

the Palestinian presence in the political struggle. The left demanded reforms as a pre-condition for treating the "security issue," and the right, in keeping with tradition, required order first, then concessions. In effect, a new National Pact was needed to unify the country over new issues, and the leftists for the first time had a military force as disciplined and organized as their Maronite rivals on the right. Instead of compromise, Franjiyya attempted to bypass the traditional Moslem leadership and crack down on the guerrillas in 1973. He failed, and the inability of the police and army to halt fighting between the rightist, Maronite Kata'ib (Phalange) Party, and the Palestinians became evident over the next year. Armed and supplied from abroad, liberally financed by foreign

nations and groups, each side prepared for a conflict that was increasingly probable.

When it did come, and heavy fighting broke out, all Lebanon, not just the south, became the arena for a war among gladiators who had begun fighting over local issues but increasingly represented regional and international power struggles. Preserving the unity and integrity of Lebanon required the introduction of a peace-keeping force which would have conflicted with another currently popular ideal, that of not intervening militarily. Countries outside the Middle East made nonintervention their highest priority and so could do little but await the end of a conflict whose sides had been largely determined by religion, but whose goals were now almost completely political.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Peter Gubser, reviewing "Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon: al-Kata'ib, 1936-70." *Middle East Journal*, vol. 29 no. 2 (Spring 1975), pp. 220-221.

2. See Michael Hudson's aptly entitled *The Precarious Republic*, probably the best book on Lebanese politics.

3. A reporter for the British press was amazed to find refugee urchins hawking gold cigarette lighters for 1.50

Lebanese lira each. The youngsters had looted them and were selling them for far below their value.

4. The postal service, while moderately successful in handling incoming mail for Beirut's main post office boxes, completely failed internally. A letter would take a week to ten days from posting in Beirut to delivery in Tripoli, 60 miles away.

III. A Sociologist Looks At His Homeland

by Anees Haddad

The Seventh-day Adventist Church has made Lebanon the nerve-center of its work in the Middle East and East Africa. In and around Beirut are the headquarters of the Afro-Mideast Division, the Middle Eastern Union, the East Mediterranean Field, Middle East Press, the Voice of Prophecy Correspondence Schools, and very significantly, Middle East College, a senior college affiliated with Loma Linda University.

Most of the denominational workers from Istanbul in the north to Khartoum in the south, and from Teheran in the east to Alexandria in

the west, have received their full or partial education at Middle East College. Situated about seven miles from the heart of Beirut, it sits astride a hill occupying about 70 acres, with a majestic view of the city and the Mediterranean Sea beyond.

Just to the northwest of the college sits Middle East Press, a multilanguage literature powerhouse for millions of people. Less than a block downhill is the headquarters of the Middle East Union Field, which has jurisdiction now over what used to be the Middle East Division. One half-mile downrange towards the capital is the headquarters of the Afro-Mideast Division of Seventh-day Adventists, a fence-encircled compound from which the affairs of 165,000 Seventh-day Adventists are managed.

Anees Haddad, a sociologist, is director of the Division of Behavioral Sciences at Loma Linda University. He was formerly youth director of the Middle East Division.

When the hill where these institutions are located was inhabited by more coyotes than men, it was called Sabtiyeh (meaning Sab-batarians), after the majority of inhabitants. But as the area flourished and \$2,000-a-month apartments were built, the elite who moved into Sabtiyeh soon outnumbered the Adventists. Sab-batarianism smacks too much of Jewishness—not exactly an advantage in the Arab world. Consequently, the non-Adventist population successfully petitioned the authorities to change the name from Sabtiyeh to Firdous, meaning Paradise. But the old name stuck, so that today when a puzzled taxidriver asks a passenger, “Where on earth is Paradise?” the ready answer is, “In Sabtiyeh, of course.”

The Adventists of Lebanon have a few concentrations of members. Paradise is the biggest and the most influential. During any troubles between Christians and Moslems, or between Lebanese and Palestinians, Paradise is potentially in trouble. Directly to the north of the hill is a large settlement of Shi'a Moslems. Directly to the southwest, less than one mile away from the hill, is the site of Tal al-Za'tar, one of the largest Palestinian camps in Lebanon. It was besieged for two months and finally captured by the Christian Phalangists during the summer of 1976.

Another Adventist stronghold is in north Lebanon, on the way to the remaining forests of cedars. This center is in the midst of a fertile plain with mostly Christian villages. From this general area the immediate past president of Lebanon, Sulaiman Franjeh, comes; despite his strong rightist position, many of these villages have leftist Christian elements. South of Beirut the Adventists have another concentration of members in a village whose inhabitants are mainly Moslem Druze.

In Beirut itself there are three major Adventist centers. One is near the Christian Armenian community, but close enough to the Moslem Kurds of the Karantine area that it was threatened and eventually occupied at one time by Kurds fleeing the fighting and seeking refuge. Another center is by the Damascus-Beirut main highway, within a block of the Beirut National Museum at the foot of Christian 'Ashrafieh, a hill that dominates Beirut. The Voice of Prophecy headquarters is there, along with a large evangelistic center and the offices of the East Medi-

teranean Field. The third location is in western Beirut between the Christian and Moslem areas. It was in this area that two of the workers of the church had their homes attacked and looted. Fortunately, no one was killed or hurt in the terrifying incidents.

Ninety-nine percent of the Adventists in Lebanon come from solid Christian backgrounds, as do other Middle Eastern Adventists. As far as their political loyalties are concerned, the missionaries have done a good job of divesting them of any political loyalties. It is very clear, however, that they do consider themselves a part of the Christian communities, and Adventists socially identify themselves with Christians. A very, very tiny percentage of Adventists in Lebanon (mostly the northern Lebanese) may have some political life. It is my understanding, however, that no Adventists were actually involved in the recent battles for Lebanon.

The Adventists in the Middle East universally espouse the basic denominational stand that the creation of the modern state of Israel is in no way to be interpreted as a fulfillment of prophecy. They are in sympathy with the Palestinians, and in general they would say that the basic problem in Lebanon is not between the Christians and the Moslems, but between the edgy Lebanese Christians supported by some moderate Moslems on the one hand, and the Palestinians, supported by militant leftiest Moslems, on the other.

But it must be made absolutely clear that any opposition to the Palestine Liberation Organization or the Palestine Liberation Army is not opposition to these groups' cause. The Christians of Lebanon have been among the most indignant at the injustices done to their southern neighbors and fellow-Arabs—the Palestinianians. Some of the most articulate defenders of the Palestinian cause on both the national and international levels are Christian Lebanese. Many of these are not even politicians, but rather men and women of letters who defend the Palestinian cause because of their strong conviction that the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people have been violated.

In seminars in Middle Eastern Studies (a program I coordinate at Loma Linda University), in conversations with Arabs from all kinds of backgrounds, in direct contact with the situation in Lebanon during past summers, especially that of 1975, I have come to believe that there are some theories of the cause of the crisis that many hold almost hysterically. Here they are:

1) *The Outside Intervention Theory*. I should say "Outside Intervention Theories" and not just one "theory." Whether the intervention is seen as coming from Syria, the Palestinians, Iraq, Libya, Israel, or the Central Intelligence Agency, most Lebanese believe that their tragedy is caused by direct outside intervention. Lebanon, with its totally open society, has been a haven for any kind of activity desired. Some feel that Syria, Iraq and Libya are intervening to bring

"A tiny percentage of Adventists in Lebanon (mostly the northern Lebanese) may have some political life. It is my understanding, however, that no Adventists were actually involved in the recent battles for Lebanon."

the Christians to heel once and for all. Some believe that Israel and the Central Intelligence Agency lit the fire in order to remove the Palestinian Commando pressure from Israel and to weaken the Arabs through internal fighting. Even if this theory is true, the results have backfired. If Lebanon becomes a "confrontation state" like Syria, Jordan and Egypt, Israel for the first time in 28 years would have gained a new, active enemy.

There seems to be no question that the Palestinians and the Lebanese Leftists have received a lot of support from Arab states. And if one reviews the freedom with which Israeli agents have been operating in Lebanon for years, and if one reviews the recent revelations about CIA activities around the world, then one does not find it so far fetched to believe that indeed these two parties may have been contributing their share in fueling the fire.

2) *The Global Conspiracy Theory*. There are some who even believe that there is an international, big- and small-power conspiracy to settle the problem of the Palestinians and their national rights at the expense of the Christians of Lebanon. This theory sees a plan that would give half of Lebanon to the Palestinians as a "National Home" with the same shamelessness that gave Palestine to International Zionists as a "National Home." And why not? Let the world's future generations come to terms with what might become the Lebanese Commandoes and the Lebanese Liberation Army seeking to regain their national and natural homeland—just as the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestine Liberation Army are trying to do now and have succeeded internationally in world-opinion support. According to this theory, it would take 30 years before the Lebanese Liberation Organization and the Lebanese Liberation Army could really disturb the world with the same ferocity the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestine Liberation Army have. Until then, Israel and all its other neighbors would have had a generation of peace. And let the next generation pay the "international debts" accrued by this generation. There is a precedent for such a policy.

3) *The Christians-Are-at-Fault Theory*. This is advanced by the political left and by some Christians in and out of Lebanon. For years, it was very apparent that the Christians were getting fewer in number, mostly because of emigration and smaller families, and the Moslems were getting more numerous for exactly the opposite reasons. Since 1932, the Christians, in their transition from a majority to a minority, have refused to allow a national census, have elected to believe that Lebanon is a "Christian Nation" no matter who says what, and have believed that France in particular and other Christian nations in general would always keep Lebanon "Christian." Perpetrating this myth of Lebanon as a Christian nation is responsible for the fighting. Lebanese Mohammedans have felt enough outrage from fellow-Moslems in the Arab world to precipitate the current major explosion in Lebanon. The presence of mostly Moslem Palestinian refugees (some 400,000) added impetus and opportunism to the Lebanese Moslem cause.

4) *The Palestinians-Are-to-Blame Theory*. This is very strongly believed by the Christians fight-

ing in Lebanon and by many of their supporters outside Lebanon. The Palestinians are guests in Lebanon, but by and by, the theory goes, they have almost totally forgotten that fact. Instead, they have rejected their role as guests in favor of their role as co-equal and even superior to the indigenous Lebanese. Lebanon, like any other Arab country, owes them not only the debt of hospitality while away from their homes in occupied Palestine, but also the greater debt of total aid in their quest to return. Both Jordan and Syria, for national security reasons, have kept the Palestinians very much under control. So has Egypt. But Lebanon, because of its pacific nature, small army, relatively free press and economy and general neutrality, was in some ways unwilling and in other ways unable, to control the Palestinians inside its borders. The result is a state within a state and friction unparalleled in recent Lebanese history. The dual role of guest and lord created the seeds that were to blossom into hatred and bloodshed. Both Lebanon's former president, Camille Chamoun, now leader of a Christian militia called the Tigers, and Pierre Gmayel, president of the Phalangist Party and leader of their militia, have declared on several occasions that the Lebanese Christians and the Lebanese Mohammedans have lived in peace for generations and will continue to do so if no outside influences come in to divide them. They believe that once the problem of the Palestinian refugees is settled, the problem of Lebanon will again assume manageable proportions.

5) *The Moslems-Are-to-Blame Theory*. This theory posits a situation in which the Lebanese Moslems took advantage of the presence of the Palestinian guests in Lebanon to press their demands for equality at least in government. The Christians believe that it is not true that they have the major power in the country. They point to the fact that in many departments of government the opposite is true, that the Moslem demands stem not from real grievances but from imagined ones. The Moslems in Lebanon are blamed for not being "true Lebanese." They are more Arab Arabs than Lebanese Arabs, it is said. And much as the Moslems believe that the Christian Lebanese are more pro-West than pro-Lebanon or pro-Arab, the Christians sincerely believe that the Moslems in Lebanon are at any time more pro-Arab than pro-Lebanon.

Thus, the Moslems are blamed for not fighting for their own country, Lebanon, taking advantage of the neighboring Moslem countries, taking advantage of the Palestinian presence, and using all this in their illegitimate fight against the "true" Lebanese. The argument makes the Christian Lebanese as ethnocentric as possible. "The only true Lebanese is the Christian Lebanese," sounds like a counter-reaction to the bigoted stand of some Moslems who claim that "the only true Arab is the Moslem Arab."

6) *The Political Ideology Theory*. In reading about the situation in Lebanon in newspapers and magazines, in hearing and seeing news and commentary on the air, there was a clear shift of emphasis from calling the conflict "Christians-against-Moslems" to "Almost-all-Christians-against-almost-all-Moslems." This came about because it became more and more apparent that there is a minority of Christians fighting on the side of the Moslems and a minority of Moslems fighting on the side of the Christians. This is where the rightist ideology is pitted against the leftist. The right in Lebanon sides with the West, and the left sides with the East. And given the current socialist drift throughout the Arab world, it is only natural for the political left in Lebanon to see every possible opportunity to conquer the political right.

7) *The Economic Ideology Theory*. In Lebanon, as in most of the world, it is the educated, the Protestant-ethic-oriented, that constitute for the most part the "haves." The "have-nots" are the uneducated "others." It so happens that the Left in Lebanon is composed of those who are less educated than the Right, composed of those who have larger families than the Right; and, in general, composed of those who have not had equal opportunity and access to the good life and the power structure. There was a lot of corruption in government. Bribery was a way of life. The rich were getting richer before the very eyes of the poor. Economic reform was needed at every level of government policy. The pressure was mounting incessantly. And when the explosion came, the destruction of the places and palaces of the rich, the looting at every turn, were manifestations of the "proletariat" getting back at the "bourgeoisie." Social justice could have gone a long way toward preventing civil war, according to this theory.

None of these theories can totally explain the Lebanese problem today. But probably each one of them has a kernel of truth. One needs to be eclectic, and stress a multicausality model rather than one that is monistic if he wants to describe accurately the cause of the Lebanese crisis.

Is there hope for Lebanon to continue as a country? Yes. The reason is as fundamental as the history and geography which produced the cultural diversity of Lebanon. Because of the combination of a pleasant Mediterranean climate and mountainous terrain (some peaks reaching 9,000 feet), for centuries Lebanon has attracted persecuted minorities fleeing from every area of the Middle East. The principal actors in the present drama all came that way: the Maronites, the Greek and Armenian Orthodox among the Christians; the Druze, Shiites, Ismailites, Nusayris among the Moslems. The Palestinians are only the most recent arrivals to a nation of refugees.

Lebanon's ancient and seemingly endless list of military conquerors further contributed to the diversity of the population and its traditions. A few miles north of Beirut, at the mouth of the Dog River, at least 19 different inscriptions are etched into the rock left by conquering armies stretching as far back as the Assyrian and Babylonian empires, continuing through Greece and Rome up to twentieth-century England and France. Even today many Lebanese are trilingual, combining Arabic, English and French phrases into a single sentence. Today, the return of troops from France, the country's last occupying power, is urged by one side or the other, depending on which side is losing the civil war.

The genius of Lebanon's prosperity since the establishment of the republic in 1946 has been its dizzyingly confusing pluralism. Religious divisions, so important in Lebanese life, have never been simple as Christian and Moslem. Moslems adjudicated all cases dealing with "personal status"—marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.—in different sectarian courts, with varying interpretations of Koranic Law. The Christian groups developed separate court systems, with the Catholics having their own courts, the Greek Orthodox theirs, and the Seventh-day Adventists theirs. All Protestant denominations in Lebanon formed a Supreme Council responsible for all their external/legal affairs *vis-a-vis* the govern-

ment. The Seventh-day Adventist denomination has been a full member of that council. For years, while I lived in Lebanon, I was the official representative of the Adventist denomination to the Supreme Council. As such, I found myself doing some odd things such as serving as a "judge" with "judges" from other evangelical churches, interpreting and applying the "law of personal status" to Protestant cases.

Political power has always been held through negotiating alliances among competing groups. It may be that the effect of both the protracted fighting and outside intervention will be to convince both the warring sides that despite the new reality of the Palestinians and now the Syrians, neither can impose a settlement on the other; perhaps the time-honored Lebanese custom of finding new combinations of groups from two apparently monolithic opponents is still the way to establish the basis for a new life in Lebanon.

The future, politically, is very murky, to say the least. But it is not necessary to give up on Lebanon as destroyed once and for all. There are some indications that after all the battles, all the bloodshed and tears, a changed but viable Lebanon will yet emerge. After their initial panic at leftist and Palestinian victories, the Christian rightists have convinced themselves that they can successfully draw on outside resources and internal will to defend their interests. But it is obvious to many smaller groups among the Christians that the Maronites will have to give up some of their cherished power and that they can no longer speak for a Christian Lebanon.

The struggle may also open Moslem eyes. They will win major concessions, but they will be aware of the futility of any attempt to Islamize Lebanon as, say Syria, Iran, or Egypt have been. Just as there are Christians cooperating with the predominantly Moslem leftists, some of the heretofore less powerful Moslem groups are already making signs of working with the predominantly Christian rightists. While various countries around the world dramatically illustrate how religion can fuel civil war, it may be that the sheer profusion of religious sects in Lebanon will still help to break up the solidarity of the armed camps presently dividing the country. It may be that with their wounds to tend to, the various factions in Lebanon will eventually come back to some sort of accommodation, and

the Cedar Tree will have weathered and flourished through yet another of its thousands of years of storms.

As for Adventism, it is not wise to assume that in a new Lebanon the foreign missionary will be able to remain indefinitely. Such a faulty assumption will delay the speedy preparation of national leadership as well as the actual turning over to local Adventists—Arab and African—of *all* the administrative functions of all Adventist institutions. With the threat of possible loss of accustomed liberties and freedom in the new emerging Lebanon, a corollary threat will emerge: the loss of institutions that are perceived to be foreign. Schools, hospitals and publishing houses have not fared well, in the surrounding countries when these institutions were seen as foreign in aims and administration. Therefore, it can be expected that the leaders of

“foreign missions” should multiply their efforts to convert these institutions from foreign to national at the earliest possible time. These institutions will have a foreign history behind them, but if the conversion is done with genuineness, speed and total integrity, the national church can reasonably hope to maintain their operation, ownership and administration.

It is my firm belief that wherever possible and as long as possible the cooperation of foreign and national missionaries is a great asset to the church. However, it is imperative to recognize that a strong position is always rooted in a strong national church, a church that is culturally acceptable to the society in which it lives and operates, a church that bears an unmistakable indigenous identity and self-image, while still connected with the mother church through the spiritual ties of faith and fellowship.