, subsequently in Washington at the Smithsonian's National Collection of Fine Arts, then at the Dallas Museum of Fine Arts, and finally at the Indianapolis Museum of Art, where it closed April 15, 1973.

Jane Dillenger, associate professor of theology and the arts at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, conceived the idea of the exhibition as an outgrowth of some work she was doing on Thomas Eakins. She succeeded in arousing enthusiasm and generating support for her idea from museum and foundation people, and after some three years of intense involvement, she brought to reality the exhibition of 123 works and an impressively annotated, generously illustrated, and handsomely printed catalogue.

Joshua Taylor, the director of the National Collection of Fine Arts, became the most actively involved consultant and coworker in the endeavor, helping to select from some 700 works, mostly from underground storage areas of the country's major museums, and contributing an erudite introductory essay that reviews attitudes and beliefs about religion and art that lay behind the production and the reception of art in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America.

If you have visited more than casually the collections of American painting in the major galleries of this country, or if you have read typical histories of American art, you have probably had the impression that American painters did not very often or very seriously deal with religious subjects and that few of them appear to have painted from strong religious impulses. This book and the exhibition it catalogues will then surprise you, as the discovery on which the exhibition rests surprised Mrs. Dillenger, for the works she uncovered represent a far richer body of religious art than is revealed in the permanent exhibits of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century holdings in our major galleries.

I first learned of the exhibition when I was invited to review the catalogue. The catalogue itself offered a refreshing view of a body of work very little known and promising a revised estimate of interrelationships between the arts and religious attitudes and impulses in the United States. But inasmuch as the catalogue was intended primarily as a guide for viewers of the exhibition rather than as an independent book, it raised a significant question: How adequately did the photographs and text reveal the range and quality of the works of the exhibition to someone unable to see the

show itself? The 62 photographs showed just half the total exhibition, and only 10 of the photographs were in color. I concluded that I would have to see the exhibition in order to appraise the catalogue. By the time I learned of *The Hand and the Spirit*, however, the exhibition had already closed in Berkeley, where I could most easily have seen it. Fortunately, an appointment in Chicago in March made it possible for me conveniently to stop in Indianapolis, where it was still on display in the handsome new Museum of Art. Not surprisingly, the impact of the works themselves was considerably greater than the illustrations in the catalogue had promised.

The Hand and the Spirit displays a varied and arresting sampling, both from "naïve" artists and from academically trained ones. The works are arranged in six groups on the basis of similarity of intention on the artist's part but also in a roughly chronological fashion. Group I, with only 7 paintings, is made up of eighteenth-century representations of biblical subjects, with little apparent relationship to traditional academic painting, though several of them appear to have been based on illustrations from Bibles. Three are by unknown painters, 4 by John Valentine Haidt, who as official church painter for the Moravian community in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, emphasized the blood and the anguish of Jesus in the crucifixion.

Group II includes such major artists as John Singleton Copley, Benjamin West, Washington Allston, Rembrandt Peale, Horatio Greenough, and several others in the principal academic tradition in the period up to approximately 1860. These paintings are mostly illustrations of biblical events, usually with a clear debt to European religious painting, but not trite nor merely imitative. Altogether it is an interesting and pleasant section, but without many surprises. The 8 works by West, though most of them are small, seem to me the most significant part of the group.

In Group III, the largest section, Mrs. Dillenger places "works that closely follow the dictates of religious teaching, largely sectarian." All but two of the artists represented in this fascinating section are naïve artists, innocent of the training or the technical concerns of the academic painters. Of them all, Edward Hicks and Erastus Salisbury Field were for me the most compelling. Hicks, a Quaker leader, is thought to have done some eighty versions of his favorite subject, *Peaceable Kingdom*, and more than forty of these still survive. The note to one of them includes Hicks's paraphrase of the passage in Isaiah that inspired the paintings:

The wolf shall with the lambkin dwell in Peace,
His grim carnivorous thirst for blood shall cease,
The beauteous leopard with his restless eye,
Shall by the kid in perfect stillness lie;
The calf, the fatling, and young lion wild,
Shall all be led by one sweet little child.

Besides the animals and children, Hicks ordinarily shows in the painting somewhere William Penn making a treaty with the Indians, a group which he has adapted from Benjamin West's painting of that subject. Hicks is represented by three versions of *Peaceable Kingdom*, each quite different from the others, and, an equally compatible subject for one who enjoyed painting animals, *Noah's Ark*. Field is represented by a quaintly idyllic *Garden of Eden* and 4 highly original interpretations of the plagues on

the Egyptians and the departure of the Israelites. While his enormous masterpiece, *Historical Monument of the American Republic*, is not included in the exhibition, an engraving of it, with explanatory notes, is. It is a fantastic construction, full of patriotic and religious symbols, painted in commemoration of the centenary of American Independence.

Group IV includes work from two exotic streams of naive art. One of these is that of the *santeros* of New Mexico, makers of panel paintings and carved and painted wooden figures of saints, blending native Mexican art with Spanish traditional images. The other is made up of examples of "fraktur" from the Pennsylvania German pietistic sects. Among these latter examples, which owe something of their importance to illuminated manuscripts, is a passage from the thirty-fourth Psalm, transcribed with ornate capitals and decorative borders of plant and animal forms, painstakingly detailed, and suggesting central European peasant decorative styles. Another, from a Pennsylvania Shaker community, is *A Present from Mother Ann to Mary H* — a meticulously drawn and decorated sheet with admonitions to holy living, interspersed with such objects as the tree of life, a beehive, a watch and chain, and a lamp, all with some special symbolic value to the believers.

Group V was one of the two sections I found most interesting. It includes an unusual range of independent artists of the latter half of the nineteenth century. Some of them — like George Inness, Albert Pinkham Ryder, and Thomas Eakins — are more generally known than William Rimmer, Edwin Romanzo Elmer, Robert Loftin Newman, or Henry Ossawa Tanner. A strangely moving work in this group is Elmer's *Mourning Picture*, occasioned by the death of the artist's nine-year-old daughter. Several paintings by Tanner offer a persuasive vision of biblical events that seems personal and sincere and compatible with a reasonably modern style. Newman's *Madonna and Child in a Landscape* and *The Good Samaritan*, depending as they do on suggestion rather than explicit statement, have a good deal of restrained power.

I found Group VI the least satisfying. In these late nineteenth-century works, aesthetic sensitivity seems itself to be regarded as a legitimate religious impulse. The result in such painters as John LaFarge, Elihu Vedder, and Abbott H. Thayer comes through to me as a soft and often sentimental idealism, reminiscent of Rossetti, or Burne-Jones, or, sometimes, Puvis de Chavannes. If Vedder's *Lazarus Rising from the Tomb* and Thayer's *Virgin Enthroned* were untitled, they would contain no clue to their religious content.

I was deeply pleased, at times exhilarated, by the exhibition. Yet, when I had time to sort out my feelings and my critical responses to the body of work so enthusiastically assembled and painstakingly prepared for exhibition, I felt somehow disappointed.

Though it is clear that there exists a considerably greater body of art expressing a religious impulse than anybody seemed to realize, and that much of it is the serious work of major figures in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American art, it does not communicate, to me at least, nearly so strong a sense of a religious spirit in this country as I think I find in the social histories of the period. If, as is inevitable, one compares these works with the glory and the grandeur of the great tradition of Western European religious art of the fourteenth through the seventeenth centuries, I believe he will doubt that by the eighteenth century the visual arts were a medium really capa-

ble of embodying powerful religious experience. American religious architecture of the eighteenth and twentieth centuries appears to me to offer a much more useful and reliable guide to the strength and creativeness of the religious impulse than do painting and sculpture. In *The Hand and the Spirit*, the work of the naive artists in their unselfconscious piety, reverent but not overawed by the biblical events they attempted to record, most clearly communicates a living religious inspiration behind their work. One senses that, except for these primitive workers, artists found it a matter of uneasiness, sometimes of embarrassment, to attempt to represent a miraculous event. Tanner, who succeeds better than most others in making biblical events seem understandable in modern terms, illustrates this well in his *Study for the Annunciation*, where attention is strongly concentrated on the humanity of Mary, while the angel has become simply a glow of light.

Taylor notes in his essay that the Protestantism in American culture is not enough to account for the lack of obvious religiosity in art, but it seems to me to have been one of the strong factors that made it difficult to express in the visual arts the real power of a religious spirit in America.

Having expressed that disappointment, however, I must say that *The Hand and the Spirit* is of significant interest and has far more value than the usual exhibition catalogue. The notes and the biographical sketches assemble a great deal of useful information, including excellent bibliographical matter. The scholarly interpretative and introductory matter by Mrs. Dillenberger and Mr. Taylor contribute valuable insights and considerably amplify our understanding of the place of religious art in our cultural history.

Anti-Conversion

DONALD E. HALL

THE FLIGHT OF PETER FROMM

By Martin Gardner

Los Altos, California: William Kaufmann, Inc. 1973 272 pp \$8.95

Avid readers of *Scientific American* will recognize the name of Martin Gardner, writer of the regular monthly Mathematical Games column. Others may recall him for *Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science*, in which one chapter stars George McCready Price. One of my main reasons for buying *The Flight of Peter Fromm* was the feeling that its author was an old friend. This first novel shows the same inventiveness, pithy good humor, and delightful facility with words that characterize his other writing.

Peter Fromm, with a rural Oklahoma pentecostal background (not unlike that depicted in the recent film *Marjoe*), somehow found himself at the University of Chicago Divinity School in the late 1930s. By way of explaining the new ideas that were confronting Peter, the author provides brief informal summaries of the salient points of various modern theologies — Barth's, Tillich's, Bultmann's, and others. Not being a theologian, I cannot vouch for their accuracy, but they are certainly more easily comprehensible than anything else I have read in that field.

With the passage of a few years, Peter's religious experience was radically changed, and he suffered a spectacular nervous breakdown. Which should be blamed: the unrealistic biblical literalism and psychic manipulation of pentecostalism, or the destructive, scoffing liberalism of the university? It is a strength of the book that Gardner treats both sides quite sympathetically, concludes impartially, and forces the reader to judge for himself. I suspect many autobiographical elements in the story. This dilemma, I think, must have been close to Gardner's heart for many years.

Perhaps few Adventists have experienced, or ever will experience, the trip from this far right to this far left. Nevertheless, many should find it very relevant, for only by regrettable ignorance or closedmindedness, can any of us avoid facing this same dilemma in some degree. I recommend the book even more for its painful relevance to the Adventist experience than for its being highly readable and enjoyable.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

GODFREY T. ANDERSON (Liberal Arts — the Last Hurrah?) has worked diligently since 1967 at his early loves (teaching, researching, writing). He has published two books: *Outrider of the Apocalypse: Life and Times of Joseph Bates* (Pacific Press 1972) and *Walk God's Battlefield* (Southern Publishing Company 1971). Among his published articles are "The Captain Lays Down the Law" (June 1971 *New England Quarterly* and Summer 1972 *SPECTRUM*) and "Edward Bancroft, M.D., F.R.S., Aberrant, 'Practitioner of Physick,'" the latter in collaboration with his son Dennis K. Anderson (October 1973 *Medical History*, Wellcome Institute of the History of Medicine, London). . . . During his presidency of Loma Linda University (1954-67) he was primary initiator in establishing, in cooperation with neighboring educational institutions, the World Affairs Council of Inland Southern California and served two terms as the first president. He has also had a key role in organizing and forwarding the Western Adventist Historical Association, the Studies in Adventist History group, and the National Association of Seventh-day Adventist Historians. He is university archivist for Loma Linda University libraries and is professor of history in the Graduate School. . . . Dr. Anderson, whose PH.D. degree was earned at the University of Chicago, became chairman of the history department at Atlantic Union College (Massachusetts) in 1939, served as academic dean there (1944-46), and was president of La Sierra College (1946-54).

DIRK K. KOOPMANS (Woodcut) has been a professional artist since his work was first exhibited in Buenos Aires in 1931. He lives in the picturesque old town of Balk in Friesland province in the Netherlands. His work has appeared in a number of issues of SPECTRUM since the early issues of 1969.

RICHARD RICE (The Knowledge of Faith) is in the last stage of completing requirements for the PH.D. degree at the University of Chicago Divinity School and will join the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences (department of religion) at Loma Linda University.

JAMES J. LONDIS (Response to Rice), whose PH.D. degree was earned at Boston University, is associate professor of religion at Atlantic Union College.

BRENDA J. BUTKA (Nativity) has had a poem and an article published in earlier issues of SPECTRUM (Winter, Autumn 1971). She has a master's degree in linguistics from the University of Michigan and now is a preprofessional student in Georgia.

THOMAS DYBDAHL (Stewardship and Securities), director of inner city programs in the Greater Boston area, has master's degrees from Andrews and Columbia Universities.

JERE W. CHAPMAN (Stewardship and Securities), a doctoral candidate in political psychology at Syracuse University, previously earned a master's from University of the Pacific.

ROBERT E. OSBORN (Investment Practices of the General Conference), a 1948 graduate of Loma Linda University (College of Arts and Sciences), has held business positions for the Seventh-day Adventist church since 1941 (including in the Middle East and South America). After a period as assistant manager of the foundation division of Loma Linda University, he became associate treasurer and manager of investments for the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists.

PHILLIP WHIDDEN (The Afternoon Half-Moon), an alumnus of Atlantic Union College and currently a graduate student at Andrews University, has had his work published in newspapers and journals.

WILFRED M. HILLOCK (Social Impact by Proxy), acting chairman of the business and economics department and professor of accounting and management at Loma Linda University, has a master's degree from Indiana University. His articles have appeared in Summer 1969, Winter 1971, and Summer 1972 issues of SPECTRUM.

JAN PAULSEN (Wake Up!), who is head of the department of theology at Newbold College (England), earned a doctor of theology degree from Tübingen University (Germany).

J. PAUL STAUFFER (American Religious Art), dean of the Graduate School and professor of English at Loma Linda University, is active in advancing the presentation of guest lecturers and aspects of art as part of the university environment — which he does from a background of considerable acquaintance with European and American arts and ideas. Dr. Stauffer (PH.D. Harvard University) is a contributing editor of SPECTRUM.

DONALD E. HALL (Anti-Conversion), a consulting editor for SPECTRUM, has previously contributed two book reviews and three articles to the journal (Winter, Summer, Autumn 1969; Summer, Autumn 1971). He has a PH.D. from Stanford University, has taught physics at Walla Walla College (Washington), and is now assistant professor of physics at University of Colorado (Denver).

