Chapter 5

VALUES IN CURRICULUM THEORY

Values are products of our culture, generated by both individuals and groups. For us to say that values are important driving forces in the maintenance of the human condition is an understatement. And for an important social institution like the school not to transmit and generate values is incredible. Individuals acquire certain values by a general process of enculturation; they acquire others didactically. The process of schooling employs both approaches.

Values and value judgments permeate curriculum decisions. The primary problem of curriculum is to decide what shall be taught in schools. This is a value question in itself and one that cannot be answered by empirical means. In the process of choosing what shall be taught in schools, a host of additional value judgments must be made. For example, the curriculum simply cannot contain all of the elements of our culture that conceivably might be transmitted to the young. A fundamental process in curriculum planning is that of selecting curriculum content from the total culture; therefore, curriculum planners must address themselves to questions of what knowledge and skills are of most worth and which of those should be included in the curriculum. Curriculum planners have to decide what value concepts are to be taught in schools, and they must decide upon vehicles to be used to help students learn how to deal with value questions. The demand for curriculum attention to values is evidenced by Smith, Stanley, and Shores in the following:

> The heart of a culture is its universals. The heart of the universals is the values or, in other words, the rules by which people order their

> social existence. These rules, when built into the personalities of the individuals comprising the society, create the personality type peculiar to the culture. Hence, the heart of any satisfactory educational program consists of those basic values that give meaning to the purposes, plans, and activities of the individual.[1]

In the above sense, value considerations are primarily a problem of curriculum design, but value considerations are also a problem of curriculum engineering. For example, the mustering of values as criteria for determining which curriculum aims and culture content are acceptable in the social-political arena is a necessary task in curriculum planning. But our purpose in this chapter is to develop a rationale for value considerations rather than to expand upon specifics of design and engineering; the latter are the subjects of the following two chapters. First, we take a brief look at some of the ramifications of value interpretations as they generally are presented; we then follow with implications for curriculum theory.

VALUE INTERPRETATIONS

After reviewing various meanings associated with values in the literature, Inlow stated: "Values, to me, simply stated, are the determiners in man that influence his choices in life and that thus decide his behavior."[2] In essence values are the rules by which people shape their behavior. They generally are multi-dimensional. They reflect attitudes or dispositions of individuals to feel and act in given ways. Values embody such concepts as good or bad, homely or pretty, rude or polite, unacceptable or acceptable. Values also involve criteria by which people form dispositions. Kaplan designated a two-way classification when he said, "Values may be distinguished as *instrumental* or *inherent* according to whether they are prized in themselves or because they are believed to lead to something else which we prize."[3] In a similar analysis, Rokeach noted that since values have to do with both modes of conduct and end-states of

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[1] B. Othanel Smith, William O. Stanley, and J. Harlan Shores, *Fundamentals of Curriculum Development* (revised edition; Yonkers-on-Hudson: World Book Company, 1957), p. 85.

[2] Gail M. Inlow, *Values in Transition* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), p. 2.

[3] Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 393.

existence, we may classify values as intrumental or terminal.[4] Industry and honesty are examples of instrumental values; whereas, beauty and freedom are examples of terminal values. Philosophers with differing outlooks or original assumptions tend to interpret values differently. Both Hardie[5] and Park[6] place value theorists in three groups: the intuitive, the skeptical, and pragmatic. Park summarized the three positions as follows:

> The intuitive theory emphasizes the "ultimate" nature of values and man's supposed ability to recognize the ultimate. The skeptic places his emphasis upon the impossibility of moving from beliefs to imperatives. The pragmatist is interested in the existential context in which valuations are made and insists upon determining what is good or bad by probable or actual consequences of acting in terms of a particular judgment.[7]

Whatever the position may be, the general purpose of having a value theory is to provide "a set of guidelines for the meaning and ground of value judgments."[8] Later in the chapter we discuss the implications of value theories for the curriculum theorist; however, the significance of that discussion will be enhanced by looking first into the kinds of questions and problems raised in the area of values.

There seem to be at least two aspects of most value questions. One has to do with the rules for behavior *per se*; the other, with behavioral adaptations to the rules. These two dimensions are expressed in different ways. For example, Frankena distinguished between Moral Education X (MEX) and Moral Education Y (MEY). MEX was used to designate the handing on (through education) of knowledge of good and evil or knowing how to act. MEY referred to education to ensure that individual and group conduct will conform with the knowledge of MEX.[9] Axelle distinguished between psychological values (matters of fact) and axiological

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[4]Milton Rokeach, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., Publishers, 1970), pp. 159-161.

[5]C. D. Hardie, "The Idea of Value and the Theory of Education," *Educational Theory*, 7:196-199, July, 1957.

[6]Joe Park, "Values and Education," *Education in Urban Society*, edited by B.J. Chandler, Lindley J. Stiles and John I. Kitsuse (New York: Dodd Mead and Company, Inc., 1962), pp. 233-248.

[7]*Ibid.*, p. 242.

[8]Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

[9]William K. Frankena, "Toward a Philosophy of Moral Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, 28:300-313, Fall, 1958.

values (what we ought to value).[10] He noted the difference between "the enjoyed and the enjoyable, the desired and the desirable, the satisfying and the satisfactory."[11] Raths, Harmin, and Simon represented such value phenomena as goals, attitudes, feelings, beliefs, interests, and others as value indicators. They termed choosing, prizing, and acting as the processes of valuing.[12] Broudy, Smith, and Burnett proposed that value education has two principal outcomes. One of them is appreciation. The other is the development of strategies for making choices.[13] Whatever the language used may be, there persist two sides of the value question — the value concepts themselves and the processes of human recognition and acceptance of those value concepts as rules for governing behavior.

One gets the general impression from at least certain contemporary literature that the humanistic domain is value-centered whereas the scientific domain is fact-centered. In the bibliography at the end of this chapter, for example, literature is cited bearing such titles as *Humanizing Education*, *The Humanities and the Curriculum*, and *Science and the Humanities*. Basically, the distinctions between humanistic studies and scientific studies have to do with human use and goals. Prior expressed a difference between the final products of scientific activity and humanistic activity as follows:

> . . . the final product of scientific activity is impersonal and uncommitted in any way to any particular human use or goal; the final product of literary effort, on the other hand, is inevitably identified with its author's character and his personal artistry, and it cannot escape its involvement with particular human feelings and with a particular view of human conduct and human aspirations and goals.[14]

Many would take objection to Prior's statement based on grounds that the product may be value-free but the scientist himself is not. Kaplan, for example, points out that it is dubious

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[10]George E. Axtelle, "The Humanizing of Knowledge and the Education of Values," *Educational Theory*, 16:101-109, April, 1966.

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 107.

[12]Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon, *Values and Teaching* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1966), pp. 30-33.

[13]Harry S. Broudy, B. Othanel Smith, and Joe R. Burnett, *Democracy and Excellence in American Secondary Education* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964), p. 219.

[14]Moody E. Prior, *Science and the Humanities* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1962), p. 17.

whether the scientist actually is concerned only with an impersonal search for truth. He notes that the preponderance of applied research stems from needs for solutions to practical problems.[15] No doubt the argument about the value-free status of the scientist will go on for years to come, but the controversy helps to keep man more conscious of the import of values for his behavior.

Irrespective of this argument, facts and values may be interrelated. Many value statements are supportable by factual evidence. In a discussion of scientific determination of value judgments, Hook stated:

> A scientific or rational approach to judgments of value consists in (a) the investigation of the causes of such judgments, (b) their logical implications, and (c) their probable consequences. This investigation is always to be undertaken in relation to alternative values which limit freedom of choice.[16]

The converse is also tenable. Values become criteria for courses of action leading to empirical information. A teacher who has high regard for rote memoritor learning judges his pupils on evidence from their rote and memoritor performances. Comparably a teacher who places high premium on the more heuristic techniques in learning judges his pupils on evidence of their ability to make observations, to collect information, to use resources, to reach rational generalizations, and so forth. Values so used become principles for guiding action. They first are learned; then they become tools for teaching or for learning.

VALUES AND THE CURRICULUM

Values are a beginning point in curriculum decision making. Goodlad and Richter have proposed that values should be a primary source for selecting school purposes or aims and for all subsequent decisions about the curriculum.[17] In this sense, the values become the criteria for determining the curricular aims. On the other hand, most educational aims are stated as if schools ought

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[15]*Op. cit.*, p. 389.

[16]Sidney Hook, *Education for Modern Man* (new edition: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 179.

[17]John I. Goodlad and Maurice N. Richter, Jr., "The Development of a Conceptual System for Dealing with Problems of Curriculum and Instruction," Report of an inquiry supported by the Cooperative Research Program of the Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Contract No. SAE - 8024, Project No. 454, 1966.

to accomplish designated ends. The aims thus are statements of value judgment in themselves. For example, we may state that an aim of the secondary school is to improve citizenship. In value terms, we would be averring that the improvement of citizenship behavior is worthwhile and that the school ought to do something about it. Note that the statement includes no attempt to describe citizenship behavior, and therefore, it gives no direction for the teaching of citizenship behaviors nor for the measuring of the effects of the teaching. In this circumstance, it is apparent that the generalized aim needs to be translated into the language of curriculum strategy and instructional strategy. The translation of aims into curriculum strategy and instructional strategy becomes the means of the ends-means continuum.

It is in the realm of aim declaration that much of our modern controversy lies with respect to values. One may state that an aim of schooling is to teach the young to be literate, that is, to teach them to read and write their language. This aim is only value laden at the points of deciding that this imposition should be made upon children and that this function should be carried out by schools rather than by some other agency of society. Conversely, for one to state that an aim of schooling is to foster an ideal of a common human community or to develop a rugged individualistic and nationalistic spirit is heavily value laden. Educational planners have had success in developing curricular and instructional strategies as means for achieving the ends of the literacy aim, but few have done anything with the latter.

As we indicated earlier, some values are acquired by the young through the processes of general enculturation. Others have to be taught. Very frequently, the values acquired through general enculturation are in conflict with those selected to be taught in schools. Some very vivid examples are occurring in our communities today, and not all of them in large urban communities. One of these is the values implied by the open hostility of certain ethnic and/or religious groups toward blacks and other minority groups. Yet most of the persons who exhibit such hostility would profess that they believe in the equality of man and in equality of opportunity for all mankind, and on Sunday mornings in churches, they routinely avow to believe in the brotherhood of man. The purpose here is to illustrate that many

attempts on the part of schools to affect significantly the value orientations of their pupils may run counter to the forces of enculturation.

Stating Behavioral Objectives

In much curriculum literature, a distinction is made between the general aims of education and the specific behavioral objectives to be fostered by the systems of schooling. If curriculum planners wish to include specific behavioral objectives in their curriculum, a major task for them is the stating, classifying, and arranging of the behavioral objectives within the curriculum. It is commonplace for us to say that behavioral objectives fall into three categories: the cognitive, the psychomotor, and the affective. The three actually are applicable to any subject, but they have different weightings from subject to subject. Our concern at the moment is mostly with the affective domain. In this connection, some guidelines for the curriculum planner are available even though they come from a single source. The publication, *A Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook II: Affective Domain* classifies value objectives into five categories in ascending complexity. The following is a condensation of the taxonomical structure for affective behaviors listed in that publication:

1.0 Receiving (attending)
  1.1 Awareness
  1.2 Willingness to receive
  1.3 Controlled or selected attention
2.0 Responding
  2.1 Acquiescence in responding
  2.2 Willingness to respond
  2.3 Satisfaction in response
3.0 Valuing
  3.1 Acceptance of a value
  3.2 Preference for a value
  3.3 Commitment
4.0 Organization
  4.1 Conceptualization of a value
  4.2 Organization of a value system
5.0 Characterization by a value or value complex
  5.1 Generalized set
  5.2 Characterization[18]

[18]David R. Krathwohl, Benjamin S. Bloom, and Bertram B. Masia, *A Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook II: Affective Domain* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 176-185.

Taking his cue from the taxonomies, Johnson arranged a schema for curriculum. Under that portion classifying learning outcomes, he listed knowledge, techniques, and values as three classes of outcomes. Under values, he listed two sub-classes: (1) norms — societal prescriptions and preferences regarding belief and conduct and (2) predilections — individual preferential dispositions (attitudes, interests, appreciations, aversions).[19]

When taxonomies contribute meaningfully to classification, they materially aid the curriculum planner with details of arrangement of curriculum content. They also aid in the development of appraisal instruments. But taxonomies do not help materially with the tasks of selecting values and beliefs to be included in the curriculum. At the moment, two avenues seem available to curriculum planners, and they have been identified earlier in this chapter. One is to search the recognized school subjects and the scholarly disciplines for value content that reflects decisions made in earlier times. The other is to make judgments about existing values in the general culture ethos of the school and its community. The selection of values is very much a judgmental procedure, and curriculum planners must face up to the task in that light.

Values as Curriculum Content

Most of the foregoing discussion in this chapter leads to the conclusion that values direct the character of school aims, but additionally values are a part of the culture content of the curriculum. It goes without saying that values as curriculum content would include value concepts as knowledge of rules of behavior and the processes of dealing with value considerations that may or may not lead to personal acceptance of value concepts as self-governing rules for behavior. This dual interpretation of values as content may be thought of as a curricular interpretation of the two-way classification of values as terminal, or end-state of existence, values and instrumental values, or it may be thought of as a curricular application of the distinction between the value concepts themselves and the processes of value clarification as

[19] Mauritz Johnson, Jr., "Definitions and Models in Curriculm Theory," *Educational Theory*, 17:188, April, 1967.

previously described. In any case, curriculum planners face the problem of distinguishing between values as substantive curriculum content and the processes of valuing as curriculum content.

Probably the first task of curriculum planners with respect to values as curriculum content is to identify and state those attitudes, beliefs, ideals, or concepts that are to be included in the curriculum. O'Connor suggested that these should consist of "a set of values or ideals embodied and expressed in the purposes for which knowledge, skills, and attitudes are imparted. . . ."[20] He indicated that such values might be classified in five categories: (1) minimum skills, (2) vocational training, (3) awakening the desire for knowledge, (4) developing a critical outlook, and (5) the appreciation of human achievements.[21] Broudy, Smith, and Burnett stated: "Three kinds of norms should be taken into account as the content of the curriculum is selected. These are the norms of efficiency or prescriptive rules, regulatory norms, and moral norms."[22] In acknowledging that the values of any society are embedded in its culture, Smith, Stanley, and Shores identified three elements in which the core of the American value system lies — the democratic tradition, the belief in the maximum development of the individual, and the institutions established to perpetuate the values.[23] Inlow indicated the rationalist tradition, the Judeo-Christian ethic, the Anglo-Saxon Tradition and pragmatic faith as the major sources of the values of the western world, particularly the United States.[24] A very practical, and often overlooked, source of value content for curriculum planners is the ethos of the community the school is destined to serve. The values that drive the inhabitants of a racial ghetto are vastly different from those of the inhabitants of a wealthy suburb. Value concepts considered acceptable in one community are not in others. Witness, for example, the problems experienced with attempts to include sex education in the curricula for elementary and secondary schools, or the conflicts that have arisen over the celebration of religious holidays in schools.

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 5.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-18.
[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 150.
[23] *Op. cit.*, pp. 76-82.
[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

Something that is often overlooked in curriculum work is that the very choice of subjects for a school is a value choice. It is assumed, for example, that the choice of seven, eight, or nine subjects for elementary schools will provide the general-education type program believed to be essential for children of elementary-school age. It is also loosely assumed that the use of those subjects as the organizational framework for the educational program will fulfill the overall aims of education for children in the society.

Unquestionably, statements of aims do not lead directly to the selection of school subjects as means for attaining those aims. The aims, by definition, imply that schools should be instrumental in achieving certain ends. There ought to be a criteria relationship between the aims and the subjects selected to advance them, but there too seldom is. Both curriculum theorists and curriculum planners need to examine this problem more critically.

Within most, if not all, school subjects, there are value components. Phenix classified the realms of meaning as symbolics, empirics, esthetics, synnoetics, ethics, and synoptics.[25] Some, if not all, of these realms are value sources. The humanities and the social studies are considered to be important sources for values. All of the disciplines have unique groups of value concepts. All have their own modes of behaving and classes of problem. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of difference in the value load of subjects like music or literature and mathematics or physics.

It would be disastrous for curriculum planners to attempt to include in a curriculum all of the possible value concepts that might be identified in our culture. Such an attempt would be akin to searching for gold in a bottomless pit. Planners will be forced to be selective and include specifically those value concepts that they deem to have high priority and community acceptance. There may be certain precepts of nationalism, rules for human conduct, or principles of democracy that planners will wish to include in the curriculum, but what they must insure is that an opportunity is provided for students to test, examine, and explore the endorsed values as well as those that arise that are not endorsed.

As previously indicated, Raths, Harmin, and Simon identified

[25] Philip H. Phenix, *Realms of Meaning* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964).

choosing, prizing, and acting as the processes of valuing. Coombs listed the following as objectives of value analysis:

1. Teaching students to rate a value object in a particular way.
2. Helping students to make the most rational judgment they can make about the value object in question.
3. Teaching students to make rational value judgments.
4. Teaching students how to operate as members of a group attempting to come to a common value judgment about some value object.[28]

The inquiry processes implied by these objectives are processes of valuing. So are such processes as accepting, thinking, criticizing, testing, judging and reasoning. Others could be added to the list. The point is that these processes are just as much curriculum content as the concept "honesty," and they should be treated as such. The processes may be more important as curriculum content than are the concepts because the concepts become clarified through exercise of the processes. Since values and valuing are not normally a separate subject in the school curriculum, they emerge from the study of all cultural elements whether they be labeled a discipline, problems of living, or persistent life situations. The processes of valuing therefore must be made a part of a total curriculum strategy to be most effective.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRICULUM THEORY BUILDING

All of the implications of value theories, values themselves, and processes of valuing for theory building in curriculum are not clearly evident. Nevertheless, one has to assume that the acceptance of different value theories would lead to differences in curriculum theories. On the other hand, a case could be made that value theories are also applicable in passing judgment upon curriculum theories. In the absence of clearly stated curriculum theories, it is difficult to test out either assumption scientifically.

To illustrate the difficulties, we might examine where in the work of the curriculum theorist, an assumption of a given value theory might affect his work. One of the most important functions of a value theory is to establish bases, or criteria, for determining what is "good." The intuitive value theorist typically asserts that

[28]Jerrold R. Coombs, "Objectives of Value Analysis," *Values Education*, Forty-first Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies, ed. Lawrence E. Metcalf (Washington: the Council, 1971), p. 19.

ideas and principles (values) exist in their own right and that man can become aware of them by the process of intuition. Once aware of them he can use them to guide his own behavior. One who holds pragmatic value theory judges value concepts and principles according to the degree to which they lead to satisfactory consequences. The notion of "goodness" in this case is determined by observation of what people do that brings them satisfaction in life.

Two implications seem to emerge for the curriculum theorist from such variation in value outlook. One implication is for the input information for a curriculum system. What shall be the sources of values to be used as influence upon the work of the curriculum planner? If the theorist chooses the intuitive position, his sources tend to be those that reveal permanent and universal values such as the word of a church, the wisdom of the ancient scholars, or the word of political bodies. If the curriculum theorist chooses the pragmatic position, he is more contextualist; his sources for values are the rules for satisfactory living in the culture in which the school lies. The processes of determining them are observation and experimentation.

A second implication is for the choice of value content to be included in the curriculum. What knowledge about values is to be transmitted to the young through schools? How can that knowledge be most effectively organized as part of the curriculum? What processes for dealing with value problems will the school stress? How shall statements about these processes be arranged in the curriculum so as to lead to the development of effective instructional strategies? Such questions are imperative if curriculum planners are to correct their previous failure to identify the package, or packages, of values the schools are attempting to make an integral part of the educational program. The consequences of the two value theories used here as examples would affect all the questions raised, and they should be apparent from the foregoing discussions. Briefly then, different value theory orientation would influence the work of the curriculum theorist at two points — his treatment of input data for a curriculum system and his treatment of curriculum design.

Value theories and the values derived therefrom can be instrumental in judging the worth of the work of a curriculum

theorist as well as in affecting the character of the work. For example, a task for the curriculum theorist is to explain relationships between statements of aims for schooling and the selection of culture content as a means for achieving the aims. A curriculum planning group may state its aims and select a body of culture content. In essence, what the group does is to predict that if the culture content is developed properly through the instructional environment, the aims will be achieved. The theorist must explain this relationship and its ramifications. Many stated aims are value statements exclusively. Others are statements of principle to be used to direct behavior. The latter, in particular, can be used to judge the effectiveness of the theorist's explanation and predictions as well as the predictive operations of the practitioner.

SUMMARY

The implications of values and value theories for curriculum theory have not been explored to the present time in depth. Most, in fact, concede that curriculum planners and other educators have failed to deal with the subject of values adequately for modern schooling. As a consequence, it has been necessary in this chapter for us to explore some of the implications of values and value theories for selected practical aspects of curriculum so that the theoretical implications might be inferred.

At least two dimensions of values have import for a curriculum. The first consists of value concepts and generalizations that may be classified as substantive knowledge. The second is more syntactical; it consists of the processes by which students will learn to cope with value problems and to come to accept values as rules governing their own behavior.

Value theorists have been classified into three groups: the intuitive, the skeptic, and the pragmatic. Each value position has its unique way of identifying and verifying value judgments. Presumably, each would have a different impact upon the work of the curriculum theorists and the practitioner. We may assume that acceptance of one value theory over others would produce uniqueness in a curriculum theory. We also may assume that the acceptance of one value theory over others would uniquely affect judgments made about curriculum theories.

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