


“GOING PUBLIC” AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: *New Sources and Forty Years Give Perspective on the Glacier View “Trial” of Desmond Ford*

BY GILBERT M. VALENTINE

Forty years provide important critical distance for reviewing many things in life. Distance enables a wider, deeper perspective. So what does Glacier View and the “trial” of Desmond Ford look like, in perspective? What more is now known about this crucial event that was not known before?

On September 17, 1980, internationally recognized Adventist theologian Desmond Ford had his ministerial credentials very publicly withdrawn and was removed from his position as a theology teacher at Avondale College in Australia. The decision to dismiss Ford, who at the time was on leave from a teaching exchange at Pacific Union College (PUC) in California, wrought widespread trauma in a church already sharply divided. Developments leading up to and at the high-profile review of Ford’s teaching at the specially convened Sanctuary Review Committee (SRC) at Glacier View



Gillian Ford/Public Post/Facebook

Ranch, Colorado, in August had caused huge anguish. The Australasian Division executive committee that voted the final action, augmented by sixteen invited observers, (largely local conference presidents chosen by administration) had convened, together with the Avondale governing board, in a joint session following proceedings viewed as technically illegal by the division’s own in-house attorney.

The termination of Ford followed a recommendation of the General Conference’s Presidential Advisory Committee (PREXAD) on September 3 which, in a five-and-a-half-hour-long session chaired by President Neal Wilson, had advised Australia to reject Desmond Ford’s two letters of carefully nuanced affirmation of faith and confidence in the church’s teaching. Ford had said that he could teach and preach in

harmony with the twenty-seven statements of fundamental belief voted at the Dallas General Conference session in July 1980 and the landmark consensus statement agreed upon at the SRC, August 10–15, 1980. Ford’s affirmations, however, were viewed as too carefully nuanced, too artfully “qualified,” too ambiguous. More problematic, he had insisted on including in his letter a list of twelve points of expanded biblical and doctrinal interpretation from his study document, which he believed the Glacier View meeting had embraced. The decision to dismiss him disillusioned many of the church’s theological scholars and led to the dismissal or resignation of many teachers and ministers, the loss of many lay members, and the emotional disengagement with the church of innumerable others. The traumatic episode seared itself into the church’s memory.

Four decades after “the dismissal,” with the passing of many of the participants in the drama, extensive new documentation has become available. These new materials, viewed through the lens of time and distance, cast fresh light on details of the church-changing trauma and help provide a clearer, more detailed, and more nuanced understanding of the specific problems, the contending personalities, and the differing perspectives that lay at the heart of the conflict.

For example, a close study of the new sources helps to resolve the vexed question of whether the dismissal of Ford after the Glacier View meetings was indeed a forgone conclusion on the part of Wilson and his headquarters colleagues. A decade after Glacier View, Richard Hammill, who had coordinated the historic meeting, reported that a significant number of scholars who participated in the conference became convinced that Dr. Ford’s future employment had been decided before his document had actually been studied. Hammill himself was not inclined to think so, at least as far as Elder Wilson was

concerned. On the other hand, his fellow administrator and participant in the conference, PUC President Jack Cassell, was convinced that by the time of the August conference dismissal was inevitable and predetermined before the document was considered. A careful study of the new sources casts light on that question.

The new sources also enable a clearer assessment of the relative weight and validity of the two determinative issues cited to justify termination: perceived doctrinal deviance and perceived lack of pastoral sensitivity and judgment. To what degree was “going public” Ford’s fatal mistake? How did differing interpretations of pastoral responsibility weigh against honesty and integrity and thus shape the outcome of the saga? Furthermore, in the light of a more complete understanding of the tangled conflict, what more can be said about the large enigma that puzzled church leaders, friends, and colleagues at the time, and now intrigues historians? If the stakes were so high, what motivated Ford to abandon caution and “go public” in his Forum address of October 27, 1979? Did he not consider that the result might well be his dismissal?

Dismissal: Predetermined or Not?

A large question widely voiced at the time, and one that has continued to hang darkly across the four decades since 1980, concerns the issue of whether Ford’s dismissal was inevitable because predetermined. Were the Glacier View proceedings a genuinely fair inquiry with an unprejudiced openness to new understandings, or were they a necessary public relations exercise to provide a semblance of natural justice but which needed to obtain a certain desired “result” as the conclusion? Had Ford inflicted such a deep wound on the body of the church by “going public” in his airing of doctrinal problems that church leadership perceived the only realistic solution to the conflict was for

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the agent of the infection to be surgically removed? When Pacific Union College theology department chair Fred Veltman wrote to theology department chairs at other North American colleges as 1980 commenced, he noted that the continued employment of Ford was “an open question.” He was speaking of “where” the employment might be, as in location. Church administrators, on the other hand, were focused much more on “if,” and the answer to that was more complicated and not so open.¹

The extensive documentation now available from this turbulent period indicates that the answer to the question of predetermination is both yes and no. The decision was not predetermined in the sense that Wilson genuinely hoped that the process of Glacier View might have a positive outcome, allowing continuing employment of some kind in some location for Ford. But that hope, it is now clear from both implicit and explicit communications of Wilson, was predicated clearly and firmly on one condition: Ford by the end of the leave must change his mind and his attitude. Wilson did not see the church changing its stance. The decision, therefore, was predetermined by the assumption that Ford would have to publicly recant in some form or another. He would have to say he was wrong, or could be wrong, and that the doctrine in question needed no correction. Several lines of evidence illustrate this.

When PUC President Jack Cassell and Academic Dean Gordon Madgwick met with Neal Wilson and his colleagues in Washington DC, in November 1979, to consider how to deal with the enormous global turmoil that had resulted from Ford “going public” in his Forum talk on their campus, immediate termination was a clear option advocated by some. Some senior church leaders and conservative agitators, like the Standish brothers, called stridently for this. But Cassell and Madgwick, sensitive to the claims of academic freedom strongly voiced by their faculty, advocated another option. They recommended a six-month leave of absence for Ford to research and further articulate his views in a study document. Wilson and PREXAD saw wisdom in this option. But because, in a totally unexpected way, Ford’s “going public” had generated world-wide concern, the leave would be spent at church headquarters under the supervision of PREXAD appointees, not at PUC. The agreement PREXAD entered into with the college administrators was that

the study document would be reviewed in June 1980 by a small, select group of scholars and administrators.² In instructions to the Biblical Research Institute director, Richard Leshar, about wording to be used in the public announcement of the agreement, Wilson noted that he was “anxious to take a positive direction.” Leshar should do “everything possible to avoid saying or doing anything that could be misinterpreted or construed as punitive disciplinary action.” At the same time, however, Wilson and PREXAD’s expectations were clear that the leave of absence would result in “the reaffirmation of the message that God has given to His prophetic movement.” This was a very firm given. Hopefully, though, the outcome would also save “Dr. Ford’s talents for future contribution to the church.”³ The recommendation was sent to the PUC Board of Trustees for action in mid-December 1979.

In the negotiation over the final wording of the agreement between the college administrators and PREXAD, the Board of Trustees wanted the hard edge softened by including an explanation of why Ford had given his public presentation. The initial draft thus included the sentence “The officers of the Forum had requested that he [Ford] speak on the topic of the investigative judgment, a topic that was receiving considerable discussion, in part, perhaps, related to the publication of Robert Brinsmead’s *1844 Re-examined*.” A softening explanatory phrase also indicated that there had been “previous questions on this subject.” In the version of the Statement of Agreement finally recorded by PREXAD, the softening language had been deleted and the statement considerably toughened with intimations of punitive intention, asserting that Ford had “ignored the counsel, directives, and procedures outlined in the *Church Manual*,” which was a “very reasonable and carefully worded,” expectation. Brethren should “refrain from presenting publicly any questions that are not in harmony with the views of the established body. The public announcement in the *Review* condensed the information and simply stated that Ford was placed on leave because he “took issue with basic theological positions” of the church.⁴ Thus, from the very outset, two different ecclesial perspectives on the controversial forum talk stood in contention. Ford and PUC saw it as a suggested solution to a doctrinal problem already being publicly discussed. Church administrators saw it as a frontal, public attack on a church doctrine.



Gillian Ford/Public Post/Facebook

Ford presents at Glacier View, a photo that was shared in the American version of *Good News Unlimited*.

Non-Negotiables

For Neal Wilson personally, there were two non-negotiables: the Sanctuary doctrine and the “canonical” doctrinal authority of the Spirit of Prophecy (i.e., Ellen White). In the first place, the Sanctuary doctrine needed to be understood and taught in a way that made clear that 1844 was the specific fulfillment of prophecy and pointed to a literal happening in heaven. Communicating news about this event constituted the rationale for the existence of the church and provided its distinctive message. This was foundational. Second, and more importantly, Ellen White’s writings carried not just pastoral authority but doctrine-elucidating and, in matters of dispute, doctrine-determining authority. Wilson made this clear in a response to Walter Rea’s January 1980 public exposure of Ellen White’s extensive literary borrowing: a parallel conflict that added challenging layers of complexity to the church’s understanding of Ellen White. The Rea exposure had seriously escalated the level of denominational turbulence.

Wilson authored an important article, intended to calm the fears of the church over the Walter Rea findings, in which he reported an investigating committee’s initial conclusion that “Ellen White used sources more extensively than we have heretofore been aware of or recognized.” Fully studying the implications of this, he noted, would take more time. But Wilson concluded with his personal testimony in very carefully nuanced language. The new information, he declared, did not detract at all from the

fact that Ellen White was still “a reliable teaching authority” and “part of God’s continuing revelation and corroboration of doctrinal truth.”⁵ White must retain her doctrine-determining authority. Wilson believed that this was the clearly established position of the church and needed to remain so. In Ford’s view, by contrast, if the church believed that Ellen White was the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of scripture and a determining source for its doctrine, it was not possible for such a community to continue to be a church in the Protestant tradition.

In early January 1980, when Wilson was asked by a member of his extended family by marriage, what would happen if Ford was “judged to be right” by his peers, Wilson replied that “there is too much that would have to be changed.”⁶ Ford could, therefore, not possibly be right. He would simply have to modify his beliefs on the Sanctuary and publicly accept Ellen White’s canonical authority.

After a personal discussion with Ford about his progress a few days later, Wilson felt the need to caution Ford in writing about expecting too positive an outcome from his research. He was pleased to discover that Ford approached his task “with optimism,” but Wilson felt the need to warn Ford about hoping for what would not be possible. “I am not sure that it is going to be as easy as you seem to anticipate to convince church leadership that your position is compatible with the Biblical and E. G. White teaching on the subject under discussion,” he wrote.⁷ Ford should be prepared to change and make things easier for himself to change.

What particularly distressed Wilson in his mid-January discussion with Ford was that Ford “saw no problem” with his Forum tape “circulating” his “viewpoints and message as widely as possible.” The Australasian Division had learned (mistakenly) that the “Brinsmead Group” was planning to circulate 50,000 copies of the Forum tape and telexed Wilson, asking him to request Ford to deny permission for this.⁸ The “coolness” with which Ford “dismissed” the suggestion, and that he register “feelings of disappointment with Bob Brinsmead,” perplexed Wilson and indicated Ford’s “lack of discretion and good judgment.” Why? Because, noted Wilson, the views

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expressed in the tape had not yet “been evaluated and accepted” by the church. “This procedure we believe to be contrary to the clear counsel of Ellen G. White, and also contrary to denominational policy,” he explained. “Should your position after examination be rejected,” Wilson implied, it would be harder for Ford to acknowledge his error, which he undoubtedly would have to do.⁹ The tapes were circulating without Ford’s permission and Ford said he would write a letter protesting the circulation if Wilson “ordered” him to do so. Wilson declined to give such a directive, just as he was reluctant to indicate in an explicit way that if Ford did not change his mind there was no future for him. In a conversation with Siegfried Horn later in the month, Wilson reported that already in his estimation Ford had “a closed mind, and will not change.”¹⁰

Two weeks later, Wilson reiterated his core convictions and his forebodings to his predecessor in office, Robert Pierson. Ford was “working hard” on his assignment he reported, noting that, for Wilson himself, “the whole matter revolves around his [Ford’s] understanding of the role and work of Ellen White.” Ford did not consider Ellen White “to be authoritative in the areas of doctrinal theology,” Wilson reported, and she did not have “teaching authority comparable to the prophets that are in the scripture.” Wilson indicated to Pierson that Ford would need to “adjust his thinking” on this. Wilson meant that Ford would have to acknowledge he was wrong. He noted that Ford “needs our prayers” to help him acknowledge this wrong understanding.¹¹ Without such a change, in Wilson’s view, continuation of employment at the conclusion of the study would not be possible. In this sense, the conclusion of the Glacier View meeting

would clearly precipitate the end of Ford’s employment as a logical outcome, though such inevitability Wilson would take care not to publicly articulate.

Reinforcing Convictions

Letters and proffered academic papers flooded across Wilson’s desk during the pre-conference period of Ford’s study leave most of them reinforcing Wilson’s strengthening conviction to hold the line.

Among the more notable were letters such as A. LeRoy Moore’s late-November, eleven-page analysis of Ford’s Forum talk, apparently written in response to a General Conference request to Moore to provide Wilson a list of questions that could be put to Ford. Moore asserted a remarkably close similarity between Ford’s talk and Brinsmead’s *1844* book, and focused nearly the entire eleven pages on a traditional defense of Ellen White’s doctrinal authority, with a list of questions intended to challenge Ford’s perceived inadequate views on this matter. Leshner marked up the letter and passed it through to Wilson.¹²

In mid-December, General Conference archivist, Don Yost, sent Wilson a copy of a 1930 letter from A. O. Tait to LeRoy Froom warning Froom not to question Ellen White’s authority and that great peril lay ahead for him and the church if he did so.¹³

In May, Robert Pierson expressed confidence that Wilson would deal “kindly but firmly” with any error in Ford’s position.¹⁴

In June, someone sent Wilson a copy of a *Newsweek* article entitled “A Pope with Authority,” by noted columnist George F. Will on tensions in the Catholic church between its theologians and church authority. Will

argued for conservatism and the importance of preserving “a core of settled convictions.” The task of “nurturing, defending and transmitting those convictions” called for strong leadership and “institutional judgment.” Will commended Pope John Paul for reigning in Hans Kung of Tübingen University. Wilson’s underlining of the article clearly indicates that he found it instructive.¹⁵

The General Conference president’s father, Nathaniel Wilson, sent him a sheaf of Ellen White quotations in July, emphasizing the traditional authority vested in Ellen White and urging him to stay strong.

Meanwhile, Kenneth Wood peppered *Review* readers with a flurry of articles hotly defending the traditional doctrinal formulations as inviolate. He

accused Adventist colleges of departing from the faith and warned the church against Ford and his “heresy,” equating Ford’s viewpoints with apostasy.¹⁶

The defensive tactics of the *Review* editor generated a wave of letters of protest from numerous academic communities on Adventist campuses, and the college presidents, at their annual meeting, united in calling Wood to account and condemning his attack on Adventist education. Many scholars who agreed with Ford’s assessment of the exegetical weaknesses underpinning the church’s Sanctuary doctrine felt that through the *Review*, the church was pre-judging and condemning Ford’s proposed solutions before they could be fairly considered. It seemed clear that, in Wood’s mind, the primary purpose of Glacier View was to be disciplinary.¹⁷ Wilson would later defend Wood’s defensive stance.

Hammill, however, had persuaded the church’s scholarly community to participate in the conference on the basis of Wilson’s assurance that Ford’s ideas would be given a fair hearing. Addressing the rapidly rising levels of angst and claims of hypocrisy, Wilson authored a prominent back-page article in the *Review*, again attempting to calm anxieties. Choosing his language carefully, he could not deny that discipline might be

involved, though it was not the “primary” purpose of the meeting, he explained. It was true, nonetheless, that the one who “publicly challenged” was at fault because he should have laid his ideas before “brethren of experience” and, if they disagreed, he would have to “yield to their

judgment.” Wilson assured readers that he did not expect anything to change, apart from maybe some “new terminology” or “changing definitions.” There was no need for conservative folk to be fearful. “In no way do we expect this restudy of our distinctive doctrines to weaken the pillars of our message.”¹⁸

In January, General Conference officials such as C. D. Brooks and Ralph Thompson, visiting camp meetings in Australia, let it be known publicly that at the end

of his study period Ford would be “shown his error” and then he would have to decide his own future: recant or be terminated. Robert Olsen and Norman Dower were also reported to have made known the mindset at church headquarters.¹⁹ Such public and explicit pre-judgment outraged many Australian ministers committed to “fair dinkum” justice, not only as a basic Christian principle but also as a deeply embedded cultural value.²⁰ The public and explicit expression of the expected outcome by others might embarrass Elder Wilson but they did not express a different view of the inevitable outcome. Wilson as leader preferred not to specifically voice the consequences if Ford was not able to change his views; nevertheless, in his and Parmenter’s post-Glacier View world, if Ford could not retract his assertions on the Forum tape or his views in the study document, he would have to be released.

Two influential letters among the many Wilson received immediately prior to Glacier View also reinforced his personal conviction that he needed to stand immovable on the role of Ellen White. These were sent to Wilson after their authors had read the 990-page study document. Ford’s former teaching colleague at Avondale and, at the time, division field secretary, Alfred Jorgensen, devoted three of his ten discussion

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points to objections about Ford's diluting of Ellen White's authority. Furthermore, from his perspective, Ford's new "alien model" of Adventist theology would undermine the church's unique mission and its understanding of 1844, and make it highly unlikely that any Seventh-day Adventist could ever persuade a Seventh Day Baptist to convert to Adventism. This observation made its way into a specific question that Wilson posed to Ford at the tension-filled Thursday afternoon SRC meeting at which Ford was first formally confronted with the requirement to retract. Ford replied firmly that he could convert a Seventh Day Baptist and explained how. More serious for Wilson's view of Ford, however, was Jorgensen's assessment that Ford's document was in essence a "cosmetic version" of Brinsmead's *1844 Re-examined*. The Jorgensen letter undoubtedly contributed to the heightened role that fear of Robert Brinsmead played at the conference, reinforcing Wilson's conviction that Ford would have to retract or be dismissed.

Ministry editor, Robert Spangler, in his review of Ford's final study-document chapter, sent to Wilson just prior to the meetings, also stressed that the Spirit of Prophecy's corroboration of biblical truth must stand "regardless of what the great majority of contemporary scholars and theologians may declare with unanimous voice." Apparently, chapter six, on Ellen White, presented material particularly difficult for Wilson, according to Gillian Ford. He viewed the chapter as evidence that her husband was "throwing out" the Spirit of Prophecy. Spangler also argued strongly for retention of the "proof text method" of interpreting scripture because he viewed it as still valid and, without it, key Adventist doctrines could not be proved. This was "counsel" Ford had not been able to accept from his advising committee. The inability to do so even after further reflection and discussion during the SRC would make his termination inevitable. But was it simply the rigidity of his personal attitude and convictions or the deadly seriousness of the doctrinal error in his teaching itself that would be the catalyst?

Rationale for Dismissal: Deviant Doctrine or Poor Pastoral Judgment?

At the outset of the Glacier View conference, Wilson


had declared that Ford was "not on trial but his ideas were."²² That distinction as a framework for proceeding through the meetings proved impossible to maintain. By Thursday afternoon, after distressing *ad hominem* thrusts at Ford and difficult personal interactions with Wilson the previous day, PREXAD concluded that dealing with the ideas could not be "completely separated" from dealing also with their author. They recorded in their minutes at this time that two levels of decision making would be needed. The SRC group would deal with Ford's document. Church administrators would make decisions about Dr. Ford's future and on this second matter, according to Richard Hammill, they found themselves needing to move more quickly than they had planned. Elder Parmenter needed a decision before he returned to Australia and thus, as Hammill reports, Wilson found himself with his "hand" being "forced."²³

The first formal discussion of Ford's continuing employment surfaced at this same Thursday-afternoon, PREXAD meeting on August 14, *before* the consensus statement had been finalized and voted on Friday morning. It seems clear that Wilson and Parmenter had talked through the issue of urgency previously. The sixteen members of PREXAD were joined for the discussion by three Australian leaders, the PUC president, and PUC Board of Trustees chair. The context suggested that the question that had always been in the background but not made explicit was now placed front and center on the table. What would be Ford's future? They would let him decide, but they would set the conditions. Discussion focused on what would be the minimal expectations of Ford for him to continue employment with the denomination. Church leaders were clearly apprehensive of schism. Four criteria were agreed. Two concerned doctrinal understanding and two concerned pastoral issues. Ford would have to acknowledge in writing that positions he had taken in his 990-page document "could be wrong," that they were "not his final argument," and that he could give "complete support" to the new statement of fundamental beliefs voted at Dallas in June. Furthermore, Ford would publicly, in writing, have to "disassociate himself" from the distribution of his study document, express regret for its "unauthorized circulation," and "address an appeal to young workers to follow the counsel of the church rather than of one man."

In tense exchanges with Ford during question time at the plenary session late Thursday afternoon following PREXAD's agreement, Wilson indicated publicly for the first time that the "administrative matter" (i.e., Ford's employment), would soon have to be dealt with. Ford, apparently surprised, asked Wilson what he meant by that and then followed up with a request that Wilson remember "the changes that had taken place in doctrine" during the SRC and alluding to what he expected would appear in the consensus statement still being finalized. Wilson responded to this with the assertion that this was simply "begging the question." There was already "a clear position" in the church, Wilson observed, and it was "not complicated" to know whether a person was "in harmony" with it. Parmenter followed these comments and expressed the essence of the PREXAD criteria agreed earlier in the day, asserting that if Ford could not agree with the church it would be easier for everyone if he would hand in his credentials. This blunt, open exchange immediately cast a deep gloom over the conference.²⁴ Would Ford cooperate? Was this the feared inevitable outcome?

PREXAD's agreed Thursday-afternoon criteria became the basis for the extended, highly fraught discussion with Ford about his continuing employment late on Friday afternoon, and provided the content for the handwritten letter of expectation that Parmenter read to Ford at that time. Several issues seriously muddled the waters and complicated the "administrative" proceedings on Friday afternoon. The consensus statement had only just been voted that morning and Ford said he could agree with it. He further said that he could teach and preach the Dallas Statement of Fundamental Beliefs and, indicating his desire to be pastorally sensitive, vowed he would not raise controverted issues. That meant to administrators, however, that there were still controverted issues. Furthermore, in a surprise move unanticipated by Hammill and which Hammill would later consider a major tactical mistake, Wilson had PREXAD request six selected participants work together to draw up a list of ten points where, in their estimation, Ford's study document differed not from the new consensus statement but from the traditional formulation of Adventist teaching. This was not new information, and the list, when completed, identified points on which many of the other scholars at the conference also disagreed with traditional formulations.

But Ford had "gone public." Ford agreed with most of the list, but would also later go on to argue, insisting on integrity, as already noted, that in twelve other significant areas the consensus statement had embraced theological development and had adopted specific points of view he had raised in his document. Most of PREXAD, however, were operating under the impression that "the majority of the participants" had straightforwardly affirmed traditional teachings, that the consensus statement broke no new ground, and that the SRC had thus rejected Ford's arguments. As Parmenter told Ford in the Friday meeting, "most of the scholars with whom I have talked do not agree with your doctrinal positions."²⁵ When Gillian Ford mentioned by name several important scholars who said they agreed with her husband, both Wilson and Parmenter expressed frustration and responded that "it was difficult to know" because "these same scholars came to them and said the opposite."²⁶ Clearly there would be continuing disagreement over whether any development had taken place at all at Glacier View and if so, how much. Many administrators thought no change had taken



A letter from Arizona Conference in 1978 canceling a Desmond Ford appointment to attend their Ministerial Workers' Retreat.

Gillian Ford/Public Post/Facebook

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place at all. To calm church fears and maintain unity, Wilson wanted to acknowledge only affirmation of the existing tradition. Continuity was all that mattered for him at this point. Ford's keen sense of integrity, on the other hand, would not allow him to ignore the reality that significant development had taken place, though not as much as he would have liked. Change had occurred. The consensus statement was proof. At this juncture in Adventist history, change and continuity glared at each other uncompromisingly, freighted with heavy emotional intensity.

Beyond the unwillingness of Ford to concede that his major suggestions for reframing the church's doctrines were in error, the weightier issues that troubled PREXAD, and which ultimately predominated as factors in his dismissal, were his perceived lack of pastoral responsibility: first of all in his decision to "go public" and now his perceived resistance to taking counsel and conceding clearly and simply that in a major way he might be wrong. In the Friday afternoon session, Wilson sharply criticized Ford's charismatic personality and the manifesting of an attitude that Wilson perceived as always needing to be right. Ford could teach, asserted Wilson, but he appeared unable to learn. Wilson expanded at length on his discomfort with the perception that Ford communicated that he [Ford] was "the one person who can lead the church out of its theological morass."²⁷ Ford's approach to the circulation of the Forum tape and the study document was cavalier and further evidence of his lack of pastoral sensitivity and care. Field Secretary Duncan Eva, who was very sympathetic to Ford's general direction, could not understand why Ford did not see the need to move slowly and patiently. "We need to move slowly enough so that all in the church can keep up with us," he pled.²⁸

The Problem of Robert Brinsmead

Weighing most heavily in the balance against Ford, as evidence of his lack of pastoral concern, was his perceived relationship with Brinsmead: "an area of great consternation" to Wilson. Perceived collusion with Robert Brinsmead, and Ford's unwillingness to publicly declare where he was different from Brinsmead, was a major problem. Clearly the activity of Brinsmead was seen by the Australian leaders as dangerously "subversive" and a major threat to the welfare of the church. Parmenter anguished over this. A month before Ford's October 1979 talk, he had written to Ford and pled with him to distance himself publicly from Brinsmead because, he explained, many people thought Ford was in Brinsmead's "camp."²⁹ The first paragraph of this letter hinted that Ford was responsible for causing confusion in Australia over Righteousness by Faith and it carried a hostile, or at least a frustrated, tone that may have made the letter difficult for Ford to read, particularly after the earlier exchange between the two men over allegations of a lack of integrity. But Parmenter feared that Brinsmead was planning to do more damage to the church with further publications and that he intended to launch a more general attack on Adventist teaching. Parmenter, apparently drawing on conspiratorial reports fed to him by Robert Brinsmead's brother John, seems to have been persuaded that there had been collusion.³⁰ John had alleged the false notion that even Ford's Righteousness by Faith themes had been drawn from himself and his brother, a claim which should have made Parmenter skeptical of the whole report. Ford had assured Parmenter in personal conversation that there was not any collusion.

In a three-page statement, Ford had also made clear to members of his advisory committee at its second meeting, the non-threatening nature, as he saw it, of his relationship

to Brinsmead. He related details of Brinsmead's successful outreach to thousands of non-Adventist clergy and that he "would not want to improve my situation by damning Bob and his work, as of Satan."³¹ Later, at the end of the SRC, the AUD president again related that it was commonly believed in parts of Australia that Ford had helped Brinsmead with his first book and was assisting with the new one. Ford again denied in public any such collusion and asserted that there had been only very occasional, innocent personal contact if Brinsmead happened to contact him.³² He acknowledged to Parmenter during the discussion that he had seen Brinsmead's more recent book.

That Ford would not publicly criticize the subversive Brinsmead seemed clear evidence to church leaders of Ford not being cooperative and of not being pastorally concerned for the welfare of the church. Furthermore, his failure to express regret for the distribution of his materials and his unwillingness to personally intervene to try and curtail such circulation constituted further evidence of a serious lack of pastoral sensitivity. This loomed as a major issue of poor pastoral judgment. At the commencement of the project it had been agreed that the study document would only be released with the mutual consent of the author, PUC administration, the General Conference, and AUD leaders. The unlicensed duplication of the confidential study document, as Veltman had noted, had, therefore, "created a pastoral problem of serious magnitude for the church."³³ Veltman called the distribution "unethical and irresponsible," an "unprincipled action." It was not Ford, however, who released the document, although he was aware that interested supporters were trying to obtain copies.³⁴ It

became clear later that Dr. Dean Jennings, of St. Helena Sanitarium, was the source. One of Jennings's patients was former General Conference president Reuben Figuhr. Jennings requested access to his copy. Apparently, he asked to borrow the document to read and then made a copy for himself. Subsequently Jennings made it available to people in Australia, sending a copy, it seems, to Elder Robert Parr, the editor of the *Australasian Record*.³⁵ Earlier in the year, Veltman had appealed to Jennings to try and use his influence "to quiet" Ford's friends and supporters and thus try and achieve "a calmer atmosphere." Veltman feared that Ford's friends would cause more injury to him than his enemies.³⁶ Jennings seemed to believe that openness was more important.

Doctrinal Development: Yes or No?

Prior to the conference, William Johnsson, as associate dean of the Seminary and a member of the committee advising Ford on his study document, was keenly aware of the exegetical inadequacies in the traditional proof text support for the sanctuary doctrine. In the light of his Vanderbilt doctoral study of the book of Hebrews he understood that changes were needed to reframe doctrinal understanding. But after visiting the Minnesota Camp Meeting

in June 1980, he had become alarmed at the "wide gap between the sort of thinking of the academics and our workers and lay people." To avoid crippling dissension descending on the church he advised Wilson that, in his view, a "result" was needed from the SRC meeting that would "affirm the essence of our sanctuary doctrine." Along with "affirmation of the center" there should, however, also be expressions of openness to further study. The issues were so big, he believed, that they could

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not be resolved in four days. Although Johnsson was uncomfortable with his fellow Australian's "polemical" style and his tendency to emphasize the problem so strongly that "the constructive elements in his work" were not adequately heard, he was hopeful that Ford was becoming more "conciliatory" in his manner.³⁷

Before the SRC meeting, Veltman had written to a scholarly colleague on Ford's study advisory committee urging that the scholarly community be encouraged to send in position papers so that the broader SRC group could "get some idea of the widespread support" among the Adventist scholarly community of the need to address the problems that Brinsmead had raised to public awareness and which Ford had now amplified in proposing a solution. Ford himself had received many letters of support from scholarly colleagues prior to the conference and while some later voiced that same support in the small committees at Glacier View, others had found it difficult to do so. Thus it was that most church administrators came away from Glacier View convinced that the church had not changed in anyway at all in its understanding of the sanctuary doctrine. It wasn't just "the center" that seemed to have been affirmed as Johnsson hoped but in administrators' minds every detail about the traditional formulas had been re-established. Kenneth Wood emphasized this particular understanding in his articles in the *Review*, stressing that the "Historical Sanctuary Theology" had been reaffirmed. The bold headline announced, "Variant Views Rejected."³⁸ In his verbal report to the *Review* and *Herald* staff after Glacier View, Wood cited a list of Ford's errors but suggested that the exegetical problems were of no real concern to him. He explained that in his view, Ford was wrong basically because his soteriology was wrong and always had been. Ford did not express "historic Adventism."³⁹

While conservative scholars like Old Testament specialists William Shea and Gerhard Hasel, and historians Kenneth Strand and Gerard Damsteegt, agreed with Kenneth Wood that the church had firmly stood its ground unchanged, many other scholars left the Colorado meeting believing that significant change had indeed occurred. Fred Veltman, for example, in a twelve-page memorandum of the meeting composed immediately after the close of the meeting, noted disappointment in Ford's polemical style and his uncooperative, determined

stance that offended administrators and some scholarly colleagues, and personally frustrated Veltman and his friends because it seemed that Ford was making it difficult for himself. Did Ford see himself as a Luther in a Diet of Worms moment, they wondered? But Veltman represented a number of others when he identified in his memo three noteworthy modifications to the historic doctrinal position embraced in the consensus statement, and observed that there were several other modifications.

Hammill also related to retired BRI director, Harry W. Lowe, directly after the meeting, that "several points" had been acknowledged as a result of Ford's research. He also reported, however, that Ellen White had been the stumbling block to any further concessions. Biblical evidence, for example, did not seem to support the idea that "the blood of a sacrificial animal defiles the sanctuary," he told Lowe. But because Ellen White said it did and seemed to place much stress on the concept, the older administrators and scholars found this "an almost insurmountable problem." It seemed such a "vital" matter. Most of the younger scholars and administrators, Hammill reported, acknowledged no difficulty in considering that Ellen White could be mistaken on something like this. Their view was that Ellen White was not "the final interpreter of the Bible," and thus "did not stumble" over the matter. There were other related issues like this.

In Hammill's desire to assist church unity, he framed such matters as "fringe areas," which did not affect the "basic doctrine."⁴⁰ This was deft language because, as Hammill would observe a decade later, the "basic doctrine" for him was essentially the broad New Testament doctrine of Christ's priestly ministry articulated in the book of Hebrews. Adventists should see themselves called to especially emphasize that. Jack Provonsha of Loma Linda University also spoke for a number of colleagues when he observed to the Thursday night plenary session that, for him, Dr. Ford's focus on the forensic model of the atonement was too limited. Nevertheless, in the broad picture Provonsha "agreed with most of what he [Ford] said. He was more right than wrong."⁴¹ This was bravely stated in the session when it emerged that administration was intending to terminate Ford. Such scholars saw the consensus document reflecting a helpful broadening of understanding. Given further time and reflection, scholars

could see the essence of the doctrine being enhanced, even as there would need to be a significant reframing of the details. Church administrators by contrast read the documents entirely differently.

Dismissal

In the days following the conference, church administrators in Washington and Sydney moved ahead expeditiously in attending to the administrative “duty” of resolving the question of Ford’s future. The situation in Australia had been further inflamed by preliminary reports from the final day of the SRC. Resolution was needed more urgently now also because Ford had formally responded to Parmenter’s August 28 letter setting out conditions of his employment. Wilson and Parmenter perceived continuing intransigence in Ford’s hedged response. Personal integrity drove Ford’s need to avoid fudging his meaning, while PREXAD also wanted clarity, but of a different kind. Using a detailed, fourteen-point grid, they carefully scrutinized the letter line by line, phrase by phrase, to flesh out the qualifying expressions in his response, not willing to take positive assurances at face value.⁴² Wilson had perceived at his first reading of Ford’s response that it was not a clearly stated, black-and-white, unreserved endorsement of the Dallas statement and he cabled his impressions to Parmenter. He also conveyed the same impressions to PREXAD. It does not seem to have bothered Wilson that Ford could not, in principle, respond to the Dallas statement as if it were a creed. Adventism had rejected creedalism. Ford’s response was shaped by this conviction and thus used qualifying phrases. For PREXAD, the nuanced response was evidence of Ford’s uncooperativeness and his unorthodoxy.

After PREXAD reviewed Ford’s “qualified” support of the Dallas Statement, they then disputed the list of twelve points in which he had claimed that changes in interpretation had been embraced. By means of a carefully outlined document (apparently prepared by someone before the meeting, for it was listed in the agenda), each point was linked to an expression or phrase in the consensus statement that conveyed continuity of understanding of the tradition. The analysis instrument intentionally ignored, demeaned, or discounted the expansive phrases in the consensus statement embracing wider interpretive options and their implications. There

was a clear unwillingness to acknowledge any suggestion of inadequacy in the traditional approach or any expression pointing the way forward toward a need for reframing.⁴³ Thus they noted that Ford’s twelve points were debatable, enabling an assertion of no change at all. PREXAD’s action, after five hours of discussion, was carefully crafted, noting that “the Sanctuary Review Committee rejected Dr. Ford’s argument and conclusions . . . as not being sufficiently convincing to cause the church to change its distinctive beliefs” concerning the Sanctuary and the role of Ellen White. Because Ford had affirmed that he could not “change his views” they concluded that the divergence was unacceptable and carried the risk of further misunderstanding later. In the lengthy action, more attention was given to Ford’s inability to receive counsel, take responsibility for the circulation of his tapes and documents, or dissociate himself from Brinsmead.⁴⁴ These were pastoral concerns.

In the follow-up Australian action, the rationale for dismissal was nuanced in a different way at a meeting that the division secretary noted as “a traumatic affair.” The AUD action emphasized theological difference as the main rationale for termination, not poor pastoral judgment. It began with the fact that Ford had “publicly challenged basic doctrines,” that his document had been “found unacceptable” in these areas, that he admitted “that his belief is no longer in accord with some of the accepted teachings of the church,” and that he was “unable to accept counsel . . . to reconsider his position.” The rationale concluded by recording that PREXAD had recommended Ford’s credentials be withdrawn and that he be relieved of his responsibilities as a minister and teacher.⁴⁵ His ordination was not annulled.

Reaction

Veltman, who had been on holiday in late August and early September following the SRC, was deeply shocked when he learned in mid-September of the actions to terminate Ford for his “divergent” theology. In an anguished letter of protest written too late to have any influence, he insisted to Wilson that the administrators were “drawing conclusions from Glacier View which were quite different from the actual facts of the case, particularly as relating to the scholarly consensus.” Scholars could legitimately feel “duped.” The “views”

discussed at Glacier View “were neither Des’s nor were they rejected,” he asserted. Veltman argued the point further three days later in a follow-up letter, citing the specific language of the SRC reporting groups and the final consensus statement as clear evidence of the fact that Ford’s views had definitely not been rejected. Parmenter, he asserted, was reading neither the consensus statement nor the ten-point statement in the same way the scholars were and this was deeply problematic for the scholarly community. Ford should not be dismissed on theological grounds. This would be grossly detrimental, untrue, and unfair. If administration felt they needed to discipline Ford for being uncooperative and for pastoral “irresponsibility” then they should identify these facts and make them clear.⁴⁶ Being wrong on doctrine was certainly not the issue. Glacier View had not determined this. Similarly framed protests against Ford’s dismissal on doctrinal grounds, asserting that such action was a negation of the agreement achieved at Glacier View and a betrayal of trust in the scholars, had been sent by groups of theologians at PUC, Andrews University, and Southern Missionary College.

In Wilson’s verbal report to General Conference staff two days later, after interviewing Ford to convey PREXAD’s recommendation of dismissal, one hears clearly the anguish of a leader who has had to make a difficult decision and knows that he will be criticized for it. Expectations of the large, aggressive, and highly critical fundamentalist section of the church represented in the Kenneth Wood bloc competed against a large section of the scholarly community and the many thousands who had been blessed by Ford’s ministry. The contention placed enormous, almost intolerable, pressure on the president. With some exasperation and irritation he felt the need in his report to defend Elder Parmenter, who he believed had “suffered a great deal of abuse” from both parties.⁴⁷

He expressed his awareness of his own ethical dilemmas involved with decisions like these. He asserted, however, that in good conscience he could “sleep at night . . . devoid of hypocrisy.” If a minister/teacher was not in harmony with the church’s beliefs, he noted in carefully chosen words to give himself ethical space, it was not unreasonable at all to expect the worker to remove themselves “*from the arena of conflict.*” He did not talk of removal of such workers *from the ministry*. If one remains and “becomes schismatic” then that “becomes a problem.” Church employment involved clear expectations and commitments. This did not address the question of which party was being schismatic. Was it not people like the Standish brothers and their supporters who had behaved as schismatics?

The ethical dilemma in which Wilson felt caught was sharpened by the awareness that even as he was setting out the criteria for Ford’s dismissal, he knew that ministers and teachers in many places, some of whom he knew very closely as loyal colleagues and associates from previous mission service, shared the same views as Ford or views that were similar in many respects or that they perhaps differed from important Adventist doctrine in other sensitive areas. But he didn’t want a “witch hunt.” Highly respected seminary professor, Siegfried Horn, for example, recorded in his diary a conversation he had with Wilson and Hammill in early 1980 at Loma Linda when the two men briefed him on Desmond Ford’s study. “At the end of our meeting I had a brief talk with Neal Wilson, who said that he wished Des Ford had followed my example and kept quiet as I had done with regard to the problems on chronology and OT history which I had faced.”⁴⁸ “Going public” was clearly Ford’s mistake.

A fortnight later in Washington, on the day in Australia when Parmenter’s committee took its action to terminate Ford, PREXAD noted in its minutes that a

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number of groups and individuals had appealed on Ford's behalf, some asserting that now PREXAD itself was not being pastorally responsible. But PREXAD was not listening anymore. It simply doubled down in asserting in a recorded action that such scholars did not understand things properly. The consensus statement, in PREXAD's determination, had clearly confirmed the Dallas Statement of Fundamentals. There had been no growth. Veltman's letters arrived too late it seems even to make any difference to the doubling down. Wilson himself was unchangeable in his view on Ellen White's doctrinal authority and on the distinctive doctrine. PREXAD echoed these convictions.

Integrity and Honesty or Pastoral Responsibility

Four times in Veltman's September 15 letter to Wilson he alluded to the matters of honesty and integrity. Not only was he tempted to feel himself “duped” but among his colleagues he reported “seeing old doubts being raised on the integrity of church administrators.” “Unity in the church” was important he noted, but so was the need to “deal honestly” with the data. Before Glacier View, he had addressed the same issues to his two senior administrators at PUC in his July letter. His views on the doctrinal problems and possible solutions were “similar” to Ford's “in a number of places.” He had informed them when he had become Theology department chair several years previously that he could be “true to his calling only where issues are open and upfront.” Back in July he had imagined that he would have to declare himself at Glacier View. He could not “live two lives.” He was willing to resign after Glacier View if necessary.⁴⁹

The tension between the exercise of pastoral care and the implications of this for personal integrity and honest expression became acute for both scholars and administrators at Glacier View. Clearly there were genuinely held differences of perspective in how to resolve or maintain the tension. This was the core dilemma for

Ford, who was inclined to come down on the side of integrity as the best way, in fact the only way to properly exercise pastoral responsibility. The issue is illustrated well in a quarrel between Ford and Hammill during the last stages of the writing up of Ford's study document.

A Quarrel

In July 1980, it had been reported to Ford by friends in the Northwest that Dr. Hammill, in a talk to ministers, had represented Ford's views on various points, but had then suggested that Ford had focused on problems so much he had “come to the point of not being able to discern truth.” Hammill had not at all indicated to the ministers that he shared many of the same questions. In a frank letter to Hammill, Ford challenged, “on committee you have frankly expressed the reality of our sanctuary problems and have told us repeatedly you have known them for twenty years.” In fact, when asked on the committee why Hammill believed in the investigative judgment, he recalled, “your reply was so frank and honest that it devastated some such as Bob Spangler.” Ford listed a number of specific interpretations that Hammill had frankly admitted to the guidance committee that he favored and were similar in nature to Ford's, and which modified established doctrine. He observed that Hammill had remarked that other scholars on the guidance committee had been “strangely silent in our discussions” on these matters. Ford's complaint to Hammill was that Hammill well knew “the ‘thinness’ of the traditional case, even as evidenced by the committee members, but you have conveyed a different impression to the workers just a week ago. . . . this cannot be pleasing to the God of truth.” Ford corrected two matters on which he felt Hammill had misrepresented him and then again reiterated his main concern that Hammill had conveyed “a false impression regarding your own appraisal of the Sanctuary problem.” He worried that “if the Glacier

View committee men behave similarly, what hope has the church for God's blessing." Did not the golden rule call for "fairness and honesty"? Ford concluded by expressing his disappointment in Hammill and he copied his letter to Neal Wilson, C. E. Bradford, Duncan Eva, and Fred Veltman.

Hammill's reply to Ford acknowledged that perhaps his talking to the ministers had been a mistake and that he had not intended to misrepresent Ford on the two specific issues Ford had corrected him on. He did not believe he had really done so. In fact from his perspective he did not think he had condemned Ford in public nor opposed his views. He said he did not wish to comment in writing on the specific points that Ford said he had conceded frankly to the committee. He acknowledged, however, that it was true that since his membership on the Daniel Committee of the 1960s he had "been aware of the lexical and contextual problems" associated with the interpretation of Daniel 8 and other aspects of the investigative judgment. At that time, however, he had "made an accommodation" about the problems and hoped that with further searching and praying "God, in his own time, would help us find some answers." He was "content to 'wait on the Lord'" and, in the meantime, "teach our denominational view" and not introduce the questions into classes or sermons. After complimenting Ford on the "excellent contribution" he was now making through "conceptual tie-ups" between the important biblical texts for which "we are all indebted to you," he counseled Ford to do as he himself had done. "You should be careful to soften the impression that now that you have spoken, lo, all the problems are solved." He warned Ford against "hubris" and urged, "we should give more consideration to pastoral concern for the members of His church and not be so positive about our own view." Hammill concluded by noting that he had tried to "avoid giving the impression [to the ministers] that decisions had been made, and that the matter was open for study." This did not mean that the doctrinal subjects were to be "held in abeyance" nor that the church's publications cease advocating the "standard positions" on the subjects.⁵⁰ Hammill clearly had a different view of pastoral responsibility. It would not be until a decade later, in 1990, that he would explore the doctrine of the investigative judgment in an unpublished manuscript and concede that using "typology" and talking of two

apartments was not a safe basis for doctrine. Furthermore, he would argue that the time projection connected with the traditional view of the investigative judgment "is off," proven by "the inexorable passing of around 150 years since that time scheme was first projected."⁵¹

Jack Cassell, who had "a great deal of respect" for Richard Hammill and counted him as a friend, would nevertheless, in later years, consider that Hammill's choice "not to speak candidly until after his retirement" was troubling. He surmised that it came "out of a deep love for the church." Pastoral concern was processed by Hammill as maintaining silence. For Ford, the same deep "love for the church" meant not staying silent. For Ford, the defense of the church he loved required speaking out. With hindsight, Cassell "could have wished that he [Hammill] had been more helpful" in the events that followed Glacier View, when Cassell himself became the victim of fundamentalist vilification and character assassination. According to Cassell, Hammill conceded that Cassell had "gotten a raw deal." Cassell felt the same about Neal Wilson's post-Glacier View unhelpfulness, recalling that Neal Wilson had visited the two PUC administrators in their offices and, in an effort to protect himself, had been "outright dishonest in his statements."⁵²


On the other hand, Cassell was also troubled by Ford. He observed that he "personally liked" Desmond Ford "and sincerely felt that he was one our outstanding theologians." He viewed Ford as "as asset" to the faculty at PUC with his "charismatic personality and excellent academic background." Students flocked to his classes, there was standing only room in the Sabbath School class he taught, and both the community and campus family "were enthralled by his presentations." Cassell himself sometimes attended his classes and "thoroughly enjoyed" the experience. Cassell recalled the positive impact that Des had both on campus and in the field. In his work relationships, Cassell found Ford "always polite and cooperative" but he noted that Ford did have "strong convictions" and at times could show frustration with "church administrator types" whom he considered "less informed and [theologically] competent" than himself. Other administrators, like Pierson, sometimes experienced this attitude as a gently patronizing disdain for administrators whom he did not consider theologically sophisticated. On one occasion in the heat of a discussion,

Ford had alluded to Robert Pierson as a Sabbath School teacher and had been obliged to apologize after the remark was reported to Pierson by Russell Standish. There “was a somewhat arrogant aspect to his [Ford’s] personality,” observed Cassell, and “like many charismatic individuals” who had strong opinions, “many, if not all of his problems arose from this personality trait.”⁵³

Students, on the other hand, deeply appreciated Ford’s warm pastoral manner in personal interviews and the practical pastoral advice he offered for those who faced personal challenges or problems. He lacked neither pastoral gifts nor pastoral sensitivity in this part of his ministry. And yet Cassell felt that he and the Forum leaders at PUC exercised poor judgment in arranging the October 1979 talk on the sanctuary question. He applauded Ford’s initial decisions to decline the invitation and believed that Ford should have “continued to resist the effort” to persuade him, given the “divisive nature of the topic.” Why then did Ford throw caution to the winds and choose to “go public” in October 1979 and address such a radioactive question, knowing the consequences could be fraught?

Why “Go Public?”

Important decisions are always made for a cluster of reasons, some perhaps contradictory and some even subconscious. Motivations are inevitably mixed and, in addressing the fateful question of why Desmond Ford chose to make a public presentation on the troubled doctrine of the sanctuary, there are numerous factors to consider. According to Cassell, Dr. Ford initially declined the invitation to speak on the topic pressed on him by forum chapter president Adrian Zytkoskee and his associate, Wayne Judd. Ford was clearly ambivalent but, after further pressure from his faculty colleagues, he agreed. Still apprehensive, he and his chairman, Fred Veltman, talked about possible risks, and Ford suggested that if Veltman would directly tell him not to speak, he would cancel the appointment. Veltman was reluctant to do this. It was not his custom to relate to his colleagues in that way, he reported later to Arthur Ferch, who had preceded Ford on the PUC exchange and was now teaching back at Avondale. Ferch had written to inquire about the fallout from the talk. Veltman responded to Ferch that he was “a little disappointed” with the way



A letter from Ray Cottrell to Desmond Ford shows Cottrell’s agreement with what Ford presented in the Forum.

Ford’s presentation had gone, but on the other hand he would defend his colleague’s “right to speak on the subject” if he felt he was making a contribution toward the solution of a problem Brinsmead had already made public. “Regardless of the outcome of the session, I think we will have to grant Des the integrity to respond to an issue in a way in which he felt was positive regardless of the way in which the meeting turned out.”⁵⁴

What were Ford’s motivations?

1. First and foremost, Ford’s decision to speak publicly on the investigative judgment in late 1979 grew out of a deep, genuine pastoral care and concern for the church. In an irony of large proportions, it was just the kind of pastoral sensitivity that he was charged with lacking and for which perceived lack PREXAD recommended his dismissal from ministry in September 1980. The context for this tension between conflicting perceptions of pastoral responsibility is

important.

a. The subject of the investigative judgment was already being widely discussed by Adventists in California and in parts of Australia. In July 1979, Robert Brinsmead had published a preliminary edition of his book, *1844 Re-Examined*, with a second, revised edition appearing three months later. In broad sweep, Brinsmead analyzed the history of the doctrine with its roots in the post Shut Door period of denominational history, and then critiqued the concept of judgment in the light of a clearer understanding of the New Testament gospel. He concluded that there was no biblical warrant for the doctrine at all. Furthermore, he had conducted seminars for large groups of Adventists in many places in Australia and throughout California.

b. If the thirty-four-page transcript of Brinsmead's audiotaped talk at Windsor, west of Sydney, on September 22, 1979 is an indication of what he said elsewhere, the impact of Brinsmead on church members should have been worrying to Washington leaders. The impact worried Ford. After criticizing the traditional investigative judgment doctrine as being unbiblical, Brinsmead cited numerous conversations with Adventist theology teachers and pastors on campuses and in churches across America and internationally during the previous two years who could not with confidence defend the doctrine and had given it up. His prognosis for the church as he concluded his talk was very negative.

I say that the immediate prospect of Adventism, looking at it from a human point of view is exceedingly bleak. I think we are facing a situation that will look like the

absolute collapse of the Adventist Movement in the world. I think it's that serious. It will look as if Adventism is gone. It's breaking up, its theology is utterly divided. All these great questions are sort of tearing people apart, . . . and they don't know where they are. . . . they are walking around as if they have had a hit on the head. They don't know what to do. They're white. They're white with fright. They are almost speechless. They seem paralyzed. As far as some of the men—I think some of the men at Washington, they are all going paralyzed on this whole present situation as to what to do.⁵⁵

c. Ford reported to Neal Wilson in December, seven weeks after his PUC talk, that during the late summer he had received “a continuing barrage of calls and letters asking me for a solution to the problem of Hebrews 9 raised by RDB. . . . Every time I went anywhere, I was asked to make a statement on what RDB had presented.” Ford disagreed strongly with Brinsmead's methodology and his dark predictions of despair for the church. He believed wholeheartedly in the mission of the church and its future and, while he agreed with Brinsmead on the nature of the exegetical problem presented by Hebrews 9, Ford strongly believed that he had developed an answer that resolved the inadequacy of previous Adventist attempts to resolve the difficulties. His inaugurated-consummated eschatology framework, he considered, provided a helpful construct. He attached a one-page schematic outline of the schema with examples of the theme in his letter to Wilson. Thus, as a pastoral response to the confusion and bewilderment of church

His talk had been an attempt “to pick up the pieces” after Brinsmead's Californian activities and, as he explained to Wilson, it seemed to his colleagues that “the church in general was doing nothing to answer” Brinsmead.

members, Ford had agreed to talk about his proposed solution. His talk had been an attempt “to pick up the pieces” after Brinsmead’s Californian activities and, as he explained to Wilson, it seemed to his colleagues that “the church in general was doing nothing to answer” Brinsmead. Retired Review and Herald book editor, Ray Cottrell, concurred with Ford.

d. In responding to a request to provide material to assist Ford’s advisory group, Cottrell complained to Hammill and Veltman that the church itself was at serious fault. “The enforced silence over the past ten years has been a major factor in escalating the problem as we face it today,” he wrote. The blame for this lay with Elder Pierson and Dr. Gordon Hyde at the BRI. If they had been willing for “responsible Bible scholars to explore these problems” before they had become a public issue confronting the church, “we would not be confronted by the serious situation we face today.” He hoped that the material he was sending them would help the administrators “to see the exegetical facts of life in their true perspective.”⁵⁶ Ford may not have seen this letter, but it helps provide the background to Ford’s citation of a “key administrator” in his letter to Wilson. The individual had commented to Ford that “there is nothing new in what you have said. Everyone knows the problems except the administrators.” Ford acknowledged that this assessment was undoubtedly a “hyperbole” but perhaps “pardonable.” Even so, reporting it to Wilson may not have endeared him any more warmly to the president.⁵⁷

e. The fact that an estimated 1,000 attended the October 27 meeting would also seem to be an evidence of strong pastoral need. Wilson observed that for him, Ford’s address came as a “bolt from

the blue,” as he described it to a relative. This suggests that headquarters was unaware of what was happening in the field in California. Normally at a Forum presentation the interest levels are low and lecture rooms designed to accommodate between 100 and 200 are chosen for the occasions. In the planning for this occasion just such a lecture room was arranged. Advertising for the occasion was similarly limited. Perhaps the title attracted greater interest. It was chosen by the forum organizers and was provocatively announced as “The Investigative Judgment: Theological Milestone or Historical Necessity?” Undoubtedly the name of the speaker attracted additional interest. And as department chair Fred Veltman observed, the presentation was a talk, not a quiet, scholarly paper. This evidence also suggests that Ford’s response was motivated by pastoral concern. As he walked on to the platform on October 27, and being surprised at the size of the crowd, Wayne Judd recalls Ford saying to himself, “it’s time, it’s time.” Ford saw the working of providence in the event.


2. Whether Ford and the Forum planners were aware of it or not, Raymond Cottrell had, on the previous weekend in October 1979, conducted a three-session scholarly presentation on exactly the same topic at Andrews University. That event attracted approximately 100 or so participants and was hardly noticed. Clearly, the pastoral context was different. What was also different was that Cottrell’s solution to the exegetical problems was to propose that the troubling doctrine be accepted and defended by relying on Ellen White’s endorsement of it. This involved accepting her authority to determine that this

Ford believed that his inaugurated-consummated framework, combined with his recurring fulfillment-of-prophecy concept, resolved the dilemma and avoided the need to extend to Ellen White what should be Bible-only authority for defining doctrine.

is what scripture now meant in the relevant passages used to undergird the teaching. Whether Cottrell was speaking tongue in cheek and playing devil's advocate on this point is not clear.

Ford did not believe that Adventism, claiming to be a Protestant church, could consistently remain protestant if it accepted Cottrell's solution to the problem and tried to secure its sanctuary doctrine on the basis of Ellen White's teaching. The need to respond to this unsustainable approach was thus a strong motivating factor for Ford. Associate Review editor Don Neufeld had also previously advocated the same position and, according to former Biblical Research Director Harry Lowe, Siegfried Horn had adopted that solution too, whether genuinely or not is not known. But as Harry Lowe explained to Hammill just prior to Glacier View, Lowe himself had found that he could not explain or defend the doctrine without reference to Ellen White either. He considered that this had brought the church "to an impasse." He warned Hammill that "the greatest problem" he would face at the upcoming conference would "center in inspiration" and "Sister White's work for the church," implying that this would become a barrier to progress.⁵⁸ Ford believed that his inaugurated-consummated framework, combined with his recurring fulfillment-of-prophecy concept, resolved the dilemma and avoided the need to extend to Ellen White what should be Bible-only authority for defining doctrine. In pastoral concern for the church, he wanted to get that approach on the table as a response to Brinsmead's criticism.

3. Ford genuinely believed that his 1979 presentation, while pushing further to deal with specific issues that Brinsmead had now raised in public, was, nevertheless, in essence, just what he had been writing about in *Ministry* magazine with increasing clarity since 1961. Along the way, he felt he had uncovered more support for his approach. During the previous two decades Ford had published in *Ministry* twenty or so articles on the inaugurated-consummated eschatology schema and he had linked this with the concept of conditional prophecy. The articles had been sought out and published by *Ministry* editors who had expressed a




In a letter dated February 2, 1983, to all ministers and teachers in the South Queensland Conference, H. G. Harker informs that the Australasian Division Committee voted to annul Ford's ordination.

need for new and better understanding.⁵⁹ This reality makes the assertion that Ford did not submit his ideas to "brethren of experience" somewhat problematic. In his Forum talk in response to Brinsmead, he had conceded that the meaning and significance of 1844 needed to be reframed but he believed that the scholarly work he had published previously on the topic provided a context for it and that the approach still preserved a continuing prophetic mandate for the church. He believed that he was not really saying anything different from many of his colleagues. It was true that he had addressed the problem publicly and highlighted the exegetical difficulties as a backdrop for presenting his inaugurated-consummated solution, but part of his calculation of the risk was that he believed he had already publicly set out a larger framework for his solution.

4. Another motivation for Ford to speak concerned the

Following conscience was critical. In a tragic sense, both the conflict and the trauma it caused seemed almost inevitable.

need to correct a misunderstanding of the doctrine of Christian perfection. Ford had come to believe that the teaching of sinless perfection had become so embedded in Adventist preaching and teaching about the end-time because it had become entangled with and nurtured by the traditional teaching of the investigative judgment. The doctrine had been taught in a distorted way that robbed church members of Christian assurance and a relationship with God that was joyful. Ford saw his inaugurated-consummated eschatology framework as a way of correcting that distortion. He believed that teaching about the pre-Advent judgment was still needed and that it was indeed scriptural, but it needed a different, Christocentric emphasis. Duncan Eva respected this and pointed it out to Neal Wilson when he sent him a



Desmond Ford died on March 11, 2019.

copy of one of Ford's articles on it on July 31, 1979.⁶⁰ Edward Heppenstall had also long appreciated Ford for this emphasis. As already noted, other scholars, such as Jack Provonsa might hold the view that Ford relied too exclusively on the forensic-penal satisfaction explanatory metaphor of the atonement, but all of them applauded his emphasis on Christian assurance balanced by accountability in the pre-Advent judgment. The need to address this issue through preaching and teaching was prompted by pastoral concerns at the deepest level in Desmond Ford.

5. A not insignificant factor that may have persuaded Ford to overlook, or underestimate, the risk of a negative reaction to his talk on such a delicate doctrinal subject, was the measure of his disillusionment over a lack of integrity that church leaders in Australia had demonstrated in their dealing with him. Ford believed that the AUD president, in response to unrelenting fundamentalist criticism, had betrayed a firm agreement with him and had lied to him about arrangements for him to stay in California for another year. Ford had left Australia on a two-year leave of absence with the assurance that after the two years he would return to Avondale as head of the theology department. Fundamentalists opposed to his anti-sinless-perfection stance and his emphasis on Christian assurance had continued their agitation and pressure on Parmenter during Ford's absence. They did not want Ford back. Parmenter indicated to Ford that Cassell had requested for him to stay on at PUC. It was, in fact, Parmenter who had asked Cassell to keep Ford and offered to subsidize his remuneration to facilitate it, but in a way that the arrangement would not become public. Ford saw the deal-making as a cynical betrayal and downright dishonesty in their communication. Furthermore, it left him without the

prospect of teaching employment. As he noted in a letter of protest to Parmenter, the decision was in effect a “sacking from my position” and Parmenter had not talked with him or given him any hearing. His prospects now were that if he returned to Australia it would be to pastor a church in some country town. This was an affront to Ford, who had completed two PhDs for the purpose of contributing to the training of ministers in Australia, and it stung at a deeply personal level. It was as if he had lost his future already and now had no home country to return to. Ford replied with deep indignation to Parmenter’s formal letter of notification that he could not return to Avondale. He challenged Parmenter’s lack of integrity, noting that “we must soon meet at the bar of God to give an account of our stewardship.” Their dealings needed to stand the scrutiny of “the Eye of the Omniscient one.”⁶¹

6. Personal integrity and honesty played important roles in Ford’s motivation. These were central values to be prized above others in Ford’s sense of Christian morality. The lack of honesty in Parmenter, linked to the consequences for his future employment, seems to have tipped the balance for him to decide that his own Christian integrity could not be sacrificed. Did he think, what else was there now to lose? Being pastorally responsible and maintaining integrity had to be held together and it seemed more important that he should “go public” about the church’s doctrinal problem come what may. This same sense of personal integrity at the end of the whole process in September 1980 would not allow him to smooth over or gloss the expression of doctrinal differences in the service of so-called pastoral sensitivity. Maintaining the tension between pastoral care and speaking truthfully with integrity for Ford could not be achieved at the expense of dishonesty.

Ford would probably not have appreciated the writings of his contemporary, African American writer James Baldwin, but Baldwin’s observation about love and safety would have resonated with him. If the racism of the broken promise at the heart of the American nation were ever to be resolved, Baldwin as artist, prophesied, it would

only be so by a love that could move beyond safety for the self. Only a genuine love could brave such a move. Ford would suggest in different ways that it was genuine love that moved him beyond the concerns of safety to address the great disappointment at the heart of Adventism.

Regret?

Did Ford ever apologize for the pain and disruption his convictions of personal integrity had caused? In December 1979, at the beginning of the controversy, Ford, in a letter to Wilson, apologized for the administrative difficulty resulting from his decision to “go public” and expressed “regret” at “having been the cause of this.” The response to his talk had been a “surprise” to him “and a matter of deep regret.” He apologized for “unintentionally” bringing trouble. Again, in his letter to Parmenter at the end of the affair, he expressed remorse for the pain he had caused. “I sincerely regret the sorrow I have brought to many by acceding to the request of my fellow teachers at PUC in speaking on the topic of their choice.”⁶² Wilson and Parmenter were sorry too. But the church was not equipped at the time to be able to cope by overlooking the trauma. This was the sort of reflection Wilson and his fellow administrators thought Ford should have exercised and been persuaded by before “going public.”

Ford would acknowledge to Wilson and his PREXAD colleagues his recognition of the administrative dilemma they faced. If he were “in their shoes,” and given the same circumstances, he observed, he would make the same decision. “I know what I would do if I were in your place.”⁶³ Following conscience was critical. In a tragic sense, both the conflict and the trauma it caused seemed almost inevitable.

Conclusion

Writing a decade after the events of Glacier View, Richard Hammill believed that it was inappropriate to speak in terms of trying to have the church “revise its official statement on the sanctuary doctrine.” Further study still needed to be given to the implications of Daniel 8 and 9 and to the consensus statement, he wrote. Furthermore, he was convinced that though he personally found it unsafe to build doctrine on typology, “some Adventists will always stress typological interpretations.” He was convinced therefore that differences of view about

the sanctuary would “exist until the end of the world.”⁶⁴ In 2020, the church no longer sees debilitating quarrels over sanctuary teaching, and in the life of the church there has been slow growth in understanding and a broadening theology has been found in the sanctuary doctrine.

But what has been learned about how to manage conflict in the church? Conflicts in other theological areas lurk beneath the surface and could become more disruptive unless proactively managed more carefully. The trauma of Glacier View suggests that resistance to change and a rigid defense of the status quo can build up pressures that can eventually become destructive. Intentionally adopting strategies that embrace inclusiveness, foster tolerance of spirit and diversity of viewpoint, and emphasize continuity while embracing change, will hopefully diminish the building up of sharp polarization over issues. Such an approach will become necessary to prevent the tearing of the delicate fabric of fellowship. Developing trusting relationships so that the duty of pastoral responsibility does not clash with and overwhelm the values of integrity and honesty are critical for the church if it is to survive conflicts over biblical interpretation in the future.

Coping with charismatic individuals who serve as change agents will also pose an occasional challenge. Can the church encourage an environment that values “speaking the truth in love”? What would it mean for learning and development as a church community if leaders cultivated a culture anchored by landmarks and waymarks that remind the church it is no longer the church of “the shut door” but the church of the open door? What would it mean if such learning would become a lifelong learning experience for Adventists?

Endnotes

1. F. Veltman to “Religion Department Chairmen SDA Colleges of North America and Australia,” January 7, 1980. F. Veltman Papers, (FVP) Box 1, Correspondence Folder, Walter C. Utt Center for Adventist History (WCUCAH), Angwin, CA.

2. The initial wording of the agreement stated that “Dr. Ford’s completed study document would be read at a meeting of the Biblical Research Institute, which would include such other persons as may be designated by the General Conference President’s Executive Advisory.” “Statement of Agreement, December 3, 1979.” Cassell would later assert that the enlarging of the review group with the addition of many more church administrators, some from the third world, was an administrative “tactic” and a departure from the intent of the proposal. Conservative pressure seemed to necessitate the widening of the readership group. For Cassell, the widening represented administrative intent to “load the dice” against Ford, and it confirmed a fear that “the case against Des was stacked and already decided.” Trevor Lloyd interview with J. C. Cassell, January 20, 1990,

48. Adventist Heritage Center, Avondale College, Cooranbong, NSW, Australia (AHCAC).

3. Neal C. Wilson to Richard Leshner, November 29, 1979. Record Group (RG) 11: N. C. Wilson – Glacier View Files (NCW-GVF), Correspondence Files 1979, General Conference Archives, Silver Spring, MD, (GCArch).

4. Initial drafts of the “Statement of Agreement,” may be found in RG11: Vice President Files – Leshner 1979, GCArch. See also “Teacher Given Leave to Prepare Doctrinal Paper,” *Adventist Review*, December 20, 1979: 23.

5. N. C. Wilson, “This I Believe About Ellen G. White,” *Australasian Record*, April 28, 1980: 5. The article was published internationally.

6. “Telephone Conversation Record,” Richard Osborn with Neal Wilson, January 9, 1980. FVP Box 1, WCUCAH.

7. N. C. Wilson to D. Ford, January 31, 1980. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.

8. R. W. Taylor to N. C. Wilson, January 9, 1980. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.

9. Taylor to Wilson, January 9, 1980. It is now known that the tapes were not being circulated by the Brinsmead Group but by an independent “tape ministry” person in New Mexico. The misinformation had apparently come from John Brinsmead, who had fed conspiratorial interpretations to Parmenter and his colleagues. John Brinsmead to N. C. Wilson, March 14, 1980. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.

10. Siegfried Horn diary, January 20, 1980. Original in possession of Larry Geraty, Riverside, CA.

11. N. C. Wilson to R. H. Pierson, February 4, 1980. RG 11: NCW-1980 Correspondence - P, GCArch.

12. A. LeRoy Moore to N. C. Wilson, November 24, 1979. Wilson seems to have received it mid-December. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.

13. Don Yost to N. C. Wilson, December 12, 1979. A. O. Tait was the editor of *Signs of the Times* and Froom the editor of *Ministry*. The letter was dated January 28, 1930. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.

14. R. H. Pierson to N. C. Wilson, May 5, 1980. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.

15. George F. Will, “A Pope with Authority,” *Newsweek*, June 23, 1980: 92.

16. K. H. Wood, “Colleges in Trouble,” *Adventist Review*, February 21, 1980: 3.

17. See for example, F. Veltman to Sakae Kubo and Kenneth Vine, March 11, 1980. FVP Box 1, Fld M-Z, WCUCAH.

18. N. C. Wilson, “Update on the Church’s Doctrinal Discussions,” *Adventist Review*, July 3, 1980: 24.

19. Milton Hook, *Desmond Ford: Reformation Theologian, Gospel Revivalist* (Riverside, CA: Adventist Today Foundation, 2008), 245.

20. Letter to N. C. Wilson, March 10, 1980, signed by twenty South Australian pastors. Copy in author’s possession.

21. J. R. Spangler, “Comments and Suggestions on Desmond Ford’s Sixth Chapter,” [July 1980], 4–6. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch; Gillian Ford to Calvin and Nerida Edwards, July 8, 1980. Copy in author’s possession.

22. “Minutes of the Sanctuary Review Committee: August 10–15, 1980,” 4. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.

23. “Minutes of PREXAD,” August 14, 1980. GCArch; Richard Hammill, *Pilgrimage: Memoirs of an Adventist Administrator* (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1990), 196.

24. “Minutes of the Sanctuary Review Committee Meeting: August 1–15, 1980,” 78. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.

25. “Notes on Meeting with Dr Ford,” 6a. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.

26. "Notes on Meeting," 21.
27. "Notes on Meeting," 3. See Gilbert M. Valentine, "Fear and the Hidden Agendas of the Ford Controversy (1979–1980)," *Spectrum* 47 No. 4 (Fall 2019): 30–49 for a more extended discussion of the downside of Ford's charisma.
28. Valentine, "Fear and the Hidden Agendas," 15.
29. K. Parmenter to D. Ford, September 6, 1979. Copy in author's possession.
30. John Brinsmead to N. C. Wilson, March 14, 1980. Brinsmead had read his letter to Parmenter and his colleagues and division ministerial director, A. N. Duffy, had typed it up to be sent to Wilson. A. N. Duffy to N. C. Wilson, March 14, 1980. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.
31. D. Ford, Statement on Robert Brinsmead, [undated but likely March 1980]. Copy in author's possession.
32. For more detail on the personal relationship between Ford and Robert Brinsmead see Valentine, "Fear and the Hidden Agendas," 30–49.
33. F. Veltman to PUC Faculty, August 21, 1980. FVP Box 1, Fld M-Z, WCUCAH.
34. Gillian Ford to Calvin and Nerida Edwards, July 8, 1980. Copy in author's possession.
35. Gillian Ford, "Glacier Review Reflections," (2017). Copy in author's possession.
36. F. Veltman to D. Jennings, February 13, 1980. FVP Box 1, Fld A-L, WCUCAH.
37. W. G. Johnsson to N. C. Wilson, June 17, 1980. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.
38. See *Adventist Review*, August 28, 1980: 32; September 3, 1980: 4–15; *Ministry*, October 1980.
39. K. H. Wood, audiotape recording of Review and Herald worship talk, September 8, 1980. Copy in author's possession.
40. R. Hammill to H. W. Lowe, September 18, 1980. RG 11: VP-R, Hammill, 1980. GCArch.
41. "Minutes of the Sanctuary Review Committee Meeting: August 1–15, 1980," 74. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.
42. "Analysis of Desmond Ford Letter to Parmenter," and "Analysis of the Four Points in the Parmenter Letter. . .," Minutes of PREXAD, September 2, 1980. GCArch.
43. "Comparison of Twelve 'Key Points,'" Minutes of PREXAD, September 2, 1980. GCArch.
44. Minutes of PREXAD," September 2, 1980.
45. R. W. Taylor to N. C. Wilson, September 19, 1980; R. W. Taylor to D. Ford, September 19, 1980. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.
46. F. Veltman to N. C. Wilson, C. E. Bradford, R. W. Wernick, and W. Duncan Eva, September 15 & 18, 1980. FVP Box 1, WCUCAH.
47. Audiotape recording of Neal Wilson staff worship talk, September 5, 1980. GCArch.
48. Siegfried Horn diary, January 20, 1980. Diary in possession of Larry Geraty. Horn's archeological research posed serious challenges to the church's short chronology for the Genesis story. Horn went on to muse that the "Washington hierarchy must have talked about me and may have worried that I would cause them trouble. They are probably happy that I am shunted aside before I could do any harm."
49. F. Veltman to J. C. Cassell and G. Madgwick, July 12, 1980. FVP Box 1, WCUCAH. After Glacier View, Veltman took up an appointment with the White Estate working on the literary dependency study exposed by Rea.
50. R. Hammill to D. Ford, July 25, 1980. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch. Hammill also copied Wilson, Bradford, Eva, and Veltman.
51. R. Hammill, "Reflections on the Adventist Typological Interpretation of the Mosaic Tabernacle and its Cultus," Unpublished Paper, January 1990, 20. Center for Adventist Research, Andrews University, Berrien Springs, MI. (CAR) He had originally thought to include the document in his published memoir but decided not to.
52. Trevor Lloyd interview with J. C. Cassell, January 20, 1990, 48. AHCAC.
53. Lloyd interview with Cassell, January 20, 1990, 44, 47.
54. F. Veltman to A. Ferch, March 17, 1980. FVP Box 1, Fld A-L, WCUCAH.
55. Transcript of "R. D. Brinsmead Tape," September 22, 1979, 31. Copy in author's possession.
56. R. E. Cottrell to R. Hammill and F. Veltman, January 6, 1980. FVP Box 31, Fldr 3, WCUCAH.
57. D. Ford to N. C. Wilson, December 12, 1979. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.
58. H. W. Lowe to R. Hammill, July 28, 1980. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.
59. In 1960, Robert Spangler had sought his articles for a *Ministry* series on the Sanctuary doctrine. He asked if Ford had any "additional evidence" to support the doctrine and published Ford's contribution as "New Light on the Sanctuary." J. R. Spangler to D. Ford, March 25, 1969; D. Ford to J. R. Spangler, April 14, 1969. Copies in author's possession. In 1974, Spangler ran a nine-part series he had asked Ford to write entitled "Dare to Study Daniel." In 1978 and 1979, Ford had further developed the theme. See for example, "The Way of the Blood," *Ministry*, July 1978: 10–18; "The Ark," *Ministry*, November, 1978: 11, 12; "The Prophetic Calendar of Israel," *Ministry*, January 1979: 16, 17; "Yom Kippur and Judgment Day," *Ministry*, March 1979: 18, 19; "Day of Atonement-Fulfilment and Consummation," *Ministry*, May 1979: 10, 11; "The Judgement," *Ministry*, July 1979: 14, 15.
60. The article was entitled, "Daniel 8.14 and Recent Scholarship." Duncan Eva to N. C. Wilson, July 31, 1979. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch. Eva thought the article evidenced Ford's "firm adherence to a pre-Advent judgment and the 1844 date." Eva applauded Ford's desire to "make our 'queer' sanctuary belief and doctrine appear more reasonable to our critics," though he suspected that his AUD brethren would condemn him on some details.
61. Desmond Ford to K. S. Parmenter, November 3, 1978. Copy in author's possession.
62. D. Ford to N. C. Wilson, December 12, 1980. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch; D. Ford to K. Parmenter, August 26, 1980, filed with Minutes of PREXAD, September 2, 1980. GCArch.
64. "Notes on Meeting with Dr. Ford," (August 15, 1980), 23. RG 11: NCW-GVF, GCArch.
65. Hammill, "Reflections," 20.



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